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Abstract 
This research provides an example of art practice employed within a metaethical framework by 
addressing 6LPRQH:HLO¶VHWKLFDOQRWLRQRIattention,QWKLVWKHVLVµPHWDHWKLFV¶LVGHILQHGDVD
second order inquiry into first order questions of normative ethics, more specifically, an inquiry into 
the metaphysical and epistemoloJLFDOSUHPLVHVRI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQWKHHWKLFDOYDOXHRIDWWHQWLRQ
2QRQHKDQG,GHPRQVWUDWHKRZ:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQFDQH[SDQGWKHVFRSHRIDUWVRDVWR
include metaethics. On the other hand, I use art to widen the current knowledge of Weilian attention.  
The research projects described and analysed in this thesis are predicated on a method which I 
GHVLJQDWHµFULWLFDOSUDFWLFDODQDORJ\¶WKLVLVDQDQDORJ\ZKLFKLQFOXGHVDUWSUDFWLFDORSHUDWLRQVIRUWKH
purpose of critical investigation. This method subsumes both theoretical and practical inquiries. I used 
two analogies:  
± Normative analogy compares (a) the dualistic relation that Weil postulates between agent 
and reality in her discourse on attention to (b) the relation that I postulate between my 
agency through observational drawing and the object of observation. The analogy operates 
E\XVLQJ:HLO¶VDVVHUWLRQVRQDWWHQWLRQQRUPDWLYHO\LQREVHUYDWLRQDOGUDZLQJ 
± Imaginal DQDORJ\FRPSDUHVD:HLO¶VXVHRIWDXWRORJ\DQGFRQWUDGLFWLRQLQKHUDUJXPHQts 
for ethical attention to (b) tautology and contradiction considered as argument forms. The 
analogy operates by giving aesthetic presence to these forms, i.e. by turning them into 
images through artworks.  
The analogies obtained the following outcomes:  
± The normative projects afford a practical knowledge of Weilian attention by interpreting it 
as an ethical practice of detachment. The projects also demonstrate that, notwithstanding 
:HLO¶VWUDQVFHQGHQW view of truth, such a practice of detachment is compatible with a 
subjective notion of truth.  
± By capitalising on the non-propositional mode of representation which is typical of visual 
art, the imaginal projects engender a scepticism which favours dialogue and values 
questions as positive research results.  
The outcomes indicate the following implications for visual arts practice:  
± The outcomes of the normative projects demonstrate how contemporary artists who regard 
notions of universal truth with scepticism need not necessarily disavow ethical intentions in 
their practice.  
± Due to its propositional character, theoretical metaethics can reach an impasse from which 
it can only point discursively to the limits of language. The outcomes of the imaginal 
projects evidence that art can move beyond these limits non-propositionally.  
The use of critical practical analogy also indicates a methodological implication for art practical, 
interdisciplinary research. Critical practical analogy could provide artists with both a heuristic 
research tool and a template for articulating a discursive representation of art practice which both 
acknowledges the non-linearity and indirectness of practice-led research and the need for 
interdisciplinary intelligibility. 
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1.1 Research aims  
The aim of this research is to provide an example of how art can be employed within a 
metaethical1 SHUVSHFWLYHE\LQYHVWLJDWLQJWKURXJKDUWSUDFWLFH:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQWKH
conditions of the possibility of attention, where attention is considered as possessing an 
ethical value ± this is how Weil considers attention in general. Such metaethical inquiry into 
the possibility of ethical attention is not only distinct from but also antithetical to a practical 
inquiry into the actuality of cognitive attention. This is because the latter entails empirical 
validation, which, being contingent, necessarily abstracts from the very object of the study 
of metaethics which is the basis of the unconditional principles of conduct2. Even though 
some metaethical positions reject the unconditionality of these principles, the articulation of 
such rejection must nevertheless employ the notion of unconditionality as a common ground 
of discourse.  
I stress the distinction between inquiring into the possibility of ethical attention and into the 
actuality of cognitive attention because, historically, the topic of attention in the visual arts 
has been treated as a branch of cognitive science. As Jonathan Crary argues in Suspensions 
of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Cultureµin the second half of the 
nineteenth century, attention becDPHDIXQGDPHQWDOO\QHZREMHFW¶&UDU\FODLPVWKDW the 
.DQWLDQYLHZWKDWWKHUHH[LVWVDµDSULRULFRJQLWLYHXQLW\¶VXSSRUWLQJWKHLGHDRIµWKH
possibility of the self imposing its unity onto the world EHFDPHXQWHQDEOH¶DQGµWKH
problem of reality maintenance gradually became a function of a contingent and merely 
SV\FKRORJLFDOFDSDFLW\IRUV\QWKHVLVDQGDVVRFLDWLRQ¶3 But while, in the first half of the 
                                                 
1
 Alexander Miller, in An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, describes metaethics as a second 
order inquiry about first order questions regarding moral obligations ± these first order questions 
belong WRQRUPDWLYHHWKLFV0LOOHUS0\UHVHDUFKLVPHWDHWKLFDOZLWKUHVSHFWWR:HLO¶V
discourse on attention, in the sense that it investigates the metaphysical and epistemological premises 
of her discourse on the ethical value of attention. The metaethical perspective that I adopt must be 
distinguished from a research project whose aim would be a comprehensive contribution to the field 
RIPHWDHWKLFV0\WKHRUHWLFDOVWXG\RIHWKLFDOLVVXHVFRQFHQWUDWHVRQ:HLO¶VZULWLQJVDQGVHFRQGDU\
sources on Weil, and although a certain familiarity with metaethical discourses was necessary in order 
WRPDNHVHQVHRI:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\,FODLPQRWKRURXJKNQRZOHGJHRIVXFKGLVFRXUVHV7KURXJKRXW
WKHUHVHDUFKP\IRFXVKDVDOZD\VEHHQSULPDULO\ZLWK:HLO¶VWKRXJKWDQG with a critique of it through 
artistic means.  
2
 The object of metaethical investigation is ethics, and ethical principles are postulated as being 
XQFRQGLWLRQDO)RULQVWDQFH3HWHU6LQJHUZULWHVWKDWµWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRIDQHWKLFDOSULQFLSOHFDQQRWEH
iQWHUPVRIDQ\SDUWLDORUVHFWLRQDOJURXS(WKLFVUHTXLUHVXVWRJREH\RQG³,´DQG³\RX´WRWKH
XQLYHUVDOODZWKHXQLYHUVDOL]DEOHMXGJHPHQWWKHVWDQGSRLQWRILPSDUWLDOVSHFWDWRURULGHDOREVHUYHU¶
(Singer, 1993, p. 11).  
3
 Crary, 2001, pp. 14±17. Weil is anachronistic with respect to late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century conceptualisations of attention (from which modern cognitive notions of attention 
derive), since Weilian attention is far removed from cognitive science. That is not to say, however, 
that the centrality which Weil accords to the notion of attention does not reflect the general interest in 
attention at this time. What Crary writes regarding Maine de Biran ± that his idea of attention arches 
back to earlier conceptualisations of it and yet prefigures the new, emerging conceptualisation (Ibid., 
p. 20) ± could also be applied to Weil (Weil refers to Maine de Biran in OC VI 4, p. 393), with the 
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twentieth century, art critics and theoreticians could attempt to develop ethical positions by 
appealing to quasi-scientific notions of attention and visual perception (one need only think 
RIWKHDQDO\VLVRI&p]DQQH¶VZRUNE\DUWFULWLFVRUDUWLVWVVXFKDV(UOH/RUDQ4, Roger Fry5 and 
Lawrence Gowing6), nowadays, cognitive science is a highly specialized field of inquiry 
unconcerned with ethics7, with the consequence that the study of attention in art excludes 
ethical considerations of a metaethical type8.   
I therefore GHFLGHGWKDWLQYHVWLJDWLQJ:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHRULHV of 
visual perception would have been inappropriate for this research project. This decision 
depended on the point within my development as an artist when my first encounter with 
Weilian attention occurred. When I started reading Weil, my art practice consisted solely of 
observational drawing, to which I had returned after having worked as an abstract painter 
(greatly inspired by the writings of Bridget Riley) with a particular interest in the subtleties 
of visual perception. When I returned to observational drawing, concerns with perception 
were not as explicit as in the painting practice, but they nevertheless lingered at a liminal 
level, possibly due to mere habits of thought, which informed my self-representation as an 
artist. At this point, I encountered Weilian theories of attention, through the aphoristic notes 
collected in the most popular of her books, Gravity and Grace. As I read passages such as 
µZHKDYHWRWU\WRFXUHRXUIDXOWVE\DWWHQWLRQDQGQRWE\ZLOO¶9 RUµWKHYLUWXHRIKXPLOLW\LV
nothing PRUHQRUOHVVWKDQWKHSRZHURIDWWHQWLRQ¶10, I felt that they chimed with my interest 
in perception and observational drawing. But it was precisely my resolution to question that 
FRPIRUWLQJIHHOLQJRI³FKLPLQJLQ´WKDWSURPSWHGPHWRXQGHUWDNHWKLVUHVHDUFh. When I 
VWDUWHGWRUHDG:HLO¶VZULWLQJVPRUHFRPSUHKHQVLYHO\DQGSXUSRVHIXOO\,UHDOLVHGILUVWO\
WKDW,GLGQRWNQRZZKDW:HLOLDQDWWHQWLRQZDVDQGVHFRQGO\WKDW:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQ
attention dealt with ethics, not with perception11. If before starting the research (but also at 
                                                                                                                                          
GLIIHUHQFHWKDW:HLO¶VWUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVPPDNHVKHUXQUHVSRQVLYHWRWKHPRUHSK\VLRORgical strands of 
contemporary discourses on attention.  For Maine de Biran on attention, see: De Biran, 1942, pp. 28±
29, pp. 136±137, p. 138, p. 143, pp. 148±149. 
4
 Loran, 1963. 
5
 Fry, 1952. 
6
 Gowing, 1977. 
7
 The outcome of cognitive science research may no doubt inform or even require the questioning of 
ethical views (as has been the case for genetics), but generally ethical issues do not determine the 
aims of cognitive science research.   
8
 I stress of a metaethical kind, because even though many contemporary artworks purport to have 
ethical import, e.g. as catalysts for socio-political change, I have distinguished these types of contents 
or contexts from a metaethical investigation (see §1.42).  
9
 Weil, GG, p. 116. 
10
 Ibid., p. 128. 
11
 For this reason, even WKRXJKVRPHRI&ODXGH+HDWK¶VGUDZLQJV (notably, the series of plant 
drawings that he produced during a residency at the Centre for Drawing, London, in 2001) formally 
resemble those drawings of mine that I discuss in §4.322, his focus on perception (see Patrizio, 2003, 
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the very beginning of the research), I had thought that being Weilianly attentive would make 
me a better drawer12 (even though I possessed only vague notions of Weilian attention and 
of what being a better drawer might mean), the actual research has turned out to be (among 
other things) an attempt to understand Weilian attention using art. It may seem trivial to 
refer to this personal history, but it is important in the context of an art practice-led13 
research, firstly because it has shaped the development of the art projects and secondly 
EHFDXVH,WKLQNWKDWLGHDVUHJDUGLQJWKHDUWLVW¶VLQWHQWLRQRUIUDPHRIPLQGwill always 
inform in some capacity the interpretation of artworks.  
The link between observational drawing and Weil's notion of attention, which led to the 
resolution to pursue the present research, became more explicit as I was making a series of 
drawings at the University Museum of Zoology, Cambridge, in 2005 (Figs. 1.1±1.3) The 
following notes were written while drawing in the museum; it is important to stress this fact, 
since dialogue between image and text, under several guises, and more generally a dialogic 
approach to art-making, runs throughout the research:  
When I draw, what is the conduct to keep? Every action should be performed with an attentive, 
lucid mind. How do I know that I am acting lucidly? I experience contradiction. How do I 
know that I'm acting without lucidity? I experience satisfaction or dissatisfaction. If I 
experience satisfaction, it's no use to try to convince myself that it isn't so. Firstly, because I 
will experience dissatisfaction and not contradiction. Secondly, because contradiction is real 
and not the imaginary fruit of self-deception. Similarly, if I experience dissatisfaction and I 
succeed in convincing myself that it isn't so, I will experience satisfaction, not contradiction.  
As Simone Weil argues:   
                                                                                                                                          
pp. 32±57) makes his practice concerns quite removed from the metaethical inquiry that I pursue in 
my research art practice.    
12
 5HDGHUVRIHDUO\GUDIWVRIWKLVWKHVLVZHUHGLYLGHGRQWKHDSSURSULDWHQHVVRIWKHWHUPµGUDZHU¶
some maintained that it is not a proper term* DWDOODQGVXJJHVWHGWKDWµEHWWHUGUDZHU¶VKRXOGEH
VXEVWLWXWHGZLWKµEHWWHUDWGUDZLQJ¶RWKHUVWKRXJKWWKDWWKHFOXPVLQHVVDQGWKHMDUULQJTXDOLW\RI
µGUDZHU¶FRQYH\HGERWKWKHIXPEOLQJFKDUDFWHUDQGWKHVRPHZKDWWragic (one reader remarked that 
µEHWWHUGUDZHU¶FRQMXUHGXSWKHLPDJHRIDFKLOGVWDPSLQJKLVIRRWDQGVFUHDPLQJµ,ZDQWWREHDEHWWHU
GUDZHU¶FRQQRWDWLRQVHHRIP\LQLWLDOLQWHQWLRQ*LYHQWKDWDV,DUJXHLQRQHRIWKH
outcomes of the research was to replace this tragic self-representation with a more critical 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQEDVHGRQDQDORJ\,GHFLGHGWRUHWDLQWKHZRUGµGUDZHU¶*Although, as a matter of fact, 
this is the term that artists engaged in drawing use, not the alternative noun µGUDXJKWVPDQ¶ 
13
 Even though an in-depth study of current debates on how to denominate doctoral research which 
involves art practice is beyond the scope of my research, I will briefly justify my choice of 
TXDOLILFDWLRQµSUDFWLFH-OHG¶From the very beginning of the research, I worked with the AHRC 
definition of practice-led research which is found in the guidelines for AHRC doctoral award grant 
DSSOLFDWLRQVµ7KHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQVRUSUREOHPVWKHRXWSXWVDQG± most importantly ± the research 
methods, mXVWLQYROYHDVLJQLILFDQWIRFXVRQ\RXUSUDFWLFHDVGLVWLQFWIURPKLVWRU\RUWKHRU\¶Arts 
DQG+XPDQLWLHV5HVHDUFK%RDUG$OWKRXJKWKHVXIIL[µOHG¶GRHVQRWVXJJHVWWKHEDlance of art 
practice and theoretical practice (theoretical study is a practice as much as art is) in my research, I 
decided to retain it because: (1) it represents with reasonable accuracy the methodological relevance 
of art practice within the research (see §2.1); and (2) art practice (i.e. my observational drawing 
practice) did lead to the formulation of my research aims and, throughout the research, the outcome of 
art projects (albeit not exclusively) showed the way to further research development and investigation. 
1. Introduction 
18 
 
µ,WLVLQFRQWHVWDEOHWKDWWKHYRLGZKLFKZHJUDVSZLWKWKHSLQFHUVRIFRQWUDGLFWLRQLVIURPRQ
high, for we grasp it the better the more we sharpen our natural faculties of intelligence, will 
and love. The void which is from below is that in which we fall when we allow our natural 
IDFXOWLHVWREHFRPHDWURSKLHG¶ (Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 121) 
I find it difficult to maintain attentiveness. Anything that stimulates the development of 
attentiveness, be it drawing, reading a particular text, or some other pursuit, is useful for the 
development of my drawing. Conversely, anything that doesn't stimulate the development of 
attentiveness is useless, or harmful, for the development of my drawing. 
 
    
Fig. 1.1 Museum of Zoology, Cambridge, 2005, pencil on paper, 30 × 42 cm. 
   
         
Fig.1.2 Museum of Zoology, Cambridge, 2005, pencil on paper, 30 × 42 cm.     
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Fig.1.3 Museum of Zoology, Cambridge, 2005, pencil on paper, 42 × 30 cm. 
 
The note above evidences a specific type of ethical view of observational drawing as a 
practice for the development of attention, and it also exemplifies a typically self-reflexive 
approach to subjectivity in art practice, and, consequently, in art practice-based research. 
However, Weil also argues that the ethical value of any effort of attention is independent of 
its results14, and this seemed to jeopardise the conceptual tenability of my intention to use 
                                                 
14
 µ6FKRROFKLOGUHQDQGVWXGHQWVZKRORYH*RGVKRXOGQHYHUVD\³)RUP\SDUW,OLNHPDWKHPDWLFV´³,
OLNH)UHQFK´³,OLNH*UHHN´7KH\VKRXOGOHDUQWROLNHDOOWKHVHVXEMHFWVEHFDXVHDOORIWKHPGHYHORS
WKDWIDFXOW\RIDWWHQWLRQZKLFKGLUHFWHGWRZDUG*RGLVWKHYHU\VXEVWDQFHRISUD\HU¶:HLOWG, p. 
µ6WXGHQWs must therefore work without any wish to gain good marks, to pass examinations, to win 
school successes; without any reference to their natural abilities and tastes; applying themselves 
equally to all their tasks, with the idea that each one will help to form in them the habit of that 
DWWHQWLRQZKLFKLVWKHVXEVWDQFHRISUD\HU¶,ELGSµ4XLWHDSDUWIURPH[SOLFLWUHOLJLRXVEHOLHI
every time that a human being succeeds in making an effort of attention with the sole idea of 
increasing his grasp of truth, he acquires a greater aptitude for grasping it, even if his effort produces 
QRYLVLEOHIUXLW¶,ELGS)RU%UDGIRUG&RRNWKHYDOXHRIDUWLVWLFFUHDWLRQLVWKDWLWWUDLQVWKH
DWWHQWLRQZKLFKLVµDVXEWOHFRPELQDWLRQRIWKHDFWLYHDQGWKHSDssive in mental concentration. 
Composition of any kind, by any mind, constituted a spiritual exercise leading eventually, she [Weil] 
hoped, to the perfect concentration of prayer. Thus literature was to be respected as a means to 
WUDQVFHQGHQWHQGV¶ (Cook, Sµ,WKDVEHHQREVHUYHGWKDWKH>WKHZULWHU@H[HUFLVHVKLVIDFXOW\
for attention, that art is a rudimentary form of prayer and commendable to that extent; so much so, 
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observational drawing for the development of attention: drawings are results, and, thus, it 
IROORZVIURP:HLO¶V argument that drawings will not necessarily offer an indication of 
attentive action. This is not problematic in itself, but, within the context of the research, it 
raised questions regarding the status of the drawings I would make: could I refer to the 
drawings in terms of attentive action without contradicting one of the main tenets of Weilian 
attention? Furthermore, my survey of secondary literature on Weil did not solve the 
difficulty of the relation between attention and results, because, generally, Weilian 
scholarship has not detected the potential contradiction in the notion of result of an effort of 
attention. For instance, the artist Eva Zippel, who has written on Weil, argues that, in order 
to avoid producing mediocre artworks, the artist must be attentive15; the poet Cristina Campo 
ZULWHVWKDWµWKHZRUGreveals LQVWDQWDQHRXVO\WKHGHJUHHRIDWWHQWLRQDWZKLFKLWZDVERUQ¶16; 
and Weil scholar MDULR9RQGHU5KXUPDLQWDLQVWKDWµMXVWDVKDSSLQHVVLVPRUHHDVLO\IRXQG
when it is not actively sought, so serious attention is more likely to yield results when these 
DUHQRWH[SHFWHG¶17.  
This difficulty seemed, if not resolved, at least counterbalanced E\DQRWKHURI:HLO¶VFODLPV
on attention, namely, that the value of attention can only be apprehended through direct, 
subjective experience18, since I thought that an art practical research self-reflectively 
focussed on my subjective experience of observational drawing might prove an effective 
means of representing such experience. However, as I explain in §4.22, self-reflectivity 
proved WREHSUREOHPDWLFLQYLHZRI:HLO¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKHVXEMHFWLQKHUGLVFRXUVH
on attention.  
                                                                                                                                          
indeed, that the usually careful Simone Weil could occasionally compliment even the worst of writers 
IRUKRQRXUDEOHLIIUXLWOHVVHIIRUWVLQWKLVGLUHFWLRQ¶,ELGS 
15
 µWhen an artist loves his or her subject, the result will be mediocre. ... When the artist of genius 
creates, he or she abstracts from him/herself.¶Zippel, 1994, p. 13.) µThe first works of an artist often 
possess a surprising geniality. This geniality wears out with experience and is degraded in repetitions 
if attention is not constantly present¶Ibid., p. 15). According to Jacques Cabaud, for Weil, only the 
artist with a morally sound life can produce a masterpiece (Cabaud, 2008, p. 46). 
16
 Campo, 1987, p. 169; my italics. 
17
 Von der Rhur, 2006, p. 24; my italics. Furthermore, in Weilian scholarship, it is not uncommon to 
find a slippage from reference to WHLO¶Vnotion of attention to the presumed attentiveness of Weil. For 
LQVWDQFH-DFTXHV'HODUXHOOHZULWHVµ7KHLQGLIIHUHQFHRIUHDOLW\FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIRXUPHGLDWLVHG
FXOWXUHDOUHDG\IRUPHGWKHEDFNJURXQGRI6LPRQH:HLO¶VSDVVLRQDWHDWWHQWLYHQHVVWRWKLQJs and 
KXPEOHDWWHQGDQFHWRWKHLURWKHUQHVV¶'HODUXHOOH 
18
 µIf one searches for the solution of a problem of geometry with true attention and if, after an hour, 
one has not advanced, one has nevertheless advanced ... in another more mysterious dimension. ... 
This apparently sterile and fruitless effort has brought more light into the soul. ... Certainties of this 
kind are experimental.¶For an alternative translation see: Weil, WG, p. 58µHuman thought and the 
universe constitute the book of revelation par excellence, if attention, lighted by love and faith, knows 
how to decipher them. The reading of them is a proof, and indeed the only certain proof. After having 
read the Iliad in Greek, no one would dream of wondering whether the professor who taught him the 
Greek alphabet had deceived him.¶Weil, ICG, p201.)  
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Although Weilian scholarship has dealt sporadically with the role of attention in art from an 
ethical perspective, these studies are wanting because Weil was primarily interested in 
literature, not visual art, and, accordingly, secondary sources on Weil concentrate on 
literature19. The very few artists who have considered the relationship between Weilian 
attention and art have premised their arguments on what can be characterised as an 
inadequately defined notion of attention20. 
Given the lack, within art practice, of concern for attention as a subject of metaethics and the 
limited understanding of art within Weilian scholarship, I pursue my research aim through 
two main subsidiary aims:  
± on one hand, to demonstrate how this notion can expand the scope of art so as to 
include a metaethical perspective;  
± and, on the other hand, to use art to expand the knowledge of Weilian attention 
beyond its present restricted horizon.  
In order to pursue these aims, it was essential to achieve the preliminary subsidiary aim of 
FODULI\LQJ:HLO¶VQotion of attention. 
The chapter structure in this text is as follows. Chapter 2 delineates the overall research 
PHWKRGRORJ\&KDSWHUSUHVHQWVP\VWXG\RI:HLO¶VZULWLQJVRQDWWHQWLRQDQGRIUHOHYDQW
secondary sources. In Chapter 4, I report on my art projects that use art within a metaethical 
perspective. Chapter 5 deals with art projects which expand the boundaries of Weilian 
scholarship. The first and the second sections of Chapters 3±5 give an account, respectively, 
of the objectives (§3.1, §4.1, §5.1) and the sub-methodological considerations (§3.2, §4.2, 
                                                 
19
 See, for instance: Andic, 1996b; Bok, 2005; Lindroth, 1996; Sturma, 1987. 
20
 7KHUHIROORZVDOLVWRIDVHOHFWLRQRIWH[WVLQZKLFKWKHWHUPµDWWHQWLRQ¶UHPDLQVXQGHILQHG,ZLOO
give an exaPSOHRIWKLVXQFULWLFDOXVDJHRIWKHWHUPµDWWHQWLRQ¶µ7RWKHH[WHQWLQZKLFKLQGLYLGXDO
DWWHQWLRQLVQRWVXPPRQHGWKHPLQGWXUQVDZD\IURPH[WHUQDOUHDOLW\DQGZLWKGUDZVLQWRLWVHOI¶
(Jiménez Ruiz, 2010, p. 52.) In this passage, the notion of attention is pivotal and yet no clue is given 
DVWRZKDWDWWHQWLRQPLJKWEHGHVSLWHWKHTXDOLILFDWLRQµLQGLYLGXDO¶RIZKLFKLWLVGLIILFXOWWRPDNH
VHQVHLQWKHFRQWH[WRI:HLO¶VWKHRU\RIDWWHQWLRQJLYHQWKDW:HLOQHYHUTXDOLILHVDWWHQWLRQDV
individual). In thHIROORZLQJOLVWRIXQGHILQHGRFFXUUHQFHVRIµDWWHQWLRQ¶,SURYLGHRQO\WKH
ELEOLRJUDSKLFDOGHWDLOVRIWKHWH[WLQTXHVWLRQDQGWKHQXPEHURIWKHSDJHVZKHUHµDWWHQWLRQ¶DSSHDUVLW
is clear that my assessment of these texts with regard to the uncritical XVDJHRIµDWWHQWLRQ¶FDQRQO\EH
taken on trust, as this judgement can only be obtained by a first-hand reading of the whole text. What 
LVEHLQJWDNHQRQWUXVWKHUHLVWKDWWKURXJKRXWWKHWH[WVZKLFK,OLVWµDWWHQWLRQ¶LVXVHGDVXQFULWLFDOO\
as in the above cited passage. However, I do not wish to criticise the authors of these texts: in any 
DUJXPHQWWKHUHDUHWHUPVZKLFKUHPDLQXQGHILQHGDQGWDNHQIRUJUDQWHGDQGµDWWHQWLRQ¶LVDQREYLRXV
candidate because often Weil herself takes it to be a self-evident notion; but, as a result of my 
focusing on Weilian attention, I became particular sensitive to underdetermined references to this 
notion. Aubert, 1982, p. 18. Cook, 1953, pp. 73±80. Delaruelle, 2003. Devaux, 1995, p. 19, p. 21, p. 
24. Droz, 2008, p. 401, p. 402, p. 403, p. 404, p. 410. Ferber, 1981, pp. 63±85, p. 64. Jiménez Ruiz, 
2010, p. 51, p. 52, p. 56. Marianelli, 2004, p. 91, p. 92. Molard, 2008, p. 85, p. 87. De Monticelli, 
2001, p. 183, p. 184, p. 194, pp. 197±199. Nicolle, 2009,  pp. 67±68. Rey Puente, 2007, p. 132, p. 
189. Springsted, 1996a, p. 5, p. 7. Zippel, 1994, p. 13, p. 14, p. 16. 
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§5.2) which pertain exclusively to the subsidiary aims analysed in that chapter. Lastly, in 
Chapter 6, I elucidate how the overall research aim (to provide an example of art practice-led 
metaethical investigation) has been achieved by analysing my solutions to the problems 
arising from the two main subsidiary aims, which I outline in §1.41±1.44.  
1.2 Who is this research for? 
In light of the two main subsidiary aims outlined in the previous section (i.e. expansion of 
the scope of art practice and conceptual expansion of Weilian attention), the research 
addresses two audiences with different fields of expertise: the artistic arena (unaccustomed 
WR:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\DQG:HLOLDQVFKRODUVKLSXQIDPLOLDUZLth contemporary art). Since 
ultimately my contribution is in the area of art, it was essential for me to engage with the 
Weilian community not only discursively, exposing my artistic intentions and their 
theoretical ground, but also directly through artworks.  
2QWKHXVHRIµ,¶ 
Before moving to the final section of this introduction, which sketches out the overall 
concerns of the two main subsidiary research aims, I will explain why I decided to use the 
SURQRXQµ,¶WKURXJKRXWWKHUHVHDUFKH[SRVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQWKHFXVWRPDU\DFDGHPLFµZH¶
This decision finds its justification, firstly, in the primacy that Weil gives to direct 
experience in her discourse on attention. Secondly, there has been a tendency to translate the 
infinitive which Weil often uses in her journals ZLWKµZH¶)RUH[DPSOHLQGravity and 
Grace:HLOZULWHVµ1HSDVMXJHUA la manière du Père des cieux qui ne juge pas: par lui les 
êtres se jugent. Laisser venir à soi WRXVOHVrWUHVHWTX¶LOVVHMXJHQWHX[-mêmes. Être une 
balance¶21, whLOHWKHWUDQVODWLRQUHDGVµ:HPXVWQRWMXGJH:HPXVWEHOLNHWKH)DWKHULQ
heaven who does not judge: by him beings judge themselves. We must let all beings come to 
XVDQGOHDYHWKHPWRMXGJHWKHPVHOYHV:HPXVWEHDEDODQFH¶22 The relentless use of the 
SUHVFULSWLYHµZHPXVW¶LVDSRRUVXEVWLWXWHIRUWKHLQILQLWLYHRIWKHRULJLQDOSDUWLFXODUO\LIRQH
takes into account the private nature of this text), and one may be drawn to ascribe to the text 
a dogmatism which cannot be imputed to the original, which reads as a to-do, not a must-do, 
OLVW/DVWO\IRU:HLOµZH¶LVDVLJQRIZKDWVKHFDOOHGUHIHUULQJWR3ODWRµWKH*UHDW%HDVW¶23, 
that is, of the collectivity, whose ersatz force conceals the true vulnerability of the 
individual24. Notwithstanding how Weil develops this argument, those who have tackled it 
RIWHQDUULYHDWWKHIROORZLQJSDUDGR[LFDOFRQFOXVLRQ:HLODUJXHVWKDWWKHXVHRIµZH¶LVEDG
                                                 
21
 Weil, OG, p. 170. 
22
 Weil, GG, p. 93. 
23
 )RU3ODWR¶VLPDJHRIWKH*UHDW%HDVWVHHRepublic, VI, 493a±d, in Plato, 1993, pp. 214±215. 
24
 There are many instancHVRIWKLVDUJXPHQWLQ:HLO¶VZULWLQJV6HHIRULQVWDQFHWeil, GG, pp. 164±
169; Weil, OG, pp. 283±293; Weil, OC VI 3, p. 45; Weil, OC VI 4, pp. 151±152. 
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therefore, ZHPXVWQRWVD\µZH¶25. The root of this paradox, which I find problematic, is the 
view that the fLHOGRIHWKLFVH[WHQGVEH\RQGWKHLQGLYLGXDOVXEMHFWLYHµ,¶WRWKHFROOHFWLYH
µZH¶ZLWKVRPHFODLPWRREMHFWLYLW\DQGDVLWZLOOEHFRPHFOHDUWKLVLVUHOHYDQWWRP\
investigation into the ethical value of attention and the limits I describe with regard to what I 
can do with it and what I can say about it.  
1.4 Research difficulties and concerns  
In this section, I give an account of the problems I faced in my pursuit of the two main 
subsidiary research aims. This is followed by an outline of some methodological 
considerations which concern the research as a whole. §1.41 and §1.42 consider the issues 
which underlie the aim of expanding the perspective of art practice to include metaethics. 
§1.41 introduces a distinction between a theoretical and a practical view of Weilian 
attention. §1.42 anticipates, on one hand, questions regarding notions of truth and 
VXEMHFWLYLW\LQ:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQDQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGP\FODLPWKDWWKH
answers which my research provides to these questions have implications for the possibility 
of metaethical inquiry through art practice in general. §1.43 considers the issues which 
underlie the aim of expanding the knowledge of Weilian attention. As I pointed out in §1.1, 
the two main aims are complementary, in the sense that their purpose is to mutually fulfil the 
overall research aim, that is, to provide an example of metaethical art practice-led research. 
What distinguishes the two aimVLVZKHWKHU:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQLVWDNHQDVWKHVWDUWLQJ
point26 from which to rethink the potential scope of art practice-led research (expansion of 
art practice), or whether certain views (already belonging to the art theoretical canon) 
UHJDUGLQJWKHIXQFWLRQRIDUWDUHHPSOR\HGWRUHWKLQN:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQH[SDQVLRQ
of Weilian attention). §1.44 addresses the overall methodological question of how to 
represent art practice in the context of interdisciplinary research in general. That is to say, 
this question abstracts from the particular metaethical concerns entailed by the two main 
research aims, although it arose from methodological considerations which are specific to 
my investigation of Weilian attention. In the conclusion (Chapter 6), I reconsider these 
issues in the light of the research outcomes and I will elucidate their implications for visual 
art practice. The issues outlined in §1.41±1.44 are discussed in §6.2±6.5, respectively.  
                                                 
25
 )RULQVWDQFH$OLFH1LFROOHZULWHVµ6LPRQH:HLOQHYHUVWRSSHGGHQRXQFLQJthe tendency to 
fabricate lies which any collectivity possesses, which Plato translates with the fact of buttering up the 
µJUHDWEHDVW¶6LPRQH:HLOZKRGHVSLVHGZKDWVKHFDOOVµthe social thing¶PDLQWDLQVWKDWLWFDQEH
UHFRJQLVHGE\DVXUHVLJQLWLVZKDWVD\Vµ:(¶µ:H¶LVWhe refusal to think for oneself, to question 
LGHDVDQGEHOLHIV+RZHDVLO\WKHLQGLYLGXDOGURZQVLQFROOHFWLYHWKRXJKW¶µ7KXVDQDXWKHQWLF
approach to religion would involve first of all to feel this bond which, in secret, connects us to an 
order of the wRUOGLQWKHXQLYHUVHWKHPDFURFRVPWKDWLVDOVRZLWKLQXVPLFURFRVP¶1LFROOH
2009, pp. 47±48).   
26
 :KLFKGRHVQRWPHDQWKDW:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQLVtaken for granted: as the analysis of the 
projects discussed in Chapter 4 will demonstrate, I investigated Weilian attention critically.  
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1.41 Distinction between theoretical versus practical notions of attention  
I will introduce this section with an anecdote which illustrates a difficulty that I encountered 
LQP\DWWHPSWWRSLQSRLQWWKHPHDQLQJRI:HLOLDQDWWHQWLRQ6LQFHWKHZRUGµDWWHQWLRQ¶LV
very commonly used in a number of English expressions, it often happened that, when 
fellow researchers (who knew the subject oIP\UHVHDUFKXWWHUHGWKHZRUGµDWWHQWLRQ¶WKH\
would give me a knowing look. As the research progressed, I found it more and more 
difficult to confront that knowing gaze, because I felt that I knew less and less what attention 
was: complicated metaphysical and epistemological questions seemed to obfuscate rather 
than clarify the idea, which was the reason for undertaking the research. In §6.2, I will 
elucidate how this difficulty stemmed from my initial research intention to gain a theoretical 
knowledge of Weilian attention, while in the course of the art practical research I discovered 
that, for Weil, attention is essentially a practical notion. However, I shall point out that, 
initially, I was unaware of my initial intention: I was only able to identify it retrospectively, 
in the light of the shortcomings of my purely theoretical analysis of attention articulated in 
Chapter 3. These shortcomings emerged in the process of developing the art projects 
discussed in Chapter 4, and this is indicative of the critical function of art practice within my 
research.  
1.42 Objective and subjective truth, and subjectivism in art practice  
In my experience, artists are typically sceptical of notions of objective truth and they tend to 
think of their practice as pre-eminently subjective. Scepticism and subjectivism hinder the 
possibility of dealing with metaethical subjects through art practice, because they tend to 
deny the possibility and validity of intersubjective consensus, while I claim that the 
possibility of intersubjective consensus is a prerequisite postulate of any reflection on ethics. 
The acknowledgement of the possibility of intersubjective consensus must be distinguished 
IURPWKHGRJPDWLFXVHRIµZH¶WKDW,GHVFULEHGLQ: in the former, consensus represents 
an ideal aim (a hypothesis) that guides dialogue; while in the latter, consensus is an 
unquestioned premise (a dogma). Analogously, there is a form of open-ended scepticism and 
a form of dogmatic scepticism which precludes dialogue (see §6.4). In light of this 
GLVWLQFWLRQ:HLO¶Vquintessentially non-sceptical philosophy is compatible with the open-
ended scepticism which informs my art projects discussed in Chapter 5, since she rejects 
only dogmatic scepticism.  
An indication of this dogmatic hindering scepticism in the arts is, for instance, the fact that, 
IRUPDQ\DUWLVWVZRUGVVXFKDVµDXWKHQWLFLW\¶µKRQHVW\¶RUµWUXWK¶DUHYHU\PXFKWDERR7KLV
claim is a truism: one need only KDYHDWWHQGHGDµcrit¶LQDQDUWFROOHJH to know that whoever 
uses this kind of terms will almost inevitably be accused, at best, of naivety or mystification 
(of the kind which I will describe in §4.4) and, at worst, of being reactionary. And yet it is 
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also clear that many see artists as bearers of moral values and that many artists define 
themselves in this way, not by using the ZRUGµPRUDO¶EXWPRUHLQGLUHFWO\E\LPSOLFLWO\
claiming some kind of value for their activity. It is as if artists did not have at their disposal a 
vocabulary for conceptualising their practice metaethically. I stress the qualification 
µPHWDHWKLFDOO\¶EHFDXVHLWVHHPVWRPHWKDWethics is not particularly problematic for artists. 
In fact, artists are used to framing their practice in ethical terms with regard to their 
products; and a vocabulary for such framing is readily available27, but this does not require 
any explicit reference to notions of honesty, truth, etc., which, in this context are tacitly 
taken for granted or deemed too abstract to be relevant. On the other hand, metaethics 
investigates precisely such notions and thus requires that one acknowledges their existence 
(even if one aims only at proving that they are fallacious).  
As regards subjectivism, it precludes artists dealing with, or having a dialogue about, 
metaethical questions, because subjective statements tend to be thought of as being 
µLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHWUXWKRUIDOVLW\RIVWDWHPHQWVRIRWKHUW\SHVWKH\DUHOLNHLVRODWHG
FRJZKHHOVWKDWGRQRWHQJDJHZLWKWKHUHVWRIODQJXDJH¶28 Subjectivism encourages artists to 
adopt a self-reflexive and solipsistic disposition towards their practice. In other words, 
ethical self-reflexivity is a disposition in which the artist considers the ethical value of the 
results of their practice exclusively as an expression of their self29. My notes on the Museum 
of Zoology drawings, in §1.1, are an indication of a self-reflexive disposition. By contrast, 
my observational drawing projects that I discuss in §4.31 illustrate a progressive moving 
away from self-reflexivity towards an explicit objectification of my role as drawing agent. 
Although I claim that many artists adopt an exclusively self-reflexive approach, ethical self-
reflexivity and objectification are not mutually exclusive, since self-reflexivity refers to 
RQH¶V disposition towards the results oIRQH¶V work, while objectification is guided by 
considerations regarding how a given artwork will be interpreted by potential interpreters.         
                                                 
27
 Again, one need only read an Art Council funding application to see thisµ$UWV&RXQFLO(QJODQG¶V
mission is to enable everyone to experience arts that enrich their lives. We believe that great art 
inspires us, brings us together and teaches us about ourselves, and the world around us. In short, it 
PDNHVOLIHEHWWHU:HZDQWDVPDQ\SHRSOHDVSRVVLEOHWRHQJDJHZLWKWKHDUWV¶$UWV&RXQFLO
England, 2008.) This terminology clearly illustrates Arts Council EnglaQG¶VHWKLFDOFRPPLWPHQW 
28
 Bitbol, 2008, p. 56. The image of the disengaged cogwheels of the machinery of language, used by 
Bitbol, was proposed by Wittgenstein; see: Wittgenstein, 2001, §270, p. 80e. Bitbol exemplifies the 
isolated character of subjectivHVWDWHPHQWVDVIROORZVµ)RULQVWDQFHWKHVXEMHFWLYHVWDWHPHQW³,IHHO
KRW´LVDGmittedly indisputable [i.e. it cannot be the object of a meaningful dialogue], even when 
confronted with the thermometer-UHDGLQJVWDWHPHQW³WKHWHPSHUDWXUHRIWKLVURRPLV&´%\
FRQWUDVWWKHVWDWHPHQW³WKHWHPSHUDWXUHRIWKLVURRPLVKLJKHUWKDQWKHERLOLQJSRLQWRIDOFRKRO´
clearly conflicts with the former thermometer-UHDGLQJVWDWHPHQW¶%LWEROS 
29
 Therefore, in this thesis, the WHUPµself-reflexive¶is not predicated of artworks that refer back to 
WKHPVHOYHVRUWRWKHSURFHVVRIWKHLUPDNLQJDVLVW\SLFDOLQDUWWKHRU\HJ0LFKHO)RXFDXOW¶VIDPRXV
WH[WRQ9HOD]TXH]¶Las Meninas, in which the philosopher interprets this picture as a representation of 
the process of painting).  
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In the analysis of the art projects discussed in Chapter 4, I demonstrate (1) that even though 
:HLO¶VZULWLngs on attention relate the ethical significance of attention to a notion of 
objective truth, in fact, Weilian attention is compatible with a subjective notion of truth; and 
(2) that the kind of subject that Weil envisages in her discourse on attention is not self-
reflexive or solipsistic but rather calls for a dialogic approach to art practice. In §6.3, I 
consider the consequences of (1) and (2) for art practice: namely, :HLO¶VYLHZRIWKHVXEMHFW
and the compatibility of attention with subjective truth indicate a way of conceptualising art 
practice metaethically.  
1.43 Weilian transcendentalism and dialogic scepticism  
As ZLOOEHFRPHFOHDUIURPP\DQDO\VLVRI:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\WKURXJKRXWWKHUHVHDUFK:HLO¶V
discourse on attention draws on her transcendent agnosticism and often employs the 
language of Christian theology, particularly in her late writings. Agnosticism is transcendent 
in the sense that it postulates an ultimate divine reality that goes beyond (i.e. transcends) 
human knowledge30:HLO¶VDJQRVWLcism is not equivalent to .DQW¶V transcendental idealism: 
Kant¶V transcendental philosophy is an inquiry into the necessary condition of knowledge, 
which leads to transcendental idealism; while Weil¶VWUDQVFHQGHQW*RGLVDSRVWXODWHG 
unknowable entity. Therefore, :HLO¶VQRWLRQRI*RGFDQQRWEHDVVLPLODWHGinWR.DQW¶V
QRWLRQRIQRXPHQRQ:HLO¶V*RG exists regardless of human existence (for Weil, God 
created human beings), whereas it makes no sense to say of noumena that they pre-exist or 
create human beings, given that noumena are the condition of KXPDQEHLQJV¶knowledge, not 
of human beings tout court.31 My initial resolution was to be as analytical as possible and to 
refrain from all references to God. This intention sets my research apart from most Weilian 
scholarship, which can be roughly divided into two camps: scholarship which adopts a 
religious perspective and which sees no proEOHPZLWK:HLO¶VUHIHUHQFHVWR*od; and 
scholarship which remains quite neutral to her transcendent statemenWVTXRWLQJ:HLO¶V
passages on God, but from a very abstract perspective, without going into the problematic 
details. The only notable exception to these two DSSURDFKHVLV5XVK5KHHV¶ERRN 
Discussions of Simone Weil, which truly tries to grapple analytically with :HLO¶V religious 
arguments; and, for this reason, 5KHHV¶ZRUNZDVDQLPSRUWDQWJXLGHLQP\LQLWLDOUHVHDUFK32. 
But, in the course of the research, I realised that, firstly, I could not disSHQVHZLWK:HLO¶V
transcendent philosophy, because it is so central to her discourse on attention, and, secondly, 
that the analytical approach towards her transcendent philosophy led to an impasse (what I 
                                                 
30
 Agnosticism is qualified as transcendent in Mautner, 2000, p. 568.  
31
 )RU.DQW¶s view that noumena are the condition of knowledge, see Guyer, 2006, p. 29.  
32
 5KHHV¶VLJQLILFDQFHIRUP\UHVHDUFKLVQRWPHDVXUDEOHE\WKHQXPEHURIUeferences to his book 
which can be found in this thesis, because what is significant is primarily his analytical approach to 
:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\not the conclusions he obtained.   
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call the µGHDG-HQGFRQFOXVLRQ¶VHH2), that is, a preclusion of dialogue across the divide 
which separates those who assert the existence of an absolutely good divine creator of the 
world and those who deny such a view. Consequently, I developed an alternative method for 
investigating the transcendent strand oI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQ namely, a non-
analytical, non-propositiRQDOGLVSRVLWLRQZKLFK,GHVLJQDWHµGLDORJLFVFHSWLFLVP¶,GLVFXVV
how this disposition expanded the knowledge of Weilian attention in §5.5. In §6.4, I 
elucidate how the method of dialogical scepticism constitutes an example of metaethical art 
practice.  
1.44 Intelligibility of art practice-led interdisciplinary research  
This section outlines a question engendered by the interdisciplinary nature (art and 
philosophy) of my research; namely, how to make the research intelligible to both artists and 
philosophers. During my research, I came up against a problem which, for a time, I did not 
fully comprehend and which I will call the invisibility problem. As I said in §1.2, the two 
main subsidiary aims which I formulated addressed two audiences with different fields of 
expertise. What I found is that art-informed audiences failed to see the philosophical 
meaning of the artwork and philosophy-informed audiences failed to see the specificity of 
how the art practice dealt with philosophy. My answer to this question was to devise a 
methodological tool (i.e. critical practical analogy, which I discuss in Chapter 2) which 
allowed me to retain the non-linear investigative approach which is typical of art practice-led 
research (which I consider to be a strength of this kind of research) without sacrificing the 
discursive intelligibility which is required of philosophical research. I approach the 
invisibility problem as a problem regarding the discursive representation of art practice.  
Practice-led research, including my doctoral project, generally requires a written component, 
whose purpose is to make interdisciplinary practice-led research validatable according to the 
norms that matter in another extra-artistic field of inquiry, whatever this may be.   
Already in 1973, Lucy Lippard had framed the problem of validation of interdisciplinary art 
as a problem of artists not being taken seriously by the practitioners of those other 
disciplines with which such art engaged:  
$V\HWWKHµEHKDYLRXUDODUWLVWV¶KDYHQRWKHOGSDUWLFXOarly rewarding dialogues with their 
psychologist counterparts ... µ$UWXVH¶RIHOHPHQWDU\NQRZOHGJHDOUHDG\DFFHSWHGDQG
exhausted, and unsophistication in regard to work accomplished in other fields are obvious 
barriers to such interdisciplinary communication.33  
Since Lippard is referring to successful artists, it is obvious that, for her, validation of artists 
by the artistic community is not enough to validate their work in the wider interdisciplinary 
contexts which these artists purport to address. The latter validation typically requires a 
                                                 
33
 Lippard, 1973, pp. 895±896.  
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discursive representation of art practice. Artists may argue that this hierarchy of disciplines 
is questionable34, but the state of affairs described by Lippard seems to be an accurate 
assessment of how matters still stand.35 In §6.5, I propose an answer to the question: What is 
the minimum requirement of a discursive representation of art practice in order for it to be 
intelligible in an interdisciplinary context? Secondly, I argue how the concept of critical 
practical analogy can meet that requirement, while avoiding a separation between practice 
and theory, which may lead to theory dictating the methodological schema and practice 
becoming merely illustrative of theory. 
In order to overcome the difficulties presented in §1.41±1.44, my art practice could not 
PHUHO\LOOXVWUDWH:HLO¶VHWKLFDOYLHZVE\XVLQJKHUDVVHUWLRQVRQDWWHQWLRQSUHVFULSWLYHO\
since those assertions constituted the first-order object of my second-order metaethical 
inquiry.  After a preliminary theorHWLFDOH[HJHVLVRI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQWKHDUW
projects that I developed engaged critically with my theoretical findings and obtained the 
following outcomes:  
(a) I expanded Weilian attention towards the practical domain by elucidating the notion of 
attention as a practice of detachment (see §6.2).  
(b,GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWDOWKRXJK:HLO¶VHWKLFVGUDZVRQDQREMHFWLYHQRWLRQRIWUXWK
attention as a practice of detachment is compatible with a subjective notion of truth, 
provided one takes into account her conceptualisation of the agent as subject to all-
embracing necessity²this demonstration indicated how the subjective and the sceptical 
dispositions can be useful to investigate metaethical questions (see §6.3).  
(c) I showed the limits of an exclXVLYHO\WKHRUHWLFDODQGSURSRVLWLRQDODSSURDFKWR:HLO¶V
discourse on ethical attention (particularly with reference to her metaphysics), and, through 
my art projects, I illustrated how the non-propositional nature of artworks allows an 
expansion of Weilian research (see §6.4).  
(d) Critical practical analogy provided a template for representing the heuristic function of 
my art practice in the context of the research (see §6.5).  
                                                 
34
 This is a popular topic of discussion amongst art practice-led researchers. 
35
 Lippard also points to the fact that often artists have limited knowledge of those other disciplines, 
but the fact that thorough  interdisciplinary knowledge and art community validation are, by 
themselves, not enough for the interdisciplinary validation of art products can be demonstrated by 
giving the example of the artist Adrian Piper, who Lippard lists as one of the exceptions, i.e. an artist 
who is LQWHUGLVFLSOLQDULO\NQRZOHGJHDEOH3LSHU¶VDUWLVWLFSUDFWLFHKDVEHHQYalidated by the artistic 
community, and her philosophical practice has been validated by the philosophical community, but 
the latter community has not validated the former practice. Thus I think that the crux of the matter 
resides, yet again, in the discursive representation of art practice. 
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Thus, by addressing the problems outlined in §1.41±1.44, this research exemplifies a 
PHWDHWKLFDODSSOLFDWLRQRIDUWSUDFWLFHWRWKHVWXG\RI:HLO¶VWKHRU\RIDWWHQWLRQ 
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Chapter outline: This chapter introduces the methodological device of critical practical 
analogy, which determined the development of the art projects in this research, and which 
shaped the presentation of research in Chapters 3±5. Critical practical analogy relates 
notions which are habitually considered as pertaining to distinct conceptual domains to 
critique them through art practice. To illustrate how critical practical analogy functions, I 
examine an art project by Art & Language and an essay by the art historian Charles Harrison 
that analyses this art project. For this research, I formulated two critical practical analogies. 
The first analogy compares, on one hand, the relation that Weil, in her theory of attention, 
envisages between agent and world to, on the other hand, the relation between my role as 
observational drawing agent and the object of observation. Since this analogy employs 
:HLO¶VDVVHUWLRQVRQDWWHQWLRQWRGHYLVHnorms for my observational drawing practice, I 
GHVLJQDWHLWDVµQRUPDWLYH¶7KHVHFRQGDQDORJ\FRQVLGHUV:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFDODQG
epistemological arguments for attention, which draw on the notions of tautology and 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQ7KLVDQDORJ\LVODEHOOHGµLPDJLQDO¶EHFDXVHLWLQYROYHVFUHDWLQJimages of 
tautologous and contradictory argument forms by materialising them. In this chapter, I also 
give a brief account of how the outcomes of these two critical practical analogies fulfil the 
two main subsidiary research aims, namely, the expansion of the scope of art so as to include 
PHWDHWKLFVDQGWKHH[SDQVLRQRIWKHKRUL]RQRIUHVHDUFKRQ:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ 
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2.1 Methodology: Critical practical analogy 
In order to pursue the two main subsidiary research aims, I formulated two critical practical 
DQDORJLHVWRHPSOR\LQDUWSUDFWLFH$IWHUKDYLQJH[SODLQHGZKDW,PHDQE\µFULWLFDOSUDFWLFDO
DQDORJ\¶,ZLOODUJXHZK\DPHWKRGRORJ\EDVHGRQVXFKDQDQDORJ\LVQHLWher purely 
theoretical nor purely practical but rather subsumes both theoretical and practical research. I 
will then provide a synopsis of the two critical practical analogies that I formulated.    
2.2 What is a critical practical analogy? 
I qualify analog\DVµSUDFWLFDO¶WRLQGLFDWHWKDWVXFKDQDQDORJ\LVWREHXVHGLQSUDFWLFHWR
EHXVHGWRDFWWRPDNHVRPHWKLQJ7KHPHDQLQJRIµFULWLFDO¶LVWKHRQHJHQHUDOO\XVHGLQ
philosophy, i.e. as pertaining to a critique, an investigation leading to some, not necessarily 
negative, result36. More specifically, drawing on Kant, I distinguish the critical approach 
from the dogmatic approach: dogmatism being concerned with determining judgement with 
regard to the object of a concept; criticism being concerned with investigating the subjective 
conditions of thinking a concept37. The notion of critical practical analogy derives (albeit not 
explicitly) from two essays by the art historian Charles Harrison, who, writing on an Art & 
Language project (the project involved covering figurative images by flicking white paint on 
them, DQG,ZLOOUHIHUWRLWDVµWKHVQRZSURMHFW¶GHVFULEHVWKHSURMHFWDVDµSUDFWLFDO
DQDORJ\¶38DQGDVDµGHYLFH>WKURXJKZKLFK@DFULWLFDODFFRXQWRIPRGHUQLW\PD\EHUHDOLVHG
or embodied or enacted¶39 +DUULVRQGRHVQRWXVHWKHH[SUHVVLRQµFULWLFDOSUDFWLFDODQDORJ\¶
(his two qualifications of analogy are found separately in the two essays), but a definition of 
this expression can be extrapolated by compounding his descriptions: a critical practical 
analogy is a practical analogy used as a critical device.  
                                                 
36
 $FFRUGLQJWR1RUPDQ.HPSW6PLWKDFULWLTXHLVµDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQOHDGLQJWRSRVLWLYHDVZHOODVWR
QHJDWLYHUHVXOWV¶.HPSW6PLWKS7KHHQWU\IRUµFULWLFLVP¶LQThe Penguin Dictionary of 
Philosophy is:   µ&ULWLFLVPn. From the Greek krisis = sifting; discerning; judging. This word, its 
derivatives and their cognates can be taken in two different senses. In one sense, a critic of a work is a 
person who subjects it to careful examination. The upshot may be, but does not have to be, negative. 
In another sense, criticism implies censure. In philosophical contexts, the first sense is often the one 
LQWHQGHG¶0DXWQHU p. 117.) 
37
 µ(YHQWKRXJKDFRQFHSWLVWREHSODFHGXQGHUDQHPSLULFDOFRQGLWLRQZHGHDOGRgmatically with it, if 
we regard it as contained under another concept of the object ± this concept forming a principle of 
reason ± and determine it in accordance with the latter. But we deal merely critically with the concept 
if we only regard it in relation to our cognitive faculties and, consequently, to the subjective 
FRQGLWLRQVRIWKLQNLQJLWZLWKRXWXQGHUWDNLQJWRGHFLGHDQ\WKLQJDVWRLWVREMHFW¶.DQWS
$V3DXO*X\HUDUJXHVµ.DQW¶V³FULWLFDO´DSSURDFKWRSKLORVRSK\LQYROYHV an examination of 
the human powers of cognition and reason as the basis for all claims about the laws of nature and 
morality ... [while, for Kant, dogmatism] is an uncritical assertion of laws of nature and morality, that 
is, a confident assertion of the truth of such laws that is not grounded in an antecedent critique of 
KXPDQLQWHOOHFWXDOSRZHUV¶*X\HUS 
38
 Harrison, 2008, p. 74.  
39
 Harrison, 2001, p. 180. 
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I will exemplify the notion of critical practical analogy by referring to the Art & Language 
project considered by Harrison and by explaining how this kind of analogy functions. In 
order to do this, I must first outline the components of a critical practical analogy in general. 
A critical practical analogy has an aim and an outcome. As with any analogy, it is a relation 
of two analogues. In a critical analogy, the analogues play different roles: one analogue is 
the objective analogue, that is, a state of affairs which is assumed to be the case; while the 
other is the reflective analogue, that is, something that, for the purpose of the critique, i.e. of 
reflection, is assumed to be analogous in some respect to the objective analogue. Lastly, in 
order for the analogy to be practical, there needs to be an operational principle, without 
which the analogy would remain merely the stating of a relation and not a means for action. 
,ZLOOXVH+DUULVRQ¶VHVVD\V on the snow project to interpret the project as an instance of 
critical practical analogy, by identifying the components of the analogy. Since Harrison does 
not develop the idea of critical practical analogy, his essays do not refer to any analogy 
components; rather the components belong to my schema for conceptualising the workings 
of critical practical analogy. Moreover, the fact that, as Harrison maintains, the Art & 
Language project is a critique of modernism is a contingent element from which one can 
abstract while retaining the idea of artwork as critical device.  
Harrison writes that the idea for the snow project was suggested by Lucas van 
9DOFNHQERUFK¶VSDLQWLQJWinter Landscape 1586 (but the aim of the critique did not involve 
9DOFNHQERUFK¶VSLFWXUe). In this painting ± a typical Flemish winter scene ± the 
representation of a snow blizzard has been achieved by seemingly flicking white paint on the 
canvas. The aim of the snow project was to test how far Art & Language could go with 
modernist reductionism. Its objective analogue ZDVµODWH-modernism apparent vacillation 
EHWZHHQVXUIHLWDQGHUDVXUH¶H[HPSOLILHGE\µWKHLPSORVLRQRIPRGHUQLVWUHGXFWLRQLVPZLWK
WKHDGYHQWRIWKHEODFNFDQYDV¶40. The reflective analogue ZDVWKHµLGHDRIDFRPSRVLWLRQ
paintHGWREHVQRZHGRQ¶XQWLOµDOOYHVWLJHVRIFRQWHQWKDGEHHQREOLWHUDWHG¶41. The 
operational principle was the carrying to its extreme of the technique that van Valckenborch 
had employed to create the effect of snow in Winter LandscapeWKDWLVE\µJUDGXDOOy 
VQRZLQJRQILJXUDWLYHFRPSRVLWLRQVZLWKGDEVRIZKLWHSDLQW¶42. The outcome was the 
                                                 
40
 The objective analogue is not necessarily something on which everybody agrees (for instance, it 
might be open to question whether late-modernism vacillates between surfeit and erasure) but simply 
something that is taken as a datum. In this sense, within critical practical analogy, the objective 
analogue is not open to question. 
41
 Harrison, 2008, p. 74. 
42
 Ibid., p. 74. 
2. Methodology 
 
35 
 
PDUNLQJRIµDNLQGRIOLPLWEH\RQGZKLFKDUWFDQQRWUHDOO\EHSUHVVHGLILWLVWRUHPDLQLQDQ\
VHQVHDVRFLDOSUDFWLFH¶43  
Sol LeWittLQKLVHVVD\µ3DUDJUDSKVRQ&RQFHSWXDO$UW¶ZULWHVWKDWLQKLVZRUNµ>W@KHLGHD
EHFRPHVDPDFKLQHWKDWPDNHVDUW¶DQGWKDWµDOOWKHSODQQLQJDQGWKHGHFLVLRQVDUHPDGH
EHIRUHKDQGDQGWKHH[HFXWLRQLVDSHUIXQFWRU\DIIDLU¶44 A critical practical analogy can also 
be understood as an ideational machine, but a machine for45 the making of art in which the 
execution is anything but perfunctory: the execution leads from the aim to the outcome; the 
outcome cannot be obtained simply by formulating an aim. For instance, in the snow project, 
the mere formulation of the aim of testing the limit of modernist reductionism could not 
have established the demarcation of this limit. I stress that the execution is essential in 
critical practical analogy because doctoral research is defined as a contribution to 
knowledge, and if the aim contained the outcome a priori, then there would be no 
justification for undertaking research, let alone practice-led research46.  
2.3 Critical practical analogy subsumes both theoretical and practical research 
The snow project example demonstrates how critical practical analogising subsumes both 
theoretical and practical research. In the analogy formulated by Art & Language, the 
objective analogue is deduced from an art theoretical discourse, while the reflective 
analogue resides in art practice. As regards the operational principle, the fact that, in this 
project, the operational principle involves the construction of artworks is incidental 
(although it is not incidental to the specific Art & Language aims). In the following section, 
I will give an account of the components of the two critical practical analogies I employed in 
my research, which will indicate further how the objective and the reflective analogues 
belong to the theoretical and the art practical strands of the research, respectively. However, 
later, in the detailed account of the research inquiry, it will become clear that art practice and 
theory often intermingle in such a way that to try to distinguish them is a fruitless exercise. 
2.4 Critical practical analogies 
The following account serves as an interpretative guide to the research, and it therefore 
presents the research themes only in the most general terms. 
                                                 
43
 Ibid., p. 74. For Harrison, the marking of this limit is indicated by the fact that the snow project was 
eventually abandoned (Ibid., p. 74).  
44
 LeWitt, 1967, p. 79.   
45
 As distinguished from a machine that makes art, as it were, automatically.  
46
 This is not a negative assessment of LeWitt¶VVWDWHGLQWHQWLRQs: he was not pursuing research in the 
VHQVHWKDWWKHZRUGµUHVHDUFK¶SRVVHVVHVLQWKHFRQWH[WRID3K' 
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I formulated two critical practical analogies because each analogy addressed one of the two 
subsidiary aims I stated in §1.1. These subsidiary aims also constitute the aims, i.e. the 
starting point, of the analogies.  
Thus the aim of the first analogy was to demonstrate how the notion of attention can expand 
the scope of art so as to include metaethics. The objective analogue was the dualistic relation 
that Weil postulates between the individual agent and reality ± and the role that attention 
plays in this ontological model (these concepts were deduced through theoretical inquiry). 
The reflective analogue was the dualistic relation that I postulate between my role of artist 
agent (the action being observational drawing) and the object of observation (thus the 
reflective analogue belongs to art practice). The operational principle was the regulative use 
of some RI:HLO¶VDVVHUWLRQVRQDWWHQWLRQWRGHYLVHOLPLWDWLRQVLQWKHSUDFWLFHRI
observational drawing. The outcome was a demonstration of how Weilian attention can 
expand the scope of art so as to include metaethics, but it also highlighted some problematic 
epiVWHPRORJLFDODQGPHWDSK\VLFDOWHQHWVRI:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWRQDWWHQWLRQZKLFK,FRXOGQRW
address through this analogy and which led to the formulation of the second critical practical 
analogy, to which I now turn.     
The aim of the second analogy was to use art to expand the knowledge of Weilian attention 
beyond its present restricted horizon. The outcome of the first analogy revealed some 
problems with Weilian metaphysics (i.e. the postulation of a tautological divinity) and 
epistemology (i.e. the pivotal UROHWKDWVRFDOOHGµLQVROXEOHFRQWUDGLFWLRQV¶ play in her ethical 
discourse). What I found problematic was the dogmatic character of her discourse. My study 
of secondary sources on Weil established that, generally, Weilian scholarship did not see this 
as a problem. Consequently, the objective analogue ZDV:HLO¶VGHIHQFH47 of tautology and 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQLQKHUGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQDJDLQ,LGHQWLILHG:HLO¶VGHIHQFHWKURXJK
theoretical inquiry). The reflective analogue was arrived at by abstracting from the particular 
instances of tautologies and contradictions to which Weil refers, by considering tautology 
and contradiction as immaterial argument forms. The operational principle was the 
objectification, i.e. the representation of these argument forms through the materialisation, 
narrativisation and personification of tautological and contradictory forms. The meaning of 
these operations will become clear when I give an account of the art projects in Chapter 5. 
The outcome was the development of a series of art projects in which the dogmatism of 
:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQLVQRWUHIXWHGEXWUDWKHULQGLUHFWO\FRUUXSWHGWKURXJKWKH
deflation of the absoluteness of the concepts of tautology and contradiction by introducing 
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 ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRSRLQWRXWWKDW:HLO¶VGHIHQFHRIWDXWRORgy and contradiction is not itself 
tautological or contradictory.   
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the snag of contingency in my representation of them ± contingency was an inevitable result 
of the process of objectification.  
The outcome of the second critical practical analogy might seem to be a negative outcome, 
but, in fact, when viewed alongside the outcome of the first analogy, it becomes apparent 
that it fulfils the overall aim of the research, that is, to offer an example of the use of art in 
WKHILHOGRIPHWDHWKLFV5DWKHUWKDQWU\LQJWRUHIXWH:HLO¶VGRJPDWLVPDWDVNWKDWEHORQJVWR
normative ethics, rather than metaethics), I took the problems I perceived in her dogmatic 
stance as an opportunity to approach the issue from a different point of view: non-
declaratively48, through art making. 
2.5 Normative objects and imaginal objects 
I qualify the two critical practical analogies with reference to their operational principles. In 
WKHILUVWDQDORJ\WKHRSHUDWLRQDOSULQFLSOHWKHUHJXODWLYHXVHRI:HLO¶VDVVHUWLRQVRQ
attention) produced norms. Consequently, I will call the first analogy normative critical 
practical analogy. In the second analogy, the operational principle (the representation of 
argument forms) produced images. Consequently, I will call the second analogy imaginal 
critical practical analogy. Inquiry through normative objects entailed the scrutiny of the 
consequences of acting according to the norms I had contrived. Inquiry through imaginal 
objects entailed contemplating the images I produced in order to bring to light conceptual 
ramifications relevant to the research.  
The difference between normative and imaginal objects informs the difference in exposition 
of the art projects. For normative objects, the expository pattern is as follows: I explain why 
I used a certain norm; I give examples of the work I produced following the norm; and I 
analyse the given examples with a YLHZERWKWRGHHSHQLQJP\XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI:HLO¶V
discourse on attention and to assess the critical efficacy of the project. For imaginal objects, 
I give an account of the argument form I intend to represent; I elucidate how the given 
artwork constitutes a representation of that argument form; and, lastly, I interpret the 
representation within the context of Weilian metaphysics and epistemology. This outline of 
the two modes of exposition shows that, while the analysis of the normative projects 
required a subjective approach49, in the imaginal projects, I claimed a more objective 
position.   
As I used two different critical practical analogies to pursue the two subsidiary aims, 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are qualified both with regard to the two aims stated in §1.1 and the 
                                                 
48
 %\µQRQ-GHFODUDWLYHO\¶,PHDQE\FUHDWLQJQRQ-truth-apt signs. Art works are non-truth-apt signs 
because they do not state anything.  
49
 I have already introduced the issue of subjectivity in the normative projects in §1.42, and, as I 
pointed out in that section, the issue will be examined in detail in §4.22.  
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kind of analogy used to attain them: Chapter 4 deals with normative projects and Chapter 5 
deals with imaginal projects. 
Both normative and imaginal practical analogies avoid collapsing the distinction between 
ethics and metaethics by conceptualising my art practice not as an expression of my own 
HWKLFDOGLVSRVLWLRQEXWDVDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGFULWLTXHRI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQHWKLFV 
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Chapter outline: 7KLVFKDSWHUH[DPLQHV:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQ,EHJLQZLWKVRPH
H[HJHWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJ:HLO¶VWH[WVQRWDEO\,VWUHVVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIUHIHUULQJ
solely to her original French writLQJVDQG,MXVWLI\P\GHFLVLRQQRWWRXVH:HLO¶VSXEOLVKHG
notebooks, on the grounds that they are too ambiguous and fragmentary to allow a reliable 
interpretation. I also give an overview of the secondary sources I have studied. The study of 
Weilian attention starts with an analysis of her conceptualisation of the agent in the early 
essay Science and Perception in Descartes, which highlights how Weil uses the notion of 
attention to account for the possibility of free agency in a material world ruled by necessity. 
Weil postulates a dualistic relation between agent and world, and this relation constitutes the 
basis for the normative analogy discussed in Chapter 4. I then FRQVLGHU:HLO¶VWKHRU\RI
imagination and perception, which states that reality is a matter of signification, or reading. 
,QRUGHUWRGHQRWH:HLO¶VVHPLRWLFYLHZRIUHDOLW\,GHVLJQDWHKHUGLVFRXUVHRQWKHHWKLFDO
YDOXHRIPRGLI\LQJRQH¶VKDELWVRIUHDGLQJZLWKWKHWHUPµVHPHWKLFV¶DQG,GLVFXVVWKHUROH
of attention in semethics. I also offer a tripartite classification of orders of Weilian attention, 
based on the degree of mastery of the imagination. Throughout her writings on attention, 
Weil relies on the notion of all-encompassing necessity²e.g. she argues that attention is a 
prerequisite for the awareness of necessity²and this, I maintain, entails a problem of 
LQFRPSDWLELOLVP,QWKHFRQFOXGLQJSDUWRIWKHFKDSWHU,GHPRQVWUDWHWKDW:HLO¶VYLHZV
regarding free will, necessity and attention were greatly influenced by the two philosophers 
Alain and Jules Lagneau; although, unlike them, she greatly emphasises the contradiction 
between necessity and freedom by making insoluble contradiction one of the central tenets 
of her ethics.    
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3.1 Outline of the objectives of the preliminary subsidiary aim 
This chapter deals with the preliminary subsidiary research aim, namely, the clarification of 
:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ7KLVaim was partly exegetical (to understand what Weil means 
E\WKHWHUPµDWWHQWLRQ¶E\VWXG\LQJKHUWH[WVDQGVHFRQGDU\VRXUces), but it was also critical 
(to question the congruousness of her assertions). Firstly, in this section, I give an account of 
the objectives determined by the preliminary aim. Secondly, I outline the taxonomy of 
literary sources that I have considered (§3.2). And lastly, I turn to my analysis of Weilian 
attention (§3.3). 
The aim of investigating the meaning of Weilian attention determined the following 
objectives:  
(1) A VWXG\RI:HLO¶VZULWLQJVDQGRIVHFRQGDU\VRXUFHVGHDOLQJZLWKKHULGHDVLQ
general and specifically with her notion of attention.  
(2) An examination of the philosophical heritage which informs her discourse on 
attention.  
)LUVWO\REMHFWLYHFRQILUPHGWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIDWWHQWLRQLQ:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\since it 
evinced both that it was a constant concern throughout her life and that secondary literature 
IUHTXHQWO\LQYRNHVµDWWHQWLRQ¶,WDOVRUHYHDOHGWKHWHQGHQF\LQWKHOLWHUDWXUHWRUHIHUWR
Weilian attention as if it was a semantically self-evident term, while the meaning of Weilian 
attention seemed to me anything but self-evident and in need of investigation. Secondly, I 
LQYHVWLJDWHG:HLO¶VWKHRU\RIPLQGZKLFKKLJKOLJKWHGWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIWKHQRWLRQVRI
imagination and of attention as faculty which wilfully regulates imagination), and I identified 
the key concepts of her discourses on attention: namely, a semiotic view of reality, the 
notions of will and habit, a threefold classification of orders of attention, and a dualistic view 
of the relation between the individual and the world. 
ObjeFWLYHLQYROYHGHYDOXDWLQJWKHLQIOXHQFHRI:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\WHDFKHU$ODLQDQGRI
$ODLQ¶VRZQSKLORVRSK\WHDFKHU-XOHV/DJQHDXRQKHU conceptualisation of attention. This 
was important for two reasons. Firstly, their theory of perception underpins :HLO¶VGLVFRXUVH
on attention. This intellectual debt needs to be made explicit, since Weil took this theory for 
granted and hardly articulates it in her writings, as her writings are seldom addressed to an 
academic audience. Secondly, Lagneau and Alain are virtually unknown in English-speaking 
countries, with the result that Anglophone Weilian scholarship has generally neglected the 
VWXG\RIWKHLULQIOXHQFHRQ:HLO¶VWKRXJKW,DOVRFRQVLGHUWKHZRUNRIWZRPDMRU
philosophers: Descartes and Wittgenstein; as their import to the research was an outcome of 
the development of my art projects, I will discuss these two philosophers in Chapter 4 
(Wittgenstein) and Chapter 5 (Descartes). The notable absence of two philosophers²Plato 
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and Kant²who one might expect to find in this research needs to be justified. Many authors 
KDYHLQYHVWLJDWHG:HLO¶V3ODWRQLVP50 DQGDFXUVRU\VFDQRIWKHLQGH[HVRI:HLO¶VERRNVLV
sufficient to realise the predominance of references to Plato. Nevertheless, the relevance of 
3ODWR¶VSKLORVRSK\WR:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQLVWDQJHQWLDO$VUHJDUGV.DQWLQP\YLHZ
there are profound differences in the epistemological requirements which Weil and Kant see 
as essential to philosophical enquiry: Kant, it can be argued, always aims at eliminating 
contradiction, while, as I will show, Weil argues that there are insoluble contradictions and, 
furthermore, that such contradictions are the mark of the real. Thus, even though Kant is not 
completely absent from this research, I refer to his philosophy only in order to bring into 
VKDUSHUIRFXV:HLO¶VQRWLRQRILQVROXEOHFRQWUDGLFWLRQ+RZHYHUWKHIXOOIRUFHRIWKLV
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ.DQWDQG:HLOFDQQRWEHDSSUHFLDWHGXQWLO:HLO¶VQRWLRQRILQVROXEOH
contradiction has been clarified; and, since this clarification was achieved through the 
imaginal projects, the topic will be dealt in §5.32.   
3.2 Sub-methodological concerns: Taxonomy of literary sources 
Primary sources 
Whenever possible, I have used the Simone Weil ¯XYUHV&RPSOqWHVedition which currently 
consists of ten volumes. However, as the five remaining volumes of the ¯XYUHV&RPSOqWHV 
DZDLWSXEOLFDWLRQVRPHWH[WVDUHRQO\DYDLODEOHLQROGHUDQWKRORJLHVRI:HLO¶VZULWLQJV 
Collections of Weilian texts 
:KHQLQYHVWLJDWLQJ:HLO¶VWH[WVLWLVLPSRUWDnt to acknowledge the fact that most of her 
writings were published posthumously and were collected in books with a degree of editorial 
intervention, which, on occasion, has been rather heavy-KDQGHG)RULQVWDQFH:HLO¶V
Waiting for God contains, amongst other texts, some letters which Weil addressed to Father 
Perrin, who is also the editor of the book. Father Perrin has captioned the letters as follows: 
µ+HVLWDWLRQV&RQFHUQLQJ%DSWLVP¶µ$ERXW+HU'HSDUWXUH¶µ6SLULWXDO$XWRELRJUDSK\¶µ+HU
Intellectual VoFDWLRQ¶DQGµ/DVWWKRXJKWV¶$QRWKHUH[DPSOHLV:HLO¶VGravity and Grace ± 
WKHPRVWZHOONQRZQRI:HLO¶VERRNV± which is a very small selection of extracts from 
:HLO¶VQRWHERRNVHGLWHGE\WKH)UHQFK&DWKROLFSKLORVRSKHU*XVWDYH7KLERQ,QGravity 
and GraceWKHH[WUDFWVDUHDUUDQJHGWKHPDWLFDOO\µ9RLGDQG&RPSHQVDWLRQ¶µ'HWDFKPHQW¶
µ,PDJLQDWLRQ:KLFK)LOOVWKH9RLG¶DQGVRRQUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHLURULJLQDOFKURQRORJLFDO
RUGHU6XFKLQWHUYHQWLRQVFDQKDYHDFRQVLGHUDEOHEHDULQJRQRQH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ of the texts 
and, therefore, it is advisable to be cautious. 
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 See, for instance, Doering & Springsted, 2004. 
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Heterogeneity of Weilian texts 
:HLO¶VSXEOLVKHGWH[WVDUHKHWHURJHQHRXVDQGWKH\FDQEHFODVVLILHGDVIROORZVQRWHERRNV
notes of her philosophy lessons taken by a student, complete essays, more or less developed 
drafts for essays, letters and poems517KHQRWHERRNVIRUPDODUJHSDUWRI:HLO¶VRXWSXWEXW
in the present study, they are never taken into consideration on their own, but only if they 
repeat arguments found in the essays. This decision is justified by the fact that, in the 
notebooks, thoughts are juxtaposed in such a way as to invite dubious conceptual 
associations. To this problem, one should also add the sometimes cryptic character of the 
entries in the notebooks52, which is perfectly understandable in light of their private nature, 
but which may also lead to a lack of interpretative rigour. Nevertheless, given that much 
secondary literature on Weil has focussed on the notebooks, it is impossible to completely 
disregard them while, at the same time, engaging with the wider context of Weilian 
VFKRODUVKLS7KHQRWHVRI:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\OHVVRQVFROOHFWHGLQLeçons de philosophie, do 
not present the same difficulties, because their clear delineative character firmly delimits 
interpretative boundaries; therefore, I use them, along with the essays, which are the primary 
material for study.  
On the use of original French texts 
The general tendency in Anglophone Weilian scholarship has been to study English 
WUDQVODWLRQVRI:HLO¶VZULWLQJV, decided to always refer to the original French texts for the 
following reasons. 
Firstly, many important texts have not been translated into English (there is an exception: an 
edition ± albeit not complete ± RI:HLO¶VOHWWHUVLVDYDLODEOHLQ(QJOLVK± Simone Weil, 
Seventy Letters, edited by Richard Rees ± while a French edition of the complete 
correspondence will not be published for several years).  
Secondly, since there is often no interlingual one-to-one correspondence between words, 
translators must make compromises which are determined by their purpose. As my (very 
specificSXUSRVHZDVWKHVWXG\RI:HLO¶VWKHRU\RIDWWHQWLRQLWZDVLPSRUWDQWIRUPHWREH
FHUWDLQWKDW,QRWHGHYHU\RFFXUUHQFHRIWKHWHUPµDWWHQWLRQ¶DQGDVWKHIROORZLQJWUDQVODWLRQ
fURP:HLO¶VThe Need for Roots demonstrates, available translations could not be relied 
upon in this respect:  
The mode of political action outlined in these pages requires that every choice made be 
preceded by the simultaneous review of several considerations of a very different nature. This 
                                                 
51
 I do not make use of the letters and poems. 
52
 In an essay on the task of translaWLQJ:HLO¶VQRWHERRNV(OLVDEHWK(GODQG:ROIJDQJ0DW]ZULWH
WKDWLQWKHPRQHILQGVDµFRPSOH[DQGVRPHWLPHVHOOLSWLFV\QWD[¶DQGµHQLJPDWLFH[SUHVVLRQVDQG
DOOXVLRQV¶(GO	0DW]S7). 
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implies a high degree of concentration [attention in the French original], more or less of the 
same standard as that required for creative work in art and science.53 
Thirdly, the task of translation can reveal semantic facets of a certain term that are 
unavailable to the native writer. In this case, the translator has an advantage over the author. 
,ZLOOHOXFLGDWHWKLVZLWKDQH[DPSOH6RPHWLPHV:HLOXVHVWKHWHUPµYRXORLU¶HTXLYRFDOO\
ERWKLQWKHVHQVHRIµZLOO¶DfacultyDQGDVWKHYHUEµWRZDQW¶ZKRVHPHDQLQJLVFORVHUWR
µWRGHVLUH¶Dpassion. To the English speaker, the ambiguity is evident because in English 
µZLOO¶LPSOLHVDQDJHQF\ZKLOHµZDQWLQJ¶GRHVQRW&RQVLGHUWKHIROORZLQJ:HLOSDVVDJHV 
We have to try to cure our faults by attention and not by will [volonté]. The will [volonté] only 
controls a few movements of a few muscles ... I can will [vouloir] to put my hand flat on the 
table. If inner purity, inspiration or truth of thought were necessarily associated with attitudes 
of this kind, they might be the object of the will [volonté].54 
The wrong way of seeking. The attention fixed on a problem. Another phenomenon due to 
horror of the void. We do not want [vouloir] to have lost our labour. ... We must not want 
[vouloir] to find55. 
Weil seems to be unaware of this ambiguity, and this is relevant to an implication of the 
argument that she advances in the first quote, namely, that the will is not involved in the 
highest form of attention. The second quote also raises the following questions: Can one not 
want to find, if one wants to find? (The question could also be couched definitionally: is 
what one wants not, by definition, what one does not not-want?) Are wants in our control 
and, thus, ethically qualifiable"$QGWKLVKDVDEHDULQJRQ:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQWKHHWKLFDO
value of attention, since an ethically responsible agent is by definition a wilful agent. The 
VDPHDPELJXLW\FDUULHVWKURXJKVHFRQGDU\VRXUFHV)RULQVWDQFHZKHQ=LSSHODVNVµ%XWFDQ
one want (vouloirWREHDWWHQWLYH"¶56, it is not clear whether she is asking µ&DQRQHwill 
EHLQJDWWHQWLYH"¶RUµ&DQRQHwant WREHDWWHQWLYH"¶ The seeds of this semantic equivoque 
FDQDOVREHIRXQGLQWKHZULWLQJVRI$ODLQ:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\WHDFKHUZKRKDGDJUHDW 
influence on her thought. For instance, in the following claim by Alain, in the context of an 
argument on volition, he seems to evade the problem by impatiently resorting to circularity: 
µ7R do what one wants [vouloir] to do, one must do what one wants [vouloir@WRGR¶57 
/DVWO\DV,H[SODLQHGLQ(QJOLVKWUDQVODWLRQVRI:HLO¶VZULWLQJVWHQGWRVWURQJO\
normalise the French infinitive (which Weil often uses and which is normative only in a 
ZHDNVHQVHE\UHQGHULQJLWZLWKµZHPXVW¶ 
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 Weil, NR, p. 213. 
54
 Weil, GG, p. 116. 
55
 Weil, GG, p. 117. 
56
 µ0DLVSHXW-RQYRXORLUIDLUHDWWHQWLRQ"¶(Zippel, 1994, p. 14.) 
57
 Alain, 1990, p. 240. 
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Secondary sources 
0DWHULDOWKDWGHDOVZLWK:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ 
/LWWOHZRUNKDVEHHQGRQHRQ:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ58. Sometimes, a relatively more 
VXVWDLQHGDQGPRUHV\VWHPDWLFLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI:HLO¶VDWWHQWLRQLVIRXQGLQERRNVZKRVH
primary subject is not attention. This state of affairs indicates the value of a research on this 
little studied aspect of Weilian thought.  
Material on Weil 
This includes wide-ranging collections of books and essays, from biographies to material 
which deals with very specific aUHDVRI:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\2IWHQWKLVPDWHULDOZLOOUHIHUWR
attention, taking it to be a perfectly self-evident notion which does not need to be explained. 
7KLVDWRQFHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHFHQWUDOLW\RI:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQDQGWKHQHHGIRU
research focused on this subject. 
Art theory and artists on Weil 
Visual Arts theoretical writings on Weil are almost non-existent59, thus, inevitably, most of 
my art theoretical references are indirectly related to Weilian attention via the mediation of 
my art practice. Accordingly, such references will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
&ULWLTXHRI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQ 
3.31 Attention as faculty 
7KURXJKRXW:HLO¶VZULWLQJVRQHILQGVLQGLFDWLRQVRIKHU6WRLFSRVLWLRQ60, particularly as 
regards determinism61)RULQVWDQFHVKHVWDWHVWKDWWKHµZKROHXQLYHUVHLVQRWKLQJEXWD
FRPSDFWPDVVRIREHGLHQFH¶62DQGVKHVSHDNVRIWKHµQHFHVVDU\FRQQHFWLRQVZKLFK
                                                 
58
 The objective of the following books, despite their titles, is not a thorough investigation of Weilian 
attention: /¶DWWHQWLRQDXUpHO (Chenavier, 2009); Simone Weil: l'attention et l'action (Janiaud, 2002); 
Simone Weil: An Apprenticeship in Attention (Von der Rhur, 2006). 
59
 The book Gravity and Grace: The Changing Condition of Sculpture 1965 ± 1975 does not provide 
such a contextualisation, since it does not refer to WHLO¶VSKLORVRSK\LQDQ\VSHFLILFZD\-RQ
7KRPSVRQ¶VHVVD\µ1HZ7LPHV1HZ7KRXJKWV1HZ6FXOSWXUH¶7KRPSVRQPHQWLRQV:HLO
RQO\LQDSRVWVFULSWZKHUHKHZULWHVWKDWUHDGLQJ:HLO¶VGravity and Grace µWDXJKWPHWKDWWKHUH
was more to sculpture than meets the eye ± RUPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\WKDQPHHWVWKHJURXQG¶,ELGS
<HKXGD6DIUDQ¶VHVVD\ µ7KH&RQGLWLRQRI*UDYLW\LV*UDFH¶6DIUDQGRHVQRWPHQWLRQ:HLO
explicitly, the only Weilian connotation being in the title. 
60
 µ7KHGXW\RIacceptance with regard to the will of God, whatever it be, imposed itself on my mind 
as the first and most necessary of all, the duty which one cannot abdicate without dishonouring 
oneself, after having found it in Marcus Aurelius in the form of Stoic amor fati¶:HLOAD, p. 40.) 
For an alternative translation, see: Weil, WG, p. 24. 
61
 7KHIROORZLQJDUJXPHQWE\0DUFXV$XUHOLXVSUHVHQWVWKHW\SLFDO6WRLFGHWHUPLQLVWYLHZµ$OOWKLQJV
come to their fulfilment as the one universal nature directs; for there is no rival nature, whether 
containing her from without, or itself contained within her, or even existing apart and detached from 
KHU¶$XUHOLXVS 
62
 Weil, IPC, p. 161. For an alternative translation, see: Weil, ICG, p. 193. 
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FRQVWLWXWHWKHYHU\UHDOLW\RIWKHZRUOG¶63. The typical charge against determinism is that, if 
everything is determined, then there is no freedom, and, therefore, there is no moral 
responsibility64. Anyone who holds a determinist belief and who also wishes to defend moral 
responsibility must find a way of arguing that, in a determinist universe, in a world ruled by 
necessity, freedom is preserved. The defence that Weil mounts in one of her earliest 
writings, Science and Perception in Descartes65, involves positing attention as a faculty. 
What is particular66 to her defence is the fact that she does not try to demonstrate that 
attention is compatible with necessity, but rather she claims that the very notion of necessity 
cannot be formed without attention. Weil puts it clearly in Lessons of Philosophy: 
One loses the notion of necessity when one anxiously searches a lost object which one urgently 
needs; but when one searches methodically, the necessity appears that the thing is not where 
one has searched, that one must [logical necessity] find it in such and such a place, if it is 
there.67  
Even though, in this passage, Weil does not explicitly mention attention, attention is implied 
in the reference to methodical searching, since, as I will show in the analysis of Science and 
Perception in Descartes that follows, for Weil, attention is the basis for all methodical 
actioQ:HLO¶VFODLPWKDWWKHQRWLRQRIQHFHVVLW\GHSHQGVRQDWWHQWLRQLVDOVRUHOHYDQWWRWKH
classification of different orders of attention which I propose in §3.36.     
:HLO¶s diploma dissertation, Science and Perception in Descartes, is one of the earliest 
essays in which she employs the notion of attention, and it is particularly valuable because it 
gives the most detailed account of Weil¶s theory of mind that can be found in her writings. 
This is due to the fact that, in this essay, Weil sets out to argue for the value of Descartes¶ 
analytical method by using it ± DV:HLOVD\VVKHLQWHQGVWRµUHVXVFLWDWH¶'HVFDUWHV68.  
,ZLOOQRWJLYHDGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWRI:HLO¶VGLVVHUWDWLRQZKLFKLQWUXH&DUWHVLDQIDVKLRQ
UHTXLUHVWKDWWKHUHDGHUµWDNHVHULRXVO\FODLPs that would be dismissed as incredible later 
RQ¶69, but rather I will present an overview of her argument to demonstrate the pivotal role 
that attention plays within it. In his analysis of the essay, Peter Winch points to the essay¶s 
conceptual failings and claims that these are due to the fact that, at this point, Weil had not 
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 Weil, ICG, p. 188. 
64
 For an in depth study of this topic, see: Bobzien, 2001. 
65
 Weil, S, pp. 9±99. 
66
 ,ZLOOVKRZKRZHYHUWKDWZLWKUHJDUGWRWKLV:HLOZDVKHDYLO\LQIOXHQFHGE\$ODLQ¶VDQG
/DJQHDX¶VSKLORVRSK\ 
67
 Weil, LP, pp. 96±97. 
68
 µ7KXVOHWXVLPLWDWH'HVFDUWHV¶Wrick in commenting Descartes. As Descartes, in order to form 
correct ideas with regard to the world in which we live, imagines another world which would begin 
ZLWKDVRUWRIFKDRVVROHWXVLPDJLQHDQRWKHU'HVFDUWHVDUHVXVFLWDWHG'HVFDUWHV¶:HLOS, p47.) 
69
 Sorell, 1987, p. 60. 
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yet introduced the notion of attention70. I will demonstrate that the notion of attention is 
FHQWUDOWR:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWHYHQWKRXJKLWLVTXDQWLWDWLYHO\VFDUFHO\UHSUHVHQWHGLQWKHWext: 
attention is mentioned only twice71 in this one hundred-page essay, and, in both cases, it may 
be easy to miss its importance to the overall argument. Thus it is important to outline the 
HVVD\¶VRYHUDOODUJXPHQWLQRUGHUQRWWRPLVVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI attention. 
At the beginning of the essay, Weil postulates that the relation of the human subject to the 
world is dualistic, with me on one side and the world on the other72; this is a recasting of 
'HVFDUWHV¶VHSDUDWLRQEHWZHHQmind and matter73. Her goal is to demonstrate the possibility 
of true action (action véritable). Her strategy is to prove the possibility of my getting a hold 
on the world (la prise de moi sur le monde)74. 
Firstly, Weil asks: What if I was merely sensibility? If I was merely sensibility, I would 
know nothing; I would only have passive feelings75 of pleasure and pain, which, moreover, 
would always be ambiguously mixed, so that, even when I hurt myself, mixed with the pain, 
I would still taste the pleasure which is the flavour of my existence76.  I could say nothing of 
WKHZRUOGIRULQVWDQFH,FRXOGQRWVD\µWKLVWKRUQKXUWVP\ILQJHU¶RUµP\ILQJHUKXUWV¶RUµ,
KXUW¶77, since I would know nothing about my own existence: I would not know what I sense 
EHFDXVHWKHUHZRXOGEHQRµ,¶WKHUHZRXOd only be the world, of which, likewise, I would 
know nothing. Feeling would be for me what pushing could be said to be for a stone which 
is being pushed78. I would have no hold on the world. Feelings would be intermediaries 
between me and the world, but only in so far as I am passively subjected to the world79.  
Secondly, Weil asks: What if I was pure thought? If I was pure thought I could doubt 
hyperbolically, that is, I could think that everything I have consciousness of is merely 
something that I think, an illusion. I would be the only agency that brings everything into 
                                                 
70
 µ7KHVHDUHGLIILFXOWLHVZKLFKDUHJRLQJWRSODJXHDQ\FRQFHSWLRQRIWKRXJKWDVSXUHDFWLYLW\$QGLQ
fact Simone Weil was to leave such a conception far behind in later writings in which the concept of 
attention became central WRKHUDFFRXQW¶:LQFKS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 %RWKLQVWDQFHVRIWKHWHUPµDWWHQWLRQ¶ are found in Weil, S, p. 75. 
72
 Weil, S, pp. 73±74. 
73
 )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRI:HLO¶VCartesian dualism, see: Narcy, 2003. 
74
 Weil, S, p. 74. Martin Andic offers an alternative transODWLRQRIµODSULVHGHPRLVXUOHPRQGH¶as 
µP\JUDVSRQWKHZRUOG¶VHH$QGLFD, p. 119).  
75:HLOWUHDWVWKHWHUPVµIHHOLQJ¶sentimentµVHQVDWLRQ¶sensationDQGµLPSUHVVLRQ¶impression) as 
synonyms. 
76µ3OHDVXUHDQGSDLQDUHQRWZLWKRXWPL[WXUH of one another ... Even hurting myself, is, first of all, to 
taste this pleasure which is like the flavour of my own existence. The presence of the world is for me, 
ILUVWRIDOOWKLVDPELJXRXVIHHOLQJ¶:HLOS, pp. 49±50.) 
77
 µ,FDQQRWVD\DQ\WKLQJDERXt the world. I cannot say: this thorn hurts my finger, nor: My finger 
KXUWVQRU,KXUW¶,ELGS 
78
 7KLVDQDORJ\LVPLQHQRW:HLO¶V 
79
 µ,PSUHVVLRQVDUHLQWHUPHGLDULHVE\ZKLFK,DPVXEMHFWHGWRWKHZRUOG¶,ELGS 
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existence, including myself. Everything would need me in order to be thought, thus, by this 
power of thought which is revealed to me by the power to doubt, I know that I am80. I make 
my existence by thinking81. But, again, I would have no hold on the world, since the 
existence of the world would be doubtable.   
:HLO¶VEULGJHEHWZHHQme and the world is summarised in the following argument: 
± µ$OOUHDOSRZHULVLQILQLWH¶82, unless something limits it83. 
± If there exists only me, there exists only my absolute power of thought (that is, 
absolute insofar as it is a power to doubt84).  
± But with regard to giving myself something to think and doubt I am powerless85. 
± Therefore, my power is not infinite. 
± Therefore, there exists something limiting my power. 
± 7KHUHIRUHµWKHUHH[LVWVVRPHWKLQJRWKHUWKDQP\VHOI¶86.  
This argument establishes in a weak sense the possibility of my hold on the world, that is, 
only on the world qua thought, since, for Weil, it demonstrates only the existence of 
something, but it gives no clue as to what it might be. However, for Weil, progress had been 
made, since now I can read in each thought a double signification: in so far as a thought 
depends on me, it is a sign of myself; in so far as it does not depend on me, it is a sign of the 
existence of something other than myself. Even though this knowledge is not yet a hold on 
the world (it is only the giving an account of a thought87), it shows at least what one could 
call the formal possibility of such a hold because it allows me to interpret each thought as an 
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 µ>,@FDQVXSSRVHWKDWWhis table, this paper, this pen, this wellbeing and even myself are nothing but 
things that I think ... I think them, they need me in order to be thought. ... And, by this power of 
thought, which reveals itself to me only by the power to doubt, I know that ,DP¶,ELGSS±55.) 
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 µ,NQRZZKDW,GRDQGZKDW,GRLVWRWKLQNDQGWRH[LVW¶,ELGS 
82
 Ibid., p. 60. 
83:HLOQHLWKHUVHWVWKHOLPLWLQJFRQGLWLRQµXQOHVVVRPHWKLQJOLPLWVLW¶QRUGRHVVKHVSHOORXWWKH
conclusion; as is often the case with Weil, the argument is enthymematic. In other words, Weil takes 
for granted the premise that a power is infinite if it is not limited by something and she directly 
proceeds to give an example of such a dynamic, namely, the human power of thought, whose infinity 
is limited by something extra-subjective, namely, the object of doubt.  
84
 µ,IWKHUHH[LVWVQRWKLQJEXWP\VHOIWKHUHH[LVWVQRWKLQJEXWWKLVDEVROXWHSRZHU,DP*RGVLQFH
this sovereign domination which I exercised on myself negatively when I refrained from judging [i.e. 
when I doubted] I must, in this case [i.e. the case in which only I exist], exercise positively as regards 
the content of my judgement. That is to say that dreams, desires, emotions, sensations, reasoning, 
ideas or calculations mXVWEHEXWP\YROLWLRQV¶,ELGS 
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 µ0\VRYHUHLJQW\RQP\VHOIDEVROXWHDVIDUDV,RQO\ZDQWWRVXVSHQGP\WKRXJKWGLVDSSHDUVZKHQ
LWLVDPDWWHURIJLYLQJP\VHOIVRPHWKLQJWRWKLQN¶,ELGS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 Ibid., p. 60. 
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obstacle88, i.e. not as something to which I am exclusively subjected or as an illusion, but as 
something upon which I can (formally) act. 
In order to hypostatise this formal possibility, Weil introduces the notion of imagination as a 
µERQG RI DFWLRQ DQG UHDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH ZRUOG DQG P\ WKRXJKW¶89. Imagination, she 
continues, can be either disorderly or orderly. Imagination is disorderly when I consider it 
as action, thus representing my thoughts as being the cause of changes outside myself. Since 
I always represent the causes as having the same nature as the effects, if I represent my hold 
on the world as a correspondence between my desires and a change in the world, then, I 
represent the world as being passionately disposed towards me and, in turn, as being the 
cause of my passions. An impassioned world would be absolutely unpredictable, and this 
would rule out the possibility of any true action90. Disorderly imagination is passive and not 
in my control, so it cannot afford a hold on the world. Imagination is orderly when it is 
considered as thought. Orderly imagination is not passive: it determines clear, methodical 
ideas, which permit rational thinking; the world troubles my thought via sensibility, and, via 
orderly imagination, I act on the world, I get a hold on the world. 
,Q:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWWKHUHDUHRWKHUVWHSVWRWKHSURRIRIWUXHDFWLRQIRU, thus far, as far as 
Weil is concerned, only the possibility of logical action has been demonstrated. For the 
purpose of the present study, it is sufficient to stop at this stage and ask: What orders 
imagination? The answer is: attention. As Weil writes: 
When I consider these same things on occasion of which my imagination rules in me, I find an 
idea of a different kind that does not impose itself on me, that exists exclusively in virtue of an 
act of my attention, that I cannot change. ... I find that this idea of number, and those that 
resemble it, replace, so to speak, the changes without rule, to which the others are subjected, 
by a progress of which they are the principle.91 
:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQDVWKHUXOHURILPDJLQDWLRQOHJLWLPLVHVKHUVXEVHTXHQWDUJXPHQWRQ
the possibility of true action as a bridging of the divide between extension-less direction of 
mind and direction-less extension of matter. Attention is the point of balance of these two 
poles. Its function cannot be measured quantitatively but only perceived by the indispensable 
support it offers.  
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 :HLOXVHVWKHWHUPµREVWDFOH¶LQDSRVLWLYHVHQVHDVVRPHWKLQJWKDW,FDQGHDOZLWKHYHQWKRXJKLW
might prove difficult), as opposed to something whose hold on me is completely uQH[SODLQDEOHµWKH
ZRUOGZLWKRXWGHSHQGLQJRQPHLVQRPRUHDQLQH[SOLFDEOHKROGRQPHEXWWKHREVWDFOH¶,ELGS
2UDJDLQµ,PXVWXVHFXQQLQJ,PXVWLPSHGHP\VHOIZLWKREVWDFOHVWKDWOHDGPHZKHUH,ZDQWWR
JR¶,ELGS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 Ibid., p. 71. 
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 Ibid., pp. 73±74. 
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Weil concludes Science and Perception in Descartes with the claim that her analysis 
demonstrates that idealism and realism are not contradictory views. Merleau-Ponty, in the 
chapter of his Phenomenology of Perception WLWOHGµ$WWHQWLRQDQG-XGJHPHQW¶92 develops a 
similar argument (as far as I know, Weil and Merleau-3RQW\ZHUHQRWDZDUHRIHDFKRWKHU¶V 
works, but ERWKDWWHQGHG$ODLQ¶V philosophy classes). Merleau-3RQW\¶VDUJXPHQWFDQEH
explained as follows: attention would have no bearing on the world:  
± if the world was a purely intellectual creation (intellectualist view): because nothing 
could be added to this perfect knowledge;  
± if the world was purely physical and the only cause of knowledge (empiricist view): 
because knowledge would be physically determined, as a stone is physically pushed.  
For Merleau-Ponty, both intellectualism and empiricism are forms of realism, that is, both 
leave consciousness and take one of its results as a given: empiricism takes the world in 
itself as given, while intellectualism takes the determinate measurable world of science as 
given.  
Analogously, Weil carves a space between, on the one hand, sensation (empiricism) and on 
the other hand, understanding (intellectualism), which allows attention to be conceptualised 
as a faculty, and which supports her claim that her analysis of agency demonstrates that 
µWKHUHLVQRORQJHUDQ\FRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQLGHDOLVPDQGUHDOLVP[since] the whole mind 
LVDFWLYHLQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKRXJKWWRDQREMHFW¶93  
Furthermore, one can point to an analogy between Merleau-3RQW\¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ
as empty intention DQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQG:HLO¶VUHFXUULQJUHIHUHQFHVWRDWWHQWLRQdirected 
towards the void. For instance, Merleau-Ponty writes: 
They [empiricism and intellectualism] are in agreement in that neither can grasp consciousness 
in the act of learning, and that neither attach due importance to that circumscribed ignorance, 
WKDWVWLOOµHPSW\¶ but already determinate intention which is attention itself.94  
Similarly, Weil writes: 
An orientation of the soul towards something that one does not know, but of which one knows 
the reality. Thus I had a thought which seemed to me important. I do not have anything to jot it 
down. I resolve to remember it. Two hours later, I recall that I must remember a thought. I no 
longer know at all what thought, not even what it is about. I orient my attention towards this 
thing of which I know that it is, but of which I do not know at all what it is. This empty 
attention can last several minutes. Then (in the best of cases) the thought comes.95 
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 Merleau-Ponty, 2000, pp. 26±51. 
93
 Weil, S, pp. 97±98. 
94
 Merleau-Ponty, 2000, p. 28. 
95
 Weil, C 2, p. 291. 
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However, there is a major difference between Merleau-3RQW\¶VDQG:HLO¶V
conceptualisations of the subject: while Merleau-3RQW\¶VREMHFWLRQWRWKHGLFKRWRP\
between intellectualism and empiricism leads his reflection towards a phenomenological 
dissolution of the divide between subject and object96, Weil describes the relation between 
the subject and the world as a kind of agonistic dualism. In other words, for Weil, the 
subject is primarily an agent, or, to say it differently, for Weil, what defines a subject is his 
RUKHUFDSDFLW\IRUWUXHDFWLRQ$V,ZLOOVKRZLQVHHDOVR:HLO¶V
conceptualisation of the subject as agent bears on her argument regarding attention as a 
practice of detachment, because it is by contemplating attentively his or her actions, and by 
realising that these actions are completely dependent on necessity, that the subject makes 
progress towards detachment.   
3.32 Semethics 
,KDYHFRLQHGWKHWHUPµVHPHWKLFV¶WRGHQRWH:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQWKHPRUDOYDOXHRI
exercising RQH¶VDWWHQWLRQLQZKDWVKHFDOOVµSHUFHSWXDODSSUHQWLFHVKLS¶6HPHWKLFVD
FRQIODWLRQRIµVHPLRWLFV¶DQGµHWKLFV¶H[SUHVVHVWKHIDFWWKDWIRU:HLOWKLVDSSUHQWLFHVKLS
PRGLILHVRQH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLYHhabit (hence the reference to ethics) and that this habit 
modification amounts to a change of reality, since, for her, reality is always a process of 
interpretation (hence the reference to semiotics)97. I define semethics as :HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQ
WKHHWKLFDOYDOXHRIPRGLI\LQJRQH¶VKDELWRIUHDGLQJUHDOLW\ZKHre reality is conceptualised 
as a semiotic tissue.98 In this research, the notion of semethics is employed exegetically to 
highlight a strand of her ethical argument.  
When Weil speaks of reality, or the real, in this context, the transcendence of the real is not 
at issue, since she assumes the reality of the material world to be a common sense truism. 
:HLO¶VVHPHWKLFDOGLVFRXUVHLVSUHGLFDWHGRQWKHIROORZLQJSUHPLVHVUHDOLW\LVDPDWWHURI
signification, that is, of signs; and by a perceptual apprenticeshLSRQHFDQPRGLI\RQH¶V
SHUFHSWXDOKDELWVLHRQH¶VKDELWRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIUHDOLW\µHWKLFV¶GHULYHVIURPWKH*UHHN
ethos, meaning habit, disposition).  
,QDQG,ZLOOFRQVLGHUWKHVHWZRSUHPLVHVHOXFLGDWH:HLO¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKH
modifLFDWLRQRIRQH¶VUHDGLQJKDELWLVDQHWKLFDOSXUVXLWDQGGHDOZLWKWKHUROHRIDWWHQWLRQLQ
                                                 
96
 µIt is the mountain itself that, from over there, makes itself seen by the painter; it is the mountain 
that the painter interrogates by looking¶Merleau-Ponty, 2006, p. 21). 
97
 7KHWHUPµVHPHWKLFV¶KDVDOVREHHQXVHGE\0LFKDHO(VNLQLQKLVEthics and Dialogue in the works 
RI/HYLQDV%DNKWLQ0DQGHO¶VKDWDPDQG&HODQ, but to convey a different meaning, namelyµWKH
VHPLRWLFFKDUDFWHURIWKHLQWHUKXPDQ¶DQGµLevinas¶ VHPLRWLFFRQFHSWLRQRIP\UHODWLRQWRWKHRWKHU¶
(VNLQSZKLOH,UHIHUWR:HLO¶VRQWRORJLFDOIRU:HLOZKDWLVDWLVVXHLVreality) notion of 
reading habit.  
98
 A theoretical account of semethics and its relation to attention is given in sections §3.32±3.34. The 
subject is further investigated in §4.33. 
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Weilian semethics. But first, I shall address a question regarding the usefulness of framing a 
VWXG\RI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHFRQFHSWRI semethics. As I have 
argued in §3.31, imagination is the bridge that Weil postulates between me and the world. 
7KURXJKRXW:HLO¶VZULWLQJVLPDJLQDWLRQLVDSDVVLYHFDXVHRISHUFHSWLRQVFDSDEOHRIEHLQJ
moulded either in disorderly or orderly fashion by, respectively, the world or the attention-
guided mind. In what follows, I will show that, for Weil, reading ± DODWHQRWLRQRI:HLO¶V± 
is essentially a modification of the imagination. By introducing the notion of semethics, one 
can thus understand Weilian attention in relation to her beliefs, which underlie the whole of 
her philosophy, regarding the nature of perception. The fact that, in later years, there is a 
FKDQJHLQ:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQZLWK:HLOSRVLWLQJWKHH[LVWence of a transcendent 
object of attention, is not incompatible with the role of attention as the faculty that orders 
imagination99, and this change becomes more discernible against the stable background of 
:HLO¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRILPDJLQDWLRQ 
3.33 Reality as semiotic tissue and reading 
,Q:HLO¶VODWHZULWLQJVWKHHDUO\DUJXPHQWRIScience and Perception in Descartes that, to 
comprehend the relation between mind and matter, both idealism and realism need to be 
acknowledged at one and the same time (see §3.31), crystallises in the notion of reading 
(lecture).  For Weil, perceiving is analogous to reading. In order to illustrate the concept of 
reading, Weil resorts to familiar examples: the way a child learns to read the letters of the 
alphabet100; the different interpretations of the same text by someone who knows the 
language in which the text is written and by someone who does not101RU'HVFDUWHV¶LPDJH
of the process by which a blind person learns to perceive by using a cane102, to which I shall 
                                                 
99
 ,QKLVDQDO\VLVRI:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIUHDGLQJ5REHUW&KHQDYLHUVSHDNVRIOHYHOVRIUHDGLQJZKLFK
FRH[LVWµ:HGRQRWVHHLQ6LPRQH:Hil, sharp breaks between early and late writings ... Most of the 
philosophical subjects on which she wrote in the forties are a central preoccupation since the twenties: 
the problems of necessity, time, attention, of purposiveness without purpose ... The interpretative key 
IRU6LPRQH:HLO¶VWKRXJKWUHVLGHVLQWKHµGLVWLQFWLRQRIOHYHOV¶7RUHDGGRHVQRWPHDQWRUHSODFH
a text with another, a reality with another, abandoning the lower levels at the advantage of the higher 
level. The world is not a rHEXVZLWKDWUDQVODWLRQµDWWKHFRUUHFWOHYHO¶WREHWDNHQDVUHDOLW\¶
(Chenavier, 2001, pp. 32±34.) 
100
 µ$VDFKLOGOHDUQVWKHXVHRIWKHVHQVHVWKHVHQVRU\NQRZOHGJHWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKLQJVZKLFK
surround him, as later he acquires the analogous mechanism of transference which is linked with 
reading, or to the new sensibility which accompanies the handling of tools, so the love of God 
involves an apprenticeship. ... A child knows at first that each letter corresponds to a sound. Later, by 
glancing at a pDJHWKHVRXQGRIDZRUGFRPHVGLUHFWO\WRKLVPLQGWKURXJKWKHH\HV¶:HLOICG, p. 
200.) 
101
 Weil, OC IV 1, p. 74. 
102
 µThe blind man¶V cane, an example found by Descartes, gives an image analogous to that of 
reading. Anybody can convince themselves that in handling a penholder it is as if touch were 
transported at the tip of the pen. If the pen bumps into some unevenness on the paper, this bumping is 
given immediately, and the sensations of the fingers, of the hand, through which we read, do not even 
appear. Nevertheless this bumping of the pen is only something that we read. The sky, the sea, the 
stars, human beings, everything which surrounds us is likewise something that we read. That which 
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return in §4.33. Given that, for Weil, all perception involves imagination103, it follows that 
reading involves imagination104: reality is a matter of signification, not sensations, and 
signification is read through sensations105; reality is a semiotic tissue106. 
                                                                                                                                          
one calls a corrected sensory illusion is a modified reading.¶,bid., p. 7.) µ7he perception of objects at 
the tip of a cane or an instrument is different from touch proper. This other sense is formed by a shift 
of attention through an apprenticeship in which the whole soul takes part.¶ (Weil, OC VI 2, p. 337.) 
103
 µ,QQormal perception there is already geometry. Thus it is not surprising that there is imagination 
LQJHRPHWU\VLQFHWKHUHLVDOUHDG\LPDJLQDWLRQLQSHUFHSWLRQ¶:HLOLP, p. 50.) One could interpret 
this passage in Kantian terms as a perception, or cognition, being a synthesis of imagination and 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJµ6\QWKHVLV... is the mere effect of the imagination of a blind though indispensable 
IXQFWLRQRIWKHVRXOZLWKRXWZKLFKZHZRXOGKDYHQRFRJQLWLRQDWDOO¶Kant, 1999, p. 211). But, 
while it is indubiWDEOHWKDWDFHUWDLQGHJUHHRI.DQWLDQLVPSHUPHDWHV:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\LQJHQHUDO
this seems more a reflex of the Neo-Kantianism of her philosophy teachers, Le Senne and Alain, since 
nowhere does Weil deal with Kant philosophy in any detail. As I will argue in §5.32, there are 
SURIRXQGGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ:HLO¶VDQG.DQW¶VSKLORVRSK\)RUWKHQHR-Kantianism of Le Senne and 
Alain, see: Kühn, 2003.    
104
 µ,ILQWKHHYHQLQJRQDQLVRODWHGURDG,EHOLHYHWKDW,VHHLQSODFHRIDWUHHDPDQO\LQJLQDPEXVK
a threatening human presence imposes itself on me, and ... it makes me tremble even before knowing 
what it is about; I get closer, and suddenly everything is different, I tremble no more, I read a tree and 
not a man. There is not an appearance and an interpretation; a human presence had penetrated through 
my eyes right into my soul, and now, suddenly, the presence of a tree. ... When Esther advances 
towards Assuerus she does not advance towards a man whom she knows can kill her; she advances 
towards majesty itself, terror itself, which reaches her soul through sight, and this is why the effort of 
walking makes her faint. Moreover, she says it: what she looks at fearfully is not the forehead of 
Assuerus, but the majesty which is impressed upon it and which she reads. Usually, in similar cases 
RQHWDONVDERXWDQHIIHFWRIWKHLPDJLQDWLRQEXWSHUKDSVLWLVEHWWHUWRXVHWKHWHUP³UHDGLQJ´¶:HLO
OC IV 1, p. 76.)   
105
 µ7ZRZRPHQUHFHLYHDOHWWHUHDFKZKLFKJLYHVQRWLFHRIWKHGHDWKRIWKHLUVRQVWKHILUVWZRPDQ
after a glance at the page, faints ... The second woman remains the same, her gaze, her attitude, do not 
change; she cannot read. It is not sensation but the meaning which took hold of the first, reaching the 
mind, immediately, brutally, without her participation, as sensations take hold of us. It is as if pain 
resided in the letter, and from the letter it jumped on the face of the one who reads. With regard to the 
sensations themselves, as the colour of the paper, of the ink, they do not even appear. What is given to 
VLJKW LVSDLQ¶ ,ELGSP\ LWDOLFV µ$WHDFKPRPHQWRIRXU OLYHVZHDUH VHL]HGDV LI IURP WKH
outside by the significations which we ourselves read in appearances. Thus one can discuss endlessly 
on the reality of the external world. SinFHZKDWZHFDOOµZRUOG¶LVPHDQLQJVZKLFKZHUHDGWKXVWKDW
LVQRWUHDO%XW WKDW WDNHVKROGRIXVDV LI IURPWKHRXWVLGH WKXV WKDW LV UHDO¶ ,ELGSS±75; my 
LWDOLFVµ,QDVHQVHRQO\VHQVDWLRQVDUHJLYHQWRXVLQDVHQVHZHFDQQRWEXWWKLQNVHQVations. But in a 
sense we can never think sensations. We only think something through them. We read WKURXJKWKHP¶
(Weil, OC VI 1 S  P\ LWDOLFV $V LW LV HYLGHQW IURP WKH IROORZLQJ SDVVDJH:HLO¶V QRWLRQ RI
reading, and her view that sensations are merely intermediaries by means of which one apprehends an 
REMHFWDUHLQGHEWHGWR$ODLQ¶VSKLORVRSK\µ1RZDGD\VLWLVFRPPRQO\DGPLWWHGHYHQE\WKRVHZKR
do not know the proof very well, that the sun is very far from us, much farther than the moon, even 
though their apparent size is more or less the same, as one sees during eclipses. Thus one cannot 
PDLQWDLQWKDWWKHREMHFWWKDWZHFDOOµVXQ¶WKHWUXHVXQLVWKLVEOLQGLQJEDOOLWZRXOGEHOLNHVD\LQJ
that the true sun is the pain in our eye when we look at it carelessly. We must then find out how we 
have come to posit this true sun that nobody can see or imagine, no more than I can see a cube that I 
nevertheless know to be a cube. I see signs of it, as I see signs of the true sun ... The object is thought, 
not felt¶$ODLQSS±60, my italics.)  
106
 µ2XUZKRle life is made of the same web RIVLJQLILFDWLRQVZKLFKLPSRVHWKHPVHOYHVVXFFHVVLYHO\¶
(Weil, OC IV, 1 S$V9ODGLPLU9RONRIIZULWHVDFFRUGLQJWR:HLOµZHFDQUHSUHVHQW«ZHFDQ
have a metaxuDQ³LQ-EHWZHHQ´VRPHWKLQJWKDWJLYHVWKHLGHDRIVRPHWKLQJHOVH¶9RONRIISS. 
xiv±xv).  
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3.34 The role of attention in semethics 
Weil argues that the power one has over how one perceives, or reads, reality is extremely 
limited; at any one moment in time, one has no power whatsoever as regards what reality is 
for them, as it is not given to them to stand back and interpret appearances, since appearance 
and interpretation are always conflated107. For Weil, perceptions seize us, jump up at us, they 
are triggered, without our participation, immediately and brutally108, that is, they are 
intuitive109. If, Weil claims, in a certain situation, we may necessarily perceive a certain 
human being as somebody we ought not to kill, in another situation we may as necessarily 
perceive the very same human being as somebody we ought to kill110. Weil redresses this 
view of perception in which, from instant to instant, one is helplessly delivered to 
perceptions by arguing that one does have a certain degree of power over how one reads 
reality: through a prolonged and attentive apprenticeship, one can indirectly111 FKDQJHRQH¶V
SHUFHSWLRQVE\PRGLI\LQJRQH¶VUHDding habits. Weil writes: 
Indirectly and in time, the will, and above all attention, and above all attention in the form of 
prayer, lead to a modification in reading. What is then changed is the imagination. 112 
One does not choose sensations, but, to a large extent, one chooses that which one feels 
through them; not in a moment, but through an apprenticeship. 113   
The perception of objects at the end of a cane or of an instrument is something different from 
touch proper. This other sense is formed by a shift of attention in virtue of an apprenticeship in 
which the whole soul and the body partake. 114 
Weil clearly believes that the concept of reading belongs to ethics, since, as she writes, it is 
related to the notion of good:   
                                                 
107
 µ7KHUH LVQRWDQDSSHDUDQFHDQGDQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDKXPDQSUHVHQFHKDGSHQHWUDWHG WKURXJKP\
eyes right into my soul, and now, suddenly, the presenFHRID WUHH¶ :HLOOC IV 1S µ7KXV
VSDFHUHOLHIIRUPVWKH\DUHJLYHQWRXVE\RXULPDJLQDWLRQ2IFRXUVHLQWKLVFDVHµLPDJLQDWLRQ¶LV
not at all synonymous with fantasy or arbitrariness: when we see two points, we are not free to see 
sometKLQJRWKHUWKDQDVWUDLJKWOLQH¶:HLOLP, p. 49.) 
108
 Weil, OC IV 1, pp. 74±77.  
109
 That is to say, immediate or non-discursive. Mautner, 2000, p. 281.   
110
  Weil, OC IV 1, p. 77. 
111
 Already in Science and Perception in Descartes, Weil argues for the possibility of acting on the 
world only indirectly (see §3.31), although, there, the focus is on effective (true) action and not on 
perception. 
112
 Weil, OC VI 1, p. 411. In her book The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch develops an argument, 
ZKLFKGUDZVRQ:HLO¶Vtheory of attention, on the slight but real power to change our reading of the 
ZRUOGWKURXJKDWWHQWLRQ0XUGRFKZULWHVµ%XWLIZHFRQVLGHUZKDWWKHZRUNRIDWWHQWLRQLVOLNHKRZ
continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we 
shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already 
over. ...We are not free in the sense of being able suddenly to alter ourselves since we cannot 
suddenly alter what we can see and ergo what we desire and are compelled by. In a way, explicit 
FKRLFHVHHPVQRZOHVVLPSRUWDQWOHVVGHFLVLYHVLQFHPXFKRIWKHµGHFLVLRQ¶OLHVHOVHZKHUHDQGOHVV
REYLRXVO\VRPHWKLQJWREHµFXOWLYDWHG¶,I,DWWHQGSURSHUO\,ZLOOKDYHQRFKRLFHVDQGWKLVLs the 
XOWLPDWHFRQGLWLRQWREHDLPHGDW¶0XUGRFKSS±38.) 
113
 Weil, OC VI 1, p. 410. 
114
 Weil, OC VI 2, p. 337. 
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A man who is tempted to take a deposit will not refrain from doing so simply because he will 
have read the Critique of Practical Reason; he will refrain, perhaps even, it will seem to him, 
despite of himself, if the appearance itself of the deposit seems to him to shout that it must be 
returned. Everybody has experienced similar states, when it seems that one would want to act 
wickedly but that one cannot. At other times, one would want to act in a good way but one 
cannot. ... The problem of value posed around this notion of reading is related to truth, beauty 
and goodness, without it being possible to separate them.115  
Several commentators have remarked that, for Weil, the notions of attention and reading are 
closely associated with each other116. The tendency has been to ascribe to the concept of 
UHDGLQJDQHWKLFDOYDOXHLQLWVHOI)RULQVWDQFH-XOLHQ0RODUGZULWHVµ6LPRQH:HLORIWHQ
XVHVDZRUGZKLFKHYRNHVDWWHQWLRQ,WLVWKHZRUGµUHDGLQJ¶µ5HDGLQJ¶PXVWEHLQWHUSUHWHG
DVUHDGLQJWKHRWKHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJKLP¶117 However, Weil does not attribute an ethical 
value to the notion of reading, since, for her, perception is always a matter of reading, of 
interpretation; as far as Weil is concerned, this is simply how things are. What does have an 
ethical value, for her, is the positing of the problem of the value of reading118, or, with the 
terminology I propose, semethics. In other words, Weil uses the notion of reading to 
articulate a metaethical discourse on the moral progress of the subject. Without this 
distinction between metaethical and the eWKLFDOFRQFHUQV:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\ZLOOPLVWDNHQO\
seem to be exclusively one of answers, when, in fact, with respect to the notion of reading, 
the questioning mode gives a more accurate representation of her view. As she writes: 
The texts of which appearances are the characters seize my soul, they abandon it, they are 
replaced by others. Are some more valuable than others? Are some more true than others? 
Where to find a norm? 119       
It may be argued that one could as easily find passages where Weil is very dogmatic with 
regard to how people could, and should, be trained to read more ethically120. This is true, 
EXWHYHQLQWKHVHFDVHVWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQVHPHWKLFVDVDW\SHRIGLVFRXUVHDQG:HLO¶V
own instantiation of the semethical discourse holds. Furthermore, given that, for Weil, all 
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 Weil, OC IV 1, p. 79; my italics. 
116
 µ6LPRQH:HLOGHILQHVDWWHQWLRQQRWWKURXJKWKHMX[WDSRVLWLRQRISHUFHSWLRQDQGUHIOH[LYLW\EXWLQ 
this form of perfect synthesis which leads to the point where it becomes impossible to distinguish 
WKHP+HQFHIRUWKRQHFDQFOHDUO\XQGHUVWDQG6LPRQH:HLO¶VLQWHUHVWLQUHDGLQJLQVRIDUDVLWLV
exemplary of such a synthesis. One does not use attention for reading, but one must become attention 
[sic] WRDWWDLQDUHDGLQJWKDWLILWLVDXWKHQWLFZLOOQRWOHDYHXVLQGLIIHUHQW¶/HFHUIS
0DVVLPR0DULDQHOOLDUJXHVWKDWIRU:HLOZKDWLVQHHGHGLVµGLUHFWLQJDWWHQWLRQEH\RQGWKH
appearance of things and events, in order to predispose it to orient itself [i.e. attention] in the infinity 
of symbols that the cosmos offers to reading¶0DULDQHOOLS 
117
 0RODUGS6LPLODUO\9LYLHQQH%ODFNEXUQZULWHVµ:DLWLQJRQ*RGPHDQWZDLWLng on 
RWKHUVZDLWLQJXQWLOWKHLUQHHGVEHFDPHFOHDUO\HYLGHQWLQRQH¶VPLQGDQGUHVSRQGLQJZLWKRXW
WKRXJKWIRURQHVHOI´6KH [Weil] FDOOHGWKLVµUHDGLQJ¶RWKHUSHRSOH¶%ODFNEXUQS 
118
 See :HLO¶VTXRWHLPPHGLDWHO\DERYHµ7KHSUREOHPRIYDOXe posed around this notion of reading is 
UHODWHGWRWUXWKEHDXW\DQGJRRGQHVVZLWKRXWLWEHLQJSRVVLEOHWRVHSDUDWHWKHP¶ 
119
 Weil, OC IV 1, p. 78. 
120
 )RULQVWDQFHLQ:HLO¶VHVVD\µ/HFKULVWLDQLVPHHWODYLHGHVFKDPSV¶:HLOOC IV 1, pp. 263±271). 
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SDUWLFXODUUHDGLQJVDUHZKROO\EH\RQGRQH¶VFRQWURODQGJLYHQWKDWLWLVDUHTXLUHPHQWRI
HWKLFDODFWVWKDWWKH\EHLQRQH¶VFRQWUROWKDWLVIUHH121, it follows that particular readings 
must be ethically neutral. That is not to say that Weil believes human beings to be a-ethical; 
as Dwight Harwell suggests, for Weil, attention opens onto an ethical perspective, that is, for 
her, the ethical nature of human beings is a given on which her discourse on attention is 
premised rather than a claim she argues for122. Yet, given that attention plays such a key role 
LQ:HLO¶VWKHRU\RIUHDGLQJWKHHWKLFDOQHXWUDOLW\RIUHDGLQJPLJKWVHHPWRKDPSHUWKH
ethical qualification of attention. However, as it will become clear in §4.22, the ethical 
neutrality of reading finds its ethical sense LQWKHFRQWH[WRI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQDV
a practice of detachment and on a notion of selflessness.  
3.35 Free compulsion 
:HLO¶VYLHZVWKDWSHUFHSWLRQGHSHQGVRQKDELWDQGWKDWKDELWLVFRHUFLve are not novel: they 
FDQEHIRXQGIRULQVWDQFHLQ0DUFHO3URXVW¶VIn Search of Lost Time123 or in Félix 
5DYDLVVRQ¶VOf Habit124. Neither is her argument that, through habit, signs almost replace the 
things they denote (by a process of what the physicist Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond has called 
WKHµRQWRORJLVDWLRQRIWKHVLJQ¶125KHURZQLQQRYDWLRQ:KDWLVRULJLQDOWR:HLO¶V
characterization of habit is that Weil greatly emphasises the coerciveness of habit126 so far as 
to make it counterintuitive. I will illustrate this with an example. A skilled pianist is usually 
thought of as someone who can DFWLQYHU\VSHFLILFZD\VWKDWLVWKHSLDQLVW¶VVNLOOLV
                                                 
121
 If a WLJHUZDVWRNLOODSHUVRQPRVWSHRSOHZRXOGQRWTXDOLI\WKHWLJHU¶VDFWLRQDVHWKLFDOO\EDG
since most people would believe that the tiger had no free choice, but rather acted as its nature 
dictated.  
122
 µ7KHZKROHDFWRIDWWHQWLRQLVH[SUHVVHGLQH[SHFtant waiting and in obedience to the irresistible 
pressure of grace. Herein true action is seen to be the measure of true attention. ... Even the inclination 
LWVHOIFDQEHSXUJHGRIWKH³,´WKHVHOIZKHQaction is focussed attentively oQWKHREOLJDWLRQ¶ 
(Harwell, 1959, pp. 119±121.) 
123
 )RULQVWDQFHDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRI3URXVW¶V7KH:D\E\6ZDQQ¶V, the narrating character describes 
WKHSURFHVVRIEHFRPLQJDFFXVWRPHGWRDQXQIDPLOLDUEHGURRPDVIROORZVµZKHUHP\PLQG
struggling for hours to dislodge itself, to stretch upwards so as to take the exact shape of the room and 
succeeding in filling its gigantic funnel to the very top, had suffered many hard nights, while I lay at 
full length in my bed, my eyes lifted, my ears anxious, my nostrils restive, my heart pounding, until 
habit had changed the colour of the curtains, silenced the clock, taught pity to the cruel oblique 
mirror, concealed, if not driven out completely, the smell of the vetiver and appreciably diminished 
WKHDSSDUHQWKHLJKWRIWKHFHLOLQJ¶(Proust, 2002, p. 12.) Note that what is described here is a 
complete change of perception. The coercive character of habit is expressed by the grammatical 
structure: habit is the subject; it is not merely the case that the character does not notice the now 
familiar objects, but rather, habit has changed colours, smell, sizes, etc.    
124
 µ+DELWWUDQVIRUPVYROXQWDU\PRYHPHQWVLQWRLQVWLQFWLYHPRYHPHQWV,QWKLVZD\RUJDQVEHFRPH
so accustomed to movements requiring force or serious effort that they become incapable of more 
VXEWOHPRYHPHQWVIRUDORQJWLPHDIWHUZDUGV¶Ravaisson, 2008, p. 59.)  
125
 Lévy-Leblond, 2006, p. 67. 
126
 See footnote 105: µ$WHDFKPRPHQWRIRXUOLYHVZHDUHVHL]HGDVLIIURPWKHRXWVLGHE\WKH
significations which we ourselves read in DSSHDUDQFHV¶7KHYHUEµWRVHL]H¶UHQGHUVWKHLGHDRI
coerciveness.  
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thought of as a freedomZKLOHVHHQWKURXJK:HLO¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIKDELWWKHSLDQLVW¶V
skill is a non-freedom that can be expressed double-negatively: the skilled pianist cannot not 
play skilfully.  
Secondly, she shrinks free, and therefore ethical, agency to almost nothing, that is, to the 
faculty of attention, more specifically, as I will argue in §3.362 and §3.363, to the faculty of 
intellectual attention and of attention as amor fati. For Weil, as the following passage shows, 
the rest of reality is under the dominion of necessity, human freedom being, with a Stoic 
simile, analogous to the freedom of a dog tied to a moving cart that can either want to follow 
the cart or be pulled unwillingly127: 
The whole universe is nothing but a compact mass of obedience. This compact mass is 
scattered with luminous points. Each of these points is the supernatural part of the soul of a 
reasonable creature who loves God and who consents to obey. The rest of the soul is encased 
in the compact mass.128 
7KHLPDJHRIµOXPLQRXVSRLQWV¶RQWKHµFRPSDFWPDVVRIREHGLHQFH¶VXJJHVWVDVWDWHRI
affairs that does not change anything material, as, for instance, the falling of a stone, which 
remains materially the same falling regardless of whether it happens in light or in darkness; 
and, in fact, Weil continues by claiming that those who do not consent to obey are, as those 
ZKRFRQVHQWµREHGLHQce through and through, but merely in the manner of a stone that 
IDOOV¶129. 
However, it would be misleading to say that Weil presents a monolithic view of the will. In 
fact, her arguments on the will are very context-sensitive: in her more religious writings, she 
tends to claim that the only freedom is consent to non-freedom, to necessity; while, in texts 
which are more concerned with political and social issues, she often claims that the exercise 
of attention does have a bearing on the material world. The latter argument has been 
SHUFHSWLYHO\DQDO\VHGE\,ULV0XUGRFKZKRPDLQWDLQVWKDWDWWHQWLRQJLYHVµVRPHFRQWLQXDO
slight control over the direction and focus of ... [RXU@YLVLRQ¶130, and that, in time, we can 
change the way we see the world, but that, in contrast with the claims of existentialist 
philosophersWKHUHLVQRµHPSW\FKRRVLQJZLOO¶131. 
                                                 
127
 The cart and dog simile is one the most famous and most commented similes in Hellenistic 
scholarship. See, for instance: Bobzien, 2001, p. 351; Gould, 1970, p. 150; Long & Sedley, 1987, p. 
386; Von Arnim, 2006, p. 845. 
128
 Weil, IPC, p. 161. For an alternative translation, see: Weil, ICG, p. 193. 
129
 Weil, IPC, p. 162. For an alternative translation, see: Weil, ICG, p. 193. 
130
 Murdoch, 1971, p. 39.  
131
 Murdoch, 1971, p. 34. See also: Murdoch, 1971 p. 41, pp. 54±55; Murdoch, 2003, pp. 246±247; 
Bok, 2005, pp. 71±78; and footnote 112.  
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But are these the only possible conceptualisations of free will: either obedience to necessity, 
slight control or existentialist leap? Douglas Hofstadter proposes an alternative absurdist 
argument to illustrate what he takes to be the futility of posing the problem: 
,DPSOHDVHGWRKDYHDZLOORUDWOHDVW,¶PSOHDVHGWRKDYHRQHZKHQLWLVQRWWRRWHUULEO\
IUXVWUDWHGE\WKHKHGJHPD]H,DPFRQVWUDLQHGE\EXW,GRQ¶WNnow what it would feel like if 
my will were free:KDWRQHDUWKZRXOGWKDWPHDQ"7KDW,GLGQ¶WIROORZP\ZLOOVRPHWLPHV"
Well, why would I do that? I order to frustrate myself? I guess that if I wanted to frustrate 
myself, I might make such a choice ± but then it would be because I wanted to frustrate 
myself, and because my meta-level desire was stronger than my plain-old desire.132  
Using a different strategy, Raymond Smullyan also collapses the issue by challenging the 
notion of necessity as domineering force, thus pre-empting the problem of free will: 
'RQ¶W\RXVHHWKDWWKHVRFDOOHG³ODZVRIQDWXUH´DUHQRWKLQJPRUHWKDQDGHVFULSWLRQRIKRZLQ
fact you and other beings do act. They are merely a description of how you act, not a 
prescription of how you should act, not a power or force which compels or determines your 
acts.133 
I find these two arguments both true and unsatisfactory, to use a Barthes-inspired 
expression134, because I do not seem to be able to imagine the possibility of ethical agency 
without freeGRP%XW,ILQG:HLO¶VSRVLWLRQQRPRUHFRPSUHKHQVLEOHJLYHQWKDWVKH
considers contradiction as constitutive of any honest discourse on ethics, which leads to 
oxymoronic notions of free compulsion or compulsive freedom.  
It is not the purpose of this research to propose a solution to this problem but rather to offer a 
perspective that PDNHV:HLO¶VYLHZPRUHFRPSUHKHQVLEOHE\VKRZLQJWKDWWKHH[SUHVVLRQV
free compulsion and compulsive freedom DUHQRWHTXLYDOHQW2QHRI:HLO¶VH[DPSOHVRI
reading considerVWZRZRPHQZKRHDFKUHFHLYHDOHWWHUZLWKQHZVRIWKHLUVRQ¶VGHDWKRQH
woman can read: she faints; the other cannot read: she remains indifferent. I ask: Could the 
OHWWHUKDYHPHDQWIRUWKHOLWHUDWHZRPDQDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQQHZVRIKHUVRQ¶VGHDWK",f the 
DQVZHULVµ1R¶DV,EHOLHYHWKHQin a sense, she was compelled to read as she did, but 
compelled in a very particular sense, which does not entail forceful coercion: hers was rather 
a free compulsion, i.e. the consequence of an unshakable certainty that to do otherwise 
would change nothing ± DµZLOIXO¶ mistranslation of the letter would not have changed its 
meaning135. The kind of necessity at issue here is analogous to the one that necessitates the 
                                                 
132
 Hofstadter, 2007, p. 340.   
133
 Smullyan, 1977, p. 106. 
134
 %DUWKHV¶H[SUHVVLRQLVµQHLWKHUXQWUXHQRUVDWLVIDFWRU\¶ (Barthes, 1985, p. 157).  
135
 &RQVLGHULQJ:HLO¶VLGea of state justice, Ronald Collins and Finn Nielsen argue that, for Weil, 
µFLWL]HQVQHHGWRFRPSUHKHQGLQDIXOODQGIDLUVHQVHwhy they must obey laws and not just that they 
PXVWGRVR:LWKRXWWKLVRQHPLJKWGRWKHµULJKW¶WKLQJIRUWKHZURQJUHDVRQV.. More than results 
FRXQWKHUH¶&ROOLQV	1LHOVHQ, p. 244.) That is to say that, for Weil, it is exclusively rational 
comprehension that can lead to free compulsion (as distinct from the mechanistic compulsion of the 
compact mass which obeys material necessity).   
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truth of the conclusion of a valid argument whose premises are true, i.e. logical necessity136. 
Thus, while the expression compulsive freedom is paradoxical, there is a way of 
conceptualising free compulsion in a non-contradictory manner. Of course, this way of 
looking at the problem is not impervious to the objection that it is incompatible with the sort 
of hard determinist137 views which Weil sometimes proposes138. I will not counteract this 
objection by appealing to Weilian supernaturalism, as some scholars have done in the 
context of a defence of compatibilism139, for this would short-circuit enquiry. I return to 
these issues in §5.32.   
3.36 The three orders of Weilian attention 
:HLOXVHVWKHWHUPµDWWHQWLRQ¶WRGHQRWHWKUHHYHU\GLVWLQFWPRGDOLWLHVRIKXPDQDJHQF\
Since Weil never wrote systematically140 about attention, the following is a reconstruction 
EDVHGRQVHYHUDORI:HLO¶VWH[WVDQGFRUURERUDWHGE\VHFRQGDU\VRXUFHV7KLVUHFRQVWUXFWLRQ
LVMXVWLILHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKHUHLVDJUHDWFRQVLVWHQF\LQ:HLO¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRI
attention, so that one finds the same ideas in early essays such as De la perception ou 
l'aventure de Protée (1929) as well as in later writings such as Réflexion sur le bon usage 
GHVpWXGHVVFRODLUHVHQYXHGHO¶DPRXUGH'LHX(1942). 
3.361 Spontaneous attention 
For Weil, spontaneous DWWHQWLRQLVQRWLQRQH¶VFRQWURORQHLVSUH\WRWKHHPRWLRQV
immobilised and rigid. One cannot think anything but what the emotions dictate. Fear, 
                                                 
136
 7KLVLVWKHVWDQGDUGGHILQLWLRQRIDYDOLGDUJXPHQWLQSURSRVLWLRQDOORJLFµ$QDUJXPHQWLVYDOLGLI
WKHWUXWKRIWKHSUHPLVHVQHFHVVLWDWHVWKHWUXWKRIWKHFRQFOXVLRQ¶6WHEELQJS 
137
 Ultimately, I think that the whole of WeiO¶VDUJXPHQWRQWKHLQVROXEOHFRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
SRVVLELOLW\DQGWKHLPSRVVLELOLW\RIJRRGUHVWVRQDKDUGGHWHUPLQLVWYLHZVLQFH:HLO¶VFODLPWKDW
good is impossiEOHLVEDVHGRQKHUSRVLWLQJDµWLJKW¶DQGµKDUG¶ necessity, a necessity with no µKROHV¶
RUµOHHZD\¶ for free action.      
138
 This kind of objection typically involves: firstly, referring to a prior state of events S on which the 
supposedly free act F depends and which, according to the determinist view, could not have not 
happened; and, secondly, pointing out that, if S is determined, then an uninterrupted chain of 
determined events links S to F, so that F cannot be free. In the present example, the objection could, 
for instance, take the following form: Was not the fact that the literate woman was literate 
determined? 
139
 )RULQVWDQFH(ULF6SULQJVWHGZULWHVµ)RUKHU>:HLO@ZKDWVXSHUQDWXUDOPHDQV,VXJJHVWLVVHHQLQ
our reading possibility in impossibility ... What her supernaturalism amounts to is a bare, indefinable 
hope, a faith in a goodness that transcends the human attempt to imagine ± and limit ± goodness and 
GHVSDLU¶6SULQJVWHGE, p. 188.)  
140
 In the essay Quelques réflexions autour de la notion de valeur, Weil writes disapprovingly of the 
kind of philosopher who builds sysWHPVµ7UXHSKLORVRSK\GRHVQRWFRQVWUXFWDQ\WKLQJLWVREMHFWLVD
given, that is, our thoughts; philosophy only makes an inventory of them; if while making the 
inventory it finds some contradictions, it is not up to philosophy to suppress them, lying in so doing. 
Those philosophers who try to construct systems to eliminate these contradictions make the opinion 
that philosophy is conjectural appear justified; because such systems can be endlessly varied, and 
WKHUHLVQRUHDVRQWRFKRRVHRQHRYHUDQRWKHU¶(Weil, OC IV 1, pp. 59±60.) In this passage, Weil 
seems to refer to some kind of (true) philosophia perennis which acknowledges that there are 
insoluble contradictions.        
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horror, etc. engender spontaneous attention.141 Weil gives the example of the inept 
apprentice who is rigidly and uncontrollably attentive to that which he or she intends to 
avoid, as the inept cyclist who focuses so much on the obstacle to be avoided as to end up 
JRLQJWRZDUGVLW7KHFDXVHRIWKLVSKHQRPHQRQLVDQLOOXVRU\H[SDQVLRQRIWKHµ,¶WRZDUG
what is nRWLQRQH¶VSRZHU142 Spontaneous attention is a negative attention143; and 
VFKRODUVKLSZKLFKGHDOVZLWK:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQKDVGLVUHJDUGHGLWSHUKDSV
considering it synonymous with distraction%XWILUVWO\µGLVWUDFWLRQ¶GRHVQRWFRQYH\WKH
obsessive and forceful quality which Weil ascribes to spontaneous attention144; and, 
VHFRQGO\E\UHIHUULQJWR:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIWUXHDFWLRQZKLFK,
examined in §3.31, one can see how spontaneous attention is an expression of disorderly 
imagination, that is of imagination prior to the attentive act, so that negative attention is not 
the contrary of attention, i.e. distraction, but the incapability of being attentive145. This 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQKDVWKHDGYDQWDJHRILQVFULELQJ:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIVSRQWDQHRus attention within 
the wider context of her ethical concern with true action and also of showing that the 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQVSRQWDQHRXVDQGYROXQWDU\DWWHQWLRQUHVWVRQ:HLO¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRI
imagination. Furthermore, this interpretation makes sensHRI:HLO¶VXVHRIWKHH[SUHVVLRQ 
µVSRQWDQHRXV¶, which would otherwise have to be considered as a rather fanciful substitution 
RIµVSRQWDQHRXVDWWHQWLRQ¶IRUWKHPRUHREYLRXVµGLVWUDFWLRQ¶ 
3.362 Voluntary attention 
9ROXQWDU\DWWHQWLRQLVLQRQH¶VFRQWURO it is the basis of all clear ideas, of all calm, 
methodical action1462QHLVLQFKDUJHRIRQH¶VLQWHOOHFWDQGDFFRUGLQJO\:HLOVRPHWLPHV
UHIHUVWRYROXQWDU\DWWHQWLRQDVµLQWHOOHFWXDODWWHQWLRQ¶DUJXLQJWKDWLQDVHQVHLWJLYHVULVHWR
reality, seen as a web of necessary connections. Without this kind of attention, there would 
                                                 
141
 µ(PRWLRQVDOZD\VFDXVHVSRQWDQHRXVDWWHQWLRQIHDUKRUURUHWF3V\FKRORJical signs: one 
FDQQRWWKLQNDERXWDQ\WKLQJHOVH3K\VLRORJLFDOVLJQVLPPRELOLW\ULJLGLW\LQWHUUXSWHGUHVSLUDWLRQ¶
(Weil, LP, pp. 264±265.) 
142
 µ7KHUHDUHWZRZD\VRISD\LQJDWWHQWLRQZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGRQHWRGH[WHULW\DQGWKHRWKHUWR
clumsiness. In reality, a clumsy person does not know how to pay attention. He is fascinated by the 
obstacle as the bird is fascinated by the snake. When our body is not developed, we pay attention to 
the actions which we must avoid. The cyclist apprentice, for instance, pays attention to the blunders 
KHFDQPDNHDQGKHPDNHVWKHP,QWKHQRYLFHJRRGZLOOEHFRPHVULJLGLW\¶:HLOOC ISµ$
cyclist apprentice fears an obstacle; he can only think about how to avoid it, but he thinks so much 
that his hands lead the handlebars exactly in the direction of the obstacle. The essential character of 
this phenomenon is that the cyclist transfers to the object itself the resistance which his own body 
RSSRVHVWRKLVGHVLUH¶:HLOLP, p. 33.) 
143
 µ7KHFRQGLWLRQRIWKHDSSUHQWLFH is in reality a condition in which one is aware but one cannot pay 
DWWHQWLRQ7KHDSSUHQWLFH¶VDWWHQWLRQLVDOZD\VQHJDWLYH¶:HLOOC I, p. 386.) 
144
 See footnote 142µ+HLVIDVFLQDWHGE\WKHREVWDFOHDVWKHELUGLVIDVFLQDWHGE\WKHVQDNH¶ 
145
 See footnote 143. 
146
  The role of attention in methodical, true action has been analysed in detail in §3.31. 
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be no thinkable reality, i.e. no reality at all147. Weil calls this non-UHDOLW\VWDWHµWKHNLQJGRP
RI3URWHXV¶EHFDXVHLQVXFKDVWDWHHYHU\WKLQJZRXOGEHSURWHDQGLVFRQWLQXLW\ungraspable 
by thought148. As with spontaneous attention, voluntary attention has a negative element: one 
waitsPHUHO\SXVKLQJDZD\DOOWKDWLVLQVXIILFLHQWWRWKHDWWDLQPHQWRIRQH¶VREMHFW149; but, 
unlike spontaneous attention, there is no rigidity: one waits alertly for the right choice to 
present itself150. Voluntary attention is indispensable in the apprenticeship of detachment 
IURPWKHµ,¶EHFDXVHLWLVE\SD\LQJDWWHQWLRQWRWKHIDFWWKDWQHFHVVLW\XQGHUOLHVDOO
(apparently freely willed and non-necessary) action that the subject gradually becomes 
detached from his or her imaginary self. For Weil, one fundamental indication of the mark of 
necessity on action is that there is always a gap between the object of desire, or the object of 
imagination, and the actions which one must perform to attain this object. As Weil writes: 
No relationship between the movements which are naturally joint to the desire and the 
imagining of this or that material change and the efficient movements to accomplish this 
movement.151   
,ZLOOUHWXUQWR:HLO¶VYLHZRIWKHVXEMHFWZKHQ,GLVFXVVWKHVXE-methodological concerns 
entailed by normative art projects, in §4.22.  
                                                 
147
 µ$WWHQWLYHLQWHOOLJHQFHDORQHKDVWKHSRZHURIFDUU\LQJRXWWKHFRQQHFWLRQVDQGDVVRRQDVWKDW
attention relaxes, the connections dissolve. ... The necessary connections which constitute the very 
reality of the world have no reality in themselves except as the object of intellectual attention in 
DFWLRQ¶:HLOICG, p. 188.)   
148
 µ7KLVH[DPSOHPDNHVLWSRVVLEOHIRUXVWRFRQFHLYHZKDWWKH\FDQEHIRUPHWKHse changes of a 
world of which I receive an impression only through the intermediary of imagination. No matter how 
OLWWOH3URWHXVFKDQJHVDOOWUDFHVRIWKHLPPHGLDWHO\SUHFHGLQJVWDWHDUHDEROLVKHGVWUDLJKWZD\¶:HLO
OC ISµ,WLVWKHNLQJGRPRIProteus, that is to say, of the thing which transforms itself by an 
LQWHUQDOSRZHUDQGZLWKRXWFRQWLQXLW\¶,ELGSµ7KHUHLVDSDUWRILPDJLQDWLRQLQDOO
SHUFHSWLRQ¶,ELGSµ,PDJLQDWLRQLVQHFHVVDULO\FRQVHUYHGLQDOOSHUFHSWLRQ1HYHUWheless ... 
one can distinguish degrees of perception according to whether imagination has been more or less 
mastered; and one can form a series, in which the first term will be pure imagination, or dream; the 
second term, orderly imagination, which constitXWHVZKDWRQHFDQFDOOµFRPPRQSHUFHSWLRQ¶WKHWKLUG
WHUPLVSHUIHFWSHUFHSWLRQRUFRPSOHWHO\PDVWHUHGLPDJLQDWLRQ¶,ELGS See also: Weil, OC I, 
p. 386. 
149
 µ,QHYHU\VFKRROH[HUFLVHWKHUHLVDVSHFLILFZD\RIGHVLURXVO\ZDLWLQJXSRQWUXWKZLWKRut allowing 
ourselves to search for it. A way of paying attention to the data of a problem of geometry without 
searching for the solution, to the words of a Latin or Greek text without searching for the meaning, of 
waiting, when one is writing, for the right word to come of itself at the end of the pen, while rejecting 
LQDGHTXDWHZRUGV¶:HLOAD, p. 94.) For an alternative translation, see: Weil, WGSµ$WWHQWLRQ
LVDQHIIRUWWKHJUHDWHVWRIDOOHIIRUWVSHUKDSVEXWLWLVDQHJDWLYHHIIRUW¶:HLOWG, p. 61.) 
150
 µ2QHFDQDQDO\VHWKHDWWHQWLRQIRFXVVHGRQDSUREOHPRIJHRPHWU\RURQDQHVVD\3V\FKRORJLFDO
signs: calm. ... In voluntary attention one prevents oneself from becoming rigid, one continuously 
prevents voluntary attention becoming spontaneouVDWWHQWLRQ¶:HLOLPSµ0RVWRIWHQ
DWWHQWLRQLVFRQIXVHGZLWKDNLQGRIPXVFXODUHIIRUW,IRQHVD\VWRRQH¶VSXSLOV³1RZ\RXDUHJRLQJ
WRSD\DWWHQWLRQ´RQHVHHVWKHPIURZQLQJKROGLQJWKHLUEUHDWKFRQWUDFWLQJWKHLUPXVFOHV,IDIWHUWZR
minutes they are asked what they have been paying attention to, they cannot reply. They have been 
paying attention to nothing. They have not been paying attention. They have been contracting their 
PXVFOHV¶:HLOWG, p. 60, with some slight changes.) 
151
 Weil, OC VI 2, p. 237.  
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Voluntary attention is also referred to by Weil as discursive, or rational, attention and, as 
Joël Janiaud maintains, Weil distinguishes this from intuitive attention152 which is superior to 
WKHIRUPHUDQGLVµDVRUWRIGLUHFWSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHVXSHUQDWXUDO¶153. Janiaud also maintains 
that, in her earlier writings, Weil postulates an active power of the mind in order to prove the 
possibility of an act of attention, while, in the late writings, the role of the mind is 
problematised 154. But, as Robert Chenavier has argued, intuitive attention does not replace 
or inhibit discursive attention, but rather there are different non-incompatible, superimposed 
UHDGLQJVDQGµWKHVHDUWLFXODWHGDQG³VXSHULPSRVHGUHDGLQJV´OLWWOHE\OLWWOHIRUPthe network 
RI:HLO¶VRQWRORJ\ the crossing of a threshold, several times, without changing direction, 
each level finding its sense and value iQDFKDQJHRIWKHRUGHURIDWWHQWLRQ¶155 As I will 
FRQWHQGLQWKHTXDOLILFDWLRQµLQWXLWLYH¶LVSUREOHPDWLFKRZHYHUDFFHSWLQJWKLV
qualification for the time being, for Weil, discursive and intuitive attention are not merely 
compatible, but rather intuitive attention depends on discursive attention: discursive 
attention makes necessity/reality known and intuitive attention makes it an object of love156. 
3.363 The most elevated attention or amor fati 
,QWKHPRVWHOHYDWHGDWWHQWLRQWKHµ,¶KDVEHHQHOLPinated. One consents to and loves 
everything that happens. This is essentially the attitude that the Stoics called amor fati157. 
                                                 
152
 However, the distinction between discursive and intuitive attention is not prominent in her 
writings. Such distinction is rather a plausible interpretation based on the Platonic distinction between 
µLQWXLWLYHDQGGLDOHFWLFnoesis ... [and] discursive and hypothetical dianoia¶-DQLDXGS 
153
 µ)RUKHU>:HLO@VXSHULRUDWWHQWLRQLVQRWGLVFXUVLYHRUUDWLRQDOEXWLQWXLWLYHLWLVOLNHDGLUHFW
SHUFHSWLRQRIWKHVXSHUQDWXUDO¶,ELGS As Janiaud points out, Weil deals with this in 
µ&RQGLWLRQSUHPLqUHG¶XQWUDYDLOQRQVHUYLOH¶LQ:HLOCO, pp. 418±434, especially pp. 425±426 and 
p. 431. 
154
 µ(PSLULFLVWDWWHQWLRQZRXOGEHWRRLQGLIIHUHQWWRLWVREMHFWLQWHOOHFWXDOLVWDWWHQWLRQWRROHDUQHG$W
first, Simone Weil is close to intellectualism due to her debt towards Descartes and Alain: geometry is 
present in all perception, and the slumber of conscience is only a lack of attention. But the power that, 
in her first writings, she accords to the human mind, already tempered by the experience of matter in 
work, is markedly questioned thereafter. Attention can open us to a truly surprising reality that the 
PLQGFDQQRWPDVWHU¶-DQLDXGS  
155
 Chenavier, 2001, p. 35. 
156
 µ:HE\LQWHOOHFWXDODWWHQWLRQGRQRWLQGHHGFUHDWH, we produce no object, yet in our sphere we do 
in a certain way give birth to reality. This intellectual attention is at the intersection of the natural and 
the supernatural part of the soul. Having conditional necessity as object, this attention produces only a 
half-reality. We confer upon objects and upon persons around us all the fullness of reality when to this 
LQWHOOHFWXDODWWHQWLRQZHDGGWKDWDWWHQWLRQRIVWLOOKLJKHUGHJUHHZKLFKLVDFFHSWDQFHFRQVHQWORYH¶
(Weil, ICG, p. 188.) See also footnote 148. Elizabeth Hardwick points out that, for Weil, the 
awareness of the equity of necessity is a condition of justice and love (Hardwick, 1975, p. 89).  
157
 The correspondence between attention and amor fati LVLPSOLFLWLQPRVWRI:HLO¶VZULWLQJ7KHUHLV
KRZHYHUDSDVVDJHLQZKLFKWKHVHWZRQRWLRQVDUHH[SOLFLWO\DVVRFLDWHGµ*RGLVDFFHSWDQFHZLWKRXW
GLVWUDFWLRQ2QHPXVWLPLWDWHWKHDWWHQGLQJDQGKXPLOLW\RI*RG:HKDYHRXUµPH¶LQWLPH
Acceptance of time and of everything that it can bring ± with no exception ± (amor fati) ± is the only 
GLVSRVLWLRQRIWKHVRXOZKLFKLVXQFRQGLWLRQDOLQUHODWLRQWRWLPH¶:HLOOC VI 4, p. 185.) There 
follow some secondary literature implicit references to attention and amor fatiµ(PSWLQHVVWKH
condition of renouncing the possession of the world, engenders in the human soul an attending 
disposition, a disposition of attention towards the Totally Other ... total compliance [i.e. amor fati], 
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The reality to which voluntary, intellectual attention gives rise is only a half-reality in 
comparison to the full reality perceived by the one who consents to all that happens158. 
:HLO¶VHDUO\ZULWLQJVZKLFKDUHPDLQO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKPDQXDOZRUNHPSKDVLVHWKH
effectiveness of this kind of attention ± for instance, the good, attentive cyclist effectively 
avoids the obstacle because he or she perceives the road in its entirety, and not only the 
obstacle, as the inept cyclist does159 ± whereas in later writings the non-active (Weil often 
refers to this kind of attention as waiting160 or as a contemplation of the void161), religious 
and transcendent aspects are emphasised162, but the practical purpose is not completely 
absent163.  
                                                                                                                                          
SXUHDWWHQWLRQ¶&DUWD0DFDOXVRSµ7KXVIRUKHU>:HLO@RQe needs an immense capacity 
for attention in order to be able to squarely contemplate necessity, an attention that she conceives as 
ORYH¶5H\3XHQWHS). µ7KHEHDXWLIXOLVWKDWZKLFKZHDUHFDSDEOHRIFRQWHPSODWLQJD
statue or a painting which we can watch for long moments, something we can pay attention to ... But 
attention can be exercised only upon what is real, what is. The identification of the beautiful and the 
real follows from this. Obviously this identity does not mean that the beautiful is something of the 
order of substance, hypostatized; the real, as we know, is only the network of necessity limiting and 
organizing the material world. The presence of necessity in the universe is essentially a harmony Weil 
liked to designate with the 6WRLFWHUP³RUGHURIWKHZRUOG´¶9HW|S 
158
 See footnote 156. 
159
 µ7KHJRRGF\FOLVWVHHVQRWRQO\WKHREVWDFOHEXWWKHZKROHURDG¶:HLOOC I, p. 386.) For the 
simile of the cyclist, see footnote 142.   
160
 See footnote 149. 
161
 µ0XVLFXQIROGLQJLn time captures attention and carries it beyond time bringing it at each moment 
RQWKDWZKLFKLV7KHDWWHQGLQJLVDWWHQGLQJWRWKHYRLGDQGDWWHQGLQJWRWKHLPPHGLDWH¶:HLOOC VI 
3S(YHQWKRXJKLQWKHIROORZLQJSDVVDJHWKHWHUPµDWWHQWLRQ¶GRes not appear, the relation 
between attention and the void becomes clear if one keeps in mind that, for Weil, the most elevated 
DWWHQWLRQLVORYHRIWKHUHDOµ7RNQRZWKDWQRWKLQJWKDWRQHWRXFKHVKHDUVVHHVHWFLQWKLVZRUOG
nothing that one represents to oneself is good. If one thinks God, this is not the good either. 
Everything that we think is as imperfect as we are, what is imperfect is not the good. ... The good is 
nothing for us, since no thing is good. But this nothing is not not-being, it is not unreal. Everything 
that exists is unreal when compared with it. This nothing is at least as real as us. Since our very being 
is nothing but this need for good. Absolute good resides completely within this need. But we cannot 
go there and take it. We cDQRQO\ORYHWKHYRLG¶:HLOOC VI 3, pp. 190±191.)  For a discussion on 
the translation of attention à vide DVERWKµDWWHQWLRQWRWKHYRLG¶DQGµDLPOHVVDWWHQWLRQ¶VHHCFDPS 
Notes 07 in Appendix 5, pp. 278±280. 
162
 µ:KHQZHGRQRWVHHZKHQQRSDUWRIRur soul is capable of sensing the reality of God, then, to 
love God, we need to really transfer ourselves outside ourselves. This is to love God. To do this we 
need to keep our gaze constantly turned towards God, without ever moving. ... One must be 
completely motionless. To remain motionless does not mean to abstain from action. ... There is an 
HIIRUWWRPDNHZKLFKLVE\IDUWKHKDUGHVWRIDOOEXWLWGRHVQRWEHORQJWRWKHGRPDLQRIDFWLRQ¶:HLO
OC IV 1Sµ7KHRQO\FKRLFHJLYHQWRPDQLVWRDWWach or not his love here below. Let him refuse 
to attach his love here below, let him remain motionless, without searching, without moving, waiting, 
without even knowing what he is waiting for. It is absolutely sure that God will come all the way to 
KLP¶,ELGSµ7KHNH\WRD&KULVWLDQFRQFHSWLRQRIVWXGLHVLVWKHUHDOL]DWLRQWKDWSUD\HU
consists of attention. It is the orientation of all the attention of which the soul is capable toward God. 
... The highest part of the attention only makes contact with God, when prayer is intense and pure 
HQRXJKIRUVXFKDFRQWDFWWREHHVWDEOLVKHG¶:HLOWG, p. 57.) On the transcendence of the object of 
attention, see: Ferber, 1981, p. 64. 
163
 For instance, see quote on pp. 43±44IURP:HLO¶VYHU\ODVWZRUNZKLFh deals with practical 
concerns regarding the political and legislative structure of France in the event of liberation. 
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The terms that Weil uses to describe this kind of attention with respect to whatever happens 
DUHQRWRQO\µFRQVHQW¶DQGµORYH¶EXWDOVRµDFFHSWDQFH¶µGHVLUH¶DQGµREHGLHQFH¶$OOWKHVH
terms invite a misinterpretation: namely, one might assume that Weil is claiming that the 
highest achievement of a human being is to accept whatever happens, without trying to 
change it, regardless of whether he or she thinks it just or not. This is not what Weil has in 
mind; hers is rather a you-cannot-undo-the-past view as exemplified by the following 
passage: 
If one descends into oneself, one finds that one has exactly what one desires. If one desires a 
certain being (who is dead), one desires a particular being; who is therefore necessarily a 
mortal, and one desires this being, this being who..., that..., etc, in short this being who died, a 
certain day, at a certain time. And one has that being ± dead. ... In such cases, suffering and 
emptiness are the mode of existence of the objects of desire. If one draws aside the veil of 
unreality, one sees that they are given to one thus. When one sees this, one still suffers, but one 
is happy.164  
When I try to guess how anyone in the throes of bereavement would interpret this argument, 
I cannot help thinking that most people would see it as a heartless joke and would take the 
claim that they can be both suffering and happy to be cruel nonsense165. And, leaving aside 
the tragic thought experiment, in my experience of dialogues on this issue, I found that 
acceptance, obedience, etc., often soon slip into the semantic area of laissez-faire. How to 
avoid misinterpretation, then? An analogy may be helpful. Someone, S, accustomed solely to 
tonal Western music and with no musical training decides to learn how to sight-sing and, to 
this purpose, starts ear-training. At the beginning, S recognizes major and minor thirds quite 
easily (to S, they feel familiar), while sevenths and ninths, especially minor ones, sound very 
disharmonic, unfamiliar and ugly. As S perseveres with the training, gradually, the sense of 
disharmony, unfamiliarity and ugliness disappears. In S, there has occurred a change towards 
acceptance, love, etc166. But, even though this analogy eliminates, to a certain extent, the 
potential for confusion outlined above, it has the disadvantage of having no ethical import, 
unlike Weilian attention as amor fati. As I will show later, I approached this problem 
through the installation Attending (see §5.422), by producing a sign that acknowledges 
:HLO¶VUHIHUHQFHWRFRQWUDGLFWLRQ167.   
                                                 
164
 Weil, OG, p. 42. For an alternative translation, see: Weil, GG, pp. 22±23. 
165
 I shall return to the issue of nonsensicality in §4.3121. 
166
 ,QIDFWWKHWHUPµREHGLHQFH¶LVTXLWHDSSURSULDWHKHUHJLYHQWKHHW\PRORJ\RIµREH\¶µfrom O.Fr. 
obeir, from L. oboedire ³REH\SD\DWWHQWLRQWRJLYHHDU´OLW³OLVWHQWR´IURPob ³WR´audire 
³OLVWHQKHDU´¶2QOLQH(W\PRORJ\'LFWLRQDU\, 2010).  
167
 $OWKRXJKLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKHWHUPµFRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶PXVWEHXQGHUVWRRGYHU\EURDGO\WKHyou-
cannot-undo-the-past and the (2) laissez-faire interpretations are not incompatible but ethically 
unappealing, (1) for its apparent obviousness and unhelpfulness, and (2) for its dismissal of ethical 
responsibility. 
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3.37 Is the most elevated attention intuitive? 
By the most elevated attention, does one read168 reality as something one loves unreservedly 
DVGLVWLQFWIURPµVRPHWKLQJto be lovHG¶ZKLFKZRXOGLPSO\WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIFKRLFHDQG
therefore, is this attention intuitive, as Janiaud and Chenavier maintain, or is it a matter of 
IUHHFKRLFHDVWKHWHUPVµDFFHSWDQFH¶DQGµFRQVHQW¶ZRXOGVHHPWRVXJJHVW"$SSHDOLQJWR
the notion of free compulsion, I will advance an answer, which, however, will not conceal 
the fact that Weil seems ambivalent on this point. 
There are passages in which Weil describes the most elevated attention in the same way as 
she describes reading, that is, as a sort of helplessness. However this is not a mechanistic 
kind of helplessness (as a stone helplessly falls) but rather a rational one, as the compulsion 
of the literate woman, in the example above, was free in the sense that it was rational. 
Consider these excerpts: 
:KHQRQHKDVXQGHUVWRRG>E\YROXQWDU\DWWHQWLRQ@GHHSLQRQH¶VVRXOWKDWQHFHVVLW\LVRQO\RQH
of the faces of beauty, the other face being the good, then all that which renders necessity felt ± 
vexation, pain, grief, obstacles ± become a supplementary reason to love.169  
No one could ever prove that such an absurdity as consent to necessity is possible. We can 
only recognize it. There are in fact souls which consent to it.170   
That this attitude towards reality is dictated by reason is clear from the fact that Weil writes 
µZKHQRQHKDVunderstood¶DQGµDQDGGLWLRQDOreason WRORYH¶-RKQ%HUJHUUHIOHFWLQJRQ
:HLO¶VZRUGVµWRNQRZKRZWRWXUQZKDWHYHUKDSSHQVQRPDWWHUZKDWLWLVLQWRDQREMHFWRI
GHVLUH¶LQWURGXFHVDGLFKRWRP\EHWZHHQRQWKHRQHKand, wilfulness and, on the other hand, 
encounter, collaboration or participation between artist and object171. But whether or not one 
DFFHSWV:HLO¶VFRQWHQWLRQDQG%HUJHU¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWDQ\RQHZKRDWWHQGVZLOOinevitably 
see reality as an object of unreserved love172 is another matter; given that, for Weil, this is 
both certain and only directly experienced, and yet dependent on faith173, I do not foresee 
much progress on this issue as long as it is framed in these terms, for there is no argument 
here but only a claim, capable of being asserted, denied or ignored, but not in any way 
                                                 
168
 Keeping in mind that elevated attention is loving the universe as God-obeying creation, one can 
VHHWKHOLQNEHWZHHQDWWHQWLRQDQGUHDGLQJLQWKHIROORZLQJSDVVDJHµ$VRQHOHDUQVWRUHDGDVRQe 
learns a craft, so one learns to feel in everything, first and foremost, the obedience of the universe to 
God. It is truly an apprenticeship. As all apprenticeship, it requires effort and time. ... For those who 
have completed the apprenticeship, things and events, everywhere, always, are the vibration of the 
same infinitely sweet divine word. Pain is the colour of certain events. Confronted with a sentence 
written in red, the one who can read and the one who cannot both see red; but the colour does not 
hDYHWKHVDPHLPSRUWDQFHIRUERWK¶:HLOOC IV 1, p. 356.) 
169
 Weil, IPC, p. 36. For an alternative translation, see: Weil, ICG, p. 101. 
170
 Weil, ICG, p. 184. 
171
 Berger, 2002, p. 11, pp. 15±16, p. 20.  
172
 As I pointed out earlier, for Weil, the universe is a book of revelation for the one who attends 
lovingly (see footnote 18). 
173
 See footnote 18. 
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proven+RZHYHUDV,ZLOODUJXHLQWKHUHLVDQRWKHUZD\RILQWHUSUHWLQJ:HLO¶V
claim that attention involves a kind of inevitability and compulsiveness; namely, by 
reintroducing the notion of reading and by postulating two phases of action: the first phase is 
the free choice to go through a certain apprenticeship in reading; the second phase is the 
inevitable reading which results from the possession of that acquired reading skill. In this 
context, it will be useful to briefly consider the intellectual milieu RXWRIZKLFK:HLO¶VLGHDV
emerged; and, to this purpose, I will now examine the influence of Alain and Lagneau on 
:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\ 
3.38 The legacy of Alain and Lagneau 
$V,VDLGHDUOLHUePLOH&KDUWLHUNQRZQDVµ$ODLQ¶ZDV:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\WHDFKHUDQG-XOHV
/DJQHDXKDGEHHQ$ODLQ¶VFKHULVKHG174 philosophy teacher. They have been virtually 
forgotten by the main history of philosophy: no major study on their work has been 
undertaken; and, outside France, they are almost unknown but for a few scant mentions in 
books on twentieth-FHQWXU\)UHQFKSKLORVRSK\:HLO¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOGHEWWRWKHPKDVEHHQ
acknowledged175EXWZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRI&KHQDYLHU¶VSimone Weil. Une philosophie du 
travail, only in a rather general manner. In what follows, the analysis will be limited to 
$ODLQ¶VDQG/DJQHDX¶VYLHZVRQreality, habit and will, since a comprehensive scrutiny of 
WKHLUSKLORVRSK\LQUHODWLRQWR:HLO¶VLVEH\RQGWKHVFRSHof this research. The aim is to 
show that the problems regarding free will that arose from my analysiVRI:HLO¶VQRWLRQRI
attention inhere in the philosophical tradition to which Weil subscribes.  
Like Weil, Lagneau argues that perception is not immediate176; it might seem to be so, but, 
in fact, it is based on habit177. Moreover, for Lagneau, neither pure sensibility178 nor pure 
                                                 
174
 Alain also wrote a book on Lagneau, Souvenirs concernant Jules Lagneau (see: Alain, 1960). 
175
 See: Pétrement, 1976, pp. 25±42; McLellan, 1990, p. 12, p. 206.  
176
 µ3HUFeption is never immediate. ± In perception considered as immediate, there could be no 
illusion; the study of the main illusions shows that this kind of perception does not exist. To perceive 
is always something different from subjection or reception of a sort of imprint; it is always the 
DIILUPDWLRQRIVRPHWKLQJWKDWRQHKDVIHOWVRPHWKLQJZKLFKLVMXGJHGUHDO¶/DJQHDXS 
177
 µ7KXVSHUFHSWLRQLVWKHFRPSOHWLRQRIWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGWKHFRUUHFWLRQRIVHQVLEOHGDWDZKLFK
both are the reVXOWRIDMXGJHPHQWDSSDUHQWO\LPPHGLDWHDQGLQWXLWLYHEXWEDVHGRQKDELW¶,ELGS
178). 
178
 µ7KHUHLVQRVXFKDWKLQJDVWUXWKRIVHQVLEOHNQRZOHGJH6HQVLEOHNQRZOHGJHLVIDOVHEHFDXVH
one cannot conceive of a way of feeling which must be considered as true for us under given 
circumstances. In fact, this would suppose either that our sensible nature does not change or that its 
development is subjected to a rigorous law, that is to say that this nature obtains in us in virtue of its 
relation to the exterior world, of which it would merely be an effect, a resultant. ... If everything in 
nature was subjected to necessity, if there was for us a way of feeling which would be the true one, if 
at each instant our way of feeling was a result of the exterior ZRUOGZHZRXOGQRWIHHODQ\WKLQJ¶
(Ibid., pp. 181±182.) 
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intelligence179 can account for the fact that human beings can perceive reality as necessity; 
for him, intelligence rests on sensibility,Q/DJQHDX¶VDUJXPHQWVRQHILQGVWKHSUHPLVHVRI
:HLO¶VFULWLTXHRIERWKHPSLULFLVPDQGLQWHOOHFWXDOLVPKHUFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRI
reality as a web of necessary relations (§3.362) and her idea that one reads through 
sensations (§3.33). And, finalO\:HLO¶VVHHPLQJO\SDUDGR[LFDOYLHZRIIUHHZLOOLV
PDWFKHGE\/DJQHDX¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWRQHLVQRWVXEMHFWHGWRQHFHVVLW\RQO\WRWKHH[WHQWWKDW
having conceived the existence of necessity, one endorses it180, and this is achieved by the 
cultivation of a moral habit, which Lagneau describes as a second nature181. This outline of 
/DJQHDX¶VLGHDVRQreality, habit and will presupposes a semethical perspective, i.e. the view 
that one can acquire ethically better interpretative habits.   
,Q$ODLQ¶VZULWLQJVRQHILQGVHFKRHVRI:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWUXHQRQ-rigid action requires 
an attention which can be exercised only after one has acquired a habit, by which one learns 
WRIRFXVRQZKDWLVUHOHYDQWUDWKHUWKDQZDVWLQJRQH¶VHQHUJ\LQPRYHPHQWVFDXVHGE\fear 
of failure182. Alain also refers to amor fati as a reading that reveals the necessary 
LQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVVRIHYHU\WKLQJLQWKHXQLYHUVH:HLO¶VVHPLRWLFWLVVXH± this is essentially 
Stoic cosmic sympatheia183$VIRU:HLO$ODLQ¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIWKHwill rests on the 
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 µ7KHUHLVQRVXFKDWKLQJDVSXUHO\DEVWUDFWWUXWK,IWKHUHH[LVWHGDQDEVWUDFWWUXWKWKDWLVWRVD\D
truth independent of the mind ..., this purely abstract truth would be purely unintelligible ... If we 
conceive that there is a truth, we conceive it as the truth of what we feel ... But from the very fact that 
truth has its basis in sensibility, in present perception, and from the fact that this perception is itself 
undeterminable, it follows that necessity, which rests on this undeterminable basis, would not be 
GHWHUPLQDEOH7KHRUGHURILQWHOOLJHQFHUHVWVRQWKHRUGHURIVHQVLELOLW\¶,ELGS 
180
 µ7KLVDFWLRQFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGZLWKRXWWKHSRVLWLQJRIDIUHHGRPZKLFKLVVXEMHFWWR necessity 
RQO\EHFDXVHLWHQGRUVHVLW¶,ELGS 
181
 µAll certainty is thus a necessity which depends on freedom and which rests on a belief. It is a 
necessity willed and maintained through the constant operation of freedom, and this operation is only 
possible by means of moral habit, which is the mind becoming nature (within nature) through 
volition.¶,ELGS  
182
 µ,WLVDPLVWDNHWRVD\WKDWDQDFWLRQWKDWRQHNQRZVKRZWRSHUIRUPLVSHUIRUPHGZLWKRXWDWWHQWLRQ
... I would rather say that in this case judgement, in virtue of habit, is obeyed immediately, without 
useless movements. ... The price of thought is that one must think well. Since we cannot act without 
thinking, we cannot act properly without thinking well about it. The main obstacle to this is fear of 
acting wrongly ... In order to overcome it and do what one wants to do, one only has to do what one 
ZDQWVWRGRIRULQVWDQFHH[WHQGLQJRQH¶VDUPZLWKRXWPRYLQJRQH¶VIRRWRURSHQLQJDORFNZLWKRXW
JULQGLQJRQH¶VWHHWKRUDJDLQKROGing a bow without gripping it, or again climbing without holding 
RQH¶VEUHDWK0DQOHDUQVQRWWKURXJKPHFKDQLFDOUHSHWLWLRQEXWDOZD\VRQWKHFRQGLWLRQRID
sustained attention, in other words, on the condition that the movements which are carried out are 
willed and free, without the body doing other movements. The main cause of this disorder is the 
FRQIXVLRQRILGHDVLQFUHDVHGE\WKHIHDURIPDNLQJDPLVWDNH¶$ODLQSS±241).     
183
 µ,EHOLHYHUDWKHUWKDWLWLVWKHXQLYHUVHDVDZKROe which is beautiful, and the interconnection of all 
things; the small pieces do not mean anything; they have no sense. But everything has a sense, 
because everything depends on everything. One loves the sea and the mountains because in them 
force [i.e. necessity] is visible; it is our alphabet. After having spelt [analogous to necessity perceived 
by means of voluntary attention], one must read and learn to survey the interconnection of everything 
to everything ... If one was able to read perfectly in the Great Book, everything would be beautiful 
[analogous to attention as amor fati@¶$ODLQS)RU6WRLFFRVPLF sympatheia, see: 
Sambursky, 1959, p. 41.  
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view that all perception involves imagination184 and that there are different states of 
imagination, depending on whether or not it is ordered by the mind185. However, there is a 
IXQGDPHQWDOGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ$ODLQ¶VDQG:HLO¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDtions of truth. As I have 
DQWLFLSDWHGLQDQGDV,ZLOODUJXHLQ:HLO¶VZULWLQJVRQDWWHQWLRQVXJJHVWWKDW
she postulates an objective notion of truth while, as the following passage shows, Alain 
holds a normative view of truth:  
The very idea that the Stoics have of truth: is not its purpose to guard us against sceptic 
discouragement, to gives us confidence in ourselves? Why doubt what we know? It is wasted 
time: for what we care about it is not what we know, but what we will know. We must not 
pursue the true, but the truer. What one must consider it is not the results, but the method; it is 
not the condition of our mind, but the progress of our mind.186 
,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRGLVWLQJXLVK:HLO¶VREMHFWLYHWUXWKIURP$ODLQ¶VQRUPDWLYHWUXWKLQRUGHUWo 
signpost a likely interpretative trap: QDPHO\WRH[SODLQ:HLO¶VGLVUHJDUGIRUWKHUHVXOWVRIDQ
effort of attention by referring to the merely normative character of truth. As will become 
HYLGHQWLQ:HLO¶VGLVUHJDUGIRUWKHUHVXOWVRIDWWHQWLRQLs more clearly explained by 
considering her view of the subject as agent who, through attention, progresses towards a 
detached attitude.      
3.4 Summary 
A summary of this chapter can be introduced by pointing out the philosophical 
commonalities between Weil, Alain and Lagneau. The three philosophers share: (1) an 
unwavering belief in a free rationality, (2) a view of necessity seen as a gift of applied 
reason, and (3) a defence of a contradictory argument on the relation between freedom and 
necessity. In their arguments, (3) is premised on (1) and (2), since (1) states that there is 
freedom, while (2) states that necessity is all-pervasive, i.e. that there is no freedom. 
However, Weil departs from Alain and Lagneau with respect to (3), not by disavowing it but 
by acknowledging it more fully with the introduction of her notion of insoluble 
contradictions187 as objects of contemplation for the most elevated attention. Whether or not 
:HLO¶VTXDOLILHG188 defence of contradiction constitutes a solution to the problem of 
incompatibilism is debatable, given that such a defence could conceivably entail 
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 µ(YHQLQWKHPRVWULJRURXVSHUFHSWLRQWKHUHLVLPDJLQDWLRQ¶$ODLQS 
185
 In AlainRQHILQGV:HLO¶VWKUHHGHJUees of imagination (see footnote 148): µ>,Q@DOOLPDJLQDWLRQ
one will find always three kinds of imagination. First, orderly imagination, that errs only because it 
dares too much, but always according to a method and under the control of experience ... The other 
imagination, that turns away from things and closes its eyes, attentive above all to the movements of 
life and to the impressions which arise from it, could be called fantasy. ... Lastly, impassioned 
imagination can be dHILQHGDERYHDOOE\FRQYXOVLYHPRYHPHQWVDQGYRFLIHUDWLRQ¶,ELGS 
186
 Alain, 1891, p. 41. 
187
 See §5.42. 
188
 Weil distinguishes between true and false contradictions. André Devaux discusses this distinction 
in Devaux, 1996. 
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trivialism189. In any case, as my exposition in §3.35 and §3.37 shows, I remain 
unconvinced190. But this uncertainty was the starting point for the development of the 
normative critical practical analogy projects discussed in the next chapter, which adopt a 
PRUHDEVWUDFWSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHILQGLQJVRIP\VWXG\RI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQ)URP
WKLVSHUVSHFWLYHWKHUHHPHUJHVDFRQVWDQWLQ:HLO¶VYDULRXVZULWLQJVRQDWWHQWLon: the 
relation between myself (an agent) and the world (the real). As I stated in §2.4, this relation 
constitutes the core of the normative projects to which I now turn. 
                                                 
189
 7ULYLDOLVPµLVWKHYLHZWKat all contradictions are true (and hence, assuming that a conjunction 
HQWDLOVLWVFRQMXQFWVLWLVDOVRWKHYLHZWKDWHYHU\WKLQJLVWUXH¶3ULHVW. 
190
 I should also point out the fact that, as my analysis shows, Weil does not give a definition of 
atWHQWLRQ7KLVIDFWLVHDVLO\PLVVHGEHFDXVH:HLO¶VZULWLQJVW\OHLVRQWKHZKROHYHU\GHFODUDWLYH
and this tends to conceal the highly metaphorical character of her arguments ± Rush Rhees speaks of 
µ:HLO¶VXVHRIVLPLOHRUPHWDSKRUZLWKQRFOXHDVWRZKDWWKHSUHFLVHPHDQLQJFRXOGEH¶ (Rhees, 
S5KHHVLVDYHU\V\PSDWKHWLFUHDGHURI:HLO¶VZULWLQJVEXWDVKHLQWHQGVWRVWXG\:HLODV
if she was a Wittgenstein-like analytic philosopher, he struggles with her metaphorical language 
throughout his book. At the 2008 Colloquy of the Association pour  O¶pWXGHGHODSHQVpHGH6LPRQH
Weil, in Paris, Jean-Marc Lévy-/HEORQGLQGLFDWHG:HLO¶VSURSHQVLW\IRUPDNLQJUDWKHUVZHHSLQJ
statements of which it is sometimes difficult to make sense. Lévy-Leblond alOXGHGWR:HLO¶VFODLP
that the ancient Greeks invented the function, which in his view, was an utter misconstruction. See 
also: Lévy-Leblond, 2009. 
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Chapter outline: This chapter examines my art projects which deal with normative critical 
practical analogy. The projects, which are all concerned with observational drawing, are 
divided into two categories: projects whose objective is to represent an experience of 
necessity; and projects whose objective is to represent an attitude of detachment. These two 
objectives led to the introduction of a textual component in my observational drawing 
practice for the following reasons. Firstly, I argue that an attitude of detachment requires that 
the results of my drawing activity should be interpreted as indications of action rather than 
as material objects which affect the attention of the viewer, and I use text to deflect the focus 
away from the material presence of my drawings. (I call this text±drawing compound 
µK\EULGDUWREMHFW¶6HFRQGO\,UHIHUWR:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VLecture on Ethics to show that the 
notion of necessity is dependent on propositional language, while the non-propositional 
nature of drawings makes them unsuitable for the representation of the experience of 
necessity. All the projects discussed in this chapter, with the exception of Bâton de 
O¶DYHXJOH, are collaborations with the artist Hephzibah Rendle-Short, and they illustrate my 
attempts²with varying degrees of success²to make my drawings less self-reflexive and 
less solipsistic while retaining the focus on my subjectivity that was required by the 
representation of an experience of necessity and of an attitude of detachment. In order to 
SXUVXHWKLVDLP,PDGHXVHRI:HLO¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIWKHVXEMHFW:HLO¶VVXEMHFWLV
essentially an object that is ruled by material necessity, a de-reified and self-less subject; the 
normative projects aim at representing this kind of objectified subject. On the other hand, 
%kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH develops the semethical theme of perceptual apprenticeship (introduced 
in Chapter 3) by considering :HLO¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHJRDORIVXFKDSSUHQWLFHVKLSLVDVKLIW
of attention which leads to a disposition of equanimity, or indifference, towards whatever 
happens. The normative projects obtained the following outcomes: I acquired a more precise 
understanding of how to represent my role of artist-agent non-reflexively; I was able to 
discriminate between the notions of inevitability and constraint, showing that the former 
does not entail the latter; I gained practical knowledge of the distinction between orderly and 
disorderly imagination; and I showed that, even though in her writings on attention Weil 
typically refers to the concept of objective truth, in fact, the notion of attention as a practice 
of detachment does not require a reference to objective truth.    
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4.1 Outline of the objectives of the normative analogy 
In §2.4, I pointed out that the aim of the normative analogy was to use art from a metaethical 
perspective and that the objective and reflective analogues were, respectively, the dualistic 
relation between the individual and the world and the dualistic relation which I postulated 
between my role of observational drawer and the object of observation.  
The development of the two analogues determined the following objectives: 
(1) To define the constitutive elements of the objective analogue.  
(2) To find a way of representing the reflective analogue in my art practice.  
(3) To devise an operational principle for the normative analogy.  
Objective (1) drew upon the study of Weilian attention presented in Chapter 3. Having 
discerned the dualistic relation which Weil postulates between the individual and the world, 
I qualified the relation as follows. According to Weil, I have the capacity (dependent on the 
faculty of attention) to take a particular attitude towards the world and to experience certain 
facts of the world, namely:   
x I can adopt an attitude of detachment.191  
x I can experience necessity.192  
As I have shown in §3.31, in the early essay Science and Perception in Descartes, Weil 
deduces from the relation between myself and the world the necessary193 existence of the act 
of attention. In later writings, the relation is not posited as explicitly but is, nevertheless, 
evidently implied by her argument on the reality-loving individual194.  What is absent in the 
relation individual/world as articulated by Weil is any kind of extra-subjective effect, or 
result of action, and this suggests a self-reflexive subjective approach to the issue of 
progress in attention. However, self-reflexivity seems to me incompatible wiWK:HLO¶VFODLP
that attention is essentially a non-DFWLRQDZDLWLQJWKDWWKHUHLVDµway of desirously waiting 
upon truth without allowing ourselves to search for it¶195, because this claim conceptualises 
the goal of attention as something completely extra-subjective, i.e. as some kind of objective 
truth that the attentive individual must simply embrace if and when it presents itself. I 
discuss the manner in which I dealt with the difficulty regarding subjectivity in the practice 
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 The notion of detachment in relation to attention is elucidated in §4.22. 
192
 The notion of necessity has been discussed at §3.362 and §3.363. 
193
 That is, for Weil, logically necessary for the possibility of true action. 
194
 Since what the individual loves is a world subject to necessity and necessity can only be perceived 
through an effort of attention. 
195
 See footnote 149. 
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of attention in §4.22. In §4.4, I explain how the notion of objective truth196 that characterises 
:HLO¶VDSSURDFKWRDWWHQWLRQDVDSUDFWLFHRIGHWDFKPHQWcan be dispensed with without 
compromising the ethical significance of Weilian attention. 
Objective (2) was achieved by recasting the relation between individual and the world into a 
relation between me as observational drawer and an object of observation. In other words, in 
the normative projects, I imitate the kind of individual agent postulated by Weil in the most 
general premises of her discourse on attention. Before giving, in §4.21 and §4.22, a detailed 
account of the methodological concerns entailed by objectives (1) and (2), I will discuss 
objective (3).  
The operational principle of the normative analogy involved a series of limitations to be 
used in the practice of observational drawing and these limitations were deduced from some 
RI:HLO¶VDVVHUWLRQVRQDWWHQWLRQ2EMHFWLYHHQWDLOHGWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIUHOHYDQW
assertions to be used as practical limitations. As I have demonstrated in §3.362 and §3.363, 
the concept that links voluntary attention and the highest form of attention is necessity: 
voluntary attention perceives necessity and the highest form of attention loves necessity or is 
analogous to love of it. For Weil, necessity is always perceived as a constraint and, 
accordingly, objective (3) entailed devising explicit constraints in the manner in which I 
approached drawing from observation. Thus, the relationship between objectives (2) and (3) 
becomes clear: (3) aims at representing necessity and (2) aims at representing the experience 
of necessity.  
0\XVHRIµSUDFWLFDOOLPLWDWLRQV¶PD\EULQJWRPLQG the mode of working of Sol LeWitt, to 
which I refer in §2.2, or 0DWWKHZ%DUQH\¶VDrawing Restraint project (see footnote 197), but 
there are two significant differences between the work of these artists and my normative 
SURMHFWV)LUVWO\QHLWKHU%DUQH\¶VQRULeWitt¶VZRUNLVSULPDULO\FRQFHUQHGZLWK
REVHUYDWLRQDOGUDZLQJ6HFRQGO\%DUQH\¶VUHVWUDLQWVDUHVHOI-imposed but not self-sustained 
(except in the weak sense that it is always up to him to stop), while the operational principle 
of the normative analogy requires the voluntary self-sustaining of limitations, and this is 
essential for the representation of an experience of necessity because, as I have argued in 
IRU:HLOQHFHVVLW\H[LVWVRQO\E\YLUWXHRIDQHIIRUWRIYROXQWDU\DWWHQWLRQ%DUQH\¶V
self-impositions take as their model bodily restraint197 (i.e. mechanical necessity) and, 
                                                 
196
 See also p. 68. 
197
 µ5LJKWIURPWKHVWDUW,ZDQWHGWRSXWP\ERG\LQWRP\ZRUN,ZDQWHGWRSXWP\RZQH[SHULHQFHV
LQWRP\ZRUNDQGWKHH[SHULHQFHV,¶GKDGZKLFKKDGEHHQPRVWSURIRXQGZHUHRQWKHIRRWEDOOILHOG
I think, at that point. So, I think, instinctually, I looked at those experiences and tried to draw them 
into what I was making in the studio, and started using my body that way, and creating situations that 
put some sort of a resistance against my body. And I think that, as an athlete, you understand that 
\RXUERG\UHTXLUHVUHVLVWDQFHLQRUGHUWRJURZLW¶VVRPHWKLQJ\RXWDNHIRUJUDQWHGWKHZKROHWUDLQLQJ
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therefore, they shrink the volitional dimension of action. At the other end of the spectrum, 
LeWitt also reduces the import of voluntary action by making execution perfunctory, as I 
pointed out in §2.2.  
4.2 Sub-methodological concerns: The subject in attention 
This section discusses the sub-methodological requirements entailed by objectives (1) and 
(2), discussed in §4.1, namely: (a) to find a way of representing through art practice the 
essential role that Weil accords to direct, or subjective experience; (b) in light of this 
cenWUDOLW\RIWKHVXEMHFWWRFODULI\WKHQDWXUHRI:HLO¶VYHUVLRQRIVXEMHFWUHIHUUHGWRDVµWKH
:HLOLDQVXEMHFW¶Objective (a) is discussed in §4.21; objective (b) entailed articulating the 
relation posited by Weil between subject, experience of necessity and detachment, by 
elucidating the dynamics of attention as a practice of detachment. As I will show, the 
Weilian subject, unlike the kind of subject typically postulated in art practice-led research, 
does not imply self-reflexivity, and led me to use a dialogical approach through a 
collaboration with artist Hephzibah Rendle-Short. Objective (b) is discussed in §4.22.  
4.21 The hybrid art object 
As I have elucidated in §4.1, the identification of the objective and the reflective analogues 
of the normative analogy evidenced the explicit disregard for extra-subjective effects in 
:HLO¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQDVXEMHFWDQGWKHZRUOGVLQFHWKLVUHODWLRQLV
H[FOXVLYHO\RQHEHWZHHQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶s attitude of detachment and a world which, if 
attentively contemplated, is seen as pure necessity ± even though results are produced, for 
Weil, such results are merely residues devoid of ethical significance. Accordingly, in order 
to represent this relation through art, I posited that my observational drawing practice should 
signify an attitude of detachment by explicitly disregarding results and by inviting an 
interpretation of the drawings as being subjective, specifically, a subjective experience of 
necessity. While, as I pointed out in §1.1, in my initial invHVWLJDWLRQRI:HLO¶VQRWLRQRI
attention through observational drawing, I resorted to text in the form of notes referring to 
my subjective experience of drawing in a rather broad and general manner, the articulation 
of the normative analogy indicated that my texts should focus on drawing as act, and 
explicitly not on drawing as product. In this section, firstly, I will give two examples of 
views of drawing as product which refer to attention, and I will indicate in what respect 
these views differ from notions of drawing as act; and secondly, I will explain how the 
                                                                                                                                          
process is built upon that understanding. So, I think that when I was confronted with this idea of being 
in the studio and generating form, it was a way in which I could understand form being developed 
with a self-imposed resistance placed upon it, as it is in a body. So those were the ideas that started 
the Drawing Restraint SURMHFW¶Barney, 2006.) 
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function of text as a reflection on drawing as act, within the normative projects, required a 
clearer definition of the correlation between drawing and text, which was achieved by 
introducing the idea of hybrid art object.  
A reference to attention in drawing, where drawing is considered as product, can be found in 
3KLOLS5DZVRQ¶VERRN Drawing5DZVRQ¶VDSSURDFKHSLWRPLVHVDYLHZRIGUDZLQJDVUHVXOW, 
in the sense that it emphasises the materiality of drawing, pre-eminently through formal 
considerations: for Rawson, the appearance of drawings directly affects a perceptual, 
attentional change in the viewer; and to a large extent, Rawson can afford to ignore the 
intention198 of the drawer ± the drawer is conceptualised as a pro-ducer of drawings (he or 
she brings forth drawings), not as an agent whose agency is indicated by his or her drawings. 
)RULQVWDQFHDQDO\VLQJ6HVVKX¶VSpilled ink landscape in haboku style 1495, Rawson writes:  
Those objects or elements which form the centre of attention in any picture are drawn with 
firm, dark lines which set off the bulk of the feature they contain as an enclosed area of 
strongly contrasted light tone. ... Then around them the other features are treated in a 
descending scale of darks, and of attention. ... This scale of tonal values ensures that the 
spectator does not feel the open spaces in the picture as gaps, but only as the natural tapering 
off of his focused attention.199 
Likewise, for the artist David Musgrave, it is the material aspect of drawing that directly 
affects the attentional disposition of the viewer: 
Drawings, in their material slightness, tend to collude in their own disappearance. No matter 
how heavily worked a drawing might be, the repeated abrasions of a pencil, charcoal, chalk or 
SDVWHOMXVWFDQ¶WEHPDGHWRFRQJHDOLQWRDQRLO\LPSDVWRDOLQHLVPRUHOLNHO\WRWUDQVIRUPD
sheet of paper into a space than to draw attention to its substance, and shaded expanses of 
graphite form a very tenuous skin.200 
5DZVRQ¶VDQG0XVJUDYH¶VDSSURDFKWRDWWHQWLRQLQGUDZLQJVHHPVWRPHLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWK
WKHUROHZKLFK:HLO¶VDVVLJQVWRDWWHQWLRQLQKHUDFFRXQWRIWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQVXEMHFWDQG
the world. For them, what is at issue is what drawings attract attention to, rather than how 
the drawer deals with the problem of the exercise of attention through drawing, which entails 
considering drawings as traces of intentional action. Moreover, my analysis of Weilian 
attention in Chapter 3 demonstrates that, for Weil, the concept of attention encompasses a 
range of ethical notions which are evidently not implied by Rawson and Musgrave201. For 
these reasons, I deemed the view of drawing as product to be unsuitable within the 
methodological framework of my investigation of Weilian attention through observational 
drawing.      
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 5DZVRQ¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI WKHGUDZHU¶VLQWHQWLRQLVPRVWO\UHVWULFWHGWRLQWHQWLRQVDWVXSUD-
LQGLYLGXDOOHYHO)RULQVWDQFH5DZVRQFRQVLGHU6HVVKX¶VGUDZLQJ (see below) only with regard to it 
EHORQJLQJWRWKHJHQHUDOFODVVµHDUly Chinese and Japanese drawing¶.  
199
 Rawson, 1987, p. 121. 
200
 Musgrave, 2004, p. 11. 
201
 7KLVLVQRWVXUSULVLQJJLYHQ:HLO¶VKLJKO\LGLRV\QFUDWLFFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ 
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A theorist who has provided a sustained reflection on attention with regard to art making (i.e. 
to art as act), although not specifically to drawing, is Anton Ehrenzweig. Throughout the 
FKDSWHUµ7KHWZRNLQGVRIDWWHQWLRQ¶202 of his The Hidden Order of Art, Ehrenzweig makes a 
distinction between inferior differentiated (conscious, narrowly focused) attention and 
superior undifferentiated (unconscious, widely focused, scattered, empty) attention. 
Similarly, Weil distinguishes between two kinds of attention that correspond, respectively, 
to clumsiness (maladresse), which is rigid, and to dexterity (adresse), which is open and 
relaxed203%XWWKHSV\FKRDQDO\WLFWRSRJUDSK\RI(KUHQ]ZHLJ¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQFDnnot 
EHPDSSHGRQWR:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQVLQFHVKHEHOLHYHV)UHXG¶VWKHRU\RIWKH
unconscious to be unclear on the point of ethical responsibility204, and, for her, attention has 
pre-eminently an ethical significance205. 
I now turn to the correlation of drawing and text in the normative projects. At the beginning 
of this section, I identified a parallelism between a view of drawing as result and a focus on 
the materiality of drawing. Thus, since, in the normative projects, I intended to combine 
drawing and text in such a way as to convey a disregard for the results of the act of drawing, 
the methodology of normative projects involved using text to deflect the focus away from 
the material presence of my drawings. In order to do so, I found it methodologically useful 
to envision a kind of hybrid art object which comprises both what is commonly thought of 
as the artwork proper (in the visual arts, this is typically a non-linguistic, material object) 
DQGDOLQJXLVWLFFRPSRQHQWEHLWWKHDUWLVW¶VRZQRUVRPHERG\HOVH¶VUHIOHFWLRQRQDFFRXQW
of, justification for, etc. a given work. 
Instances of this kind of art object are more readily exemplified by materially slight 
DUWZRUNVIRULQWKHVHFDVHVWKHTXHVWLRQµ:KDWFRQVWLWXWHVWKHDUWZRUN"¶VHHPVSDUWLFXODrly 
relevant. I will give four examples: 
-DPHV/HH%\DUV¶ Homage to Apollo: In an essay on Byars, the art critic Thomas 
McEvilley gives an account of an impromptu performance by the artist: a homage to Apollo, 
at the Temple of Apollo, in Delphi206. What is the mode of existence of this piece? Or, 
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 Ehrenzweig, 2000, pp. 21±31. 
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 See footnote 142. 
204
 Weil, LP, pp. 106±117.  
205
 µ$WWKHFHQWUHRIYROXQWDU\DFWLRQDWWHQWLRQ¶:HLl, OC ISµ,WLVLPSRVVLEOHHYHQDEVXUG
WREHVXUSULVHGE\$FKLOOHV¶LQKXPDQLW\+HGRHVQRWSD\DWWHQWLRQWRWKHIDFWWKDWWKH\RXQJ7URMDQV
EHORQJWRWKHVDPHVSHFLHVWRZKLFK3DWURFOXVEHORQJV¶,ELGSµ9ROXQWDU\DFW¶DQG
µKXPDQLW\¶are ethical notions. 
206
 µ7KHQH[WGD\DW'HOSKL%\DUVZDQWHGWRGRDSLHFHLQWKH7HPSOHRI$SROORLWZDVDIWHUDOO1HZ
<HDU¶V'D\%UHDFKLQJWKHURSHERXQGDU\KHVWUHWFKHGKLPVHOILQWRDVWDU-shaped figure behind a 
gold lame circle while I hollered a VHOHFWLRQRIORFXWLRQV³7KDW¶VDEHDXWLIXOKDW´$VWKHJXDUGV
EOHZWKHLUZKLVWOHVDQGUXVKHGWRZDUGVXVDVFKRROWHDFKHUVWRSSHGKHUVWXGHQWVWRVD\³/RRN
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rather, since the former question misleadingly suggests a duality between a piece and an 
account of it, it is more appropriate to ask: What is the art object here? Given that, as far as I 
know, there is neither vLGHRQRUSKRWRJUDSKLFDOUHFRUGLQJRI%\DUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH
0F(YLOOH\¶VDFFRXQWRILWZRXOGKDYHWRIRUPSDUWHYHQWKHmain part) of the answer, any 
answer; this is sufficient to show the import of the linguistic element in this art object, 
regardless of the various particular answers one may formulate. 
(2) Tino Sehgal: Sehgal has made immateriality one of the principal concerns of his artistic 
endeavour (he does not allow the events he organises to be recorded and even gallery labels 
are dispensed with). To give an idea of the thoroughness with which Sehgal tries207 to 
preserve the immateriality of his work, I will quote from an interview between the artist and 
Silvia Sgualdini: 
SS: I have a last question, which is about the future. This year you have been invited together 
with Thomas Scheibitz to represent Germany at the Venice Biennale 2005. Can I ask you what 
we can expect? TS: Yes, you can because you are working on the project but only when you 
switch off the machine. So you can, the machine cannot.208 
Sehgal maintains that the referentiality of language makes language a suitable means for the 
representation of immateriality, while images tend to be interpreted as (material) artworks in 
their own right209. In the normative projects I use text to referentially emphasise the status of 
drawing as act, rather than as a result (as Rawson and Musgrave do).  
<YHV.OHLQ¶V The Refinement of Sensibility in the First Material State into Stabilized 
Pictorial Sensibility (ROS). This art object is found in the book Overcoming the 
Problematics of Art: The Writings of Yves Klein and it consists of four photographs of the 
empty210 Galerie Iris Clert, Paris, on 27th April 1958, where and when ROS took place, and 
.OHLQ¶VOHFWXUHThe Evolution of Art Towards the Immaterial, given at the Sorbonne, on 3rd 
                                                                                                                                          
children, an homage to Apollo´¶0F(YLOOH\S7KLVHVVD\KDVEHHQUHSULQWHGZLWKVome 
changes in Friedli & Frehner, 2009. 
207
 In this age of easily producible and reproducible images, it is impossible for Sehgal to avoid the 
dissemination of images and videos of his work. But by not selling such by-products, Sehgal 
maintains control over what constitute his ZRUN,PPDWHULDOLW\H[WHQGVDOVRWRFRQWUDFWVµ7R
guarantee absolute de-materialization of the art object, Sehgal only sells his work via an oral contract. 
... Generally speaking Sehgal presents the sales contract as a feat of memory aORQH¶6D\HMS
20.) 
208
 Sgualdini, 2009. 
209
 ,QDQLQWHUYLHZZLWK7LP*ULIILQ6HKJDODUJXHVµ$VZLWKDQ\RWKHUDUWP\ZRUNZDQWVWR
communicate and is dependent on its reception. For me, the issue simply is the way such 
communication takes place ± WKDWLWGRHVQ¶WVXEVWDQWLDOO\DOWHUWKHFKDUDFWHURIP\ZRUNDVD
photograph would. ... Language is rooted in a referential mode, while a documentary image is always 
in danger of being taken as something in itself, especially, of course, in the field of vLVXDODUW¶
(Griffin, 2005.) See also: Coburn, 2007. 
210
 7KHWHUPµHPSW\¶LVXVHGZLWKLWVHYHU\GD\PHDQLQJ*LYHQP\DUJXPHQWWKH*DOHULH,ULV&OHUW
can be said to be empty but not art-object-less. 
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June 1959211, where he refers to ROS$JDLQLQWKLVDUWREMHFWWKHWH[WLH.OHLQ¶VOHFWXUH
plays a major role in its mode of existence.    
7KHODVWH[DPSOHLV3DXO.OHH¶VPedagogical Sketchbook, which is particularly 
paradigmatic in the context of my research, because it contains both texts and drawings. In 
order to clarify what kind of perspective on drawing is required for interpreting the 
Pedagogical Sketchbook, and the normative projects, as a hybrid art objects, I will outline 
3DWULFN0D\QDUG¶VQRWLRQRIdepiction, in his recent book on drawing. Maynard makes a 
distinction between: 
± on one hand, representation, whose function is to mandate that we imagine things, i.e. 
which is a source of information; 
± and on the other hand, visually depictive representation, or, more succinctly depiction, 
whose function is to mandate that we imagine seeing things, i.e. which is a source of 
information about what is visible, about how things might look.212  
0D\QDUG¶VXVHRIWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQLQhis analysis of drawings is illuminating because it 
affords a theoretical conceptualisation and, therefore, a clarification, of the kind of semantic 
function of drawing which Rawson and Musgrave describe in the quotes discussed above, 
namely, a function that goes beyond straightforward causality213. But I would like to expand 
0D\QDUG¶VQRWLRQRIGHSLFWLRQVRDVWRLQFOXGHWKHFRQIODWLRQRIWH[WDQGGUDZLQJ
characteristic of hybrid art objects. For Maynard, there are, on one hand, drawings which are 
representations, such as design drawings and diagrams, and, on the other hand, depictive 
drawings which are depictions, in which latter category one finds artistic214 drawings; and he 
predicates this distinction almost exclusively on the appearance of drawings. The expansion 
of the notion of depiction which I propose considers drawings as signs that, by virtue of 
many factors (many of which are extra-visual, such as the context in which the drawing is 
seen, the socio-cultural association the drawing might suggest, extra-artistic fields of 
knowledge, and, notably, a textual component referring to the drawing), invite a certain 
range of interpretations. I think that this expansion is necessary to fully appreciate the 
VHPDQWLFIXQFWLRQRI.OHH¶V Pedagogical Sketchbook (and of the normative projects in my 
researchDFFRUGLQJWR0D\QDUG¶VYLHZRIGHSLFWLRQWKHPedagogical Sketchbook would 
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 Klein, 2007, pp. 71±98.  
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 Maynard, 2005, pp. 88±93.    
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 :KHQ5DZVRQZULWHVWKDWLQ6HVVKX¶VGUDZLQJµWKHVSHFWDWRUIHHOVWKHRSHQVSDFHVLQWKH
SLFWXUHDVWKHQDWXUDOWDSHULQJRIIRIKLVIRFXVVHGDWWHQWLRQ¶RUZKHQ0XVJUDYHZULWHVWKDWµDOLQHLV
more likely to transform a sheet of paper into a VSDFHWKDQWRGUDZDWWHQWLRQWRLWVVXEVWDQFH¶WKH\
conceptualise drawings as the causes of the attentional disposition of the viewer.  
214
 0D\QDUGGRHVQRWXVHWKHWHUPµDUWLVWLF¶EXWDIOHHWLQJSHUXVDORIWKHLPDJHVLQWKHERRNVKRXOGEH
sufficient to demonstrate that this is what Maynard has in mind.    
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neither be a mere source of information (notwithstanding the diagrammatic nature of many 
of the drawings) nor a source of information about what is visible in any straightforward 
sense. How, then, can one make sense of the Pedagogical Sketchbook? The expanded notion 
of depiction helps to answer this question. In the Pedagogical Sketchbook, through a 
combination of texts and drawings, Klee is inviting the viewer/reader to interpret the 
drawings as an analogy to mechanical dynamics: here is a line ± look again: it is an active 
moving point that has come to rest; here is a plane described by a line ± look again: it is a 
medial moving point which, while forming a line has returned to its point of departure; here 
is a plane ± look again: it is a passive line; and look again: the point is a brain, the linear 
plane is a muscle and the plane is a bone; or a waterfall, a wheel and a hammer of a 
waterwheel, respectively, or, again the drum of a big wheel, the transmission belt of a 
subsidiary wheel and the subsidiary wheel215; and so on and so forth ± the analogy keeps 
propagating semantic permutations. 
Likewise, the normative projects are hybrid art objects in which the textual component 
invites the viewer/reader to interpret the drawing in terms of the normative critical practical 
analogy, that is, as representations of my attempt to adopt a detached disposition towards 
necessity. 216 
Having explained how the notion of hybrid art object affords a conceptualisation of action 
which is congruent with the relation that Weil envisages between the individual and the 
world in her discourse on attention (namely, a relation which centres on disposition and 
which ethLFDOO\GHYDOXHVWKHUHVXOWVRIDFWLRQLQ,ZLOORXWOLQH:HLO¶VYLHZVRQWKH
nature of the agent, or subject; in particular, I will demonstrate that the Weilian subject 
cannot self-reflectively evaluate his or her progress in attention as a practice of detachment.  
4.22 The Weilian subject in attention as a practice of detachment 
Given that Weil stresses that the value of a sustained effort of attention can only be 
comprehended through direct subjective experience and given that self-reflexivity is the 
most diffused mode of discursive articulation of art practice, it is not surprising that, as I 
have pointed out in §1.1, I initially construed the hybrid art object in self-reflexive terms, 
with my notes on drawing functioning as a detector of my progress in attention. 
Furthermore, the fact that, for Weil, the degree of attentiveness with which an action is 
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 Klee, 1953, pp. 16±30.  
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 Other art objects which I consider to dwell on questions regarding the relation between material 
REMHFWDQGWH[WDUH3DXO.OHH¶VThe Thinking Eye (Klee, 1978); several publications of Marcel 
'XFKDPS¶VQRWHVThe Writings of Marchel Duchamp (Duchamp, 1973), Duchamp du signe 
(Duchamp, 1994a), Notes 'XFKDPSEDQG+HQU\0LFKDX[¶VEmergences/Resurgences, a book 
ZKLFKFRQWDLQVUHSURGXFWLRQVRI0LFKDX[¶VGUDZLQJVDORQJVLGHKLs reflections on them (Michaux, 
2000).  
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performed is not measurable by considering extra-subjective effects of action (see § 4.1) 
seemed to point in the direction of subjectivity. However, as my analysis of Weilian 
attention in Chapter 3 intimates, the Weilian subject is just one more element in the web of 
mechanistic necessary relationships that constitutes reality (as I have argued in §3.363, in the 
PRVWHOHYDWHGDWWHQWLRQWKHµ,¶KDVEHen eliminated). In other words, the essential point of 
WKHVXEMHFWLQ:HLO¶VDFFRXQWRIDWWHQWLRQDVDSUDFWLFHRIGHWDFKPHQWLVWKDWWKHDLPRIVXFK
practice is to obtain a de-reification of the subject. Therefore, the Weilian subject cannot be 
self-reflexive because this subject is self-less (even though selflessness is an ideal, regulative 
goal for Weil). AlsoDV,SRLQWHGLQHYHQ:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIUHDGLQJZKLFKZRXOGVHHP
to imply the possibility of self-PRQLWRULQJRQH¶VHWKLFDOSURJUHVVSRLQWV towards ethical 
neutrality. I will elucidate the Weilian subject by considering it within the dynamics of 
attention as a practice of detachment.  
As I have argued in §3.362, for Weil, voluntary attention perceives reality as necessity. The 
most elevated attention is acceptance of reality as necessity and this also includes accepting 
WKDWWKHVXEMHFWLYHµ,¶LVDOZD\Vsubject to necessity along with the rest of the material world 
(§3.363). That is to say, in her discourse on attention, Weil sees the subject within the 
reductivist perspective of scientific materialistic monism217, which de-reifies the subject by 
turning it into an object-subject-to. Detachment is the acceptance of this de-reified 
conceptualisation of the subject as the reality of the subject. For Weil, the process of de-
reification of the subject through attention involves contemplating the subject with regard to 
its agency in the context of the relation between the subject and the world (which constitutes 
the objective analogue of the normative analogy (§4.1)). In this respect, the Weilian subject 
as agent is akin to the view of the agent which is found in Stoic ethics: as Pierre Hadot 
PDLQWDLQV6WRLFHWKLFVµLQYLWHVWKHVXEMHFWWRDFW while becoming aware of the fact that the 
results of our actions do not depend on us, but from the interweaving of universal causes, of 
WKHJHQHUDOFRXUVHRIWKHFRVPRV¶218 ± although the concept of de-reification of the subject is 
alien to Stoic philosophy. The process of de-reification obtains the death of the subject as 
free wilful agent, and this death of the subject is detachment. As Weil writes:  
Any action which has really occurred can be reduced to a play of necessities, without any 
residual part of the self.219  
                                                 
217
 µ$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVSULQFLSOH>LHWKHSULQFLSOHRIPRQLVP@LQLWVVFLHQWLILFJXLVHWKHUHLVRQHXQLILHG
universe consisting of generally one kind of stuff, which can be described completely by physics. This 
metaphysical principle is closely conjoined with another belief, known as universalism, which asserts 
that natural quantifiable, regular laws govern the course of events in the universe throughout all space 
DQGWLPH¶:DOODFHS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 Hadot, 2002, pp. 173±175.  
219
 Weil, OC VI 1, p. 331; my italics and bold. 
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There is no greater attitude of humility than that of silent and patient attending. ... The cry of 
SULGHLVµWKHIXWXUHLVPLQH¶LQVRPHIRUPRUDQRWKHU+XPLOLW\LVWKHNQRZOHGJHRIWKH
opposite truth. If only the present is mine, I am nothing, for the present is nothing.220 
Hunger (thirst, etc.) and every desire of the flesh is an orientation of the body towards the 
future. The whole of the carnal part of our soul is oriented towards the future. Death freezes. 
From afar, privation resembles death. The flesh lives oriented towards the future. 
Concupiscence is life itself. Detachment is a death.221 
Thus, attention as a practice of detachment leads to the paradoxical foiling of the subject by 
WKHVXEMHFW:HLO¶Vargument is similar in some respects to the one articulated by 
Wittgenstein in the famous penultimate proposition, §6.54, of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus: 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as 
senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak 
throw away the ladder, after he has climbed upon it.) He must surmount these propositions; 
then he sees the world rightly.222  
Likewise, Weilian attention as a practice of detachment requires the use of the concept of 
VXEMHFWLYHµ,¶LQRUGHUWRUHFRJQLVHWKDWWKHUHLVQRµ,¶$V,ZLOOVKRZLQWKLVNLQGRI
SDUDGR[EHORQJVWRWKHZLGHUFRQWH[WVRI:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFVLQZKLFKWKHQRWLRQVRI
tautology and contradiction (which are the subjects of the imaginal projects) play a central 
role. On the other hand, in the normative projects, I use the non-self-reflexive Weilian 
VXEMHFWWRGHYHORSDQHSLVWHPRORJLFDOFULWLTXHRI:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ 
There is another reason why I deemed self-reflexive subjectivity to be methodologically 
problematic within the research, namely, the problem of solipsism. The following drawings 
of mine (Figs. 4.1±4.4) and accompanying notes are an example of solipsistic hybrid art 
object: 
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Fig. 4.1 Gisborne Road, East, 2005, pencil on paper, 42 × 
30 cm. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 Gisborne Road, East (detail), 2005, pencil on 
paper, 15 × 12 cm. 
 
 
          
Fig. 4.3 Gisborne Road, Night Window, 2005, pencil on 
paper, 42 × 30 cm. 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Gisborne Road, Night Window (detail), 2005, 
pencil on paper, 13.5 × 10 cm. 
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,¶m drawing from observation. As soon as I put down a mark that refers to the subject, I 
become aware of a paradox. On one hand the mark does seem to relate to the subject in some 
ZD\,VD\µThis mark represents that particular feature of the observed object¶; on the other 
hand, I¶m aware of the total difference that exists between the mark and what it represents: I 
say µThis mark is not what I see¶. 
It would seem an impasse. Yet, because I can¶t hold on to the idea of total difference between 
seeing and representing, and because, for me, the mark still refers, somehow, to the subject, I 
start believing that I can, however slightly, reduce the gap of total difference. The difference is, 
of course, fundamental, the gap cannot be bridged but I can¶t know it (I can write and talk 
about it, but knowing is another matter), therefore I have the (deluded) impression that 
something can be done, that there is a lot of work to do. 
With drawing I say nothing: I turn my attention to...  
As long as I hold on to the paradox that what I draw is and is not what I see, there is always 
more work to do. Strangely, it feels like voluntary forced labour, self-imposed ob-servation.   
6ROLSVLVPLVQRWRQO\DWRGGVZLWK:HLO¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQDVDSUDFWLFHRI
detachment: there is also a more specifically artistic issue regarding solipsism, that is, the 
positioning of the viewer, or interpreWHU:LWKRXWDQLQWHUSUHWDWLYHµZD\LQ¶, the viewer might 
be left stranded in front of an unintelligible sign. In the above notes, for instance, references 
to what I see, what I believe, what I have an impression of and what I feel remain quite 
impenetrable for the reader. The viewer needs to be presented with a context for the work. 
That context could have taken the form of an explanation in terms of my research on 
Weilian attention, but this would have been unsatisfactory, for the semantic function of 
artworks is generally tied to a quite indeterminate, but nevertheless pervasive, notion of 
autonomy of the art object. That is not to say that I subscribe to a modernist view of art as 
existing in a socio-cultural vacuum; neither do I think that explanation ± or rather the 
explanatory mode ± as such is inappropriate material for the production of artworks. But, if 
the explanatory mode is not read by the viewer as an artistic trope, then, given the general 
view of the semantic autonomy of artworks, it is likely that a mismatched dualistic reading 
of explanation, on one side, and artwork, on the other, will ensue; and, in turn, this would 
make the artwork merely illustrational (my notes quoted above could for instance be seen as 
LOOXVWUDWLYHRI:HLO¶VRZQPDQQHURISKLORVRSKLVLQJUDWKHUWKDQKHXULVWLF 
In order to deal with the problem of solipsism and to enact the non-reflexive subject through 
observational drawing, the methodology of the normative projects involved a dialogical 
approach, which was implemented through a long-lasting collaboration with artist 
Hephzibah Rendle-Short. The collaboration arose from a common interest in the potential of 
observational art practice to address questions that exceed the field of art, and we shared the 
intention of employing theoretical discourses which are not germane to art theory for a 
critique of our art practices. This collaboration spans several normative projects, and, 
consequently, it is the core of the exposition of the projects articulated in §4.3. I use the 
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DGMHFWLYHµGLDORJLFDO¶ZLWKLWVPRVWJHQHUDOPHDQLQJLHµSHUWDLQLQJWRRUFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\
GLDORJXH¶$V,ZLOOVKRZWKHFROODERUDWLRQWXUQHGWKHVROLSVLVWic monologue, characteristic 
of my initial approach, into a dialogue. However, the dialogic element of the normative 
projects should not be confused with the dialogical scepticism of the imaginal projects (see 
§6.4), since the former is a method, while the latter is a methodological attitude. Dialogue in 
the normative projects pertains to a way of making drawings, while dialogical scepticism in 
the imaginal projects is a way of approaching :HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQWKURXJKDUW
making.  
4.3 Normative projects 
In what follows, I discuss the normative projects. These projects all use the dialogic 
methodology, with the exception of the project reported in §4.33, which is in many respects 
a transitional project (somewhere in between normative mode: it places limitations on my 
observational drawing practice; and imaginal mode: it is an image of an image, i.e. of the 
EOLQGSHUVRQ¶VFDQHPHWDSKRU7KHSURMHFWEHORQJVLQWKLVFKDSWHUILUVWO\EHFDXVHLWGHOYHV
into the semethical notions of habit and reading223, and, therefore, it deals with the issue of 
WKHDJHQW¶VGLVSRVLWLRQWRZDUGVWKHZRUOGZKLFKLVWKHNH\FRQFHUQRIWKHQRUPDWLYH
projects); and, secondly, because it is a clear example of hybrid art object, since two 
versions of this project were published in journals as a combination of text and drawing. 
The twofold qualification of the relation myself/the world in terms of a capacity to 
experience necessity and to assume a detached attitude affords a classification of the 
normative projects into two subcategories, namely, projects whose objective is the 
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 This change of course required laying aside, at least for a time, the preoccupation with the general 
picture of Weilian attention which I outlined in the literary review, focussing instead on the rather 
scant* remarks that Weil makes on the relation between attention and artworks. In these remarks, Weil 
holds that an attention-inviting art object, Ai, cannot but be the result of the agency of an attentive 
artist, Aa, and this is problematic not because it is incongruent with what Weil says about results of 
attentive actions, but because it places the artist, as producer of Ai (in this case, me) in the position of 
having to assume the role of Aa. Since this implies a self-righteousness which I find untenable, I GHFLGHGWRGLVFRXQWWHPSRUDULO\:HLO¶VHTXDWLRQAi ĺ$a. In other words, I assumed that I could 
produce an artwork having the properties of Ai and that this would not necessarily make me Aa.  
* The scantiness of the remarks is counterbalanced by the fact that they are found in a rather wide-
ranging and systematic essay, titled De la perception ou l'aventure de Protée, in which Weil relates 
attention and art by considering imagination, which, as I argued in §3.31 and §3.32, is an overarching 
concern of hers.  
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 µ:KDWLVSDUWLFXODULQZRUNVRIDUWLVWKDWWKHVRXQGZKLFKUHDFKHVWKHOLVWHQHUIURPRXWVLGHVHHPVWR
him to be solely the frXLWRIKLVRZQDWWHQGLQJ,QUHDOLW\LWKDVEHHQWKHIUXLWRIWKHDUWLVW¶VDWWHQGLQJ
For the composer, to foresee what note will follow is always to invent it; this invention is the fruit of 
attending¶:HLOOC ISµ,QFRPSRVLQJPXVLFRUSRHWU\one aims at a certain inner silence of 
the soul and one arranges words or sounds in such a way as to render this aspiration perceptible to 
RWKHUV¶:HLOC 1, p. 56.) 
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representation of an experience of necessity, and projects motivated by the intention of 
representing an attitude of detachment, and thus the following sections are arranged 
according to this classification.  
4.31 The experience of necessity 
4.311 First collaboration with Hephzibah Rendle-Short 
In this project, Hephzibah painted my portrait and I made a drawing of the painting after 
each session; we both wrote notes on this process; no agreement was made with regard to 
the form the notes should take, and we never compared notes during the project. In the 
exhibition Acts and Actions224, we presented the painting, four drawings and a booklet with a 
typed reproduction of the notes, arranged so that the viewer could compare the notes we had 
written after each session (Figs. 4.5±4.16).      
  
Fig. 4.5 Acts and Actions installation, Cafe Gallery, London, 2008: Drawings after 
Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJ 
     
                                                 
224
 Cafe Gallery, London, February 2008. 
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Fig. 4.6 Acts and Actions installation, Cafe Gallery, London, 2008: Drawings after Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJ 
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Fig. 4.7 Acts and Actions: Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJ&DIH*DOOHU\/RQGRQ
2008, oil on canvas, 101 × 86 cm. 
      
 
   
Fig. 4.8 Acts and Actions: Hephzibah Rendle-Short¶VSDLQWLQJ (detail), Cafe Gallery, 
London, 2008, oil on canvas, 101 × 86 cm. 
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Fig. 4.9 Acts and Actions: Drawings after Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJ
(detail), Cafe Gallery, London, 2008, pencil on paper, 7.9 × 7.8 cm. 
 
      
 
Fig. 4.10 Acts and Actions: Drawings after Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJ
(detail), Cafe Gallery, London, 2008, pencil on paper, 9.1 × 7.8 cm. 
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Fig. 4.11 Acts and Actions: Drawings after Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJ
(detail), Cafe Gallery, London, 2008, pencil on paper, 10.7 × 9.7 cm. 
 
   
 
Fig. 4.12 Acts and Actions: Drawings after Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJ
(detail), 2008, Cafe Gallery, London, pencil on paper, 9.5 × 8.6 cm. 
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 Fig. 4.13 Acts and Actions: Booklet, Cafe Gallery, London, 2008, 21 × 14.8 cm.  
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   Fig. 4.14 Acts and Actions: Booklet, Cafe Gallery, London, 2008, 21 × 14.8 cm.  
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    Fig. 4.15 Acts and Actions: Booklet, Cafe Gallery, London, 2008, 21 × 14.8 cm.  
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    Fig. 4.16 Acts and Actions: Booklet, Cafe Gallery, London, 2008, 21 × 14.8 cm.  
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In light of my research225, this was a representation of the relation myself/the world, in the 
sense that it was an invitation to interpret the installation as an objectification of me as 
drawing agent, both through the visual component: these are drawings of an object, i.e. of a 
SDLQWLQJDQGQRWRIDSHUVRQ+HSK]LEDK¶VQRQ-trompe-O
°LO painting manner reinforced the 
objectification); and through the textual component: see, for instance, the notes of Monday 
18th February 2008 (Fig. 4.16), where Hephzibah describes me drawing and where I give a 
diagrammatic sketch of the dynamic of the collaboration. I stress the difference between (1) 
the text/drawing combination in Figs. 4.1±4.4 and (2) the Acts and Actions installation: the 
interpretation of the former presupposes that the viewer empathises with me as a specific 
individual (hence the potentially unintelligible solipsism), while, in the latter, the viewer is 
SUHVHQWHGZLWKDGHVFULSWLRQRUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIPHDVEHORQJLQJWRWKHFODVVµGUDZLQJ
DJHQW¶ZKLFKRIIHUVWRWKHYLHZHUDPRUHKHOSIXOLQWHUSUHWDWLYHNH\,QRQHVHHVWKH
object of observation, i.e. the painting (this is not so in (1)), which functions as a 
representation of the world in the relationship myself/the world. While (1) indicates a belief 
in the direct presentability of this relationship, (2) evidences a view of the artwork as re-
presentation, as mediation between an intended meaning and a potential interpreter who will 
respond in a certain imputed manner226. Moreover, while (1) is ambiguous with regard to the 
effacement of the results of drawing, in (2), the reading of the drawings as results is 
discouraged by their inclusion in the wider dialogic narrative of collaboration. 
As I show below, the collaboration with Hephzibah continued further and moved towards a 
more explicit representation of the artist as drawing agent, which involved questioning what 
counts as drawing as result.  
4.312 Collaborative residency with Hephzibah Rendle-Short 
Hephzibah Rendle-Short and I collaborated on a residency at the Centre for Drawing Project 
Space, London227. In order to elucidate our intentions, firstly, I will return to the analysis of 
the orders of Weilian attention and explain how Weil binds the notions of voluntary and 
most elevated attention, necessity and contradiction in her discourse on ethics. Secondly, I 
ZLOOLGHQWLI\ZKDW,VDZDVDSUREOHPZLWK:HLO¶VDUJument. And, thirdly, I will show how I 
XVHGWKLVSUREOHPSRVLWLYHO\LQDUWSUDFWLFHE\DSSHDOLQJWR:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VGLVWLQFWLRQ
between ethical feelings and ethical judgements. The first part of this third exposition 
GLVFXVVHV:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VLecture on Ethics, and, even though it might have seemed more 
                                                 
225
 1DWXUDOO\DV+HSK]LEDK¶VUHVHDUFKFRQFHUQVGiffered from mine, the function she intended the 
work to fulfil was also different.  
226
 This triadic semiotic relation is modelled on the one proposed by Ogden and Richards in their 
book The Meaning of Meaning. See: Ogden and Richards, 1989, p. 11.  
227
 The residency took place during May 2008.  
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appropriate to include such a discussion in Chapter 2, this would have obfuscated its specific 
propaedeutic function in the development of the art projects. 
As I have argued in §3.362 and §3.363, for Weil:  
± Voluntary attention reveals necessity and the most elevated attention is consent to 
necessity. 
± The most elevated attention is associated with both goodness in the general sense of 
aptness (e.g. the dexterity of the good cyclist) and with goodness in the ethical sense 
of freedom as acceptance of the will of a transcendent being228.  
± There is an insoluble contradiction between the fact that reality is necessity and the 
fact that the only truly free act is the acceptance of necessity229. 
One may object: Is this not DQLPSRVVLEOHVLWXDWLRQ":HLO¶VDQVZHUWRWKLVREMHFWLRQLV
simply: Yes, it is an impossible situation; and yet, if you fix your attention on the 
impossibility, your actions will inevitably be good. I shall quote two passages where Weil 
proposes this argument: 
All true good entails contradictory conditions and is therefore impossible. He who keeps his 
attention truly fixed on this impossibility and acts will do what is good.230  
We all know that there is no good here below ... Every human being has probably had during 
their life several moments in which they have clearly admitted to themselves that there is no 
good here below ... It is up to them to remain motionless, without diverting their gaze ... If 
God, after a long wait, gives a vague premonition of his light or even reveals himself in 
person, it is just for an instant. Once again one must remain motionless, attentive [attentif], and 
wait [attendre@(OHFWUD>LQ:HLO¶VPHWDSKRU(OHFWUDLVWKHVRXO@GRHVQRWVHDUFKIRU2UHVWHV>LQ
:HLO¶VPHWDSKRU2UHVWHs is God], she waits. ... All that which she desires is not to exist, since 
Orestes does not exist. At this moment Orestes can no longer stop himself. He cannot help but 
disclose his name. He gives certain proof that he is Orestes.231    
,IRXQG:HLO¶VSURSRVition problematic, since it seems to ask for more or less blind 
acceptance of contradiction. And, yet, at the same time, I also felt that it indicated something 
significant about Weilian ethics. By considering the proposition as an index (see §4.3121), I 
was able to lay aside the question of whether what Weil maintains was true or false232 and I 
could concentrate on what the index seemed to point to, which, for the moment, I shall call 
                                                 
228
 See footnote 162.  
229
 See §3.38 and §3.4.  
230
 Weil, OC VI  3, p. 95. 
231
 Weil, OC IV 1, pp. 334±335.  
232
 Indexes do not possess truth value because they do not state anything. For instance: a pointing 
finger is neither true nor false; the index of a book, despite the fact that it might be composed of 
symbols which convey very abstract and complex notions, states nothing, but merely indicates that 
such notions are to be found at such and such a page. The second example intimates how a 
SURSRVLWLRQVXFKDV:HLO¶VSURSRVLWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\LPSRVVLELOLW\RIJRRGPLJKWEH
considered an index, despite its propositional function. 
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DQµHWKLFDOLQNOLQJ¶:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VLecture on Ethics proved very useful for the 
investigation of this issue.  
4.3121 Ethical feelings and statements of absolute value  
In Lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein describes ethics as an enquiry concerned with absolute 
value judgements233. The problem is that all judgements are represented by propositions and 
so, given that propositions are statements of facts and given that statements of facts are 
always relative (i.e. not absolute), there appears to be no possibility of representing absolute 
value judgements234. If an omniscient being, Wittgenstein continues, were to write a book 
VWDWLQJDOOWKHIDFWVLQWKHZRUOGµWKLVERRNZRXOGFRQWDLQQRWKLQJWKDWZHZRXOGFDOODQ
ethical judgment or anything that would logically imply such a judgment. It would of course 
contain all relative judgments of value and all true scientific propositions and in fact all true 
propositions that can be made. But all the facts described would, as it were, stand on the 
VDPHOHYHODQGLQWKHVDPHZD\DOOSURSRVLWLRQVVWDQGRQWKHVDPHOHYHO¶235 Yet, since 
Wittgenstein iVµVWLOOWHPSWHGWRXVHVXFKH[SUHVVLRQVDV³DEVROXWHJRRG´³DEVROXWHYDOXH´
HWF¶236, he tries to give examples of the sort of expressions he is inclined to use when he 
H[SHULHQFHVHWKLFDOIHHOLQJVWKHVHH[SUHVVLRQVDUHµI wonder at the existence of the world¶
DQGµWKHH[SHULHQFHRIIHHOLQJabsolutely VDIH¶237. It is important to stress the word feeling 
KHUHEHFDXVH:LWWJHQVWHLQLVYHU\FOHDUDERXWKLVSUHGLFDPHQWµ,DPLQWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ
which you would be if, for instance, I were to give you a lecture on the psychology of 
SOHDVXUH¶238 In other words, Wittgenstein makes no claim to the effect that, from his ethical 
feelings, he can deduce the truth of propositions stating some absolute, or ethical, value ± 
WKLVIROORZVIURP:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VYLHZWKDWVXEMHctive statements, like statements regarding 
RQH¶VIHHOLQJDUHGLVHQJDJHGIURPWKHmachinery of language (see p. 25 and footnote 28). 
2QWKHFRQWUDU\:LWWJHQVWHLQZULWHVµ,VHHQRZWKDWWKHVHQRQVHQVLFDOH[SUHVVLRQVZHUHQRW
nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality 
ZDVWKHLUYHU\HVVHQFH¶239 :LWWJHQVWHLQUHPDLQVILUPO\ZLWKLQWKHOLPLWVRIµ,¶ 
                                                 
233
 Wittgenstein, 1993, pp. 38±39. 
234
 µ(YHU\MXGJPHQWRIUHODWLYHYDOXHLVDPHUHVWDWHPHQWof facts and can therefore be put in such a 
IRUPWKDWLWORVHVDOOWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIDMXGJPHQWRIYDOXH,QVWHDGRIVD\LQJ³7KLVLVWKHULJKWZD\WR
*UDQWFKHVWHU´,FRXOGHTXDOO\ZHOOKDYHVDLG³7KLVLVWKHULJKWZD\\RXKDYHWRJRLI\RXZDQWWRJHW
to *UDQWFKHVWHULQWKHVKRUWHVWWLPH´³7KLVPDQLVDJRRGUXQQHU´VLPSO\PHDQVWKDWKHUXQVDFHUWDLQ
number of miles in a certain number of minutes, etc. Now what I wish to contend is that, although all 
judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere statement of facts, no statement of fact can ever 
EHRULPSO\DMXGJPHQWRIDEVROXWHYDOXH¶,ELGS 
235
 Ibid., p. 39. 
236
 Ibid., p. 40. 
237
 Ibid., p. 41. 
238
 Ibid., pp. 40±41.   
239
 Ibid., p. 44. 
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:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQethical feelings and statements of absolute value allows a 
clearer view of :HLO¶VFRQWUDGLFWRU\SURSRVLWLRQRQWKHVLPXOWDQHRXVSRVVLELOLW\DQG
impossibility of good: this proposition is an index of her ethical feelings. I may or may not 
KDYHH[SHULHQFHGVLPLODUIHHOLQJVEXWWKLVLVEHVLGHWKHSRLQW,QP\YLHZ:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVH 
on ethics suggests that her ethics rests on logic, that is, that it can be deduced by the use of 
argument, and thus she has to resort to a dogmatic notion of impossibility, while, for 
Wittgenstein, ethics rests on aesthetics, i.e. on feelings. WittgensteiQ¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ
ethical feelings and statements of absolute value allows him to approach ethical enquiry in a 
less dogmatic manner than Weil. In the last lines of the Lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein 
writes:  
My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics 
or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of 
our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say 
something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be 
no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. It is a document of a 
tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not 
for my life ridicule it.240  
Even though Weil does not explicitly argue that ethics rests on logic, this is implied by 
several passages in which, unlike Wittgenstein, she claims that there is such a thing as a 
science of ethics which is even more precise than mathematics:  
One does double harm to mathematics when one regards it only as a rational and abstract 
speculation. It is that, but it is also the very science of nature, a science totally concrete, and it 
is also a mysticism, those three together and inseparably.241 
There is an analogy between the fidelity of the right-angled triangle to the relationship which 
forbids it to emerge from the circle of which its hypotenuse is the diameter, and that of a man 
who, for example, abstains from the acquisition of power or of money at the price of fraud.242 
We have lost the idea that absolute certainty belongs only to divine things. ... Our intelligence 
has become so crude that we no longer conceive that there could be any authentic, rigorous 
certainty concerning the incomprehensible mysteries. Upon this point there would be an 
infinitely precious use for mathematics, which is irreplaceable in this respect.243 
The appearance of geometry in Greece is the most dazzling of all the prophecies which 
foretold the Christ. One can thus understand how science, by its infidelity, should have become 
partly involved in the principle of evil.244 
But, as Rhees points out245:HLO¶VWHQGHQF\WRSRVLWDEVROXWHVLVSUREOHPDWLFEHFDXVHWKH
validity of scientific proposition, including those of mathematics, make sense only within a 
relative context of investigation.  
                                                 
240
 Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 44. 
241
 Weil, ICG, p. 191. 
242
 Ibid., p. 189. 
243
 Ibid., p. 165. 
244
 ,ELGS$FFRUGLQJWR2OLYLHU5H\µ>IRU:HLO@LWLVDPLVWDNHWREHOLHYHWKDWRQHFDQEUDFNHW
JRRGDQGHYLOZKLOHRQHDFTXLUHVWKHNQRZOHGJHWREHXVHGODWHURQIRUJRRG¶5H\S 
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4.3122 Propositions and necessity 
Ethical feelings, as all feelings, state nothing. Statements of absolute value, considered as 
indexes, point to ethical feelings but state nothing, even though they seem, at first, to state 
WKDWVRPHWKLQJLVWKHFDVH)XUWKHUPRUHWKHDGMHFWLYHµHWKLFDO¶LQWKHH[SUHVVLRQµHWKLFDO
IHHOLQJV¶GRHVQRWTXDOLI\WKHIHHOLQJVWKHPVHOYHVIRUIHHOLQJVDUHundergone by someone, 
not willed, and, since anything undergone is beyond one¶VFRQWUROLWIROORZVWKDWLWLV
ethically neutral (in the same way that particular readings, in the Weilian sense, are ethically 
neutral). Ethical feelings are qualified as ethical because the expressions which one is 
inclLQHGWRXVHZKHQH[SHULHQFLQJWKHPHYRNHDEVROXWHQHVV:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VLecture on 
Ethics illustrates how verbal language, through propositions, permits the representation of 
absolute values and, at the same time, leads to the collapse of this representation by the 
deduction of the nonsensicality of the expressions which one is inclined to use when one 
experiences ethical feelings. In this collapse, I saw the possibility of an experience of 
necessity, since the nonsensicality of expressions of absolute value is a corollary of the 
relativity of all statements of fact, that is, it follows from a reading of reality as a web of 
necessary relations.  
4.3123 Necessity and drawing 
Drawings, insofar as they are images246, state nothing. In this respect, drawings are 
analogous to ethical feelings. In the collaboration with Hephzibah during the Centre for 
Drawing residency, I sought to bring verbal language and drawing closer to each other, with 
a view to experiencing necessity. Before giving an account of this project, it will be useful to 
consider in more detail the non-propositional nature of images. 
It is easy to forget that images247 state nothing, as one might confuse the strong sense of 
actuality that images can sometimes engender with the semantic stating function of 
                                                                                                                                          
245
 µ$OOPDWKHPDWLFDOVFLHQWLfic methods, whether Greek science or classical mechanics, leave you 
with a certain relativity. Scientific problems (of physics or biology) and possible answers to them 
have meaning within a system ± in relation to a method of investigation, of proof or disproof, testing 
DQGFRQILUPDWLRQDQGLQUHODWLRQWRDQRWDWLRQ:KHQ6LPRQH:HLOVSHDNVRI³XQHYpULWDEOHVFLHQFH´
DOPRVWOLNH³ZKDWLQYHVWLJDWLRQZRXOGEHLILWZHUHreally LQYHVWLJDWLRQ´VKHFRQIXVHVWKLV%XWLI
she suggests that a genuine science, perhaps Greek science, would show the world as God sees it, this 
cannot be something which she learned from science or from contemplating science. It must rest on 
WKHUHOLJLRXVFRQYLFWLRQZKLFKVKHKDVLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIVFLHQFH¶5KHHVSS±92.) For a 
more sympathetic view, see: Morgan, 2009, pp. 293±S)RUDQHXWUDODFFRXQWRI:HLO¶V
ideas on the relation between science and ethics see: Rey Puente, 2009. For a historical 
FRQWH[WXDOLVDWLRQRI:HLO¶VLGHDVRQVFLHQFHVHH$UFROHR 
246
 Drawings are not images by default, as they can be employed in such a way as to functions as 
symbols. 
247
 :KHQ,VSHDNRIµLPDJHV¶,KDYHLQPLQG&KDUOHV6DQGHU3HLUFH¶VQRWLRQRIicon, or likeness, and 
his triadic classification of signifiers (or, to use PeLUFH¶VPRUHWHFKQLFDOWHUPrepresentamina) into 
LFRQVLQGH[HVDQGV\PEROV3HLUFHS,UHWDLQWKHWHUPµLPDJH¶EHFDXVHLWVPHDQLQJLV
VXIILFLHQWO\FOHDUZKLOHWKHWHUPµLFRQ¶ZRXOGUHTXLUHDPRUHVXVWDLQHGH[SRVLWLRQRI3HLUFH¶VWKHRU\
of signs, which is beyond the scope of the present research. I will, however, summarily sketch 
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propositions. For instance, a photograph of a dead friend might make one feel as if the friend 
was actually there, while a sentence stating that the friend was alive on such and such a day, 
at such and such a time of that day, etc. is less likely to engender this feeling of actual 
presence. But the fact remains that the photograph does not state anything at all regarding 
the life of the friend.  
The example of the photograph PLJKWPLVOHDGRQHLQWRWKLQNLQJWKDWWKHWHUPµLPDJH¶
denotes solely that class of signs that are devoid of symbolical elements. This is not the case: 
for instance, as Katarzyna Paprzycka argues, propositional forms (which are composed of 
symbols) cannot be true or false, as they do not state anything; to elucidate this point, 
Paprzycka shows that the meaning of a propositional form (which is not itself propositional) 
written in the standard symbolical logical notation, p ĺaq Ɣp), (if p, then not q and p), 
can be represented by an image248:  
 ĺa         Ɣ         ) 
By the same token, images might be used in a semantic context where they function 
propositionally: for instance, in a school, photographs of students might be placed on a 
board to signify that a given student attends that school; in this context, a photo of a given 
student on the board is equivalent to a proposition stating that that student attends that 
school; thus, the photograph functions symbolically.   
4.3124 Gesture and observation 
I now return to the Centre for Drawing residency, and I will show the practical bearing of 
WKHLQVLJKWVDIIRUGHGE\UHIOHFWLRQRQ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VLecture on Ethics outlined in §4.3121 
and §4.3122.  During the residency, the first step towards nearing verbal language and 
drawing was a questioning of the notions of gesture and observation by a reflection on a 
SDVVDJHRI$ODLQ¶V3URSRVVXUO¶HVWKpWLTXH. Alain writes: 
Observation does not temper the gesture; but, on the contrary, it is the gesture that tempers 
observation. Retain the gesture, if you want to know.249 
This quote suggests that it might be possible to investigate how gesture informs observation. 
But what is a gesture? Is it simply what one can infer from the drawing marks with regard to 
                                                                                                                                          
3HLUFH¶VVHPLRWLFPRGHOE\TXRWLQJ5RPDQ-DNREVRQµ7KHicon acts chiefly by a factual similarity 
between its signans and signatum ... (2) The index acts chiefly by a factual, existential contiguity 
between its signans and signatum ... (3) The symbol acts chiefly by imputed, learned contiguity 
between signans and signatum7KLVFRQQHFWLRQ³FRQVLVWVLQLWVEHLQJDUXOH´DQGGRHVQRWGHSHQGRQ
the presence or absence RIDQ\VLPLODULW\RUSK\VLFDOFRQWLJXLW\¶-DNREVRQS 
248
 Paprzycka, 2007, pp. 6±9. 
249
 Alain, 1923, p. 65. 
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the movements of the drawing-DJHQW¶VKDQG"2UGRHVLWLQFOXGHWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKWKH
DJHQWVLWV"$QGZKDWDERXWWKHDJHQW¶VGLHWDQGVOHHSLQJKDELWV± are they also part of 
JHVWXUH":HWKRXJKWWKDWWKHPHDQLQJRIµJHVWXUH¶ZDVVXIILFLHntly broad to comprise the 
way one might analyse drawings verbally and we proceeded to make drawings of the empty 
Centre for Drawing Project Space, which we subsequently tried to analyse as objectively as 
possible, typing our analysis as we spoke, as a way of equalising the status of analysis and 
drawing in terms of product. Figs. 4.17±4.18 show an example of the results of this 
approach. The related text can be found in Appendix 2.   
 
Fig. 4.17 My first drawing during collaborative residency with Hephzibah Rendle-Short, at the Centre 
for Drawing, London, 2008, pencil on paper, 14.8 × 9.8 cm. 
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Fig. 4.18 +HSK]LEDK¶VILUVWGUDZLQJGXULQJFROODERUDWLYHUHVLGHQF\ZLWK+HSK]LEDK5HQGOH-Short, at the Centre for Drawing, 
London, 2008, pencil on paper, 42 × 29.7 cm. 
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We repeated this process several times with a growing sense of frustration, due to our 
realisation that verbal analysis and drawing were as far apart as ever, with the difference that 
we now had become very conscious of the fact. After various attempts, we arrived at the 
following method: one of us would draw and, at the same time, would instruct the other 
person, who would face away from the object of observation and draw, relying on the 
instructions, but able to ask for clarification regarding the instructions. In Appendix 2, there 
is a transcript of one of the dialogues by which the drawing was made and Fig. 4.19 
reproduces the resulting drawing.  
 
Fig. 4.19 +HSK]LEDK¶VGUDZLQJGXULQJFROODERUDWLYHUHVLGHQF\ZLWK+HSK]LEDK5HQGOH-Short, at the 
Centre for Drawing, London, 2008, ink on paper, 59.4 × 42 cm. The space drawn is the same as the space 
that can be seen in Figs. 4.17 and 4.18. 
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As I argued §4.22, in order to avoid unintelligible solipsism in the representation of the 
relation myself/the world, I aimed at objectifying the sign drawing agent. Such an 
objectification involved questioning what is to count as drawing as result. A comparison 
between the drawings reproduced in Fig. 4.18 and Fig. 4.19 and related text, will clarify how 
this aim was achieved. In order to both preserve the conceptualisation of these two works as 
single drawings comprising two components and distinguish between the two components, I 
VKDOOUHIHUWRWKHWH[WXDOFRPSRQHQWDVµGUDZLQJT¶µ7¶VWDQGLQJIRUµWH[W¶ZKLOHWhe other 
ZLOOEHFDOOHGµGUDZLQJM¶µ0¶VWDQGLQJIRUµPDUN¶$VLWZLOOEHFRPHHYLGHQWVXFK
indexing is more representative of the work reproduced in Fig. 4.19 than of the one in Fig. 
4.18, but it is nevertheless appropriate in both cases as a representation of our intention.   
Fig. 4.18. DrawingT: Fig. 4.19. DrawingT: 
Is an analysis of something (i.e. drawingM). It is 
clear that there are two very separate elements: 
drawingT about drawingM. 
Is not an analysis of something. DrawingT 
is not drawingM but is a part of the same 
drawing. 
Could be used as a set of instructions to make a 
drawingM resembling, albeit imperfectly, the one 
which is being described (similar to Sol Le:LWW¶V
LQVWUXFWLRQVDOWKRXJKPXFKOHVVSUHFLVHHJµ$W
the bottom there is a curYHVZLQJLQJOHIWWRULJKW¶
could be read as an instruction to draw a curve at 
the bottom of the page, left to right. 
Could not be used as a set of instructions 
to make a drawingM resembling the one 
to which the text is related, because the 
time frame of the rhythm by which we 
³V\QFKURQLVHG´RXUIRUPDWVLVPHUHO\
LQGLFDWHGEXWQRWUHSUHVHQWHGHJµBut 
mine has gone right off the page«:HOO
LWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHULWLVPRUHWKH
UK\WKP«But am I following your rhythm 
or my own? Following mine, follow 
PLQH«Ok shall we start again? Yes. 1... 
«««««««,¶PRIIWKH
page2N\RX¶UHRIIWKHSDJH¶ 
Is mostly a series of propositions whose truth 
value could be assessed (at least in some cases) 
by the viewer through a comparison with 
drawingM: e.g., the vieZHUFRXOGDVNµ,VLWWKH
case that at the bottom of the page there is a curve 
VZLQJLQJOHIWWRULJKW"¶ 
Despite its considerable length, there are 
no descriptions of drawingM, but 
representations of intentions. Moreover, 
there are many interjections which 
indicate (and, therefore, do not describe) 
feelings such as frustration, surprise, 
uncertainty, etc. 
Is a consequence of the drawingM and is thus a 
descriptive representation of drawingM as result. 
Is a transcription of the dialogue which 
took place before the drawingM was 
produced (drawingM is a consequence of 
it) and is thus a representation of a 
drawing-agent action, and not of 
drawingM as result. 
Functions symbolically, that is, it will be 
transparent to any interpreter who knows the 
conventions (i.e. the English language) by which 
it is a sign. 
Possesses more the semantic opacity of a 
thing250 (it is likely that most viewers 
would find it unreadable). 
                                                 
250
 Oliver Sacks, in his book Musicophilia, reports the case of Clive Wearing, a musician with a 
severe form of amnesia, who cannot remember anything that happens from one moment to the next: 
µ'HVSHUDWHWRKROGRQWRVRPHWKLQJ&OLYHVWDUWHGWRNHHSDMRXUQDO%XWKLVMRXUQDOHQWULHV
FRQVLVWHGHVVHQWLDOO\RIWKHVWDWHPHQWV³,DPDZDNH´RU³,DPFRQVFLRXV´HQWHUHGDJDLQDQGDJDLQ
ever\IHZPLQXWHV+HZRXOGZULWH³SPWKLVWLPHSURSHUO\DZDNHSPWKLVWLPHILQDOO\
DZDNHSPWKLVWLPHFRPSOHWHO\DZDNH´DORQJZLWKWKHQHJDWLRQVRIWKLVVWDWHPHQWV³$W
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In drawing Fig. 4.19, the focus of drawingT has shifted from drawingM to the drawing agent, 
but it neither represents the agent descriptively nor iconically (i.e. through resemblance251); 
rather it is an object, a by-product, or an index, of the drawing agent ± in this sense, 
drawingT (Fig. 4.19) represents the agent through objectification.  
Did this proximity of drawingT and drawingM afford the experience of necessity I sought? 
No, but this is inconsequential with respect to the analogical function of the work for two 
reasons: firstly, even if I had experienced necessity, it would have been in any case a private 
experience; and, secondly, the analogical function was to be fulfilled by the approach to 
drawing, rather than by the properties of any particular drawings that might be produced. 
4.313 Sin Podium: Speaking of Writing ± Speaking/Writing about Drawing 
The work of which Fig. 4.19 is an instantiation252 was presented as a performance at the 
conference Sin Podium: Speaking of Writing253, with the title Speaking/Writing about 
Drawing. This title is a misnomer because, in fact, there was no writing during the 
performance, and, as no audio recording of the event was made, there was no possibility of 
transcribing the dialogue at a later date. Furthermore, the drawingM I made was never shown 
WRWKHDXGLHQFHDQG+HSK]LEDK¶VZDVGLVFDUGHGDWWKHHQGRIWKHSHUIRUPDQFH. The only 
record of the event is a rather grainy photograph (see Fig. 4.20).     
                                                                                                                                          
pm I awoke for the first time, despite my previous claims´7KLVLQWXUQZDVFURVVHGRXWIROORZHGE\
³,ZDVIXOO\FRQVFLRXVDWSPDQGDZDNHIRUWKHILUVWWLPHLQPDQ\PDQ\ZHHNV´7KLVLQWXUQ
ZDVFDQFHOOHGRXWE\WKHQH[WHQWU\¶6DFNVS5HFHQWO\&OLYH:HDULQJ¶VMRXUQDOZDV
exhibited in Identity: Eight rooms, nine lives, at the Wellcome Collection, London, 26th November 
2009 ± 6th April 2010. Even though drawingT (Fig. 4.19) has nothing tragic about it (on the contrary, 
it is quite comical), it possesses qualities which are similar to WeaULQJ¶VMRXUQDOLQVRIDUDVERWK
engender a feeling of impenetrability, or opacity, with regard to the experience that they signify.  
251
 $V:LWWJHQVWHLQZULWHVµ,QWKHIDFWWKDWWKHUHLVDJHQHUDOUXOHE\ZKLFKWKHPXVLFLDQLVDEOHWR
read the symphony out of the score, and that there is a rule by which one could reconstruct the 
symphony from the line on a gramophone record and from this again ± by means of the first rule ± 
construct the score, herein lies the internal similarity between these things which at first seem to be 
HQWLUHO\GLIIHUHQW¶(Wittgenstein, 1999, §4.0141, p. 46.) In the case of drawing
 
Fig. 4.19, the 
similarity between drawingM and drawingT is suggested, but there is no rule to turn the drawing into 
the text and vice versa.  
252
 By this, I mean to say that the work is not the final product but, in keeping with the aim of 
normative critical practical analogy, the work is the set of norms used in the process. 
253
 The conference took place at the Museum of English Rural Life, University of Reading, on 15th 
July 2009. The conference had WKHIROORZLQJDLPµ7KHUHFHQWKLVWRU\RIYLVXDODUWVSUDFWLFHZLWKLWV
fusion of performance and residual object-based work, its increasing assimilation of varieties of 
writing, and its interrogation of the relationship between image and text, suggests that contemporary 
artists and art researchers are well placed to critically explore the habits of public presentation. Sin 
Podium will bring together presentations that, in various ways, look at the production of writing in its 
UHODWLRQWRVSRNHQSUHVHQWDWLRQHQJDJLQJLQDQLQWHUURJDWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHVSHDNHU¶VSODWIRUP
in all its diversity. The event will focus on those rarely acknowledged practices, both material and 
immaterial, which underlie the presentDWLRQRIZULWLQJ¶ Sin Podium: Speaking of Writing, 2009. 
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Fig. 4.20 Speaking/Writing about Drawing performance at the Museum of English Rural Life, Reading, on 15th July 2009. 
This image was reproduced on the website dedicated to Sin Podium (http://sinpodium.wordpress.com). 
 
As the photograph shows, I faced and drew the audience and gave instructions to Hephzibah, 
who faced away from the audience. I drew on an A6 sketchbook and, as I was sitting about 
two metres from the first row of the audience, my drawingM could not be seen. The piece of 
paper on which Hephzibah drew was attached to a blackened glass which reflected the 
audience. The performance lasted half an hour. This event pushed the objectification of the 
drawing agent further because there was nothing else left: no drawingT or drawingM, but only 
two people engaged in the act of drawing. The struck-WKURXJKµDERXW¶RIWKHSHUIRUPDQFH
title signified a change of perspective with regard to this project: at the beginning, we had 
conceived the nearing of verbal analysis and drawing as a bridging of the gap between text 
and image; now, we sought to get rid of the bridge, for we saw the bridge as a separation, 
not as connection ± µDERXW¶UHSUHVHQWVWKDWVHSDUDWLRQLQWKHVHQVHWKDW as long as our texts 
remained analyses about drawings, they could not be read as components (drawingT and 
drawingM) of a unique GUDZLQJ7KHVWULNHWKURXJKRIµDERXW¶ZDVWKHUHDOEULGJLQJ 
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4.32 Attitude of detachment 
In this section, I consider a normative project whose objective was the representation of an 
attitude of detachment. The project was a development of the first collaboration with 
Hephzibah, which I discussed in §4.311.  
In this project, Hephzibah painted a portrait of me. I made a drawing from the painting after 
each session and I also drew a portrait of Hephzibah ± a new drawing on each session ± and, 
in turn, Hephzibah made a painting from each drawing254. We decided not to write any notes 
on our experience. The next section (including the three sub-sections) deals with the 
drawings I made after the painting.  
4.321 Skull drawings 
)RUWKHGUDZLQJVDIWHU+HSK]LEDK¶VSDLQWLQJVHH)LJV±4.24), I proceeded as follows:  
± Focus attention on three patches of colour at a time. 
± Imagine that the three patches are the eye and nose sockets of a skull.  
± :DLWXQWLOWKHVRFNHWVµpop¶255 into consciousness, as if they were not on the flat 
canvas surface but, as it were, three-dimensionally following the volume of the 
imagined skull. 
± Draw the sockets with unhurried, light gestures (reassessment of previously drawn 
sockets was also permitted, both through erasure and superimposition of marks). 
Each drawing session was on average one-hour long.  
                                                 
254
 Retrospectively, this move might be interpreted as a way of eliminating the textual component of 
the process while preserving the reflective aspect.  
255
 I borrow this expression from Betty Edwards; she uses it in the context of the perception of 
negative space (Edwards, 1995, p. 155). Imagining the sockets feels very similar to perceiving 
negatives spaces, as in both cases there is a conscious effort to see something as something else and 
there occurs a rather sudden perceptual shift.  
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Fig. 4.21 Skull drawing after Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJ 11th May 2008 
(detail), pencil on paper, 7.1 × 9.3 cm.   
         
 
Fig. 4.22 Skull drawing after Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJth May 2008 
(detail), pencil on paper, 11.1 × 9.2 cm. 
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Fig. 4.23 Skull drawing after Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWing, 19th May 
2008 (detail), pencil on paper, 15 × 11.5 cm. See Fig. 4.26.   
        
  
Fig. 4.24 6NXOOGUDZLQJDIWHU+HSK]LEDK¶VSDLQWLQJ, 2nd June 2008 (detail), 
pencil on paper, 8.5 × 9.3 cm. See Fig. 4.27.   
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This approach was not exclusively germane to the collaboration, and, in fact, on occasion, it 
ZDVXVHGRXWVLGHWKDWFRQWH[WIRUH[DPSOHLQDQHVVD\,ZURWHZKLFKGHDOVZLWK:HLO¶V
notion of the moving indifference RIZRUNVRIDUWWKURXJKDQDQDO\VLVRI$JQHV'HQHV¶DUtist 
book Book of Dust (see Fig. 4.25), which I will discuss further on in §4.33.  
 
)LJ3DJHIURPWKHHVVD\µ/DFRPPRVVDLQGLIIHUHQ]DGHOO¶DUWLVWDFKHDWWHQGH,OYDORUHGHOO¶DUWHLQ6LPRQH:HLO
DQG$JQHV'HQHV¶At the bottom of the page, one can see a skull drawing after DeneV¶SKRWRJUDSKHuman Dust.   
1HYHUWKHOHVVRQFHDJDLQ+HSK]LEDK¶VPDQQHURISDLQWLQJVHH)LJZDVSDUWLFXODUO\
suited to the task, as it made it relatively easy to abstract from the representational content of 
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the image (this kind of abstraction would have certainly been more demanding with a 
photorealistic painting)256.  
 
         
Fig. 4.26 Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJth May 2008, oil on canvas, 101 × 86 cm. See Fig. 
4.23.   
  
                                                 
256
 7KHLGHDIRUWKLVSURMHFWRULJLQDWHVLQ/HRQDUGRGD9LQFL¶VA Treatise on Painting, where he 
GHVFULEHVDWHFKQLTXHWRDZDNHQDQGLQFUHDVHRQH¶VFUHDWLYHIDFXOW\ZKLFKLQYROYHVLPDJLQLQJD
landscape, figures, etc., in the stains on a wall (see: da Vinci, 1995, p. 58). Furthermore, the project 
ZDVLQVSLUHGE\+HQUL0LFKDX[¶V Emergences/Resurgences, in particular, a passage on p. 14 (with 
related drawing on p. 15), both because of the general emergent quality of the drawing, and of the text 
in which Michaux describes the perceptual metamorphosis of patches of colour into nameable 
HQWLWLHVµ6RPHRQHVD\V³:K\QRWSDLQWRQDEODFNJURXQG"2UVLPSO\RQDVKHHWRIEODFNSDSHU"´$V
soon as I start in, as soon as several colours are applied to the sheet of black paper, it ceases to be a 
sheet and becomes night. The colours almost haphazardly applied have become apparitions... looming 
RXWRIWKHQLJKW¶0LFKDX[S 
4. Normative critical practical analogy 
 
112 
 
 
Fig. 4.27 Hephzibah Rendle-6KRUW¶VSDLQWLQJth June 2008, oil on canvas, 101 × 86 cm. See Fig. 
4.24.   
 
The project, as I said, sprang from an intention to represent an attitude of detachment; more 
specifically, it investigated the notions of waiting, free compulsion, and obedience (with 
which I dealt theoretically in Chapter 3), and, accordingly in §4.3211±4.3213, I focus on 
these aspects separately.  
4.3211 Waiting 
I have argued that Weil associates attention with detachment and that she also describes 
attention as a kind of waiting. The restrictions I posed on drawing were the means by which 
I could wait in the Weilian sense257. On one hand, the skull drawing project is problematic, 
due to its solipsistic nature, but, on the other hand, I wish to stress its importance as a step 
                                                 
257
 µ,KDYHa thought that seems to me important. I have nothing on which to jot it down. I resolve to 
remember it later. Two hours later I recall that I must remember a thought. I no more know which 
thought at all, not even what it is about. I orient my attention towards this thing of which I know that 
it exists, but of which I do not know at all what it is. This empty attention can last several minutes. 
7KHQDWEHVWLWFRPHV,UHFRJQLVHZLWKRXWDQ\LQFHUWLWXGHWKDWLWLVWKDWWKRXJKW¶:HLOC 2, p. 
291.) See also the passages quoted in footnotes 149 and 162. 
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towards the development of Gayliana: Isle of Idle (GIOI), discussed in §5.412, since it gives 
me the opportunity to exemplify one of the modi operandi of art practice within the research, 
i.e. a process of association which might sometimes appear quite removed from the 
conceptual territory of the research. GIOI is the title of the installation which I produced 
during a residency at the Centre for Drawing, which consisted of an exhibition of the work 
of the fictional character Otto U. Gayl. The poster for GIOI (see Fig. 4.28) shows a figure 
lookinJXSDWDSDVVLQJFORXGZKLFKµEHFRPHV¶ DQLQGHWHUPLQDWHFUHDWXUH¶VKHDGZKLFK
incidentally, as with the imagined skull, possesses eyes and nose but lacks a mouth), before 
turning once more into a nondescript shape.  
 
Fig. 4.28 Image for poster of Gayliana: Isle of Idle.  
GIOI is conceptually very distant from the skull drawings, and, yet, the latter informed GIOI 
and helps its contextualisation within the research, since GIOI also dealt with attention as 
waiting258. As I will argue, with regard to the issue of how these projects function as 
artworks in the wider sense259, I consider GIOI a more successful project precisely because 
the viewer does not need to be informed of the research context in order to experience it as I 
envisaged. Moreover, GIOI was the result of a clearer awareness of how wide ranging 
associations could be used in art practice as a tool for the acquisition of knowledge260.  
                                                 
258
 As the poster for GIOI DQQRXQFHGµ$VSDUWRIP\RQJRLQJ3K'UHVHDUFKRQ6LPRQH:HLO¶VQRWLRQ
RIDWWHQWLRQ,LQWHQGWRPXVHRQ:HLO¶VLGHDRIattention as waiting, where waiting oxymoronically 
approaches assiduous idling. In many ways, Otto U. Gayl, to whom the residency is dedicated, was 
the quintessential assiduous idler (it would be fair to say that, because of this, he was, until recently, 
completely unknown), and there is a chance, perhaps, even a good chance, that Gayl may lead me 
towards hoped-IRUVLWHVRUHQYLURQV¶ 
259
 In §4.22, I pointed out that this wider sense is not inconsequential for the semantic function of the 
artworks within the research. 
260
 The dialogue between Dino Alfier, Fiona Erild and Odelia Frin, in Centre for Drawing Project 
Space ± Notes 07 (see Appendix 5), exemplifies the non-linear, associative mode, and, in many ways, 
it is the most comprehensive representation of my findings on Weilian attention. Notably, this 
representation does not possess the form of an argument with premises and conclusion; rather its form 
is spiral, with several returns on the same axis but on a different position.  Another example of 
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7KHVNXOOGUDZLQJSURMHFWZDVLQVWUXPHQWDOIRUP\XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI:HLO¶VGLVWLQFWLRQ
between disorderly and orderly imagination, discussed in §3.31, since I soon realised that 
my intention to wait for the sockets to µpop¶ was hindered by impatience; and now I could 
interpret this impatience as an indication of disorderly imagination, under the influence of 
which ,SRVWXODWHGDFFRUGLQJWR:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWmistakenly) a thought ± i.e. my intention 
± as having a direct consequence on the world. Retrospectively, I also interpreted the hurried 
and heavy manner of the earlier drawings of Cambridge Museum of Zoology (Figs. 1.1±1.3) 
as an indication of the same dynamic. On the other hand, the intention itself (i.e. the 
intention abstracted from the consequences of acting upon it) was a representation of orderly 
imagination, albeit solely in the form of a wish.  Before undertaking the skull drawings, I 
possessed a merely theoretical picture of the distinction between disorderly and orderly 
imagination, which promised no way forward with regard to how this might be engaged with 
through art practice; while now I could see it in relation to a specific attitude towards 
drawing ± this newly gained perspective paved the way for the reintroduction of the artwork 
as a positive, attention-inviting element in the research, with the work %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH, 
which I discuss in §4.33.  
4.3212 Free compulsion 
With the skull drawings, I sought to conceptualise drawing as a form of reading, in order to 
LQYHVWLJDWHWKHQRWLRQRIIUHHFRPSXOVLRQDWZKLFK,DUULYHGWKURXJKWKHDQDO\VLVRI:HLO¶V
notion of reading. To this purpose, I considered drawing as a form of translation, because:  
± The concept of translation is semantically close to that of reading.  
± One can find an ethical viewpoint in several texts on translation261 VLPLODUWR:HLO¶V
ethical framing of reading); and, particularly relevant to this research, the attitude of 
the good translator has been described as a disposition of detachment262.  
                                                                                                                                          
association can be found at the end of §4.33, where I explain how the project %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH led 
WR'LGHURW¶Vletter to Sophie Volland, which, in turn, led to further reflections on Weilian 
metaphysics.  
261
 For inVWDQFH:DOWHU%HQMDPLQ¶VHVVD\ µ7KH7DVNRIWKH7UDQVODWRU¶LQZKLFKKHVSHDNVRIµSXUH
ODQJXDJH¶ZKLFKSRVVHVVHVDQµXOWLPDWHHVVHQFH¶WKHVHQRWLRQVEelong to ethical discourse), which the 
WUDQVODWRUµUHOHDVHVLQKLVRZQODQJXDJH¶%HQMDPLQSS±81).  
262
 For instance, the following text by Jean-François Lyotard suggests how translation could be 
WKRXJKWRIDVDQHWKLFDOSXUVXLWRIGHWDFKPHQWµ3Hrhaps nothing is as wondrous as a good translation. 
Because of the abnegation [detachment] one feels. Much more than for the motives of technical 
competence. ... It arouses moral respect. For someone who was willing and able to prefer what came 
to the mind RIDQRWKHUUDWKHUWKDQZKDWFRXOGKDSSHQWRRQH¶VRZQ1RWSUHIHUULQJZKDWWKHRWKHU
writes as such, once things have been cleaned up, to what he or she, the translator, could write on the 
same subject. But, if possible, to prefer the thought that comes to another before being cleaned up. 
7KXVWRSUHIHUWKHRWKHU¶VGLVRUGHULI\RXOLNHQRWMXVWWRRQH¶VRZQRUGHUEXWWRRQH¶VRZQGLVRUGHU
WKHWUDQVODWRU¶VIRUMXVWEHFDXVH\RX¶UHDWUDQVODWRUGRHVQ¶WPHDQ\RXWKLQNRUZULWHDQ\OHVV$JUHDW
effect oIORYH¶/\RWDUGS 
4. Normative critical practical analogy 
 
115 
 
± In discourses on translation, there appears the idea of untranslatability263 (which 
VHHPVWRSUHVHQWVRPHDQDORJ\ZLWK:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIWKHLPSRVVLELOity of absolutely 
good reading). 
± I was interested in the idea of open-endedness264 in translation. 
Before I turn to free compulsion, I shall counter the possible objection to the application of 
WKHWHUPµWUDQVODWLRQ¶WRGUDZLQJRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWWUDQVODWLRn is too narrow and simple to 
describe what a drawing agent tries to achieve through observational drawing. As Douglas 
Hofstadter points out, translation is anything but straightforward, and even the most literal 
translation often involves making carefully considered choices between conflicting 
demands265, and it is a generative process, in the sense that the process of translation has a 
bearing on what the translator perceives. The composer György Ligeti gives a clear account 
of the generative nature of translation involved in the creative process:  
I lay my ten fingers on the piano and imagine the music. My fingers copy [translation] this 
mental image as I press the keys, but this copy is very inexact: a feedback emerges between 
idea and tactile/motor execution. This feedback loop repeats itself many times, enriched by 
provisional sketches ... The result sounds completely different from my initial conceptions: the 
anatomical reality of my hands and the configuration of the piano keyboard have transformed 
my imaginary constructs.266  
The analogy between drawing and translation will give an idea of the complexity of the 
translatLRQLQYROYHGLQGUDZLQJLIWKHµWH[W¶ to be translated is thought to possess the 
complexity of a text such as James Joyce's Finnegans Wake: it is difficult to envisage the 
ultimate true translation of Finnegans Wake, and yet it still makes sense to talk about more 
or less successful renditions of Finnegans Wake (although agreement could be very limited). 
As regards the issue of untranslatability, it can be exemplified as follows. Take the sentence 
µ7KHEXWWHUIO\IOLHG267 RYHUEXWWHULQWKHSRUWRI'RYHU¶+RZFRXOGWKLVEHWUDQVODWHGIRU
instance, in Italian? How could one translate the relation butterfly/butter, and the incorrect 
conjugation RIWKHYHUEµWRIO\¶ZKLFKFUHDWHVDSKRQHWLFµ'RYHU¶",QWKLVFRQWH[W
+RIVWDGWHU¶VQRWLRQRIµSHUFHSWXDODWWUDFWRUV¶LVXVHIXOZKLFK+RIVWDGWHUGHILQHVDVµORQJ-
                                                 
263
 6HHIRULQVWDQFH-DFTXHV'HUULGD¶VµFrom Des Tours de Babel¶µ)RU%DEHOLVXQWUDQVODWDEOH*RG
weeps over his name. His text is the most sacred, the most poetic, the most originary, since he creates 
a name and gives iWWRKLPVHOI¶'HUULGDS 
264
 This open-endedness is exemplifiHGE\'RXJODV+RIVWDGWHU¶VERRN Le Ton Beau de Marot: In 
Praise of the Music of Language, in which one finds, amongst other things, 72 translations of the 
same poem, A une Damoyselle malade, by the sixteenth-century French poet Clément Marot (see: 
Hofstadter, 1997). 
265
 Ibid., p. 2a. 
266
 György Ligeti Edition 3, 1996. 
267
 µ,WLV³IOHZ´QRW³IOLHG´¶RQHPLJKWSRLQWRXW7KLVLVWUXHEXWDUHZHWROLPLWWUDQVODWLRQWR
orthographically corrHFWWH[WV"2QFHDJDLQ,EULQJWKHH[DPSOHRI-R\FH¶VFinnegans Wake: is 
Finnegans Wake not the most orthographically incorrect (ortho-graphically un-ortho-dox) book ever 
written? And yet it has been translated. 
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WHUPPHQWDOORFLWKDWDUH]RRPHGLQWRZKHQZHHQFRXQWHUDQHZVLWXDWLRQ¶268 Perceptual 
attractors are concepts, whether or not they are capable of linguistic representation269. An 
example of a linguistically representable perceptual attractor would be the English auxiliary 
YHUEµFDQ¶DVXVHGLQWKHIROORZLQJFRQWH[WLQ(QJOLVKWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHen knowing 
something and knowing how to do something is difficult to perceive because the auxiliary 
YHUEµFDQ¶indifferently labels both situations, while, with languages which make a 
distinction, such as Italian, the difference is clearly perceived270. This may seem an obvious 
consideration, but it seems so only because the example is simple, for the sake of clarity. To 
reiterate271 that perceptual attractors are not necessarily as simple as the concept conveyed 
E\DZRUGVXFKDVµFDQ¶,ZLOOJLYHDQH[DPSOHthat I used in a pedagogical context (a life 
GUDZLQJFODVV,LQYLWHGWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVWRGUDZWKHPRGHODVLIµ\RXZHUHGUDZLQJWKH
GRZQRQDEXWWHUIO\¶VZLQJ¶272. After the exercise, I asked the participants their views on the 
experience, and they said that the metaphor had changed the way they saw the model: they 
                                                 
268
 Hofstadter, 2006. Hofstadter distinguishes EHWZHHQWKUHHNLQGVRISHUFHSWXDODWWUDFWRUµ6WDQGDUG
lexical items (words, names, phrases, proverbs, etc.) provided to a vast public through a shared 
linguistic environment ... Shared vicarious experiences provided to a vast public through the media 
(e.g. places, personages, and events of small and large scale in books, movies, television shows, and 
so on), the smaller of which have explicit linguistic labels, the more complex of which have none ... 
Unique personal memories, lacking any fixed linguistic labels (such chunks are generally very large 
and complex, ... such as a favourite high-school class, a year spent in a special city, a protracted 
GLYRUFHDQGVRRQ¶,ELG 
269
 Hofstadter points out that perceptual attractors, even when they remain within the sphere of what 
can be represented by words, include lexical items that are not normally thought of as concepts: e.g. 
µ:HOO¶µ,PHDQ¶µ:KDWHYHU¶HWF:KLOHWKHW\SLFDOH[HPSOLILFDWLRQRIFRQFHSWLQYROYHVZRUGV
standing for objects perceivDEOHWKURXJKWKHVHQVHVVXFKDVµGRJ¶µKRXVH¶HWFSHUFHSWXDODWWUDFWRUV
also include (I am extrapolating from Hofstadter¶V argument) the manner in which a certain people 
communicates certain information. For, instance, Lera Boroditsky reports that, in a small Aboriginal 
community of northern Australia, spatial information is always communicated by reference to the 
FDUGLQDOSRLQWVZLWKWKHFRQVHTXHQFHWKDWµ\RXKDYHWRVWD\RULHQWHGDOOWKHWLPHRUHOVH\RXFDQQRW
VSHDNSURSHUO\¶%RURGLWVN\It seems plausible to infer that the way this social group 
perceives space is quite different to, for instance, the way an English speaker perceives space. 
270
 6RIRULQVWDQFHLQ(QJOLVKµ&DQ\RXVZLP"¶PLJKWPHDQHLWKHUµ'R\RXSRVVHVV³WKHVNLOO
swimming´"¶RUµ,VLWSRVVLEOHIRU\RXWRVZLPLQWKHVLWXDWLRQ\RXILQG\RXUVHOIDWSUHVHQW"¶ZKLOHLQ
,WDOLDQWKHVHWZRPHDQLQJVDUHFRQYH\HGUHVSHFWLYHO\ZLWKµ6DLQXRWDUH"¶RUµ3XRLQXRWDUH"¶
notwithstanding the fact that, in practice, speakers often use these expressions interchangeably.  
Another example: my mother-tongue is not English but Italian, and thus I do not perceive the quality 
heathery-ness YHU\HDVLO\EHFDXVHWKH,WDOLDQODQJXDJHGRHVSRVVHVVWKHZRUGµKHDWKHU\¶RQHFDQVD\
µFRYHUHGZLWKKHDWKHU¶µKDYLQJWKHFRORXURIKHDWKHU¶µVLPLODUWRKHDWKHU¶DQGVRRQEXWQRQHRI
WKHVHH[SUHVVLRQVFRQYH\WKDWZKLFKµKHDWKHU\¶FRQYH\V$QG\HWKDYLQJOLYHGLQDQ(QJOLVK-
speaking country for some time, I possess a very rudimentary grasp of heathery-ness that, at least, 
allows me to think about the issue of my difficulty to fully grasp heathery-ness. Thus even what one 
may call the subjective perception of qualities (i.e. aesthetic perception) is bound up with non-
subjective entities. 
271
 I think that this reiteration is justified by the tendency to fall back on simple conceptualisation of 
the notion of perceptual attractor. 
272
 4XRWHIURP5XVNLQ¶VThe Elements of Drawing (Ruskin, 1971, p. 39). Joseph Becker has shown 
the importance of typically unnoticed, culturally acquired phrasal patterns in the process of expressing 
DWKRXJKWOLQJXLVWLFDOO\HJµ/LNHDOORWKHUVFLHQWLVWVOLQJXLVWVZLVKWKH\ZHUHSK\VLFLVWV¶LVDQ
LQVWDQWLDWLRQRIWKHSKUDVDOSDWWHUQµ$/LNHSOQ%DOORWKHUSOQ&SHrson) wishes (he/she) 
ZHUHVRPHWKLQJ¶%HFNHU, p. 63.) 
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KDGµIHOW¶ the sensitivity of human skin more markedly than usual. This example shows not 
only that something as elusive as a metaphor can be considered a perceptual attractor but 
also that perceptual attractors are not exclusively habit-bound: a concept never encountered 
before, such as drawing-the-down-on-a-EXWWHUIO\¶V-wing-as-if-ness might, in a limited 
context, such as a life-drawing class, bring about a significant, albeit short-lived, perceptual 
shift.   
Moreover, the notion of perceptual attractor, at least with regard to those perceptual 
attractors which can be expressed linguistically, makes the idea of detachment thinkable, 
because the fact that they can be expressed linguistically entails that they do not belong 
exclusively to an individual but to a community of speakers. As Weil argues in Leçons de 
philosophie, language is an object upon which the faculty of attention is exercised: signs 
(e.g. the words of a given language) are objects one can attentively select. Signs allow one to 
REMHFWLI\RQH¶VIHHOLQJVE\DGRXEOLQJSURFHVV)RULQVWDQFH:HLODUJXHVRQRQHKDQGWKHUH
is my pain (µ,¶SDLQDQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHUHLVWKHZRUGµSDLQ¶ZKLFKLVµQRWPH¶µ,¶-
less pain).  Thus objectified, pain can be observed.273 In the skull drawings, the concepts 
µVNXOO¶µH\HVRFNHW¶µQRVHVRFNHW¶µXQKXUULHGJHVWXUH¶HWFDUHSHUFHSWXDODWWUDFWRUVDQGDV
such, they were used with the intention of attaining a detached attitude. The hope was that, 
through practice, my reading habit would change in time, and that the perception of this 
FKDQJHZRXOGDIIRUGDUHIOHFWLRQRQ:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIUHDGLQJ7KLVFKDQJHZDVREVHUYHG
that LV,GHYHORSHGDWHQGHQF\WRµVHH¶ skulls while drawing visual situations which were 
conducive to this reading, i.e. in the presence of relatively irregular patterns of shapes, such 
as the foliage of a tree. However, the problem of the compatibility of free compulsion and 
hard determinism, discussed in §3.35, re-emerged, since, in the skull drawings, it was hard 
to see how free compulsion could be said to follow from an unshakable certainty that to do 
otherwise would change nothingWKHPHDQLQJRIµFHUWDLQW\¶VHHPHGLQDSSURSULDWHVLQFH
what had happened was simply that a new habit had, to a certain degree, superimposed itself, 
and thus slightly changed, some old habits. And, yet, this dynamic is quite consonant with 
VRPHRI:HLO¶VGHVFULSWLRQVRIIUHHRUJRRGDFWLRQ274. From this point of view, free 
                                                 
273
 µ/DQJXDJHLVRIJUHDWLPSRUWDQFHZLWKUHJDUGWRDWWHQWLRQIRUPRIWKHZLOO*LYHQWKDWZHKDYH
language, amongst the words that come to our mind, there are some that we can reject: selection of 
words. ... Language is an object (because it is fixed, permanent, artificial). It permits us to double 
ourselves: tears, screams, moans: they are states of us, often unconscious and, in any case, always felt 
DVRXUVRQWKHFRQWUDU\WKHZRUGµSDLQ¶LVQRWSDLQIXO:KHQRQHKDVJLYHQDQDPHWRRQH¶VIHHOLQJV
RQHFDQORRNDWWKHPDVDQREMHFW¶:HLOLP, p. 69.) 
274
 µ$VLWLVIRUHUURUDQGIRUFOHDUDQGGLVWLQFWWKRXJKW>&DUWHVLDQH[SUHVVLRQV@WKHUHDUHWKRXJKWVRI
action that, if stared at with thHH\HVRIWKHVRXOVXVSHQGLQJRQH¶VMXGJHPHQWYDQLVKDVDLUEXEEOHV
(they can influence body movements only in the darkness of the soul), there are others that, on the 
FRQWUDU\FURVVRQWRWKHUHDOELWLQJRQUHDOLW\WKURXJKWKHLQWHUPHGLDU\RIWKHERG\¶ (Weil, OC VI 1, 
p. 333.) 
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compulsion could be seen as an inevitable consequence of some prior free decision taken by 
the agent. To illustrate this with the example of the literate and illiterate women introduced 
in §3.35, the free choice, for the literate woman, would have been the decision to learn to 
read, from which would have followed the inevitable correct reading of the letter275, as in the 
skull drawings, the free choice would have coincided with the decision to imagine skulls, 
sockets, etc., from which inevitably would have followed my perceptual shift. This view of 
free compulsion is not compatible with hard determinism276, while, on my first 
conceptualisation of free compulsion, in §3.35, the problem of the inevitability of action 
(raised at in §3.37) is evaded by implicitly appealing to some idea of free rationality277. 
Neither can I propose a solution for incompatibility (even though, in §4.3213, I suggest that 
there might be a way of conceptualising necessity as inevitable but non-constraining) nor 
have I found a plausible solution in Weilian scholarship278. 
4.3213 Obedience 
However, despite this unresolved incompatibility, the skull drawings were instrumental for a 
SUDFWLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI:HLO¶VQRWLRQVRIQHFHVVLW\DQGREHGLHQFHZKLFKVRIDUKDG
remained merely theoretical concepts. While drawing, WKHµDSSHDULQJ¶ of a skull had a 
quality of inevitability but not that of a constraint279, somewhat akin to the recognition of a 
familiar face in a crowd of strangers. This experience led to a clarification of the notions of 
necessity and obedience: for Weil, there is a mechanical obedience, which is a consequence 
of determinist, mechanical necessity, and a higher form of obedience, which is a 
consequence of spiritual necessity and which depends on voluntary attention280. I would not 
                                                 
275
 $V:HLOZULWHVµ$OPRVWDOZD\VWKHPRPHQWRIGHOLEHUDWLRQGRHVQRWFRLQFLGHZLWKWKDWRIFKRLFH
One deliberates when one has already chosen, or perhaps, more rarely, when one is not yet in 
FRQGLWLRQRIFKRRVLQJ¶,ELGS2.)   
276
 It suffices to point out that, for most people, literacy in not a matter of choice.    
277
 That the notion of rationality is at the basis of this conceptualisation of free compulsion can be 
seen by referring once again to the example of the literate woman: the letter cannot convey to her any 
other meaning than the meaning it does convey on the assumption that she is a rational being, i.e. 
that, for her, if A is B and B is C, then A is C, or in valid argument the conclusion incontrovertibly 
follows from the premises, and so on. 
278
 The problem of incompatibilism has not been raised by Weilian scholarship, with the exception of 
Rhees, who however offers no solution (Rhees, 2000). 
279
 µ2EHGLHQFHLVWKHRQO\SXUHPRWLYH«2QWKHFRQGLWLRQWKDWLWEHREHGLHQFHto a necessity and not 
DFRQVWUDLQW¶:HLOOC VI 2, p. 194.)     
280
 µ2EHGLHQFHWKHUHDUHWZRNLQGVRILW2QHFDQREH\JUDYLW\RUWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKLQJV*. In 
the first case, one does that to which the imagination which fills the void pushes. ... If one suspends 
the workings of the filling imagination and one focuses the attention on the relationship between 
things, a necessity DSSHDUVZKLFKRQHFDQQRWQRWREH\¶,ELGS 
*µ1HFHVVLW\7RVHHWhe relationships between things and oneself, including the motives that one has, 
DVRQHRIWKHWHUPV¶,ELGS 

 µ0HQFDQQHYHUHVFDSHIURPREHGLHQFHWR*RG$FUHDWXUHFDQQRWEXWREH\7KHRQO\FKRLFHJLYHQ
to men as intelligent [the rationality theme] and free creatures, is to desire obedience or not to desire 
it. If a man does not desire it, he obeys nevertheless, perpetually, inasmuch as he is a thing subject to 
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speak of spiritual necessity with regard to the seemingly inevitable but unconstrained 
appearance of the skulls, but this experience was, in some respects, similar to what Weil 
describes and thus useful in order to try to grasp what she might have meant. And even 
though it offers no solution to the aforementioned problems, it, at least, made it clear that 
:HLO¶VVSLULWXDOSHUVSHFWLYHDVUHSUHVHQWHGE\KHUZULWLQJVFRXOGQRWEHFRPSOHWHO\
discounted when investigating her ideas on attention. This implied some limitation of the 
normative projects, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
4.322 Portraits of Hephzibah  
For the portraits, I proceeded as follows: I used coloured felt-tip pens and, every five 
minutes, I switched to a pen of a different colour (see Figs. 4.29±4.31). Sometimes, this 
procedure was used in conjunction with the skull drawing procedure (see Figs. 4.32±4.33). 
                                                                                                                                          
mechanical necessity. If he desires it, he is still subject to mechanical necessity, but a new necessity is 
added to it, a necessity constituted by laws belonging to natural things. Certain actions become 
impossible for him; others are done by his agency, sometimes almost in spite of himself [the 
LQHYLWDELOLW\WKHPH@¶:HLOWG, pp. 76±77.) A reference to Spinoza is helpful, in this context, since 
DV-RKQ&XUW'XFDVVHDUJXHVµ$V6SLQR]DREVHUYHVDQHPRWLRQWRZDUGVDWKLQJZKLch we consider to 
be free (i.e. XQQHFHVVDU\LVJUHDWHUWKDQRQHWRZDUGVZKDWZHFRQFHLYHWREHQHFHVVDU\¶'XFDVVH
1929, p. 253; see de Spinoza, 1996, pp. 164±165). Read from a Weilian perspective, the strong 
emotion towards a thing which one considers free would be an indication of the disorderly state of 
imagination, when the world is regarded as free, that is, as capriciously inclined sometimes 
benevolently and sometimes malignantly towards oneself, while the milder emotion would be an 
indication of a view of reality as a web of necessary relations, which, for Weil, is attained through 
voluntary attention. 
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Fig. 4.29 Colour drawing, 23rd November 2008, coloured felt tip pens on paper, 29.7 × 20.1 cm. 
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Fig. 4.30 Colour drawing, 3rd January 2009, coloured felt tip pens on paper, 29.7 × 20.1 cm. 
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Fig. 4.31 Colour drawing, 1st March 2009, coloured felt tip pens on paper, 29.7 × 20.1 cm.    
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Fig. 4.32 Drawing made using both the colour 
drawing and the skull drawing procedures, 
2009, coloured felt tip pens on paper, 29.7 × 
20.1 cm. 
 Fig. 4.33 Drawing made using both the colour drawing and the skull 
drawing procedures (detail), 2009, coloured felt tip pens on paper, 
10.8 × 8.9 cm. 
 
In the skull drawings after the painting, there was a problem with the lack of indexes that the 
viewer might interpret as pointers to an intention to develop an attitude of detachment. The 
portraits possess such indexes because: (1) the chromatic progression does not serve my 
representational purpose, but, on the contrary, is quite external to it281, and the passage of 
time, which is also indifferent to human purposes, is explicitly represented282; (2) the 
comparison of several drawings reveals my habits (see Figs. 4.34±4.35), which, by the very 
repetition of their indications, are shown in all their mechanistic µ,¶-lessness283; (3) mistakes, 
                                                 
281
 As the project progressed, I realised that, in order to make the indifference of the chromatic 
progression with respect to the representational purpose explicit, I should avoid using all the light and 
dull colours at the beginning, otherwise, the progression would follow the quite natural tendency to 
draw the most visible marks towards the end, when, through trial and error, one has attained a clearer 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHREMHFWRIREVHUYDWLRQDV1RUPDQ%U\VRQZULWHVµWKHZRUNRIGUDZLQJIROORZV
an innate rhythm of development, from broad to narrow and from relatively loose to increasingly 
ERXQGDQGGHWHUPLQHG¶%U\VRQS 
282
 $WWHQWLRQWRWKHLQH[RUDELOLW\RIWLPHDVDSUDFWLFHRIGHWDFKPHQWLVDFRQVWDQWWKHPHLQ:HLO¶V
ZULWLQJV6HHIRULQVWDQFHWKHIROORZLQJSDVVDJHµ0DQXDOODERXU7ime that enters in the body. ... 
:RUNLVOLNHDGHDWK>LHWKHGHDWKRIWKHµ,¶@2QHPXVWJRWKURXJKGHDWK± let the old man die. But 
death is not suicide. One must be killed, be subjected to gravity, to the weights of the world. ... To 
work ± if one is exhausted ± is to become subjected to time as matter is. The mind is forced to go 
IURPRQHLQVWDQWWRWKHQH[WWKLVLVWRREH\¶:HLO OC VI 2, p. 62.) 
283
 The viewer might also see that these habits are quite impersonal: for instance, the habit of drawing 
from left to right is very likely a consequence of the culturally acquired manner of reading and 
writing; the habit of drawing the face first is a very general one which, I assume, is a consequence of 
the fact that humans spend a lot of time looking at people faces. My activity as a drawing tutor 
confirms that these are indeed very typical habits.  
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in the form of reassessments of previously made marks, are made explicit ± for Weil, 
DWWHQWLRQWRRQH¶VPLVWDNHVLVDSUDFWLFHRIGHWDFKPHQWUHDVVHVVPHQWLVPDGHH[SOLFLWE\Whe 
fact that the viewer can see, albeit only discretely, the orders in which the marks were made. 
 
 
Fig. 4.34 Colour drawing, 23rd November 2008 (detail), coloured felt tip pens on paper, 10.1 × 8.6 cm.284  
          
                                                 
284
 In this drawing and the one reproduced in Fig. 4.35, I use the same colour sequence, namely, 
orange, light green, brown, blue, red, light blue, black, pink and green. Comparison of the two 
drawings shows that I have a habit of drawing from left to right (Fig. 4.35) and that this habits is 
superseded by the more peremptory habit of drawing the face first in those situations where the face is 
to my right and the mass of hair to the left (Fig. 4.34). 
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Fig. 4.35 Colour drawing, 3rd January 2009 (detail), coloured felt tip pens on paper, 10.8 × 10 cm. 
 
As regards (3), Weil argues that, when one attends WRRQH¶VPLVWDNHVRQHVHHV RQH¶Vµ,¶DV
WKHVRXUFHRIHUURUZKLOHWKHWUXWKLVSHUFHLYHGDVQRWEHORQJLQJWRµ,¶:HLOH[HPSOLILHVWKLV
as follows: 
I say that 7 +  8 =  16, I am wrong; in a way, I make 7 +  8 =  16. But it is not me who makes 7+ 
8 =  15. A new mathematical theorem, a beautiful line of verse; reflections of this great truth... 
I am absent from all that which is true, or beautiful, or good.285  
There is a problem in transposing this example onto observational drawing, namely, the fact 
that, in drawing, there is nothing as definite as 7 + 8 = 15. However, this problem offers the 
RSSRUWXQLW\WRUHIOHFWRQWKHDSWQHVVRI:HLO¶VH[DPSOHsince this example unduly stresses 
                                                 
285
 Ibid., p. 125. 
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the objective correctness of 7 + 8 = 15286. After all, if I first calculated 7 + 8 = 16, and then 
µFRUUHFWHG¶ P\VHOIE\FDOFXODWLQJ :HLO¶VDUJXPHQWZRXOGVWLOOKROGsubjective 
awareness of having made a mistake is what is consequential here (even if nobody else 
thinks that there is a mistake), while the notion of objective truth is dispensable. This 
interpretation once again narrows the scope of Weilian ethics to the individual. My point is 
that the notion of truth as a subjective regulative principle of conduct is a very familiar one, 
which can make sense even when one is patently at a complete loss with regard to what that 
truth might be. To give an example from the visual arts, in the famous anecdote about 
Cézanne painting the Portrait of Ambroise Vollard 1899 (Cézanne left two small spots of the 
canvas unpainted and, allegedly, when Vollard asked Cézanne whether he would paint the 
two spots, Cézanne replied that if he painted them at random, he would have to start the 
whole painting all over again287), it is unlikely that those who find the anecdote ethically 
PHDQLQJIXOLHWKRVHZKRWDNHLWWRLQGLFDWH&p]DQQH¶VDUWLVWLFJUHDWQHVVKRQHVW\HWF
would claim that they know the objective colours which befit those spots, and yet 
presumably they have no problem in thinking that the search for just such colours regulated 
&p]DQQH¶VFRQGXFWGXULQJZRUNRQWKHSDLQWLQJWKHPDLQPRUDORIWKHDQHFGRWHLVWR
UHSUHVHQW&p]DQQH¶VULJRURXVDGKHUHQFHWRWKLVVHOI-imposed rule).  
)XUWKHUPRUHLQ:HLO¶VRZQZULWLQJVRQHILQGVUHIHUHQFHVWRDVXEMHFWLYHQRWLRQRf truth 
which seems distinct from the notion of objective, mathematical truth expressed in the above 
quoted passage. Notably, Weil argues that the notion of truth applies solely to those objects 
of knowledge that one loves: 
If a man catches his wife, whom he loves and whom he trusted completely, being flagrantly 
unfaithful to him, he is brought into brutal contact with the truth. If he learns that a woman, 
whom he does not know, of whom he hears the name for the first time, from a town which he 
does not know either, has cheated on her husband, this does not change in any way his 
relationship to the truth. This example furnishes the key. The acquisition of knowledge draws 
one closer to the truth when it is a question of knowledge of that which one loves, and in no 
other case.288  
If one recalls that, for Weil, love is synonymous with the most elevated attention, then the 
HWKLFDOVLJQLILFDQFHRIDFNQRZOHGJLQJRQH¶VPLVWDNHZLWh regard to the objective truth of the 
mathematical example is primarily dependent on attention as love and only secondarily 
dependent on the intersubjective agreement on the truth.   
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 7KLVH[DPSOHPLJKWDOVREHUHDGDVDQLQGLFDWLRQRI:HLO¶VWHQGHQF\WRFRQFHSWXDOLVHWKHµ,¶YHU\
negatively, sometimes, with images, which suggests annihilation, as the following passage shows: 
µ7KH beauty of a landscape when nobody sees it, absolutely no one... To see a landscape as it is when 
I am not in it. When I am somewhere, I blemish the silence of sky and earth with my respiration and 
P\KHDUWEHDW¶:HLOOC VI 3, p. 109.)   
287
 Benesch, 2000, p. 54. 
288
 Weil, E, pp. 318±319. For an alternative translation, see: Weil, NR, p. 250. 
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4.33 Attention-inviting art object%kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH 
The project Bâton GHO¶DYHXJOH (see DVD Track 1) saw the reintroduction of the artwork as 
an attention-inviting object. More specifically, the project singles out a Weilian metaphor for 
reading ± WKHPHWDSKRURIWKHEOLQGSHUVRQ¶VFDQHGLVFXVVHGEHORZ± to produce a work, 
that, in the light of this metaphor, solicits an interpretation of the work as attention-inviting. 
%kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH LVDYLGHRFRPSRVHGRIDVHULHVRIEOLQGGUDZLQJVRI:HLO¶V5HQDXOW
factory identity card289 (see Fig. 4.36).  
 
)LJ:HLO¶V5 Renault factory identity card. 
Each drawing took between 1 and 60 minutes and, in the video, each drawing appears for a 
number of seconds equivalent to the number of minutes it took to draw it. The video Bâton 
GHO¶DYHXJOH was shown during a presentation/performance at the 2009 American Weil 
Society Colloquy290. Two different printed versions of this work also appeared: in the 
Cahiers Simone Weil, the philosophical journal produced by the $VVRFLDWLRQSRXUO¶pWXGHGH
                                                 
289
 Weil worked in several factories to study the conditions of workers. I chose this image because it 
LVWKHPRVWLFRQLFRIDOORI:HLO¶VSKRWRJUDSKLFSRUWUDLWVLWKDVEeen used extensively on the covers of 
many books of Weil and in countless posters for Weilian conferences. There are surely many factors 
that render this image so iconic, but I will refer only to two: firstly, its frontality and the impassibility 
RI:HLO¶V H[SUHVVLRQZKLFKZLOOEHUHDGE\PDQ\DVDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI:HLO¶VPRUDOVWDXQFKQHVV
secondly, the image might remind one that Weil sought that contact with hard reality (she, a well-to-
do Parisian, chose to become a factory worker) which she so keenly advocated, and was not a mere 
speculative philosopher. Whether these interpretations are founded or not is inconsequential, since 
what matters for %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH is the existence of this Weilian hagiography, the myth of Saint 
Simone* (which can be gleaned from Weilian secondary literature), because this ensures that the 
community of Weilian scholars and more generally of those interested in Weil, will instantly 
recognise the image and find it emotionally charged. That is not to say that %kWRQGHO¶DYHXgle was 
exclusively directed at the Weilian community, but rather that, for such a community, the work will 
convey a more explicit meaning.  
*One can also buy a Saint Simone Weil T-Shirt (see: Saint Simone Weil T-Shirt, 2000).  
290
 Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, 24th April 2009. 
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la pensée de Simone Weil291, where the first blind drawing of the series was published 
alongside a text outlining the project (see Fig. 4.37); and in the humanities magazine 
Indigo292ZKHUHWKHILUVWEOLQGGUDZLQJVDUHDFFRPSDQLHGE\DQHVVD\RQ:HLO¶V
argument on the training of attention (see Appendix 4), with which I deal in this section. 
 
Fig. 4.37 %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH, Cahiers Simone Weil version.  
In the essays De la perception ou l'aventure de Protée293 and Essay sur la notion de 
lecture294, Weil develops an argument on the training of attention. Whether this argument 
applies to both voluntary attention and the most elevated attention or to just one of them is 
not clear; and, while the fact that Weil often describes the most elevated attention as a kind 
of transcendent gift would seem to rule out that this attention can be trained, thus leaving 
only the voluntary-attention option295, her writings remain ambiguous on this point. I will 
consider two strands of this argument. The first strand adduces that works of art are useful 
means in the training of attention. The second strand is best introduced with a metaphor 
which Weil uses: the metaphor of the blind man. How does a blind person learn to read 
objects with a cane? At first, the sensations caused by the cane on the hand are 
overwhelming and the blind person finds it difficult or impossible to perceive what is at the 
end of the cane. When the blind person has mastered the cane, the sensations of it on the 
hand hardly register, and attention is directed to the object conveyed by the sensations296. 
With the image of the blind person, Weil illustrates a much more general point about the 
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 Alfier, 2009a. 
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 Alfier, 2010. 
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 Weil, OC I, pp. 121±139. 
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 Weil, OC IV 1, pp. 73±79. 
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 Spontaneous attention cannot be trained by definition, given that it is spontaneous. 
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 See also §3.33. 
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perception of reality, which I exposed in §3.34, namely, that, for Weil, we297 read everything 
that happens to us in a certain way, and, by a slow apprenticeship, we can change the way 
we read, as the blind person does298. For Weil, we can improve how we read: the aim is to 
read everything that happens as good for the very fact that it happens, instead of reading 
certain things as good (e.g. pleasurable occurrences) and other things as bad (e.g. painful 
occurrences)299.  
Weil holds that human beings are frequently fooled by their disorderly imagination because 
they distort their perception with the reflection of their emotions; for instance, Weil writes, 
µZKHQWKHVXQULVHV, do not know if the landscape seems to me more joyous because I feel 
happier, or because the sun is higher; a real landscape is illuminated by my happiness as 
PXFKDVE\WKHVXQ¶VUD\V¶300 In such conditions, attention to the world is impossible 
because the world keeps changing abruptly under the distorting effects of ever-changing 
emotions, and nothing is stable enough to become an object of attention301. For Weil, even if 
one could attain an emotionless state in which reality is a web of pure mathematical 
relationships, nobody could remain is this state of pure reason for very long, because, for 
her, imagination and emotions are necessarily involved in all perception302. What can one 
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 Here I am merely reporting :HLO¶VXVHRIµZH¶DQGWKLVXVDJHGRHVQRWFRQWUDGLFWP\GHFLVLRQWR
XVHµ,¶ZKLFK,GLVFXVVHGLQ 
298
 $V&ODXGH'UR]DUJXHVIRU:HLOµDWWHQWLRQWUDQVIRUPVWKHIRUFHRILPSUHVVLRQE\WUDQVIRUPLQJ
LPDJLQDWLRQ¶'UR]S 
299
 Weil appropriates WKHVLPLOHRIWKHEOLQGSHUVRQIURP'HVFDUWHV¶VOptics (see: Descartes, 1985, p. 
153f., p. 166, p. I+RZHYHUWKDWLVQRWWRVD\WKDW:HLOVXEVFULEHVWR'HVFDUWHV¶SK\VLRORJLFDO
DFFRXQWRIYLVLRQUDWKHUVKHXVHV'HVFDUWHV¶LPDJHPHWDSKRULFDOO\DQGin different contexts; for 
LQVWDQFH:HLOXVHVLWWRLOOXVWUDWHQRWRQO\WKHLGHDRIUHDGLQJDQGRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIVKLIWLQJRQH¶V
attention (which I exposed in §3.34) but also that of metaxu or means between a human and a 
transcendental being. The blind person simile appears many times in the notebooks: see: Weil, OC VI 
1, p. 110, p. 201, p. 290, pp. 293±295, pp. 308±309, p. 316, p. 322, p. 329, pp. 338±339, pp. 410±411; 
OC VI 2, p. 73, p. 145, p. 247, p. 337, pp. 356±357, p. 465. 
300
 Weil, OC I, p. 138. 
301
 µ,QUHDOLW\WKHILUVWREMHFWRIRXUSHUFHSWLRQLVQRWVFDWWHUHGWKLQJVLWLVQRWHYHQWKH3URWHXVRIWKH
legend, something that is in front of me; it is an indivisible Proteus, which presses upon my body, 
winds itself up, so to speak, around me, without ever being, since it has no parts, big or small, near or 
IDU:HFDQQRWIRUPDQ\LGHDRIWKLVFRQGLWLRQZKLFKSUHFHGHVSHUFHSWLRQ¶,ELGSµ7KLV
example allows us to conceive what the changes of a world which impresses itself on me only through 
the intermediary of imagination could be for me. No matter how little Proteus changes, all trace of the 
LPPHGLDWHO\SUHFHGLQJFRQGLWLRQLVDEROLVKHGVWUDLJKWDZD\¶,ELGSµ,WLVWKHNLQJGRPRI
Proteus, that is to say, of the thing which changes by DQLQWHUQDOSRZHUZLWKRXWFRQWLQXLW\¶,ELGS
127.) 
302
  µ&HUWDLQO\RQHPXVWDGPLUHWKHPDQZKRKDYLQJFRPHRXWRIWKHFDYHE\UHIOHFWLQJRQJHRPHWU\
has grabbed Proteus, has divested it and has found, beneath this mantle of emotions, pure extension, 
always external to himself, the material for our work, which does not talk, think or will. But even for 
the sage these moments of clairvoyance are difficult, rare, and unrelated to ordinary perceptions, 
which all, without exception, are first of all emotions. Some hungers pangs, a sun ray, a noise more 
frightening or sweeter than the rest: these will be sufficient to make the sage fall again into our world 
of illusions; then he will forget his difficult wisdom, and, at the very moment when he needs this 
wLVGRPWRRYHUFRPHWKHSDVVLRQVKHZLOOEHDVJXOOLEOHWRHPRWLRQVDVDQLQIDQW¶,ELGS$V,
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do, then, in order to pay attention to the world? One can train in the art of perception by 
contemplating works of art. Works of art move us aesthetically and, yet, they remain 
indifferent WRXVµLQDSDLQWHGVXQULVHHYHQLIWKHOLJKWFDQPDNHPHKDSS\WKLVKDSSLQHVV
ZLOOQHYHUEHDFFRPSDQLHGE\DQDFFUHWLRQRIWKHOLJKW¶303 By imitating the moving 
LQGLIIHUHQFHRIZRUNVRIDUWRQHFDQOHDUQWRGLUHFWRQH¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKHZRUOGZLWKRXW
distorting it with the reflection of emotions. Eventually, this leads to love of everything that 
happens304. In this argument, Weil is drawing on the distinction that she makes in Science 
and Perception in Descartes between disorderly imagination (considered as action) and 
orderly imagination (considered as thought). As I argued in §3.31, this distinction is one 
between, on one hand, a world seen as impassioned (i.e. not indifferent) towards us, and, on 
the other hand, a world seen as law-bound (i.e. indifferent to our ends but that, for this very 
reason, can to a certain extent be mastered through methodical action).  
:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWFDQEHVXPPDULVHG as follows: The world is ordered but extremely 
complex and it is difficult to perceive its order; the senses of those unskilled in the art of 
perception are passively subjected to the world, so they respond to this aesthetic assault by 
fabricating illusions; the order of works of art, on the other hand, is simple and, unlike 
purely mathematical order, it is an aesthetic order ± one can feel it, not only think it, and is 
thus suited to human perception which is a synthesis of intellection and sensation305. To 
elucidate the notion of aesthetic order, Weil gives the example of the sounds of a piece of 
                                                                                                                                          
have shown in §3.31, Weil articulates in detail this view of perception as a synthesis of intellection 
and perception in Science et Perception dans Descartes. 
303
 Ibid., p. 138. 
304
 µ7KXVRXUPRPHQWVRI&DUWHVLDQFODLUYR\DQFHDUHXVHOHVVZLWKRXWDQDUWRISHUFHSWLRQWKDWLVD
gymnastics which allows us to recall pure understanding, while not stopping, as we do in reflection, 
being attentive to the dances of our body. But doubtless this gymnastics would not be possible 
without the experience of special perceptions by which the spontaneous dance of our body, although it 
sometimes compels our attention, does not hinder, and perhaps aids, the use of pure understanding. 
7KHVHVSHFLDOSHUFHSWLRQVDUHJLYHQWRHDFKRQHRIXVE\KXPDQNLQGWKURXJKZRUNVRIDUW¶,ELGS
µ$FDWKHGUDOPRYHVXVPRUHWKDQQDWXUHGRHVEXWWKLQJVGRQRWUHVSRQGDWDOOWRRXUHPRWLRQV
even though they move us, they remain indifferHQW¶,ELGSµ7KXVXQWLOQRZP\OLIHZDV
divided in two: those moments in which, by an effort of attention, I stopped being moved and I 
delivered myself to pure reason; and the moments when emotions once again got hold of me and I let 
myself be deceived by Proteus, clothing objects with my own emotions. ... But even these objects [i.e. 
artworks] would be useless for me, if, by an imitation of the attitudes, of the movements, of the 
immobility which they impose on me, I could not, without escaping from the emotions that I receive 
from nature, which is impossible, at least rid nature of the reflection of my emotions. Landscapes 
must become paintings for me, forests must become cathedrals, sounds must become symphonies, 
men must become portraits or sWDWXHVRQO\WKHQLV3URWHXVWUXO\WDPHG¶,ELGSS±139.) 
305
 7KLVDUJXPHQWHYLGHQFHVWKDW:HLO¶VLGHDRISHUFHSWLRQUHPDLQHGXQFKDQJHGWKURXJKRXWKHUOLIH
since De la perception ou l'aventure de Protée was written in 1929 while Essay sur la notion de 
lecture was written in 1941. 
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music: these sounds are moving, but their order is based on invariable rules which have 
nothing to do with the emotions the listener feels306. 
One aim of the blind drawing project was to produce a work that carries a quality of moving 
indifference, in the Weilian sense. The image of a face is psychologically charged, attention 
is drawn to it almost automatically, and it is easy to read expressions in it (even an 
expressionless face is a face with an expressionless expression); in short, the image of a face 
is moving. But, in blind drawing, eye, nose, mouth, etc. are all represented indifferently by 
the same kind of line; in fact, there is only one line in each drawing; and the order of the 
LPDJHVLQWKHYLGHRLVLQGLIIHUHQWWRZKDWRQHPD\FDOOµWKHHPHUJLQJOLQJHULQJIDPLO\
UHVHPEODQFH¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKLVUHVHPEODQFHLVVRPHWLPHVGHIDFHG,QRWKHUZRUGVZKLOH
the content of the project carries a moving agency, its form carries a quality of 
indifference307. Furthermore, the erratic duration of each drawing in the video creates an 
impression of indifference308.  
As regards the second strand of the argument, which is concerned with shifts of attention, it 
was hoped that, in time, the series of drawings might indicate a shift of attention from the 
whole of the face in the photograph, whose psychological charge, as I said, attracts attention, 
WRWKHIDUHQGRIWKHµFDQHRIP\H\HV¶VRWRVSHDNZKHUHWKHH\HVµPHHW¶ the contour of 
shapes devoid of any figurative representational connotation. This second aim was not 
achieved, but, as for the representation of a detached disposition in the skull drawings, it 
nevertheless functioned semantically in the form of a wish or hope. 
%kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOHwas in part the outcome of my analysis of Book of Dust, by the American 
artist Agnes Denes309.  I will first give a brief overview of Book of Dust, before I explain 
how it has helped me to clarify an aspect of the first strand of the argument which I 
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 µ,ILQDIRUHVW,KHDUDVFUHDPRIKRUURUHYHQWKHZKLVSHUVRIWKHOHDYHVZLOOVHHPWRPHIXOORI
horror. But at a concert, after a sort of moan that wrings the heart, comes immediately, not according 
to my emotions, but according to the text of the symphony, which itself conforms to invariable rules, 
DORYHVRQJRUDWULXPSKDOVRQJ¶,ELGS0LFKHO1DUF\DUJXHVWKDW:HLOSHUFHLYHGQHFHVVLW\LQ
a Cartesian fashion as blind, i.e. as not having finality, or, rather, as having a finality without finality, 
that is as a work of art (Narcy, 2003, pp. 33±34). For an investigation of the view of the artistic 
FUHDWLRQDVEHLQJFKDUDFWHULVHGE\ILQDOLW\ZLWKRXWILQDOLW\µDXWRWHO\ZLWKRXWtelos¶VHH/\RWDUG
1991, p. 172. 
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 %\µFRQWHQW¶,PHDQWKDWZKLFKRQHUHDGVLQWKHµIRUP¶)RUH[DPSOHLIRQHZULWHVWKHZRUG
µKRXVH¶ILUVWLQORZHUFDVHDQGWKHQLQFDSLWDOOHWWHUVRQHFKDQJHVWKHIRUPEXWQRWWKHFRQWHQWRIWKH
word. I do realise that this is a simplification. For instance, take a text written all in lower case except 
IRUWKHZRUGµ+286(¶ZKLFKLVZULWWHQLQFDSLWDOVZRXOGQ¶WWKDWFKDQJHLWVFRQWHQW",WKLQNLWZRXOG
Anyway, here I work with the simplification. I will return to the issue of form and content later in this 
VHFWLRQZKHQFRQVLGHULQJ$JQHV'HQHV¶Book of Dust. 
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 Indeterminacy feels more indifferent that determinacy, because in the latter one possess at least a 
certain degree of control in the form of an understanding of the determining law, while in the former 
no such knowledge is available. 
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 3DUWRIWKHIROORZLQJUHIOHFWLRQVRQWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ:HLO¶VLGHDRIDWWHQWLRQ-inviting art and 
'HQHV¶Book of Dust were published in Alfier, 2009b. See also: Alfier, 2009c. 
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described above, that is, the issue of the moving indifference of works of art. Book of Dust is 
a text with images that, according to the author, tries to give an overall account of 
contemporary hard science, particularly, physics, chemistry and neuroscience310. In what 
follows, I consider three instances of moving indifference in Book of Dust. 
Firstly: The title Book of Dust FDQPHDQERWKµERRNmade of GXVW¶DQGµERRNconcerning 
GXVW¶%\µGXVW¶'HQHVPHDQVWKHDVWURSK\VLFDOQRWLRQRIFRVPLFGXst. The semantic duality 
of the title, on one hand, points to the material slightness of human existence, it points to the 
undifferentiating process by which everything that is dust to dust shall return311, and, on the 
other hand, it conjures up moving images of the immensity of the universe.  
Secondly: Denes compiles a table of data regarding some material aspects of the universe² 
namely, size, velocity, power, numbers, density, mass and temperature²and she considers 
these aspects at the microscopic level, the human level and the cosmic level; for instance, 
size: at the microscopic level, Denes gives Planck length, which is 10-33 cm; at the human 
level, one finds the average size of a human being, which is 200 cm; and at the cosmic level, 
1028 cm, which, according to Denes, some scientists hypothesise to be the size of the 
universe. This table is followed by a text which argues that the table seems to justify an 
anthropocentric view of the universe312:KLOHWKHWDEOHFRQYH\V'HQHV¶FULWLFDOHYDOXDWLRQ
of the contemporary scientific approach which is based on the indifferent accumulation of 
data, her comment on the table conveys the idea that the human presence in the universe is a 
fragile and fertile equilibrium. In other words, this is a moving representation of 
indifference. 
7KLUGO\,QDVHFWLRQRIWKHERRNWLWOHGµ+XPDQ'XVW¶RQHILQGVDSKRWRgraph of a pile of 
human bones. This image is followed by an obituary written in a rather emotionless style: 
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 Denes developed this project during the 70s and 80s in order to tackle the ever-growing 
specialisation of the various scientific branches. She sees the body of knowledge as an octopus whose 
tentacles continue to multiply and extend, while its head keeps shrinking. This renders reasonable 
dialogue increasingly difficult as knowledge drowns in information (Denes, 2008, pp. 66±67). Denes 
is motivated by ecological concerns; she believes that lack of knowledge makes humankind incapable 
of taking effective responsibility for the future of the earth (Ibid., p. 71). 
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 Genesis, 3:19. 
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 µ7KHXOWLPDWHDQWKURSRFHQWULFYLHZWKDWZHDUHWKHFHQWHURIWKHXQLYHUVHLVWUXHLQDVHQVH,QWKLV
universe of extremes humanity is almost in the center of its range of sizes, masses, and temperatures. 
We are macroscopic, in the middle between cosmic and microscopic proportions. Our size is the 
geometric mean between atoms and stars, ten billion times larger than an atom, ten billion times 
smaller than the sun. We are the mean between the ultramicroscopic (quarks and Planck length), and 
the whole visible universe. Our world begins at the surface of our skin and we can peer inward and 
out at equal depths. Similarly, our body temperature, 300 K, is the geometric mean between the 3 K 
temperature of the universe and the 30,000 K of the hottest stars. Even our earth is a medium planet; 
there are four smaller and four larger in the solar system. We occupy a thin layer on the surface of the 
HDUWKEHWZHHQLWVPROWHQLQWHULRUDQGIULJLGRXWHUVSDFH¶'HQHVS 
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He was an artist. He died of a heart attack. ... He was unhappy and lonely more often than not, 
achieved 1/10,000 of his dreams, managed to get his opinions across 184 times and was 
misunderstood 3,800 times when it mattered. ... He had 4 friends at various times in his life 
and was loved by 17 people, including his parents. He was liked by 312. ... 34 people 
remembered him or spoke of him after his death, and his remains shown here [this refers to the 
photograph of the pile of bones] represent 1/85 of his entire body.313 
The text is discordant314 because there are two juxtaposed registers: the monotonous 
accumulation of numerical facts refers to concepts which have little to do with number and 
quantity: sadness, loneliness, friendship, etc. For instance, while the last sentence of the 
TXRWHµKLVUHPDLQVVKRZQKHUHUHSUHVHQWRIKLVHQWLUHERG\¶UHIHUVWRWKHSLOHRIERQHV
as something that could indifferently belong to anybody, the obituary evokes the moving 
memory of an individual life. 
The form of Book of Dust is that of hard, indifferent science: the table of data, the images of 
matter, the impersonal style of the writing; while its content refers to human value, and, 
above all, to the aesthetic experience of feeling oneself in the world. In other words, in Book 
of Dust, the form conveys a quality of indifference, while the content conveys a moving 
quality. The meaning of Book of Dust is somewhat analogous to that of a medical report 
informing somebody of an incurable illness. Probably, for the patient, the form of the report 
will carry a quality of indifference, while the content will be moving.  
Book of Dust was instrumental in thinking about how to conceive an art project, Bâton de 
O¶DYHXJOHZKLFKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIP\UHVHDUFKPD\H[SUHVV:HLO¶VLGHDRIDUWDVDPHDQVLQ
the training of attention.  
As with the skull drawings, %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH engendered an association which, even 
WKRXJKLWPLJKWVHHPIDUUHPRYHGIURP:HLOLDQDWWHQWLRQDIIRUGHGDUHIOHFWLRQRQ:HLO¶V
metaphysics that was instrumental to the development of my research through the imaginal 
projects. The association was sparked by the compound of blindness, reading and drawing 
ZKLFKOHGPHWR'HUULGD¶VMemoirs of the Blind. The book opens with a quotation from a 
letter from Diderot to Sophie Volland: 
I write without seeing. I came. I wanted to kiss your hand ... This is the first time I have ever 
written in the dark ... not knowing whether I am indeed forming letters. Where there will be 
nothing, read that I love you.315 
                                                 
313
 Ibid., pp. 35±36. 
314
 I delivered this quote on several occasions and the reaction of the audience was always the same: 
WKHSDVVDJHµ+HKDGIULHQGVDWYDULRXVWLPHVLQKLVOLIHDQGZDVORYHGE\SHRSOHLQFOXGLQJKLV
SDUHQWV+HZDVOLNHGE\¶DOZD\VHQgendered laughter. At first, I was puzzled by this reaction, as, 
on my first reading of Book of Dust, I had not found the passage amusing. Later, I thought that my 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQKDGEHHQLQIRUPHGE\P\NQRZOHGJHRI'HQHV¶DUWLVWLFRYHUDOOFRQFHUQVZKLFK most 
definitely do not include irony), while the audience had sensed the jarring and uncomfortable quality 
of the text and had thus reacted by laughing.   
315
 Derrida, 1993, p. 1. Diderot, 1984, p. 48. 
4. Normative critical practical analogy 
 
134 
 
7KHZRUGVµZKHUHWKHUHZLOOEHQRWKLQJUHDGWKDW,ORYH\RX¶ZHUHWKHFDWDO\st between my 
theoretical and practical lines of enquiry to date, for they precipitated my understanding of 
the role of absence in Weilian attention: in the reading of reality as an object of love (amor 
fati), that object is, for Weil, absent, just as, in WKHXQIRUPHGFKDUDFWHUVRI'LGHURW¶VOHWWHUV
the meaning is absent but still, he hopes, capable of expressing his love and, thus, in turn 
capable of making the reader a lover,Q:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFV*RGLVDQDORJRXVWR'LGHURW
God means love but one needs faith and love (the most elevated kind of attention) to 
GHFLSKHU*RG¶VPHVVDJH316,QRWKHUZRUGV:HLO¶VUHPDUNVRQDWWHQWLRQRSHUDWHZLWKLQKHU
wider negative-theology discourse. As I will argue in Chapter 5, this realisation affected a 
shift in the epistemological premises of the research, that is, a change of view with regard to 
what I believe my research can contribute to the expansion of knowledge of Weilian 
attention (see §5.1).  
4.4 Summary 
In Chapter 3, I argued that Weil articulates a hierarchy of attentive states, at whose summit 
is a disposition of absolute consent to whatever happens and whose object (i.e. the object of 
attention) is an insoluble contradiction. In the present chapter, firstly, I stated that the notion 
of insoluble contradiction is epistemologically problematic. Secondly, I approached the 
SUREOHPRILQVROXEOHFRQWUDGLFWLRQE\DSSHDOLQJWR:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VQRWLRQRIWKH
nonsensicality of ethics and the distinction he makes between ethical feelings and ethical 
judgements. Wittgenstein¶VGLVWLQFWLRQDOORZHGPHWRERWKDEVWUDFWIURPSDUWLFXODUHWKLFDO
dogmas of Weil (by considering them as indexes of her ethical feelings) and to make a 
parallel between ethical feelings and judgements, on one hand, and image and text, on the 
other hand (texts and judgements being propositional, images and feelings being non-
propositional). This parallel was used for the representation of necessity and of an attitude of 
detachment in some of my observational drawing projects. As I have pointed out in §4.3124, 
even though this strategy did not lead me to experience necessity, it nevertheless fulfilled the 
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 :LWKUHJDUGWRWKHKLGGHQORYHRI*RG:HLOZULWHVµAt each instant, the fabric, the substance of 
RXUYHU\EHLQJLVWKHORYHWKDW*RGKDVIRUXV*RG¶VFUHDWLYHORYHZKLFKPDLQWDLQVXVLQH[LVWHQFHLV
not only overabundance of generosity. It is also renunciation, sacrifice. It is not only the Passion, it is 
FUHDWLRQLWVHOIZKLFKLVUHQXQFLDWLRQDQGVDFULILFHRQ*RG¶VSDUW7KH3DVVLRQLVRQO\LWVFRPSOHWLRQ
Already as creator, God empties Himself of His divinity. He takes the form of a slave. He submits 
+LPVHOIWRQHFHVVLW\¶µ7KHHYLOWKDWZHVHHHYHU\ZKere in the form of affliction is a sign of our 
GLVWDQFHIURP*RG%XWWKLVGLVWDQFHLVORYHDQGWKHUHIRUHLWPXVWEHORYHG¶µ,WLVQRWWKDWRQHPXVW
love evil. But one must love God through evil. When a child, while playing, breaks a precious object, 
the mother does not love this destruction. But if later her son goes far away or dies, she ... thinks 
about this accident with affection, because she sees in it only one of the manifestations of the 
H[LVWHQFHRIKHUFKLOG¶:HLOOC IV 1, pp. 272±µ7KHUH is an effort to make which is by far the 
KDUGHVWRIDOOEXWLWLVQRWLQWKHGRPDLQRIDFWLRQ,WLVWKHHIIRUWRINHHSLQJRQH¶VJD]HWXUQHGWRZDUGV
God, of bringing it back when it deviates, of applying it with all the intensity of which one is 
capable.¶,ELGSS±µ7KHRQO\FKRLFHRIIHUHGWRPDQLVWRDWWDFKRUQRWKLVORYHKHUHEHORZ
Let him refuse to attach his love here below, let him remain motionless, without searching, without 
moving, attending, without even trying to know what he is waLWLQJIRU¶,ELGS    
4. Normative critical practical analogy 
 
135 
 
IXQFWLRQRIWKHQRUPDWLYHDQDORJ\LHWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI:HLO¶VUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
individual and the world through observational drawing. The insights afforded by the 
application of the normative analogy can be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, I acquired a practical knowledge of the difference between orderly and disorderly 
LPDJLQDWLRQZKLFK:HLO¶VSRVWXODWHV,ZDVDEOHWRGLVFULPLQDWHEHWZHHQLQHYLWDELOLty and 
constraint, showing that, even though it seems quite natural to think of something inevitable 
as a constraint, in practice, the feeling of inevitability need not be accompanied by a feeling 
of constraint. This analysis might allow a less monolithic conceptualisation of the notion of 
necessity which Weil articulates in her writings; and, even though the implications of such a 
conceptualisation are beyond the scope of my research, I expect that it could provide a 
fruitful starting point for further research on Weilian ethics.  
Secondly, I identified a distinction between truth and subjective awareness of truth, arguing 
WKDW:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWRQDWWHQWLRQDVDSUDFWLFHRIGHWDFKPHQWKROGVHYHQLIRQHUHMHFWVWKH
DEVROXWLVWYLHZRIWUXWKZKLFK:HLO¶VZULWLQgs seem to imply. The implications of this 
distinction for art practice dealing with metaethics are discussed in §6.3. The distinction 
might affRUGDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI:HLO¶V philosophy from a less morally dogmatic point of 
view than the one adopted by a great deal of Weilian scholarship.  
Thirdly, the analysis of the normative projects presented in this chapter chronicles my 
journey from an equivocal representation of the subject317 in the normative analogy (a self-
reflexive representation which is common in art practice) to the realisation that I could 
FDSLWDOLVHRQ:HLO¶VYHUVLRQRIWKHGH-reified, non-reflexive subject to achieve the critical 
IXQFWLRQRIWKHQRUPDWLYHDQDORJ\LHWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOFULWLTXHRI:HLO¶VQRWLRQRI
attention through the dialogic method of artistic collaboration. In other words, by 
instantiating the normative critical practical analogy through the normative projects, I 
progressively came to understand the character of the subject/agent which Weil envisages in 
her discourse on attention and the requirements which the normative projects had to fulfil in 
order to re-enact such a subject. This demonstrates the heuristic function of critical practical 
analogy: the objective and the reflective normative analogues, which I articulated in §2.4, 
were very abstract, guiding concepts that, through the normative operational principle have 
                                                 
317
 This kind of subject, which was a determination of my initial intention to become a better drawer, 
as discussed in §1.1, invites a sort of mystified reading along Merleau-Pontian lines of the artist as a 
somewhat tragic ILJXUHDVDGRRPHGDOFKHPLVWWU\LQJWRPDNHWKHYLVLEOHVHHQµ,WLVWKHPRXQWDLQ
itself that, from over there, makes itself seen by the painter. It is the mountain that the painter 
interrogates by looking. What does he ask exactly? To reveal the purely visible means by which it 
becomes mountain under our eyes. Light, illumination, shadows, reflections, colour: all these objects 
of the research are not real beings at all, they have only a visual existence, as ghosts have. They are 
barely at the threshold of everyday vision; they are not commonly seen. The gaze of the painter asks 
to them how they manage to suddenly make something be there, this thing, to compose this talisman 
RIWKHZRUOGWRPDNHXVVHHWKHYLVLEOH¶0HUOHDX-Ponty, 2006, p. 21.) 
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acquired particular and precise referents. In light of this development, the projects which 
more clearly exemplify the workings of the normative analogy are the performance Speaking 
of Writing ± Speaking/Writing about Drawing and the project %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH, the 
former, because its absurdist character is an antidote to the mystification of observational 
drawing318, the latter, because it parallels one of :HLO¶VDUJXPHQWVLQVXFKDQH[SOLFLW
manner as to leave little room for mystification. As I will show in Chapter 5, the imaginal 
critical practical analogy does not entail the same problems with regard to the subjectivity of 
my role as an artist, both because the imaginal projects do not involve observational drawing 
and because, in these projects, my role as art maker is not of primary importance for the 
interpretation of the work.   
However, I also realised that my theoretical conceptualisation of free compulsion in Chapter 
3 HYDGHGWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZRQH¶VIUHHGRPWRFKDQJHRQH¶VSHUFHSWXDOKDELWFRXOGEHPDGH
compatible with the idea that necessity is all-pervasive (which, regardless of the above-
mentioned distinction between inevitability and constraint, is undoubtedly how Weil 
describes necessity). In other words, an insoluble contradiction remains very much unsolved; 
and, in my view, this is problematic because, in the appeal to contradiction, I detect an 
impatience to cut dialogue short (the contradictory H[SUHVVLRQµWRDJUHHWRGLVDJUHH¶UHQGHUV
clearly this kind of impatience). The last paragraph of §4.33 intimates that an investigation 
RI:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFVVSHFLILFDOO\RIKHUQHJDWLYHWKHRORJ\DUJXPHQWPLJKWSURYHDXVHIXO
lead to deal with (if not to solve) this problem. This investigation will be the subject of the 
next chapter.   
Before I turn to Chapter 5, I will ask the following metaethical questions. Is it fair to appeal 
WR:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VQRWLRQRIHWKLFDOQRQVHQVLFDOLW\WRLQYHVWLJDWH:HLO¶VDVVHUWLRQVRQHWKLFV"
,V:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VYLHZQRWVRPHYHUVLRQRIHPRWLYLVPE\ZKLFKDQ\HWKLFDOMXGJHPHQWVDUH
interpreted as mere expressions of feelings? And is the emotivist view not antithetical to 
:HLO¶VHWKLFDOSRVLWLRQZKLFKVHHPVPXFKPRUHDOLJned with the kind of non-naturalist 
cognitivism propounded by G.E. Moore? In other words, have I not grossly misinterpreted 
:HLOLDQHWKLFV",SURSRVHWKHIROORZLQJDQVZHUV:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VQRWLRQRIQRQVHQVLFDOLW\LV
not emotivist, since he does not state that ethical judgements merely express emotions, but 
rather that, when analysed, ethical judgements do not seem to represent any conceivable 
DFWXDOVWDWHRIDIIDLUV(YHQWKRXJK:HLO¶VODQJXDJHHVSHFLDOO\LQKHUUHOLJLRXVZULWLQJV
sometimes suggests a non-QDWXUDOLVWYLHZDNLQWR0RRUH¶V319, her notion of insoluble 
contradiction intimates that her discourse is more self-critically open-HQGHGWKDQ0RRUH¶V
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 This performance is not a tragedy but rather a kind of tragicomedy. 
319
 This view sees moral facts as non-natural, that is, as fundamentally different from the facts which 
are the object of investigation of natural science, but nevertheless cognisable.     
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while Moore asserts that there are non-natural moral facts, Weil often asks: Are there non-
natural, or transcendentPRUDOIDFWV",QWKLVUHVSHFW,WKLQN:HLO¶VUHIOHFWLRQRQHWKLFVLV
FORVHUWR:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V7KXV,GRQRWWKLQNWKDW,KDYHPLVLQWHUSUHWHG:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRI
ethics, even though I do not hold that the reading of it which I have articulated is the only 
plausible reading. My reading stresses subjective truth over objective truth, on one hand, and 
on the other hand, objectifies the subject; while the typical reading proposed by Weilian 
scholarship tends to move in the opposite direction, assuming an objective moral ground320 
DQG\HWDUWLFXODWLQJDQH[HJHVLVRI:HLOLDQDWWHQWLRQVW\OHGRQ:HLO¶VRZQVXEMHFWLYH
expository manner321. My reading was no doubt at least partly determined by the fact that the 
operational principle of the normative analogy functioned through a practice of 
observational drawing, because a critique of the notion of objective truth seems to me 
necessarily to inhere within such practice. 
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 Of whLFKWHQGHQF\WKHLQVLVWHQWSUHIHUHQFHIRUµZH¶RYHUµ,¶VHHLVDQLQGLFDWLRQ 
321
 In 4.2121, I have shown how I have objectified Weilian statements on ethics by considering them 
as indexes of her ethical feelings, and not as beliefs that I had to try WRµPDNHVXEMHFWLYHO\PLQH¶ in 
RUGHUWREHWUXHWR:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\ 
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Chapter outline: This chapter begins by returning to the issue of the relation between 
DWWHQWLRQDQGIUHHGRPDQGIRFXVHVRQWKHPHWDSK\VLFDOEDVLVRI:HLO¶VQHJDWLYHWKHRORJ\,
argue that, like Descartes, Weil postulates an absolutely free faculty of attention by means of 
which one can withhold judgement whenever perception is unclear. Both Weil and 
Descartes, I claim, are dismayed optimist rationalists in a quandary: since they posit the 
existence of an absolutely good divine creator, they require the notion of attention in order to 
give a rational account of the possibility of human evil; and, since, for Weil, God is 
LQILQLWHO\JRRGILQLWHKXPDQEHLQJVFDQQRWNQRZ*RG¶VJRRGQHVV²except through 
revelation. This conclusion is unsatisfactory, firstly, because it precludes dialogue between 
tKRVHZKRGRDQGWKRVHZKRGRQRWDFFHSW:HLO¶VUHOLJLRXVPHWDSK\VLFVDQGVHFRQGO\
because it proceeds exclusively from propositional argumentation and overshadows my non-
propositional thoughts on these issues.  The imaginal projects obviate these shortcomings: 
they capitalise on the non-propositional semantic function of artworks by abstracting from 
WKHFRQWHQWRI:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFDOGLVFRXUVHUHWDLQLQJRQO\WKHDUJXPHQWIRUPVZKLFKWKLV
discourse employs, namely, tautology (e.g. God is God) and contradiction (e.g. The good is 
possible and impossible). Furthermore, through these projects I developed a sceptical 
disposition whose intention was to favour dialogue. In the most general terms, imaginal 
projects function by materialising tautology and contradiction, thus introducing an element 
of contingency into the representation of these purely logical forms. Weil is widely regarded 
as a pre-eminently mystical thinker, but the imaginal projects highlight the fact that her 
metaphysics, in particular her notion of insoluble contradiction, also draws on ideas of 
logical purity and unconditionality that are quite distinct from²but not incompatible with²
her mystical outlook.  
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5.1 Outline of the objectives of the imaginal analogy 
The aim of the imaginal projects was to expand the knowledge of Weilian attention beyond 
its present restricted horizon. This horizon is constituted by the typical position found in 
Weil scholarship on her negative theology (outlined in the next paragraph), but is also 
indicated by my scepticism with regard to the epistemological status of insoluble 
contradictions. In secondary literature on Weil, one finds a general acceptance of both 
:HLO¶VQHJDWLYHWKHRORJ\DQGKHUDSSHDOWRLQVROXEOHFRQWUDGLFWLRQ 
Weil sometimes refers to the contradictory object of attention as the simultaneous 
presence/absence of God322. For Weil, the object of the most elevated attention is absolute 
good (a notion which belongs to ethics) or God (i.e. a transcendent being), and it cannot be 
found, as Weil writes, here below323,IQRWKLQJµhere below¶324 can be the object of attention, 
then, this object cannot be represented in statements of fact (except negatively). The general 
YLHZRI:HLOLDQVFKRODUVKLSLVH[HPSOLILHGE\$QQ3LUUXFFHOOR¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKLVREMHFW
can be grasped only in a non-GLVFXUVLYHµUHDOPWKDWRSHQVXSRQO\WKURXJKLPDJHV¶325, but 
little is achieved through this argument, not because this claim is not an appropriate 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI:HLO¶VWKRXJKWEXWEHFDXVH3LUUXFFHOOR¶VDUJXPHQWUHPDLQVGLVFXUVLYH: this 
would be analogous to pointing at something and stating that it absolutely cannot be seen. 
Another related issue is the manifestation of the attention of the artist in the works he or she 
produces. Weil suggests that it is manifested326. I ask:  How can it be manifested if the object 
of attention is transcendent? Can the artist ascend to the transcendent? Is attention not 
unmanifestable by definition? One can see how attention conceptualised as the ultimate, 
absolutely good ethical end (as Weil conceptualises it) quickly leads always to the same 
epistemological impasse, variously expressed. In her writings, Weil grapples time and again 
with this impasse, and this feeds my interest in her philosophy, but trying to demonstrate that 
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 Pirruccello, 1995, pp. 61±74. 
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 µ0DQGRHVQRWKDYHto search for, nor even believe in, God. He must only refuse to love anything 
that is other than God. This refusal does not suppose any belief. It is sufficient to note what is evident, 
namely, that all the goods here below, past, present or future, real or imaginary, are finite and limited, 
radically incapable of satisfying the desire of an infinite and perfect good which perpetually burns 
ZLWKLQXV¶:HLOOC IV 1, p. 277.)   
324
 7KHVFDUHTXRWHVDUHMXVWLILHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKHH[SUHVVLRQµKHUHEHORZ¶SUHVXSSRVHVD
transcendental metaphysics, that is, it presupposes a there above, i.e. GRG¶VSODFH1RWHKRZRQWKH
other hand, WitWJHQVWHLQ¶VHWKLFDOGLVFRXUVHGRHVQRWSUHVXPHDPHWDSK\VLFDOGRPDLQ 
325
 Pirruccello, 1995, pp. 61±74. 
326
 The following passages, already quoted in footnote 223H[SUHVVWKLVYLHZµ:KDWLVSDUWLFXODULQ
works of art is that the sound which reaches the listener from outside seems to him to be solely the 
IUXLWRIKLVRZQDWWHQGLQJ,QUHDOLW\LWKDVEHHQWKHIUXLWRIWKHDUWLVW¶VDWWHQGLQJ)RUWKHFRPSRVHUWR
IRUHVHHZKDWQRWHZLOOIROORZLVDOZD\VWRLQYHQWLWWKLVLQYHQWLRQLVWKHIUXLWRIDWWHQGLQJ¶:Hil, OC 
ISµ,QFRPSRVLQJPXVLFRUSRHWU\RQHDLPVDWDFHUWDLQLQQHUVLOHQFHRIWKHVRXODQGRQH
DUUDQJHVZRUGVRUVRXQGVLQVXFKDZD\DVWRUHQGHUWKLVDVSLUDWLRQSHUFHSWLEOHWRRWKHUV¶:HLOC 1, 
p. 56.) 
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the work I make somehow PDQLIHVWVHOHYDWHGDWWHQWLRQZRXOGEHIROORZLQJ:HLO¶V
reasoning and using her terminology, identical to claiming to be God ± a hard claim to live 
up to. These epistemological questions required a change in the art practice, that is, a shift 
from normative to imaginal critical practical analogy.  
$VWKLVFKDSWHUZLOOGHPRQVWUDWH:HLO¶VQHJDWLYHWKHRORJ\DSSHDOVWRWKHLGHDVRIWDXWRORJ\
and contradiction in a very general sense. That is to say that, while in the field of logic, the 
WHUPVµWDXWRORJ\¶DQGµFRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶KDYHYHU\VSHFLILFPHDQLQJVDQGGHQRWHWZRLQILQLWH
classes of arguments (which can be extrHPHO\FRPSOH[:HLO¶VWDXWRORJLHV and 
contradictions are so in a general and everyday sense: a tautology has the simple form 
µ6RPHWKLQJLVVRPHWKLQJ¶DFRQWUDGLFWLRQKDVWKHVLPSOHIRUPµ6RPHWKLQJLV[DQG
VRPHWKLQJLVQRW[¶7KHLPDJLQDOSURMHFWVDOVRDVVXPHWKLVJHQHUDOVHQVHRIWKHQRWLRQVRI
tautology and contradiction.     
7KHREMHFWLYHDQDORJXHRIWKHLPDJLQDODQDORJ\:HLO¶VDSSHDOWRWDXWRORgy and 
contradiction in her discourse on attention) determined the following objective: to indicate 
how Weil refers to tautology and contradiction in her metaphysics. The role of attention in 
Weilian metaphysics is discussed in §5.31, where I demonstrate that her metaphysics has its 
URRWVLQ'HVFDUWHV¶SKLORVRSK\,QLQOLJKWRIP\DQDO\VLVRI:HLOLDQPHWDSK\VLFV,
propose an explanation of why Weil postulates the notion of attention. As I will argue, this 
explanation, albeit plausible, is a dead-end conclusion, and I propose it in order to highlight 
the usefulness of the expansion of knowledge of Weilian attention which is the aim of the 
LPDJLQDODQDORJ\)XUWKHUHOXFLGDWLRQRI:HLO¶VYLHZVRQWDXWRORJ\DQGFRQWUDGLFWLRQDUH
found in the analysis of the art projects in §5.41 and §5.42. The reflective analogue 
(considering tautology and contradiction qua immaterial argument forms) involved a general 
UHIHUHQFHWRWKHQRWLRQRIORJLFDOIRUPDQGWRWKHHYHU\GD\VHQVHRIWKHZRUGVµWDXWRORJ\¶
DQGµFRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶ZKLFK,GHVFULEHGLQWKHSUHYLRXVSDUDJUDSK7KHRSHUDWLRQDOSULQFLSOH
(the materialisation, narrativisation and personification of tautological and contradictory 
forms) was informed by the art theoretical classification of the functions of art proposed by 
the philosopher Curt John Ducasse; by the writings of the art historian Thomas McEvilley 
on the use of theory in Conceptual Art; and by the work of Agnes Denes. These theories, 
which inform the methodology of the imaginal projects, are discussed in §5.2. The account 
of the imaginal projects is divided into two sections: one on tautology (§5.41) and one on 
contradiction (§5.42). Each section gives an account of two projects.  
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5.2 Sub-methodological concerns: Aesthetic, lectical and heuretic art 
My initial conception of the possibility of developing the imaginal analogy owes much to 
the classification of art practices according to their function advanced by Curt John Ducasse 
in his The Philosophy of Art. Ducasse distinguishes between: (1) aesthetic art (objectification 
of feeling); (2) lectical art (objectification of meaning); and (3) heuretic art (objectification 
of will)327.  
'XFDVVH¶VFDWHJRULHVDUHQRWPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHDQGWKHUHDUHREMHFWVWKDWPD\IXQFWLRQDW
once aesthetically, lectically and heuretically. For instance, a cookery book written in the 
form of a poem whose meter represents mathematical equations would function in the three 
modes simultaneously. On the other hand, in a more conventional scenario, a poem may 
function mainly aesthetically328, a cookery book mainly heuretically (it objectifies the will-
to-cook), and a mathematical treatise mainly lectically. The snow project by Art & 
Language, considered as a hybrid art object, which includes CKDUOHV+DUULVRQ¶VHVVD\VVHH
§2.2), is an H[DPSOHRIDQDUWZRUNZKLFKIXOILOV'XFDVVH¶VWKUHHIXQFWLRQVRIDUWLW
aesthetically gives the feeling that there is a limit beyond which art cannot be pressed; it 
heuretically objectifies the will to paint on a composition until all recognisable content is 
obliterated329DQG+DUULVRQ¶VHVVD\IXOILOVDOHFWLFDOIXQFWLRQWKURXJKDQH[HJHVLVRIWKHVQRZ
project.  
Although Ducasse, having defined the terms of this tripartite classification, concentrates 
solely on the aesthetic function of art, his categories present a wide and inclusive idea of the 
scope of art; in particular, they allow one to see arguments (which are lectical) as possible 
objects and material of art, and, consequently they permit one to see how art practice could 
GHDOZLWK:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWRQ attention at a meta-level, i.e. not at the level of its content but 
at that of its form. As Thomas McEvilley argues, arguments and theories are objects and, as 
such, they have aesthetic presence330$JQHV'HQHV¶LQVWDOODWLRQRice/Tree/Burial 1968±79, 
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 Ducasse, 1929, pp. 110±133. 
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 The function a particular art form fulfils is culturally relative. For instance, twentieth-century 
Western poetry tends to fulfil an aesthetic function, while, say, the Divine Comedy fulfils not only an 
aesthetic function but also a lectical one (narrative, descriptive, theological, etc.). To demonstrate the 
rarity of the lectical mode in contemporary poetry, it is sufficient to point out the rarity of 
FRQWHPSRUDU\QRYHOVLQYHUVHVXFKDV9LNUDP6HWK¶VThe Golden Gate (see: Seth, 1986). 
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 The aesthetic and heuretic functions which I attribute to the snow project are paraphrases of the 
SDVVDJHVIURP+DUULVRQ¶VHVVD\V (see §2.2).  
330
 µ7KHJHQHUDOQHJOHFWRIZKDWPLJKWEHFDOOHGWKHDHVWKHWLFVRIWKRXJKWDULVHVIURPWKHWUDGLWLRQRI
mind-body dualism. ... Descartes divided all that exists into two categories, the material (res extensa), 
that is, the body ...; and the immaterial, which is specified as mind (res cogitans). A consequence of 
'HVFDUWHV¶WKRXJKWLVWKHLGHDWKDWPLQGEHLQJLPPDWHULDOFDQKDYHQRLQWLPDWHFonnection with the 
arts that, like painting or music, work through the senses. ... In terms of Conceptual Art, ... theories 
are things ... Every thought or concept is an object, and every object has form and aesthetic presence. 
... There is, in other wordsDQDHVWKHWLFVRIWKRXJKW¶0F(YLOOH\SS±79). 
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which, WKHDUWLVWZULWHVLVSDUWRIDµSURFHVVOHDGLQJWRWKHYLVXDOL]DWLRQRIPHFKDQLVPVDQG
K\SRWKHVHV¶331, is an example of the materialisation of theory, which I found helpful332 for 
the development of an art practice suited to the research problems.  
The aesthetic function of art in the research is supported by the following seemingly obvious 
consideration: a definition does not feel like that which it defines. For example, saying that a 
WDXWRORJ\LVWKHµUHSHWLWLRQRIWKHVDPHWKLQJLQGLIIHUHQWZRUGV¶333 does nRWIHHOOLNHµ$FDWLV
DFDW¶GRHV7KHTXDOLILFDWLRQµDHVWKHWLFV¶LVKHUHHPSOR\HGLQWKH.DQWLDQVHQVHRIWKDW
which pertains to examples and it is distinguished from the discursive, or conceptual mode 
of representation334. Thus, the operational principle of the imaginal analogy obtains an 
aesthetic representation of the conceptual forms of tautology and contradiction (which 
constitute the reflective analogue), in the sense that it gives particular examples of such 
forms. Furthermore, as Agamben argues in The Coming Community, since the property of 
H[DPSOHVLVWKDWRIµEHLQJ-FDOOHG¶WKHQµEHLQJ-called, the property that establishes all 
possible belongings (being-called Italian, -dog, -Communist) ± is also what can bring them 
all back radically into question¶335 For Agamben, even though what makes something an 
example is its having the purely linguistic property of being-called, unlike purely linguistic 
HQWLWLHVKHUHIHUVWRWKHSXUHO\OLQJXLVWLFµVHW¶RIVHWWKHRU\WKHH[DPSOHUHPDLQV
nevertheless a paradigm, that is a para-deigmaLHVRPHWKLQJµZKLFKLVVKRZQ
DORQJVLGH¶336, and, as such, it remains ambiguous, at once universal and particular. In other 
words, an example is not only an abstract semantic placeholder of a member of a given 
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 'HQHVFDOOVWKLVSURFHVVµ'LDOHFWLFWULDQJXODWLRQ¶µ'LDOHFWLF7ULDQJXODWLRQUHIHUVWRDSURFHVV
leading to the visualization of mechanisms and hypotheses. ... One builds progressive trichotomies, 
IDLOLQJDQGVXFFHHGLQJLQDGLDOHFWLFDOPHWKRGHDFKWLPHDUULYLQJDWDEHWWHUWKHVLVRQDKLJKHUOHYHO¶
'HQHVS'HQHVJLYHVWKHIROORZLQJH[DPSOHRI'LDOHFWLF7ULDQJXODWLRQµExercises in 
Logic: The first transitional triangulation was realized in the summer of 1968, in Sullivan Country, 
New York. RICE was planted to represent life/growth; TREES were chained to represent interference 
with life/growth; and HAIKU was buried to represent the idea, the abstract, the absolute. We begin 
with something vital or controversial ± LIFE; find its opposite ± DEATH; then proceed to establish a 
connective link, intermediate rationale which modifies the first two, (deductive, assertive or 
expository) and transitional into a higher trichotomy ± ,'($¶,Eid., p. 5.) 
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 'HQHV¶ZRUNLVDXVHIXOH[DPSOHEHFDXVHLWHQJDJHVZLWKWKHRU\LQDWKRURXJKPDQQHUZKLFKLV
QRWWKHFDVHIRUDOOFRQFHSWXDODUW$V0F(YLOOH\ZULWHVµ$UWLVWVRIWHQPDNHVXSHUILFLDOUHIHUHQFHVWR
scholarly and scientific topics. Others take more extreme approaches: Bernar Venet* refuses to study 
the context or meaning of the mathematical or astrophysical formulas he uses in his work. ... Denes, 
by contrast, has intensely studied each of the disciplines she has drawn from, attempting to bring the 
LQQHUPHDQLQJRIVFLHQWLILFLGHDVLQWRWKHDUWZRUN¶0F(YLOOH\S 
*For McEvilley on Venet see: McEvilley, 2003, pp. 108±113.     
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 Brown, 1997. 
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 In the Critique of Pure Reason.DQWZULWHVµ)LQDOO\DVUHJDUGVFODULW\WKHUHDGHUKDVthe right to 
demand first discursive (logical) clarity, through concepts, but then also intuitive (aesthetic) clarity, 
through intuitions, that is, through examples or other illustrations in concreto¶(Kant, 1999, Axviii, p. 
103.) 
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class, but also a thing that exceeds its exemplary role. In the imaginal projects, I aimed to 
exploit the ambiguity of examples because I do not see this ambiguity as a negative quality 
(and neither does Agamben) but as a semantic richness that might afford a new viewpoint. 
Lastly, the idea proposed by Norman Jakobson that linguistic signs, such as sentences, have 
aesthetic meaning, that is, that they are, to a certain extent, images of the things they 
signify337, was instrumental for the maturation of the idea that it was possible338 to create 
images of tautology and contradiction.  
The lectical function is fulfilled by art events (often combining installation and performance) 
comprising a textual component which dealt, either explicitly or implicitly, with some 
specific aspects RI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQ7KHIXQFWLRQRIWKHVHSURMHFWVLVWRH[SRVH
problematical concepts (i.e. problematical lekta) or arguments which are unclear to me and 
to work through them in a manner for which traditional written research is not suited, due to 
the need for systematic articulation which the latter requires, which favours the kind of 
negative-theology to which I referred in §5.1. 
The products of heuretic art are instruments which invite or suggest a particular sort of 
willing339'XFDVVH¶VH[ample is the telephone which objectifies the will-to-speak-far340. 
'XFDVVHZDUQVWKDWµWo objectify a volition is not to carry it out in action, but to create a state 
of affairs in the contemplation of which that volition is reflected back, reimparted to one¶341 
Retrospectively, my initial approach to the normative projects can be interpreted as an 
attempt to objectify the will to be attentive, achieved through an explicit representation of 
my role of artist-DJHQW7KLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDFFRUGLQJWR'XFDVVH¶VGefinition of heuretic 
object, does not imply that I have carried out any attentive action (as a telephone does not 
entail that its maker has made a phone call), that is, it does not necessarily place me in the 
uncomfortable position of claiming the position of the attentive artist. Nevertheless, the 
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 µ7KHFKDLQRIYHUEVveni, vidi, vici (I came, I saw, I conquered) informs us about the order of 
&DHVDU¶VGHHGVILUVWDQGIRUHPRVWEHFDXVHWKHVHTXHQFHRIFRRUGLQDWHSUHWHULWVLVXVHGWRUHSURGXFHWKH
succession of reported occurrences. The temporal order of speech events tends to mirror the order of 
narrated events in time or in rank. ... The correspondence in order between signans and signatum finds 
LWVULJKWSODFHDPRQJWKH³IXQGDPHQWDOYDULHWLHVRISRVVLEOHVHPLRVLV´ZKLFKZHUHRXWOLQHG by Peirce 
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-DNREVRQ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functioning aesthetically. A detailed study of Jakobson linguistics is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
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 Ducasse, 1929, p. 121. 
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 7KHJHQHUDOQRWLRQRIKHXUHWLFREMHFWLVTXLWHLQWXLWLYHDQGLVDOVRIRXQGLQ:HLO¶VLeçons de 
philosophie DOWKRXJK:HLOGRHVQRWXVHWKHWHUPµKHXUHWLF¶µ(YHU\REMHFWZKLFKZHVHHFRPPDQGV
a hint of movement, no matter how imperceptible it is. (A chair commands to sit, stairs command to 
JRXSHWF¶:HLOLP, p. 23.) 
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normative work still invites an interpretation as intending to convey the idea that the artist 
who produced it is an attentive agent. In the imaginal projects, the likelihood of this 
interpretation is reduced because the role of the artist is depersonalised by the use of 
fictional characters (see §5.412), or stereotype²the lecturer (see §5.411 and §5.421)²and 
observational drawing is used primarily as a denotative means (see §5.422), by which I 
mean that the issue of the appearance of the drawing is secondary to the overall meaning that 
I intend to convey. In the imaginal projects, the heuretic function is downplayed, because in 
this work there is an element of spectacle, which places the audience in a removed position 
with respect to what is being presented.  
Since two of the projects discussed below included my presence, it will be useful to 
elucidate how I intended my presence to function semantically. In order to do so, I will draw 
RQWKHWH[Wµ$UWDV&DWDO\VLV¶E\WKHDUWLVW$GULDQ3LSHU3LSHUUHIOHFWVRQKHUHDUO\
performances as follows: 
The artist himself becomes the catalytic agent inducing change in the viewer; the viewer 
responds to the catalytic presence of the artist as artwork. This is not to be confused with life 
DVDUWRUWKHDUWLVW¶VSHUVRQDOLW\DVDUW7KHDHVWKHWLFIRUPDOLW\DQGDUWLILFHRIWKHZRUN
temporarily replace or veil the personal attributes of the artist as a private individual. The 
artwork consists in artificially assumed attributes of the artist.342 
My performances are also clearly artificial (e.g. they have the form of lectures but they are 
obviously not lectures in the traditional sense, they are artifices), with a view to functioning 
as referents to the research topics rather than to my private individuality.  
The mention of tautology and Conceptual Art is likely to bring to mind the name of Joseph 
.RVXWKVRDFODULILFDWLRQLVLQRUGHU.RVXWKZULWHVWKDWµDUWLVDWDXWRORJ\LQWKDWLWLVD
SUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHDUWLVW¶VLQWHQWLRQWKDWLs, he is saying that a particular work of art is art, 
which means, is a definition RIDUW¶343 For Kosuth, tautology depends on meaning344, not on 
form, while the imaginal projects involve dealing with tautology and contradictions merely 
as argument forms and are, therefore, independent of meaning. However, abstracting from 
what Kosuth says about the inherent tautolougness of art, works such as his One and Three 
Chairs 1965 doubtlessly have been an example for the development of my projects on 
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 Piper, 1996, p. 34. 
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 Kosuth, 1993, p. 20. 
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 .RVXWK¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIDUWKHOSVWRHOXFLGDWHZKDW,PHan by tautology dependent on 
PHDQLQJµZRUNVRIDUWDUHDQDO\WLFSURSRVLWLRQV¶WKDWµLIYLHZHGZLWKLQWKHLUFRQWH[W± as art ± ... 
provide no information what-so-HYHUDERXWDQ\PDWWHURIIDFW¶,ELGS$QDQDO\WLFSURSRVLWLRQ
is a proposition in which there is equivalence between subject and predicate in virtue of their 
PHDQLQJHJµ$OOEDFKHORUVDUHXQPDUULHG¶2QWKHRWKHUKDQGDV,KDYHDUJXHGLQWKHIRXUWK
paragraph of this section, argument forms, such as tautologies, are empty of meaning, because their 
YDULDEOHVDUHQRWSURSRVLWLRQVEXWSODFHKROGHUVIRUSURSRVLWLRQV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tautology, particularly, his intention to critique the generally presumed perfect fit, or 
tautology, between an object and its signs.  
The imaginal analogy is much closer in spirit to the work of Belgian artist Éric Duyckaerts, 
both in terms of interests and products. As rHJDUGVLQWHUHVWV'X\FNDHUWV¶ZRUNW\SLFDOO\
deals with epistemology (see also §5.422). As regards products, I will give the example of 
the installation which Duyckaerts exhibited at the 2007 Venice Biennale, which consisted of 
a labyrinthine installation which at once echoed the formal urban intricacy of Venice and the 
convolution of paths to knowledge345$VLVRIWHQWKHFDVHZLWK'X\FNDHUWV¶ZRUNWKLVSLHFH
also involved a lecture-like performance. As it will become clear when I discuss the various 
imaginal projects, I used a similar strategy for the representation of tautological and 
contradictory forms.  
5.3 Weilian metaphysics 
5.31 The Cartesian roots of Weilian attention 
,Q,GLVFXVVHG:HLO¶VH[SOLFLWUHIHUHQFHWR'HVFDUWHV¶SKLORVRSK\LQWKHFRntext of the 
theory of mind which she delineates in her early essay Science and Perception in Descartes. 
I have indicated the import of the notion of attention in this early text. Now I turn to the 
analysis of the role of attention in Weilian metaphysics, with a view to introducing the 
referents of the imaginal projects, namely, tautology and contradiction. In what follows, I 
will demonstrate that Weilian metaphysics is also indebted to Descartes, although, since 
Weil does not explicitly acknowledge this debt, my demonstration requires a synoptic 
SHUVSHFWLYHRQ:HLO¶VZULWLQJVUDWKHUWKDQWKHNLQGRIVWHSE\VWHSH[DPLQDWLRQZKLFK,
articulated in my study of her theory of mind. There follows a synoptic reconstruction of 
:HLO¶VDQG'HVFDUWHV¶DUJXPHQWVRQDttention, which shows their affinity.  
Argument outline: 
(1) I am free of refraining from judgement when I do not have a clear perception. 
(2) When I have a clear perception, my freedom of judgement coincides with the necessity 
of making just that judgement (i.e. the rationally right judgement). 
(3) By attentive meditation, I can form the habit of avoiding error. 
(4) Thus, attention can make me free.  
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'HVFDUWHV¶H[SUHVVLRQRIWKHDUJXPHQW 
µ)RULWLVVXUHO\QRLPSHUIHFWLRQLQ*RGWKDWKHKDVJLYHQPHWhe freedom to assent or not 
to assent in those cases where he did not endow my intellect with a clear and distinct 
SHUFHSWLRQ¶346  
µ,QRUGHUWREHIUHHWKHUHLVQRQHHGIRUPHWREHLQFOLQHGERWKZD\V>LHLQGLIIHUHQWO\
inclined to both affirmation and denial]; on the contrary, the more I incline in one direction ± 
either because I clearly understand that reasons of truth and goodness point that way, or 
because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost thoughts ± the freer is my choice. 
But the indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing me in one direction rather than 
another is the lowest grade of freedom; it is evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but 
UDWKHURIDGHIHFWLQNQRZOHGJHRUDNLQGRIQHJDWLRQ¶347 
µ,FDQDYRLGHUURUin the second way, which depends merely on my remembering to 
withhold judgement on any occasion when the truth of the matter is not clear. Admittedly, I 
am aware of a certain weakness in me, in that I am unable to keep my attention fixed on one 
and the same item of knowledge at all times; but by attentive and repeated meditation I am 
nevertheless able to make myself remember it as often as the need arises, and thus get into 
WKHKDELWRIDYRLGLQJHUURU¶348 
7KHFRQFOXVLRQIROORZVIURP'HVFDUWHV¶DUJXPHQW349. 
:HLO¶VH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHDUJXPHQW 
µ$WWHQWLRQFRQVLVWVRIVXVSHQGLQJRQH¶VWKRXJKWOHDYLQJLWGLVSRVDEOHHPSW\DQG
SHQHWUDEOHE\WKHREMHFWRIPDLQWDLQLQJZLWKLQRQHVHOILQSUR[LPLW\RIRQH¶VWKRXJKWEXWDW
a lower level and without contact with it, all the diverse knowledge which one is forced to 
use. ... All mistranslations, all absurdities in the solution of geometrical problems, all 
awkwardness of style and all imperfections in the connection of ideas in French 
compositions, all these are due to the fact that thought has rushed hastily on something, and, 
WKXVEHLQJSUHPDWXUHO\ILOOHGZDVQRPRUHGLVSRVDEOHIRUWKHWUXWK¶350 
µ7KHRQO\FKRLFHJLYHQWRPDQDVLQWHOOLJHQWDQGIUHHFUHDWXUHLVWRGHVLUHREHGLHQFHRU
not to desire it. If he does not desire it, he obeys nevertheless, perpetually, inasmuch as he is 
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 Because, for Descartes, through attention, I can withhold judgement (3); the withholding of 
judgement (in cases of unclear and indistinct perception) is an exercise of freedom (1); and the degree 
of freedom is directly proportional to the degree of clarity and distinctness of the perceptions on 
which my choices depend (2). 
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 Weil, AD, pp. 92±93. For an alternative translation, see: Weil, WG, p. 62. The freedom of 
withholding judgement when one does not see the truth is tacitly postulated rather than stated. 
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a thing subject to mechanical necessity. If he desires it, he remains subject to mechanical 
necessity, but a new necessity is added to it, a necessity constituted by laws belonging to 
natural things. Certain actions become impossible; others are accomplished through him, 
VRPHWLPHVLQVSLWHRIKLPVHOI¶351   
µ,QGLUHFWO\DQGZLWKWLPHWKHZLOODQGDERYHDOODWWHQWLRQDQGDERYHDOODWWHQWLRQLQWKH
form of prayer, lead to a modification in reading. What is changed then is the 
LPDJLQDWLRQ¶352 µ2QHGRHVQRWFKRRVHVHQVDWLRQVEXWWRDODUJHH[WHQWRQHFKRRVHVZKDW
RQHIHHOVWKURXJKWKHPQRWLQDPRPHQWEXWWKURXJKDQDSSUHQWLFHVKLS¶353 
µ$WWKHFHQWUHRIYROXQWDU\DFWLRQDWWHQWLRQ 2QO\DWWHQWLRQLVIUHH¶354 
I will give an account of Weilian metaphysics by answering the question: What 
metaphysical premises does the above argument require? An answer to this question 
QHFHVVLWDWHVVRPHUHIHUHQFHVWRVHFRQGDU\VRXUFHVRQ'HVFDUWHV¶SKLORsophy. 
Cecilia Wee argues that, for Descartes, if one is attentive, then one cannot help but do what 
one clearly perceives as good355 but that, since there is always a temporal gap between 
perception and the affirmation of the will, one can, in principle, shLIWRQH¶VDWWHQWLRQDZD\
from a clearly perceived good356. In other words, for Wee, Descartes ascribes an ethical 
value to attention, i.e. the value of making the agent, if he or she so chooses, see and 
consequently pursue the good. That Weil ascribes the same ethical value to attention is 
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 Weil, AD, p. 113 (see footnote 280). For an alternative translation, see: Weil, WG, pp. 76±77. Weil 
GRHVQRWPHQWLRQFOHDUSHUFHSWLRQRUMXGJHPHQW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a truth /good, and to shift attention to some other thought before the will affirms/pursues that 
truth/good. Thus, it is possible for the agent to do otherwise even in the case of clear and distinct 
perception ± for it is possible for her not to affirm and not to pursue, by the expedient of shifting her 
attention almost immediately to some other thought before VKHDIILUPVSXUVXHV¶:HHS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evident from the passage of the above reconstructed argument, where Weil maintains that 
the cause of imperfect action is a lack of attention, and also in her argument that attention 
affords perception of the real (keeping in mind that, for Weil, the real and the good are 
synonyms). Furthermore, Wee points out that, in Descartes, there is a tension between free 
ZLOODQGµ*RGDVWKHSUH-ordainer and sustainer of tKLVXQLYHUVH¶ZKLFK'HVFDUWHVµsolves¶357 
by making a distinction between clear perceptions: those which proceed from the natural 
light, and those which proceed from divine grace; and by appealing to the latter, twinned 
with a commonsensical stance (I feel free, therefore I am free), to argue that we can have a 
clear perception of the possibility of free will in a universe pre-ordained by God358. Again, 
Weil uses an analogous strategy to deal with the problem of the contradictory possibility and 
impossibility of good, by appealing to the notion of insoluble contradiction and divine 
grace359ZKLFKFURZQVWKHDWWHQWLYHDJHQW¶VHIIRUWPRUHRYHUKHUFODLPWKDWLQWKHVH
matters, certainty can be reached only through experience is a commonsensical claim. 
Furthermore, in Descartes (the following observation also applies to Weil), as Paul Reynolds 
points out, the notion of attention does not fulfil an explicative function, and attempting to 
                                                 
357
 The quotation marks LQGLFDWHP\QRW:HH¶VVFHSWLFLVPZLWKUHJDUGWRWKLVVROXWLRQ 
358
 µ)RU'HVFDUWHVWKHPDLQWHQVLRQOLHVEHWZHHQIUHH-will (which includes the robustD [sic] ability to 
do otherwise) and God as the pre-ordainer and sustainer of this universe. But Descartes makes clear 
that humans can never adequately comprehend the infinite power(s) of God. This being so, the first 
perspective ± wherein we consider freedom and the robustD ability to do otherwise in relation to the ZLGHUPHWDSK\VLFVDQG*RG¶VSRZHUV± must lie beyond our human grasp. But the Cartesian agent 
knows, independent of any wider metaphysics, that she is genuinely able to choose otherwise. This is 
all she neHGVLQRUGHUWRHVWDEOLVKWKDWKHUDFWLRQVDUHIUHHDQGFRQWLQJHQW¶,ELGSµ'HVFDUWHV
DFFHSWVWKDWZHFDQQRWµJUDVS¶KRZKXPDQIUHHGRPLQFOXGLQJWKHUREXVWD ability to do otherwise, is FRPSDWLEOHZLWK*RG¶VSUH-ordination of events in the universe. However we know from our own 
H[SHULHQFHWKDWZHDUHDEOHWRGRRWKHUZLVHDQGWKLVLVHQRXJKWRHQVXUHWKDWZHFDQGRVR¶,ELGS
µ+RZ*RGFDQEHWKUHHLQGLYLGXDOVDQG\HWRQHLVEH\RQGWKHµQDWXUDOUHDFKRIWKHKXPDQPLQG¶
for it apparently contravenes the laws of logic. However [for Descartes] we would still have to accept 
that God is a trinity. For Descartes, the clarity and the transparency that marks a perception as 
indubitably true may come from either the natural light or divine grace. In this case, the clarity of the 
perception that God is a trinity is given by divine grace. Thus we have to accept this, though we 
FDQQRWFRQFHLYHKRZLWFRXOGEHVR¶,ELGSS±409.) 
359
 Thus the interpretation proposed by André Devaux, that the (indubitable) increased 
WUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVPWKDWPDUNV:HLO¶VODWHUZULWLQJVLPSOLHVDPRYLQJDZD\IURPKHUHDUOLHU&DUWHVLDQ
rationalism (which became a mere step towards grace*), is not the only plausible one because: (i) 
Descartes view is not less transcendHQWDOLVWWKDQ:HLO¶VDQGLLDV,KDYHVKRZQLQLQ:HLO¶V
earliest writings, the existence of the external world is inferred ± according to Weil, in Cartesian 
fashion ±  from a limit of the power of thought (I have the power to doubt any thought, but not to give 
myself an object of thought), which already amounts to an admission of the existence of a supra-
human reality. That is not to say, however, that Weil did not consider her later views as a distancing 
from the Cartesian position; but this concerns :HLO¶V idea of Descartes as a pre-eminently rational 
thinker and in no way precludes a priori D&DUWHVLDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI:HLO¶VODWHWUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP 
* µ7KXV:HLORSSRVHVWRWKH&DUWHVLDQSKLORVRSK\RILPPHGLDF\DUHOLJLRXVPHWDSK\VLFVEDVHGRQ the 
idea of mediation and on the presence of the Mediator. Rational philosophy keeps its essential role: 
µWREULQJWROLJKWZKDWLVLUUHGXFLEOHWRLW¶EXWDIWHUµUDWLRQDOLW\LQWKH&DUWHVLDQVHQVHWKDWLVWKH
mechanism, humanly representable necessity, [will have been] supposed in any place where one can 
VXSSRVHLW¶>&,,,@7KHQWKHPLQGFRPHVXSDJDLQVWµWKHLQFRPSUHKHQVLEOH¶µWKHWUXHP\VWHULHV
WKHLQGHPRQVWUDEOHVZKLFKDUHUHDO>&,,,@¶'HYDX[S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use attention explicatively will lead to argumentative circularity360 (one could say to 
tautology). For Weil and Descartes, attention is a postulate (see also §3.31), whose function 
is to guarantee, within their metaphysics, the possibility of free human action, which is a 
prerequisite of good action, in a world which is the creation of an all-powerful God361.  
There is, however, a difference between 'HVFDUWHV¶DQG:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFVZKLFKZDV
crucial for the articulation of the objective analogue of the imaginal projects. As Anthony 
.HQQ\DUJXHVIRU'HVFDUWHVµLWLVSRVVLEOHWRSURYHWKHH[LVWHQFHRI*RGIURPD
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRI*RG¶VFUHDWXUHV¶DQG WKLVSURRILVEDVHGµRQO\RQKLV>LH'HVFDUWHV¶@RZQ
PLQGDQGLWVLGHDV¶362 for Descartes, the fact that he can conceive the idea of a perfect God 
is sufficient to prove that a perfect God exists.363 On the other hand, Weil problematises the 
issue of the existence of God: for her, God is beyond our reach and whatever we think of as 
being God is a false God364. And it is precisely the negative theology which Weil articulates 
by means of the notions of tautology and contradiction that is the starting point of the 
imaginal projects.  
                                                 
360
 Reynolds, 1939, p. 426. 
361
 This entails the incompatibilism problem discussed in §3.35.:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWFUHDWLRQRIWKH
universe by God is an act of withdrawal and abnegation does not conflict with the notion of an all-
powerful God, for this argument refers to God as, according to Weil, it can be known by human 
beings phenomenologically and not as God really is (even though Weil claims that human beings can 
QHYHUNQRZ*RG¶VUHDOUHDOLW\WKHPDQ\:HLOLDQFODLPVUHJDUGLQJWKHVXSHU-rigidity of super-natural 
laws (which are stricter than mechanical necessity) support this point. For both Weil and Descartes, 
attention is a faculty, i.e. an active power, but, in order to understand how this power can be employed 
by the good agent, one must keep in mind that both Weil and Descartes subscribe to a positivistic 
metaphysics: for Descartes, there is the light of the understanding; for Weil, there is truth. All the 
good agent has to do is not to withdraw attention from the perceived good and the will inevitably 
flows towards the good. In other words, attention is a constraining power. The will is analogous to a 
sphere at the top of an incline. At bottom of the incline is the light of the understanding (or truth). The 
incline gets steeper as it approaches the light of the understanding, so that the will of those closer to 
the light of the understanding rolls towards it with more force than the will of those who are further 
from the light of the understanding (the will of those who are very far from the light of the 
understanding is on a sort of plateau with hardly any inclination: it rolls here and there, haphazardly). 
A good sphere is a sphere that rolls towards the light of the understanding; a bad sphere is a sphere 
that rolls here and there. The sphere has a brake. Good spheres pull the brake more strongly the less 
the incline and release the brake more the more the incline; bad spheres use the brake in the contrary 
manner. The less a sphere has to pull the brake in order to be a good sphere the freer it is, but all 
spheres can be good because they can all use the brake. The brake is attention. This image conveys 
:HLO¶VDQG'HVFDUWHV¶RSWLPLVPIRULWGHSLFWVWKHJRRGQRWDVDQDVFHQWZLWKWKHULVNRIDQLQHYLWDEOH
IDOOEXWDVVRPHWKLQJDOZD\VZLWKLQWKHDJHQW¶VSRZHUWKHEUDNHif only the agent be attentive! 
(That is not to say that, for them, the exercise of attention is easy ± quite the contrary; but it is, 
nevertheless, always up to the agent.)  
362
 Kenny, 2009, p. 127.  
363
 µ%HFDXVHZHILQGLQRXUVHOYHVWKHLGHDRID*RGRUDVXSUHPely perfect Being, we are able to 
investigate the cause which produces this idea in us; but after, on considering the perfection it 
possesses, we are constrained to consider it only as emanating from an all perfect being, that is from a 
God that truly exisWV¶'HVFDUWHVS 
364
 µ,IZHEHOLHYHZHKDYHD)DWKHUKHUHEHORZLWLVQRWKLPLWLVDIDOVH*RG2QHPXVWEHJODGWKDW
KHLVLQILQLWHO\EH\RQGRXUUHDFK¶:HLOOC IV 1, p. 337.)  
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In the next section, firstly, I identify some of premises that Weilian metaphysics requires one 
to accept; secondly, I argue that these premises are problematic; and, thirdly, I explain why 
the argument that I articulate in §5.32, albeit defendable, is an inadequate representation of 
my views on Weilian metaphysics and of my intention as a researcher. 
5.32 The dismayed optimist rationalist quandary  
As I anticipated in §5.1, this section considers the function of the notion of attention in 
:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFV0\SXUSRVHLVWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWDSURSRVLWLRQDODSSURDFKWRWKH
question of the ethical significance of attention leads to a conclusion which I deem 
unsatisfactory both because it hinders dialogue on this issue and because it is semantically 
depleted. On the other hand, as I will show in my analysis of the imaginal projects (§5.4), 
the non-propositionality of these projects favours dialogue and encompasses a wider range 
of meaning.  
Why do Weil and Descartes need to postulate the faculty of attention? Why not postulate, 
for instance, a natural movement towards the good which does not require any active effort 
RIDWWHQWLRQRQWKHSDUWRIKXPDQEHLQJV"%\URQ:LOOLVWRQDUJXHVWKDWµLWLVSUHFLVHO\WKH
inclination to place oneself intentionally in a condition when one can act contrary to the 
perceived good that Descartes understands as constitutive of moral weakness. Adapting the 
letter to Mersenne to the problem of moral weakness thus understood, we can say that the 
latter requires the prior withdrawal of attention from the good in favour of the less worthy 
DOWHUQDWLYHZKLFKLVLWVHOIWKHQVHHQGHOXVLYHO\DVWKHJRRG¶365 Descartes needs an 
attention-withdrawal requirement, Williston continues, because, without it, he would be 
(logically) forced to admit that an agent can knowingly pursue the bad, and this admission 
would amount to claiming that reason is not free366; this is not a tenable position for a 
rationalist like Descartes367. Thus, Descartes is an optimist: human beings are rational; the 
                                                 
365
 Williston, 1999, p. 42. 
366
 µ6SDUVKRWWFRQFOXGHVWKDW$ULVWRWOH¶VHQWLUHWKHRU\RIakrasia µGHSHQGVRQWKHPRUDOSULQFLSOHDQG
WKHDFUDVWLFGHVLUHE\SDVVLQJHDFKRWKHU¶,IWKLVGLGQRWKDSSHQLIWKHakrates were fully aware of the 
discrepancy between his acratic desire and the reason it contravenes but chose nevertheless to act 
against that reason, knowledge would indeed find itself dragged about like a slave, something which 
Descartes, no less that Socrates or Aristotle, does not want to allow. This is why for Descartes 
attention must be withdrawn from the perception of the overriding reason before acratic desire can 
IXOO\WULXPSK¶,ELGSµ,IDQGZKHQWKHGHIHFWGRHVPDQDJHWRPDQLIHVWLWVHOIDWWKHOHYHORI
thought it has by that fact overcome the reasons which were contrary to it. And since those reasons 
were ex hipothesi manifest to the agent, the only way they could have failed to win the day is if 
attention were actively withdrawn IURPWKHP¶,ELGS 
367
 This non-acratic view of the moral agent has a long history in Western philosophy and can be 
traced as far back as Socrates and, later, the Stoics. As Anthony Long argues in his study on 
(SLFWHWXV¶SKLORVRSK\Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to LifeµWKHFRUHRI6RFUDWLFHWKLFV¶
VRPHRIZKRVHSURSRVLWLRQVLQFOXGHµQRRQHGRHVRUZDQts what is bad, knowing or thinking that what 
KHGRHVRUZDQWVLVEDG>LHZURQJGRLQJLVLQYROXQWDU\@¶* DQGµWKHZURQJGRHUGRHVQRWGRZKDWKH
ZDQWVEXWZKDWPLVWDNHQO\³VHHPVJRRGWRKLP´¶, were endorsed by the Stoics in general and 
Epictetus in particular (Long, 2004, pp. 70±71).  
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exercise of reason is guaranteed by the free faculty of attention; and reason is all one needs 
to be a good agent. One could object that this applies to Descartes but not to Weil: Weil is 
not a rationalist but a transcendent thinker ± at any rate, in later years. This objection is 
dispelled with the observation that Descartes¶SRVLWLRQ too was a transcendent one: for him, 
there are clear perceptions that proceed from divine grace. The objection follows from a 
view of reason and transcendence as mutually exclusive. This objection indicates a 
confusion: namely, a failure to recognise that this is not :HLO¶V or 'HVFDUWHV¶ view: for them, 
reason and divine transcendence coexist368; even though reason has its limits and the 
transcendent domain may be sometimes described by Weil as being above the rational 
domain369, this, as Weil maintains in Letter to a Priest, does not imply the primacy of the 
transcendent object over the rational370:HLO¶VUDWLRQDOLVPFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DIHUYent 
transcendent élan, is typical of the Neo-Kantianism of her philosophy teachers, Lagneau and 
Alain, although, because of her interest in religion, and Christianity in particular, her 
terminology is much more explicitly theistic than theirs. 
If the claim that Weil never renounced the rationalism of her early philosophy might be met 
with resistance by those who consider her an exclusively transcendent thinker, the assertion 
that she was an optimist might be even more controversial: after all, the almost total 
domination of evil, brutal foUFHHWFDUHXELTXLWRXVO\UHIHUUHGWRLQKHUZULWLQJVµ$OPRVW¶LV
the key word here: for Weil, the world is almost (i.e. not completely) ruled by blind force, 
because God, who is absolutely good, counter-levers this force. To subscribe to a 
metaphysics whose fundament is an absolutely good divine entity is to be an optimist.   
                                                                                                                                          
*6HH3ODWR¶VGorgiasG3ODWRS(SLFWHWXV¶Discourses, Book 2, Discourse 26 (1±2), 
(Epictetus, 1995, p. 145).  
6HH(SLFWHWXV¶Discourses, Book 4, Discourse 1 (3), (Ibid., p. 227). 
368
 However, as I argued on pp. 150±151, Weil does not claim, as Descartes does, that the existence of 
God can be deduced through ratiocination.  
369
 :HLOZULWHVµ7KHP\VWHULHVRIIDLWKDUHQRWWKHSURSHUREMHFWIRUWKHLQWHOOLJHQFHFRQVLGHUHGDVD
faculty permitting affirmation or denial. They are not of the order of truth, but above it. The only part 
of the human soul which is capable of any real contact with them is the faculty of supernatural love. It 
DORQHWKHUHIRUHLVFDSDEOHRIDQDGKHUHQFHLQUHJDUGWRWKHP¶:HLOLPR, p. 36.)   
370
 :HLO¶VYLHZRQWKHanathema sit demonstrates this: µ:HRZHWKHGHILQLWLRQVZLWKZKLFKWKH&KXUFK
has thought it right to surround the mysteries of faith, and more particularly its condemnations (... 
anathema sit) a permanent and unconditional attitude of respectful attention, but not of adherence. ... 
Intellectual adherence is never owed to anything whatsoever. For it is never in any degree a voluntary 
thing. Attention alone is voluntary. And it alone IRUPVWKHVXEMHFWRIDQREOLJDWLRQ¶:HLOLPR, p. 
,QWKLVH[WHQGHGOHWWHU:HLO¶VWKRXJKWLVFORVHWR:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VLHWRWKHYLHZWKDWHWKLFVGRHV
not belong to the discursive, intellectual realm), perhaps, because, here, she considers her own ethical 
feelings in relation to the Church dogmatism, while, generally, in her socio-political writings, she 
abstracts from her individual perspective. 
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$VDQRSWLPLVWDQGDUDWLRQDOLVW:HLOKDVDSUREOHPZKLFK,VKDOOFDOOµWKHGLVPD\HG
RSWLPLVWUDWLRQDOLVWTXDQGDU\¶5HDVRQLVHWKLFDOO\QHXWUDOEHFDXVHLWLVQRWYROXQWDU\371. God 
LVDEVROXWHO\JRRG2QHPLJKWDVN:HLOµ,I*RGLVDEVROXWHO\JRRGZK\LVWKHUHHYLOLQWKH
ZRUOG"¶:HLOGRHVDJUHHWKDWWKHUHLVHYLOLQWKHZRUOGWKDWLVZK\VKHLVGLVPD\HGDQGVKH
DQVZHUVµ+XPDQEHLQJVGRDOZD\VZKDWVHHPVJRRGWRWKHPEXWRIWHQWhey mistake evil for 
good. This is not GRG¶VIDXOWEXWLWLVGXHWRDQactive withdrawal of attention, for which 
they are responsible, not GRG¶2QHUHSOLHVµ%XWLI*RGLVDEVROXWHO\JRRGZK\GLG*RG
give this active power to human beings, so that they FDQPLVWDNHHYLOIRUJRRG"¶$QG:HLO
µ7KLVLVRQHRIWKRVHLQVROXEOHFRQWUDGLFWLRQVZKLFKDUHWKHPRVWHOHYDWHGREMHFWRI
DWWHQWLRQ¶7KLVVKRUWLPDJLQDU\GLDORJXHLOOXVWUDWHVWKHLQFRPSDWLELOLVPSUREOHPZLWKZKLFK
Weil is confronted, which differs from the free will versus determinism incompatibility, 
discussed earlier, in §3.35: in the latter, the question is how one can have free will (and, 
consequently, a potentially good agent) in a totally determined universe; in the former, the 
question is why one would want free will (and, consequently, a potentially mistaken and bad 
agent) in a universe created by an absolutely good God. Weil uses the notion of attention to 
pass the responsibility from God to human agent372. This interpretation offers a possible 
explDQDWLRQRI:HLO¶VDPELYDOHQFHZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHUHVXOWVRIDWWHQWLYHDFWLRQDQGKHU
insistence on the very small degree of control WKDWWKURXJKDWWHQWLRQRQHFDQKDYHRQRQH¶V
KDELWDQGWKXVLQGLUHFWO\RQRQH¶VDFWLRQ,IHYHU\DWWHQWLYHDFWLRQERUHYisible fruit, then 
attention, and consequently good action, might seem easy; and if one had a high (or 
DEVROXWHGHJUHHRIFRQWURORYHURQH¶VDFWLRQWKHQKRZFRXOGWKHGLVPD\HGRSWLPLVW
rationalist account for the existence of evil? Did God get it wrong? Is God, perhaps, not as 
absolutely good as one thought? No, this cannot be: for Weil, the human agent possesses just 
enough freedom for moral blame, but goodness belongs to God. 
In many ways, this conclusion seems obvious: if one postulates the existence of goodness 
DQGFDOOVLWµ*RG¶WKHQRQHORJLFDOO\QHHGVDOVRWRSRVWXODWHWKHH[LVWHQFHRIEDGQHVVDQG
at the very least, hypothesise that its source is not in God. Why, then, would such a 
conclusion not have occurred to Weil scholars with a profound knowledge of her 
philosophy? The answer is that many Weilian scholars would not accept that her argument is 
hypothetical: for them, God is good. From this point of view, Weilian attention is truly a 
means to become a good agent and not a mere logical consequence of hypothesised premises 
                                                 
371
 See footnotes 369 and 370: for Weil, intellectual, or rational adherence, cannot be the subject of 
obligation, i.e. of normative ethics. 
372
 This is HYLGHQWLQ:HLO¶VFODLPWKDWHYLOLVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIDQDWWHQWLRQZLWKGUDZDOµ6RPHWKLQJ
in our soul has a far more violent repugnance for true attention than the flesh has for bodily fatigue. 
This something is much more closely connected with evil than is the flesh. This is why every time 
WKDWZHUHDOO\FRQFHQWUDWHRXUDWWHQWLRQZHGHVWUR\WKHHYLOLQRXUVHOYHV¶Weil, WG, pp. 61±62.) 
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RUDIXQFWLRQDOWHUPZLWKLQWKHHFRQRP\RI:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFV373. Mine, however, is not a 
critique of that view, but rather an admission of incapacity: I am incapable of seeing what it 
means to say that God is good, and, like WiWWJHQVWHLQLI,FRQMHFWXUHDQRPQLVFLHQWEHLQJ¶V
book, I see this book containing only relative judgements of value (see §4.3121). But I do 
not deem this incapacity as antithetical to the experience of ethical feelings. Moreover, since, 
as I have pointed out in §1.1, my decision to pursue this research coincided with the 
abandonment of the intent of becoming a better drawer through attention and with the 
resolution to use art practice heuristically, it follows that my research does not address first-
order ethical questions regarding good (or better) agents but second-order metaethical 
questions regarding the manner in which those first-order questions can be approached. 
Thus, while Weilian scholarship, given its typical concern with ethics, tends to seek a direct 
DOPRVWFDXVDOQH[XVEHWZHHQDQDJHQW¶VSUDFWLFHRIDWWHQWLRQDQGKLVRUKHUHWKLFDO
betterment, my investigation, which is situated at the more abstract, metaethical level, can 
make sense of the hypothetical character of Weilian attention merely as a way of engaging 
with ethical questions. That is not to say, however, that the metaethical perspective includes 
the ethical perspective; rather, both fields have specific limitations: on one hand, ethical 
discourses exclusively endorse one amongst the many possible metaethical positions, but 
this localisation potentially gives to ethics a great pertinence to everyday life situations; on 
the other hand, metaethics is far removed from everyday concerns, but its speculative nature 
counterbalances the not uncommon dogmatic entrenchments of ethical positions.  
With regard to the issue of insoluble contradiction, even if one considers the distinction that 
Weil sometimes makes between knowing that the good is impossible and possibility of the 
good374 (a possibility depending on the revelation of God to the attending soul), there is no 
contradiction between the knowledge that the good is impossible and the possibility of the 
good. However, here RQHLVRQHSLVWHPRORJLFDOTXLFNVDQG:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWZRXOGQRWEH
considered valid by someone who is sceptical as regards the possibility of the graceful 
revelation of God to human beings; and, given that Weil takes the knowledge of the 
impossibility of the good to be inherent in all human beings without exception, such a 
scepWLFFRXOGDOVRDVNµ+RZGRHVWeil NQRZWKDWWKHJRRGLVSRVVLEOH"¶2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
:HLO¶VDUJXPHQWZLOOEHDFFHSWDEOHIRUVRPHRQHZKREHOLHYHVLQWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIGLYLQH
revelation and that Weil experienced such revelation.  
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 7KHH[SUHVVLRQµDIXQFWLRQDOWHUPZLWKLQWKHHFRQRP\RI:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFV¶LVDQDGDSWDWLRQRI
an expression that the philosopher Michel Bitbol uses in the context of an epistemological analysis of 
WKHVFLHQWLILFFRQFHSWVRIµFDWHJRULFDOSURSHUW\¶DQGµGLVSRVLWLRQDOSURSHUW\¶%LWERODUJXHVWKDWWRVD\
WKDWDSURSHUW\LVFDWHJRULFDORUSURSRVLWLRQDOµGRHVQRWGHQRWHLWV nature but only its function within 
WKHHFRQRP\RINQRZOHGJH¶%LWEROS  
374
 See quotes on p. 96, where the emphasis is on the lack of knowledge of the possibility of good here 
below, as distinct from the actual impossibility of good.  
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Before offering an appraisal of the arguments that I proposed in the two preceding 
paragraphs, I must briefly explain (as I anticipated in §3.1) why a reading of Weilian 
metaphysics in Kantian terms (which might solve the problem of contradiction) would lead 
to a misinterpretation RI:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\For Kant, the unconditionality²be it of good 
(categorical imperative) or beauty (aesthetic judgement)²and the conditionality, or 
contingency, of the world of nature (i.e. the domain of cause and effect) are not 
contradictory, because they arise from distinct faculties of the mind, and they serve different 
purposes (unconditionality: practical purpose, i.e. moral conduct; conditionality: theoretical 
purpose, i.e. acquisition of NQRZOHGJH7KXVIRU.DQWHYHQWKRXJKµZHIHHORXUVHOYHV
urged by the moral law to strive after a universal highest end, yet we feel ourselves and all 
QDWXUHWRRLQFDSDEOHRILWVDWWDLQPHQW¶375, there is no contradiction here because the concept 
of a universal highest end is merely regulative (both of moral conduct and of scientific 
enquiry)376, i.e. non-objective. On the other hand, for Weil, there is an insoluble 
contradiction between absolute, unconditional good and conditionality; and this insoluble 
contradiction is the mark through which reality is given to us (albeit only negatively). 
Moreover, Kant argues that transcendental concepts are objects of practical faith and not 
theoretical provable knowledge377. Sometimes, Weil also maintains this²notably, in Letter 
to a Priest, where she writes that Christian dogmas are objects of contemplation and not of 
assertion or denial (see footnote 369)²and yet when she argues about attention she claims 
that the results of attention, even though they belong to a spiritual (and therefore, 
presumably, supersensible) realm, can be confirmed by experience378. In doing this, Weil 
goes towards a sort of Pyrrhonian scepticism (good is impossible and good is possible), 
which is the very position Kant argues against379. But, of course, Weil is not a sceptic: for 
her, insoluble contradictions are the mark of the real, not the proof that we cannot have any 
form of reliable knowledge (as for Pyrrhonists). These elucidations demonstrate that, even 
WKRXJKLQ:HLO¶VZULWLQJVRQHILQGVPDQ\ZRUGVRISUDLVHIRU.DQWWKHUHLVDIXQGDPHQWDO
difference in the way they conceive transcendence and, consequently, in their conception of 
what an adequate philosophical account of the transcendence requires.    
                                                 
375
 Kant, 2008, p. 275. 
376
 Ibid., pp. 227±232. 
377
 Guyer, 2006, p. 134. 
378
 µ+XPDQWKRXJKWDQGWKHXQLYHUVHFRQVWLWXWHWKHERRNVRIUHYHODWLRQpar excellence, if the attention, 
lighted by love and faith, knows how to decipher them. The reading of them is a proof, and indeed the 
only certain proof. After having read the Iliad in Greek, no one would dream of wondering whether 
WKHSURIHVVRUZKRWDXJKWKLPWKH*UHHNDOSKDEHWKDGGHFHLYHGKLP¶:HLOICG, p. 201.) See also 
footnote 18.  
379
 µ8QGHUPLQLQJ3\UUKRQLDQVNHSWLFLVP ... by determining the proper use and limits of human reason 
through the critical scrutiny of its powers is the methodological project that structures the whole of 
.DQW¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGdefence of his substantive theory of theoretical and practical autonomy of 
KXPDQEHLQJV¶*X\HUS 
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In §5.1, I described the argument which I have articulated in this section as a dead-end 
conclusion. Why? Because it obtains two exclusive disjunctions:  
(1) On one hand, those who believe that God is good, for whom attention is a means to 
become a good agent; on the other hand, those who do not believe that God is good, 
for whom attention is a mere hypothetical postulate to which Weil is forced to have 
recourse because of her mistaken metaphysics (i.e. mistaken for those who do not 
believe that God is good).   
(2) On one hand, those who believe in revelation, for whom there is no contradiction 
between knowing that good is impossible and the possibility of good; on the other 
hand, those who do not believe in revelation, for whom there is a contradiction 
between knowing that good is impossible and the possibility of good.  
I qualified these two disjunctions as exclusive, and they are obviously logically exclusive380. 
But they are also exclusive in the sense that they exclude the possibility of fruitful dialogue 
between those who hold the opposing views. I consider the preclusion of dialogue 
detrimental; therefore, I deem this a dead-end conclusion. There is also another reason why, 
for me, this is a dead-end conclusion. Even though, as it is clear from my argument, I side 
with those who do not believe that God is good and that there is no contradiction between 
knowing that good is impossible and the possibility of good, I nevertheless feel that the 
propositional character of argumentation ill-represents the not-very-propositional thoughts 
that I have on these matters. I feel that I have been cornered by my own argument, but I also 
feel that there is no real corner beyond the one created by the argument. This cornered 
feeling is similar to the feeling one might experience while answering the questions of a 
survey that does not seem to justly represent the facts that it purports to deal with and that 
consequently forces one to give inaccurate answers.  
The purpose of following this argument to its dead end is to highlight how art practice can 
expand the knowledge of Weilian attention precisely because, by virtue of the non-
propositional character of its products (and unlike propositional argumentation), it does not 
VRUHDGLO\HQJHQGHUµWUDSSLQJFRUQHUV¶ and affords a richer (and I believe truer) 
representation of my position. I said that the dead-end conclusion precludes dialogue, and it 
is not accidental that, in many of the imaginal projects, the exposition of which occupies the 
remainder of this chapter, dialogue plays a crucial role.  
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 In logic, an exclusive disjunction has the form One or the other but not both.  
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5.4 Imaginal projects 
5.41 Tautology 
For Weil, God is a tautological entity381 and God is also synonymous with absolute good. 
Tautologies have the property of being always true (e.g. it is always true that a cat is a cat, 
UHJDUGOHVVRIDQ\FRQWLQJHQWIDFWDERXWDFWXDOFDWV7KXV:HLO¶VFODLPWKDWLQHWKLFVWKHUH
are insoluble contradictions follows from the tautologousness and absolute goodness which 
she ascribes to God, because the goodness of God is not contingent, while the goodness here 
below, the goodness of human actions, is always contingent: e.g. it might seem non-
contingently good to save ten people from dying in an accident, but what if one of those who 
has been saved turns out to be a mass-murderer who will kill thousands? I do not need to 
answer this question: this kind of thought experiment is a commonplace in discourse on 
ethics. My point is to illustrate why it is quite natural to think of non-divine goodness as 
being necessarily contingent. One could put it as follows: I am convinced that my best is not 
the EHVW$QGWKLVLVDOVRWKHFUX[RI:HLO¶VYLHZRQWKHPDWWHU  
A tautological God is a transcendent God because nothing here below, in the contingent 
world, is tautological. As I pointed out in §5.1, to deal with the transcendent through 
deductive argumentation always leads back to contradiction; in view of this fact, I decided to 
consider tautology qua aesthetic object, in order to gain and represent another mode of 
knowledge: aesthetic knowledge. Below, is an example of deductive argumentation in which 
one of the interlocutors makes a tautological claim about beauty: 
Two inseparable friends called Tauto and Logy. They are sitting by the sea, at sunset. Tauto 
VD\V³,VQ¶WWKLVEHDXWLIXO´³<HVWUXO\EHDXWLIXOWKHFDOPVHDWKHLQFDQGHVFHQWUHGWKH
VHDJXOOVDK´VD\V/RJ\³%XW\RXFDQ¶WUHGXFHWKLVEHDXW\WRDPHUHVWring of facts, as if you 
FRXOGHQJLQHHULWLQVRPHODEDWZLOO´³2N7KHQEHDXW\LV´³%HDXW\LVEHDXW\EHDXW\LVjust 
EHDXW\´7DXWRFULHVRXW$QG/RJ\³*RRG6Rthat is that:KDWFDQZHWDONDERXWQRZ"´382 
7DXWR¶VFODLPLVDQDUJXPHQWabout the tautologousness of beauty, but when one states that 
something is a tautology, the work of expressing the tautological quality is yet to be done. 
7KHVWDQFHRI:HLOLDQVFKRODUVKLSRQ:HLO¶VHWKLFVLHRQKHUQRWLRQRIJRRGLVVLPLODUWR
7DXWR¶VSRVLWLRQ0\ DLPLVWRDFNQRZOHGJH/RJ\¶VTXHVWLRQ:KDWFDQZHWDONDERXW
now?), but the approach that I adopt does not appeal to logic but, as I said, to aesthetics.    
There are precedents of artistic representations of tautology, notably, besides the already 
mentioned work of Kosuth, many pieces by William Anastasi, e.g. Microphone383 1963, 
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 µ*RGSURGXFHVKLPVHOISHUIHFWO\)LUVWRIDOO*RGORYHVKLPVHOI7KHORYHEHWZHHQ*RGDQG
God, which is itself God, is this doubly virtuous bond; this bond that unites two beings to such an 
extent that they are indiscernible and are really a single one, this bond which extends over the distance 
DQGRYHUFRPHVDQLQILQLWHVHSDUDWLRQ¶:HLOOC IV 1, p. 353.) 
382
 Alfier, 2009d. 
383
 A tape recorder that plays its own sound (McEvilley, 2005, pp. 105±135). 
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Nine Polaroid Photographs of a Mirror384, and Six Sites385 1967, DQG%HUQDU9HQHW¶VTube 
no. 150/30/1300386 1966,  in which a metal tube is exhibited alongside a diagrammatic 
representaWLRQRILWRU.RVXWK¶VProto-Investigations 387. Even though my tautology projects 
are closer to the slightly absurdist sensibility which Anastasi displays in his work than to the 
KLHUDWLFDOTXDOLW\RI9HQHW¶VDQG.RVXWK¶VZRUNP\SURMHFWVDUHDOVRTXLWHGifferent from 
$QDVWDVL¶VLQDWOHDVWWZRPDMRUUHVSHFWVILUVWO\XQOLNH$QDVWDVL¶VZRUNWKH\DOVRIXQFWLRQ
lectically; and, secondly, as I will show in §5.411 and §5.412, while Anastasi represents 
tautologies388, I represent thwarted tautology.  
5.411 Is capable of not not-being 
The first imaginal projects that dealt with tautology was Is capable of not not-being 
(ICONNB), an event, including an installation (Figs 5.1±6) and a performance (Figs 5.7±8), 
which took place at the Centre for Drawing, University of the Arts London, in December 
2008. As I have shown in §3.32±3.36, Weil argues that without intellectual attention, there 
would be only matter, or stuff389 ± not stuff thought by mind but mindless stuff, pure matter 
of which nothing could ever be said or written, because, no matter what the materialists say 
or write, it could never be thought. Weil rejects the materialist view of reality on the grounds 
that, since we do talk about stuff, this stuff must necessarily be thought stuff; she also rejects 
idealism on the grounds that there are limits to what we can think, not think, doubt, and so 
on (see §3.31). For Weil, intellectual attention constitutes, that is, creates reality as a 
semiotic tissue. 
Semiotic stuff remains always somewhat recalcitrant stuff, although, most of the time, this 
goes unnoticed because, in thinking and perceiving, one generally manages semiotic stuff 
ZKLFKFDQEHµPDQLSXODWHG¶ seamlessly, or nearly so390. ICONNB materialises some 
recalcitrant aspects of semiotic stuff in order to make it aesthetically significant. 
                                                 
384
 Anastasi took Polaroid photographs of himself in front of a mirror. Each new Polaroid was stuck to 
the mirror, until the mirror was completely obliterated by the photographs but for one small section of 
the mirror (Ibid., pp. 105±135).  
385
 An exhibition of photographs of the walls on which the photographs were hung (Ibid., pp. 105±
135). 
386
 Ibid., pp. 154±155. 
387
 .RVXWK¶VIDPRXVSLHFHOne and Three Chairs 1965, which consists of a chair, a life-sized 
SKRWRJUDSKRIWKHFKDLUDQGWKHGLFWLRQDU\GHILQLWLRQRIµFKDLU¶LVSDUWRIWKH Proto-Investigations 
series (Ibid., pp. 86±87). 
388
 E.g. in Microphone one has this (the sound of the actual recorder) and this again (the recorded 
sound of the recorder).  
389
 ,XVHWKHWHUPµVWXII¶WRGHQRWHPDWWHUDQGWRFRQQRWH± E\UHIHUHQFHWRµVWXII¶PHDQLQJZRYHQ
fabric ± :HLO¶VQRWLRQRIUHDOLW\DVVHPLRWLFWLVVXH 
390
 I return again (see §3.35) to Lévy-/HEORQG¶VQRWLRQRIontologisation of sign. Lévy-LeEORQG¶V
argument is that seamlessness in the handling of signs is determined by habit and, therefore, 
SUHFDULRXVµ7KHVHJUDSKLFVLJQVDOEHLWRULJLQDOO\ZKROO\FRQWLQJHQWWLHGIRUH[DPSOHWRDSDUWLFXODU
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The installation consisted of: 
400 pages containing the first million GLJLWVRIʌDWWDFKHGWRWKHZDOO)LJV±2). 
    
Fig. 5.1 Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008: First million digLWVRIʌ 
       
                                                                                                                                          
language: otherwise why denote a mass with m?), end up acquiring a real ontological charge: for the 
physicist E is an energy, v is a speed, etc. To assure oneself of this, one only needs to see how 
difficult it is to carry out a physical law, even an elementary one, when the conventional notations are 
modLILHG¶/pY\-Leblond, 2006, p. 67.) 
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Fig. 5.2 Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 20)LUVWPLOOLRQGLJLWVRIʌ 
A post-LWQRWHUHDGLQJµDQinfinitely small SRUWLRQRIWKHGLJLWVRIʌ¶)LJ2QWKH
opposite wall, a drawn circle with one of its diameters (Fig 5.4). 
   
Fig. 5.3 Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008: Post-LWQRWHUHDGLQJµDQinfinitely 
small SRUWLRQRIWKHGLJLWVRIʌ¶ 
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Fig. 5.4 Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008: Circle drawn on the 
wall. 
On the floor, red lines drawn with a permanent marker indicated the halfway point of the 
length of the room, the half of the half, and so on, until the space became too small to be 
drawn. A post-it note placed near the main half-LQGLFDWLQJOLQHUHDGµPRYHRQ=HQR¶)LJV
5.5±6). 
         
Fig. 5.5 Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008: Post-it reading 
µ0RYHRQ=HQR¶. 
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Fig. 5.6 Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008: Post-it reading µ0RYHRQ=HQR¶ 
 
The performance was in the form of a lecture (Figs 5.7±8). As the performance lasts over an 
hour, I will limit myself to sketching out its main focus (a full transcript of the performance 
is given in Appendix 3): to show the difference between the verbal description of an 
occurrence and the experience of that occurrence (e.g. the difference between a description 
of silence and experiencing silence ± I invite the audience to observe a minute of silence; or 
WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ:HLO¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIVSRQWDQHRXVDWWHQWLRQDQG the experience of it ± 
I bang the table loudly and unexpectedly); to problematise the notion of experimental 
certainty by questioning the notion of fact; in order to ask whether voluntary attention is 
possible, I invite the audience to try to solve the liDUSDUDGR[µWKLVVWDWHPHQWLVIDOVH¶
pointing out that nobody and nothing had compelled them to judge the statement 
alternatively true and false, that they had done so, assuming they had, voluntarily. The 
lecture gives no answers; rather it casts the question of the relation between Weilian 
attention and free will in epistemological terms: How does one know one is acting 
voluntarily?       
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Fig. 5.7 Is capable of not not-being performance, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008. 
          
 
Fig. 5.8 Is capable of not not-being performance, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008. 
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As for the materialisation of the recalcitrant aspect of signs, the almost materially negligible 
VLJQµʌ¶EHFRPHVVOLJKWO\PRUHPDWHULDOO\VXEVWDQWLDOLQWKHGUDZQFLUFOHDQGGLDPHWHUDQG
EHFRPHVPXFKPRUHVXEVWDQWLDOLQWKHVKHHWVRIWKHILUVWPLOOLRQGLJLWVRIʌWKHZDOOZDV
not large enough to accommodate them all so a pile of them was left on the ground, and the 
ink ran out while printing them (another indication of their materiality) (Fig. 5.9); 
furthermore, the post-LWQRWHUHDGLQJµDQinfinitely small SRUWLRQRIWKHGLJLWVRIʌ¶UHPLQGHG
tKHDXGLHQFHWKDWQRPDWWHUKRZPDQ\GLJLWVRIʌRQHSULQWVRXWLWZLOODOZD\VEHDQ
infinitesimal SRUWLRQRIWKHGLJLWVRIʌ± all the paper and ink in the world could not make the 
VWDWHPHQWµ7KLVLVDQinfinitely small  SRUWLRQRIWKHGLJLWVRIʌ¶IDOVH. In this respect, this 
statement shares with tautologies the property of always being true.  
 
Fig. 5.9 Is capable of not not-being, 2008: A4 print-RXWRIWKHILUVWPLOOLRQGLJLWVRIʌ, where the 
ink is running out. 
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The lines on the floor materialise ZenR¶VDUJXPHQWRQWKHLQILQLWHGLYLVLELOLW\RIVSDFHZKLFK
leads to his famously controversial negation of the possibility of spatial movement. Even in 
this case, the materialisation brings recalcitrance: there comes a point when no more lines 
can be drawn.  
As Vance Morgan, in Weaving the World: Simone Weil on Science, Mathematics, and Love, 
points out, Weil constructs an analogy between the Greek solution to the problem of 
incommensurables through the use of the circle which transcends the numerical order and 
the problem of the incommensurability of contingent earthly good and absolute divine good 
which she solves by appealing to the notion of transcendence391. ICONNB deflates the 
transcendence conjured up by the circle as a purely geometrical concept, by asking: What is 
a circle? Is it this shape drawn on thHZDOORUWKHOHWWHUʌRUWKHVHVKHHWVRISDSHU" 
In the ICONNB OHFWXUHWKHWKHPHRIFLUFXODULW\LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK:HLO¶VFLUFXODUGHILQLWLRQ
of voluntary attention as not spontaneous attention392: 
Imagine that somebody who wants to challenge Weil on the point of the non-compellability of 
attention says to Weil:  
³6RPHRQHLVSRLQWLQJDJXQWR\RXUKHDG6KHJLYHV\RXSHQFLODQGSDSHUDQGWHOOV\RXWR
draw a perfect circle. S/he also tells you that if the circle you draw is not perfect, s/he will kill 
yoX<RXZLOOSUREDEO\GUDZDVDWWHQWLYHO\DV\RXFDQDQG\RXZLOOEHFRPSHOOHGWRGRVR´ 
I imagine that Weil would reply:  
³1RGUDZQFLUFOHZLOOHYHUEHDSHUIHFWFLUFOHVRWKHUHLVQRSRLQWLQPHWU\LQJWRGUDZRQHLI
my life depends on my drawing a perfect circle, I am as dead already by the very definition of 
SHUIHFWFLUFOH´ 
The other, a little impatient because Weil has cunningly evaded the issue, would then slightly 
reshape the imaginary scenario and say:  
³2Nnot a perfect circle but whatever the gun-pointer deems to be a good enough FLUFOH´ 
,LPDJLQHWKDW:HLO
VUHSO\ZRXOGEH³,I,ZDVcompelled to draw attentively it was 
spontaneous attention that I exercised and not voluntary attention which²by definition²is 
voluntary and, therefore, non-comSHOOHG´ 
As I will explain in §5.412, the notion of good enough versus good, which in ICONNB is 
merely sketched out, is central to the project Gayliana: Isle of Idle.  
5.412 Gayliana: Isle of Idle   
Before outlining the function of the installation Gayliana: Isle of Idle (GIOI), I will give a 
brief description of it. GIOI was the result of a residency at the Centre for Drawing, 
University of the Arts London, April±May 2009. The installation led to the publication of 
The Centre for Drawing Project Space ± Notes 07393 (CFD07), which is included as 
Appendix 5 and which contains additional visual documentation and several texts which are 
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 Morgan, 2005, p. 120, p. 126. 
392
 This definition is circular because it begs the question: What is spontaneous attention, then? Not 
voluntary attention? 
393
 Alfier, 2009d.  
5. Imaginal critical practical analogy 
167 
 
integral to this imaginal project. GIOI was presented as an exhibition of the work of a 
ILFWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUQDPHGµ2WWR8*D\O¶28*ZKLFKLVDQDQDJUDPRIµWDXWRORJ\¶
although the viewer was informed neither of the fictional dimension of the installation nor of 
WKHDQDJUDPPDWLFVRXUFHRIµ2WWR8*D\O¶$OO28*¶VZRUNVZHUHGXSOLFDWH394 and 
included: several engraved glass and mirror pieces on plinths, accompanied by short texts 
IURP28*¶VNotebooks (Figs. 5.13, 5.16±17395); blindfolds with circular mirrors, with a box 
and visual instructions on how to wear them396 (Figs. 5.13, 5.15397)  ± these pieces were also 
on a plinth and accompDQLHGE\WH[WVIURP28*¶VNotebooks; a piece of music ± the music 
was written by assigning to each letter oIWKHDOSKDEHWDQRWHDQGWKHQµVSHOOLQJRXW¶ a series 
of palindromic-word398 WDXWRORJLHVHJµUHYLYHULVUHYLYHU¶DUUDQJHGDOSKDEHWLFDOO\DQGWKH
recording is a superimposition of two performances of the score by cellist Gamaliel Rendle-
Short (Fig. 5.19 for the score and DVD Track 2 for the recording). There was a video-text 
ZLWKYDULRXVIDFWVDERXW28*¶VOLIHDQG several books available for consultation by the 
public3992YHUWKHHQWUDQFHGRRUWRWKHLQVWDOODWLRQRQHUHDGWKHZRUGVµ1R7DXWRORJ\LQWKH
.LQJGRPRI*RRGHQRXJK¶)LJDQGRQWKHZDOOLQVLGHWKHUHZHUHWZRWH[WVUHIHUULQJ
WR28*¶VOLIH)LJV±12).  
 
Fig. 5.10 Gayliana: Isle of Idle installation, 
Centre for Drawing, London, 2009. 
    
                                                 
394
 For a presentation of the fictional exhibition, see Appendix 5, p. 274, where one can also find an 
H[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHGXSOLFDWLRQRI28*¶VZRUNV 
395
 See also Appendix 5, pp. 281±282, p. 287. 
396
 The instructions show that the blindfold should be worn with the mirrors facing the eyes and not 
outwards.  
397
 See also Appendix 5, p. 284. 
398
 µ2WWR¶LVDOVRDSDOLQGURPLFZRUG 
399
 Appendix 5, p. 272.  
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Fig. 5.11Gayliana: Isle of Idle installation, 
Centre for Drawing, London, 2009. The text 
RQWKHZDOOUHDGVµ³PD\LPDJLQJULJUXIIOHG
RSSRVLQJUK\WKPV´)URP2WWR8*D\O¶V
ZLOO¶)RUDQH[SOanation of these words, see 
Appendix 5, p. 274. On the plinth are the 
blindfolds with circular mirrors. For a close 
up view of the blindfolds, see Figs. 5.13, 
5.15 and Appendix 5, p. 284.  
 Fig. 5.12 Gayliana: Isle of Idle installation, 
Centre for Drawing, London, 2009. The text 
RQWKHZDOOUHDGVµ)ULHQGVDQGIRHDOLNHDVN
³2WWRDUH\RXUHDO"´,UHSO\³:RXOG\RX
care for the short or the long aQVZHU"´³7KH
VKRUWRQH2WWR´³<HV´³7KHORQJRQH´
³<HVEXW´)URP³&RQWDJLRXV
&RQWLQJHQFLHV´¶)RUDFORVHXS view of the 
text, see Appendix 5, p. 288. 
 
 
Fig. 5.13 Gayliana: Isle of Idle installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 20097KHTXRWHIURP28*¶V
Notebooks alludes to the possible ambivalent interpretation of palindromic-word tautologies. The label reads 
µ28*$D³3DOLQGURPHVnoon is noon = noon is noon only apparently since n1o2o3n4 n4o3o2n1. Hence, 
palindromic tautologies are not tautologies after all. Blindfold: eye is eye, phonetically: I is I, the primordial 
non-tautology, the elemental, generative self-reflection. Yet I1 1I is not analogous to n1o2o3n4 n4o3o2n1. In 
I1 1I, the inverted position of the index ± what does it mean to say that I1 1I"´)URP28*¶VNotebooks¶ 
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Fig. 5.14 Gayliana: Isle of Idle installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2009. The label UHDGVµ28*$E
³2QHSRLQWVthis. Or: not this. But thisness is trickier: is it unpointable? It may not be, that is, not be 
unpointable. Somebody point to it, then. I am at a loss. And thislessness? Oh, now, what a hiss! Unthinkable, I 
VD\XQWKLQNDEOH´)URP28*¶VNotebooks¶)RUDFORVHXSYLHZRIWKHJODVVVHH)LJ 
 
 
Fig. 5.15 Gayliana: Isle of Idle installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2009: Blindfold with circular 
mirror in a box, cardboard, paper, felt and plastic. Box: 7.5 × 7.5 × 3.9 cm. Blindfold: Approx. 7 × 20 cm. 
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Fig. 5.16 Gayliana: Isle of Idle installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2009. Close up view of the plinth 
WKDWFDQEHVHHQLQ)LJ7KHJODVVUHDGVµWKLVOHVVQHVV¶ 
 
          
Fig. 5.17 Gayliana: Isle of Idle installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 
2009. A close up view of the glass that can be seen in Appendix 5, pp. 281±
282VKRZLQJWKHUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHZRUGµVRXOOHVV¶HQJUDYHGLQWKHPLUURU 
 
Fig.5.18 Gayliana: Isle of Idle 
installation, Centre for Drawing, 
London, 2009. Entrance to the 
exhibition. On the door, one can see 
the poster with the image reproduced 
in Fig. 4.28. See Appendix 5, p. 289.  
The installation intends to give an aesthetic experience of tautology but also an experience 
of the fact that, as soon as tautology is materialised, it loses its tautologousness: the mirror 
and glass pieces are placed horizontally, so that, generally400, they do not reflect the viewer 
but show a different view; and even though these pieces are duplicates, they are not identical 
                                                 
400
 Even if a viewer leaned over the reflecting surfaces in order to see a reflection of himself or 
herself, the reflection, due to the horizontal placing, would not be a familiar one and it therefore 
would not be experienced as a doubling.  
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because they are filled with different reflections; the two renderings of the musical score do 
not match rhythmically, as they are played at different speeds; palindromic tautologies lose 
thHLUV\PPHWU\ZKHQPXVLFDOO\UHSUHVHQWHGEHFDXVHWKHµLV¶LVVRPHWLPHVKHDUGDVEHORQJLQJ
to the melody of the palindromic word, or the rhythmic progression might invite higher-level 
gestalts which abstract from the individual tautologies401. Moreover, even though 
palindromic-ZRUGWDXWRORJLHVVXFKDVµUHYLYHULVUHYLYHU¶appear to be tautologies, one could 
DOVRVHHWKHVHFRQGµUHYLYHU¶DVDGLIIHUHQWZRUGLHDVWKHILUVWµUHYLYHU¶VSHOWEDFNZDUGV
(see Fig. 5.13). In other words, the installation highlights contingency ± the Kingdom of 
Goodenough ± while suggesting tautology. As, in ICONNB, ʌLVDQLPDJHRISHUIHFWLRQ
which is corrupted by the excrescence of its numerical representation, so, in GIOI, the 
perfection of the simplest of tautology instances ± i.e. p is p ± is negated by the experience 
of the latter p not being quite identical to the former p. (This exemplifies the respect in 
which GIOI is a representation of thwarted tautology and not of tautology, as is the case for 
$QDVWDVL¶VZRUNWRZKLFK,UHIHUUHGLQ+RZHYHUWKHLQWHQWLRQIURPZKLFKGIOI 
springs is not to state the XQWHQDELOLW\RI:HLO¶VLGHDWKDWWKHUHH[LVWVDSHUIHFWDQGWKHUHIRUH
tautological) object of attention but rather to show the epistemological complications of this 
position. 
 
Fig. 5.19 Gayliana: Isle of Idle. Score of six-letter palindromic words arranged alphabetically.   
                                                 
401
 The mismatch between the rhythmic regularity of the score and the irregularity of its performance 
can be clearly perceived by listening to the recording while following the music on the score.   
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CFD07, which is not a documentation of GIOI but an expansion of it, exemplifies the 
generative approach to Weilian discourse on attention and the process of depersonalisation. 
If Weil posits a transcendent reality (i.e. a divinity which is absolutely good, beautiful and 
true), CFD07 sets out to ask: What is real? OUG, in his letter to the Fellows of the Board of 
the Discernment of Reality, states that he is as real as geocentrism or as the number 641 are 
real: are they real?402 In the image of the books, the side-up spines might seem at first to be 
real but they are in fact a reflection4037KHµWKLVOHVVQHVV¶LPDJHVHYHUDOSKRWRgraphs of the 
same piece, taken with different exposures) highlights its being a photographic construction 
rather than reality404,QWKHIURQWSDJHLPDJHRQHVHHVDURDGVLJQUHDGLQJµ*RRGHQRXJK
5RDG¶405EXWWKHQDGHWDLORIWKHVDPHLPDJHVKRZVDVLJQUHDGLQJµ'LDORJXH5RDG¶406: is one 
image more real than the other? In OUG¶V'LDORJLF7UDJHG\6NHWFKDQµLQQRFXRXV¶ knife 
turns out to be fatally noxious407. This questioning sets the scene for the dialogue between 
Dino Alfier, Fiona Erild and Odelia Frin408; these three characters are all equally real or 
unreal, and through them I (the other Dino Alfier, the one who is now writing these words) 
can take different sides of the same argument and suspend the binary mutual exclusivity of 
truth and falsity. The dialogue does not have an exegetical function: it does not explain what 
Weilian attention is, but it rather instantiates a meandering thought thread which weaves 
around it. This instantiation is no truer than a deductive argument would be, but it is 
certainly a more accurate representation of how I think (or thought) about Weilian 
attention409. My critique of Weilian dogmatism, in §4.3121,  gives a theoretical justification 
for this position: if, as Wittgenstein argues, attention belongs to ethics and ethics rests on 
aesthetics410, then it seems plausible that my views on attention could be oscillating and 
represented by a non-propositional image such as the dialogue in question. In a sense, the 
dialogue functions as GIOI does: the perfectly true argument is tautologically hard411; while 
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 Appendix 5, p. 273.  
403
 Appendix 5, p. 272.  
404
 Appendix 5, p. 275.  
405
 Appendix 5, p. 271.  
406
 Appendix 5, p. 277.  
407
 Appendix 5, p. 285.  
408
 Appendix 5, pp. 278±280µ)LRQD(ULOG¶DQGµ2GHOLD)ULQ¶DUHERWKDQDJUDPVRIµ'LQR$OILHU¶ 
409
 As I stated at the end of §5.32, one of my intentions in the imaginal projects was to obtain a truer 
representation of my thoughts. 
410
 In §4.3121 I showed that, for Wittgenstein, ethical statements of absolute value are an attempt to 
express the perceived absoluteness of ethical feelings.    
411
 ,DPUHIHUULQJWR:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VQRWLRQVRIVXSHU-mechanism and super-hardness which he 
associates with logical necessity, since, in propositional logic, a proposition whose proper logical 
form is a tautology is logically true, i.e. (logically) necessarily WUXH:LWWJHQVWHLQZULWHVµ:HKDYHWKH
idea of a super-mechanism when we talk of logical necessity, e.g. physics tried as an idea to reduce 
things to mechanisms or something hitting something else. We say that people condemn a man and 
WKHQVD\WKH/DZFRQGHPQVKLPWRGHDWK³$OWKRXJKWKH-XU\FDQSDUGRQ>DFTXLW"@KLPWKH/DZ
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this dialogue, with its associative tangents, its admissions of closet transcendentalism, its 
mateULDOLVWERXWVHWFLVSODVWLF28*¶V'LDORJLF7UDJHG\6NHWFK412 represents this 
plasticity, these changes of mind, by the use of erasure. The common editorial practice of 
including erasures in the publication of manuscripts highlights the changes that occur in the 
thinking process: the writer erased certain passages but the editor rehabilitates them, thus 
eroding the image (perhaps, the image of a fiction) of monolithic certainty. If the normative 
work is based on the dogmatic413 assumptions that what Weil writes on attention is true (or, 
at least, on acting as if it was true), GIOI proceeds from a more sceptical attitude. But unlike 
the supercilious, exclusive dead-end scepticism expressed in §5.32, this is a dialogic, open-
ended kind of scepticism: while the former uses doubt as a weapon, the latter uses doubt as a 
question for the generation of dialogue.  
The following passage from the dialogue printed in CFD07, exemplifies the dialogic, 
sceptical approach: 
FE: So how do you go from intellectual attention to attention à vide?  
'$7REHKRQHVWP\YLHZVRQWKLVRVFLOODWH6RPHWLPHV,WKLQNLW¶VDJUDGXDOLQFUHDse from 
one towards the other²a you-FDQ¶W-run-before-you-can-walk sort of thing²and, sometimes, I 
WKLQNWKHUH¶VGLVFRQWLQuity, when you get to the top²more of a Mary-sucked-up-to-heaven 
type of event.  
FE: Do you believe that? 
DA: What? 
FE: The giant cosmic hoover effect. The Assumption. 
DA: That people can be transported up to the celestial sphere body and soul? No, not really. 
But then I sometimes catch myself thinking thoughts that, well, somehow, seem just as 
untenable, but they have a more acceptable attire. It comes down to fashion, perhaps: 
Fashionable thinking, thinking out of fashion. 
FE: Assumption? Thinking out of mind, if you ask me! 
OF: Or iWPLJKWKDYHVRPHWKLQJWRGRZLWKWKHIDFWWKDWVLJQVFDQGHFHLYHLI\RXGRQ¶WTXLWH
NQRZZKDW\RXDUHGHDOLQJZLWK:KRZDVLWZKRVDLG³%HWZHHQWKHWZRRIWKHPWKH\KDG
g of bread, a measly 5 g each. Had they thought of sharing with a third, what never-ending 
DEXQGDQFH´" 
In the above passage, FE represents haughtiness, DA represents doubt, and OF represents 
the question that keeps dialogue going in the face of potential occlusion.   
                                                                                                                                          
FDQ¶W´7KHLGHDRIVRPHWKLQJVXSHU-strict, something stricter than any Judge can be, super-rigidity. 
... Cf. a lever-fulcrum. The idea of super-KDUGQHVV³7KHJHRPHWULFDOOHYHULVKDUGHUWKDQDQ\OHYHUFDQ
EH,WFDQ¶WEHQG´¶:LWWJHQVWHLQSS±16.)   
412
 Appendix 5, p. 285. 
413
 7KHTXDOLILFDWLRQµGRJPDWLF¶LVXVHGKHUHQRWDVHOVHZKHUHLQWKLVUHVHDUFKLQWKHVHQVHRIULJLGO\
moralistic, but in the sense that Sextus Empiricus gives to the term in his Outlines of Scepticism: 
µ:KHQSHRSOHDUHLQYHVWLJDWLQJDQ\VXEMHFWWKHOLNHO\UHVXOWLVHLWKHUDGLVFRYHU\RUDGHQLDORI
discovery and a confession of inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation. This, no 
doubt, is why in the case of philosophical investigation too, some have said that they have discovered 
the truth, some have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still investigating. Those 
who are calOHG'RJPDWLVWVLQWKHSURSHUVHQVHRIWKHZRUGWKLQNWKDWWKH\KDYHGLVFRYHUHGWKHWUXWK¶
(Empiricus, 2000, p. 3). 
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Before moving on to discuss the two imaginal projects which deal with contradiction, I will 
ask: What kind of response does GIOI (but the same can be asked of ICONNB) invite from 
the viewer with regard to attention? To answer this question, I will refer to the work of 
James Lee Byars, whom I have already mention in §4.21 with reference to the notion of 
K\EULGDUWREMHFW%\DUV¶ZRUNLVSDUDGLJPDWLFDOO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKquestions. For instance, 
McEviOOH\ZULWHVWKDWµLn May 1969, Byars went from Antwerp to Oxford and spent a week 
... requesting questions from the dons and finding that they were much more comfortable 
with answers than questions ..., that, in fact, in this environment, the question apart from the 
answer was ... no question at all. This was precisely the problem: Byars had located a blind 
spot in attHQWLRQ¶414 ,Q1RYHPEHURIWKDWVDPH\HDUµWKH:RUOG4XHVWLRQ&HQWHUZDVSXWRQ
Belgian television. Byars, in a pink suit, with 50 students from the University of Brussels 
DFWLQJDV³RSHUDWRUV´WHOHSKRQHGSHRSOHLQ(XURSHDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZKRKDGEHHQ 
forewarned of the event without being told that they would be asked for questions rather 
WKDQDQVZHUV¶415 Thus, according to McEvilley, with the question, Byars was directing 
attention to an unattended object, i.e. the question itself. And, drawing again oQ0F(YLOOH\¶V
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKLVVWUDWHJ\FDQEHVHHQLQWKHZLGHUFRQWH[WRI%\DUV¶DUWLVWLFLQWHQWLRQVµ,W
LVQRWSHUFHSWXDOTXLUNVFXOWXUDOFRGHVRUSDWWHUQVRIUHODWLRQVKLSWKDW%\DUV¶VZRUNIRFXVHV
on, but the quality of delicate and open attention itself. The art work is less the object of this 
attention than the subjective experience of it. Attention relatively purified of past and future 
associations, attention that can see the thing as strictly experienced, is the substance of his 
art, and the SXUSRVHRIKLVXQXVXDOSHUVRQD¶416 Is the experience of attention in GIOI 
likewise the substance of this work? Certainly such was, at least in part, my intention when I 
started developing GIOI, but retrospectively I am not in position to say. Thus, in Byarsian 
IDVKLRQ,VKDOOOHDYHWKHTXHVWLRQXQDQVZHUHGSRLQWLQJWR%\DUV¶DUWDVDSRVVLEOH
interpretative perspective on this project. 
5.42 Contradiction 
7KHDFFRXQWRI:HLO¶VWKRXJKWJLYHQWKXVIDUGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWKHUZKROHSKLORVRSK\LV
deeply impregnated with Cartesian dualism ± me/the world, mind/matter, 
direction/extension, spontaneous/voluntary attention, good/bad: these are all expressions of a 
dualistic view; and the insoluble contradictions which are the object of the most elevated 
attention are also an indication of a dualistic perspective (possible/impossible good, 
present/absent God), since the very notion of contradiction implies the opposition of a 
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proposition to its negation417. While GIOI and ICONNB engaged with the tautological form 
RI:HLO¶Vmetaphysics and discourse on attention, the projects Attention, Contradiction and 
Detachment and Attending dealt with Weilian dualism by acting out contradictory 
arguments. Once again, this acting out is depersonalised; and, as GIOI and ICONNB 
softened the rigidity conveyed by tautology as a purely conceptual entity, so these two 
projects tarnished the shine of purely conceptual contradiction.    
5.421 Attention, Contradiction and Detachment 
Attention, Contradiction and Detachment (ACD) was a performance in the form of a lecture, 
given at the French Institute, London, on 28th April 2009, as part of the Simone Weil 
Symposium: That Attention Be a Looking. Weil ascribes the highest ethical value to the 
practice of attention to (for her) insoluble contradictions; the ultimate contradiction is that of 
the possibility/impossibility of good actions: good action is impossible and yet, if one 
attends to this impossibility, one will do what is good418. More generally, for Weil, attention 
to any kind of contradiction is ethically beneficial because this is a practice of detachment, 
as she argues in the following passages: 
When attention fixed on something has rendered manifest contra[di]ction in it (since, at the 
base of all thought, of every feeling, and of all volition there is contradiction), a kind of 
unsticking is produced. By persevering in this course, one reaches detachment.419 
Connection of evil with force, with being, and of good with weakness, nothingness. And, at the 
same time, evil is privation. To elucidate the manner contradictories have of being true. 
Method of investigation: when one has thought something, to try to see in what sense the 
contrary is true.420 
In ACD, ,FRQVLGHUHGP\RZQVWDWHPHQWVUHJDUGLQJ:HLO¶VZULWLQJVRQDUWZKLFK,KDG
exposed in a previous presentation at the American Weil Society Annual Colloquy (at 
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, on 24th April 2009) and I argued against them, 
that is, I tried to show in what sense the contrary of these statements was true. But the 
SURQRXQµ,¶does not convey the depersonalised quality of the performance: while presenting 
P\LQLWLDOVWDWHPHQW,ZRUHDFDSLQVFULEHGZLWKWKHOHWWHUµS¶DQG,ZRUHDµaS¶FDSIRUWKH
negation of the initial statement421 )LJ0RUHRYHUVLQFHWKHµS¶FKDUDFWHr (P) was 
                                                 
417
 Referring back to GIOI, one could say that there is no contradiction in the Kingdom of 
Goodenough.  
418
 See quotes on p. 96. 
419
 Weil, OC VI 3, p. 96. 
420
 Weil, OG, p. 184. For an alternative translation, see: Weil, GG, p. 102. 
421
 Initially, I had envisaged the use of a single cap, for the negation, merely to distinguish the two 
voices, but I realised that to give a cap to one character while leaving the other character cap-less 
would have conveyed the idea that the capped-self is somehow unnatural and artificial, thus 
misleadingly suggesting that the cap-free character is the one who speaks the original truth. The artist 
Éric Duyckaerts, in the video of the lecture/performance La barre de Sheffer, shows that what might 
seem purely symbolical devices (as my use of a hat was symbolical) and devoid of any other 
connotative functions might not be so: for instance, talking about the mathematical translation of the 
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OLNHO\WRDSSHDUDVKDYLQJSUHFHGHQFHRYHUWKHµaS¶FKDUDFWHUa3DVLIWKHODWWHUKDGQR
existence of its own beyond the relation to its positive, i.e. non-QHJDWLRQDOµWZLQ¶, I gave P 
an air of artificiality by using a voice-distorting device in order to counterbalance its 
tendency to be interpreted as the natural term422. P and ~P impersonate the two fundamental 
figures of propositional logic, DQGWKHLUGLDORJXHLVDQDHVWKHWLFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI:HLO¶V
dualistic premise in her argument on the object of the most elevated attention.  
 
Fig. 5.20 Attention, Contradiction and Detachment. Caps that I wore during the performance at the 
French Institute, London, on 28th April 2009.  
As I delivered the presentation, I showed stills from a passage of WerQHU+HU]RJ¶VILOP The 
Enigma of Kaspar Hauser (see DVD Track 3), in which a professor tries to assess whether 
Kaspar can think logically; in the presentation, I make no reference to these images423. The 
professor presents Kaspar with the following thought experiment: there are two villages; the 
inhabitants of one village always tell the truth, while the inhabitants of the other always lie; 
Kaspar is asked to provide the only question that, if addressed to one of the inhabitants from 
                                                                                                                                          
V\PEROVXVHGLQSURSRVLWLRQDOORJLFWRUHSUHVHQWWUXWKDQGIDOVLW\UHVSHFWLYHO\µ7¶DQGµ)¶ZLWKµ¶
IRUµ7¶DQGµ¶IRUµ)¶'X\FNDHUWVSRLQWVRXWWKDWWRVD\µ,DPQXPEHURQH¶DQGWRVD\µ,DPD]HUR¶
DUHTXLWHGLIIHUHQWVWDWHPHQWVDQGDJDLQKHDUJXHVWKDWWKH6KHIIHUVWURNHµ_¶UHYHDOVDQDPELWLRQRI
SXULW\ZKLFKLVDNLQWRWKDWRIWKHDUWRIWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\ZKLOHWKHV\PEROµĻ¶
UHSUHVHQWLQJ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VµQHLWKHUp nor q¶FRQQHFWRUGRHVQRWFRQYH\WKHVDPHDPELWLRQRISXULW\
DQGUHPLQGVRQHRIWKHDUURZVLQ3DXO.OHH¶VZRUN'X\FNDHUWV 
422
 This explanation regarding the use of the hats and the voice distorter is part of the performance, 
albeit formulated differently.  
423
 The images were shown in PowerPoint and I manually changed the slides while delivering the 
presentation. Given that PowerPoint is normally used as a presentation aid (to explain or expand on 
what is being said), the lack of explanation frustrated this expectation, thus giving to the dialogue 
between Kaspar and the professor a quality of independence from what I was saying, as two strangers 
LQWKHURRPZKRFRPSHWHGIRUWKHDXGLHQFH¶VDWWHQWLRQDJDLQVWP\GHOLYHU\ 
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either village, would permit one to deduce in which village he or she lives; Kaspar does not 
know; the professor gives the answer: a double-QHJDWLYHTXHVWLRQµ:RXOG\RXDQVZHUµ1R¶
LI,ZHUHWRDVN\RXZKHWKHU\RXFDPHIURPWKHOLDUV¶YLOODJH"¶424; Kaspar proposes an 
alternative qXHVWLRQµ$UH\RXDWUHHIURJ"¶425WKHSURIHVVRUGLVFRXQWV.DVSDU¶VDQVZHUWKDW
is, his question) on the grounds that logic has to do with deduction and reasoning and not 
with description and understanding.  
The dialogue between Kaspar and the professor illustrates the difference between logic and 
DHVWKHWLFV.DVSDU¶VTXHVWLRQLVDQVZHUHGDHVWKHWLFDOO\EHFDXVHZKHWKHURUQRW,WDNHWKH
answer of the inhabitant to be true or false depends on whether or not he or she seems to me 
to be a tree frog, while no sXFKDSSHDOWRDSSHDUDQFHVLVQHHGHGIRUWKHSURIHVVRU¶VTXHVWLRQ
and, in light of what has been said earlier, with regard to the aesthetic basis of ethics, it 
shows the gap between aesthetic truth (in the sense that it is always true that I have the 
feelings that I happen to have) and logical truth (even when, as in the tree-frog case, 
aesthetics would seem to suffice to infer a conclusion which is certain426), that is, it reiterates 
WKHSUREOHPZLWK:HLO¶VHWKLFDOGRJPDWLVP$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHGLDORJXHintimates that the 
categories of logic (deduction, reasoning) and aesthetics (description, understanding) might 
not be as discrete as they are often thought to be: the tree-frog question requires an appeal to 
the appearance of the villager, while, it would seem that nothing of the sort is required with 
the double-negative question; but does one not need to hear ZKHWKHUWKHYLOODJHUVD\Vµ<HV¶
RUµ1R¶"7KDWLVFRXOGWKHYLOODJHU¶VDQVZHUQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDVDQaesthetic quality (just as 
there is tree-frog-ness, there could be yes-answer-ness or no-answer-ness) of the villager? 
And, if so, then, is the difference between logic and aesthetics, or objectivity and 
subjectivity, one of degree and not of kind ± the wider the consensus of the community of 
inquirers, the closer to logic and, conversely, the narrower this consensus, the closer to 
aesthetics427? Thus, while P and ~P act out pure logical bivalence, Kaspar and the professor 
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 If an inhabitant RIWKHOLDUV¶YLOODJHZDVDVNHGWKLVTXHVWLRQKHRUVKHZRXOGDQVZHUµ1R¶EHFDXVH
WKHWUXWKIXODQVZHUZRXOGEHµYes, if you asked whether I came from the liaUV¶YLOODJHP\DQVZHU
ZRXOGEH³1R´¶DQGWKHOLDUalways lies. On the other hand, an inhabitant from the truth-tellHU¶V
village would answer µYes, if you asked whether I came from the liarV¶YLOODJHP\DQVZHUZRXOGEH
³1R´¶ 
425
 COHDUO\DOLDUZRXOGDQVZHUµYes¶ZKLOHDWUXWKWHOOHUZRXOGDQVZHUµNo¶ 
426
 The conclusion seems certain in the tree-frog case because it is plausible to assume that, to most 
people, human beings do not appear to be tree frogs.  
427
 Although the field of cognitive science is not only beyond the scope of my research but also, as I 
have argued in 1.1, antithetical to my research aims, I shall point to a convergence between my 
reflections on ADC and the views on objectivity and subjectivity proposed by Michel Bitbol, views 
aligned with the minority branch of cognitive science known as neurophenomenology%LWERO¶V
argument elucidates how objectivity and subjectivity can be conceptualised as two ideal poles of a 
FRQWLQXXPUDWKHUWKDQDVWZRGLVWLQFWRQWRORJLFDOHQWLWLHVµ2EMHFWLYHGRPDLQVRINQRZOHGJHDUH
elaborated in two steps, with conscious experience as an implicit departure point. Firstly, one 
progressively pushes aside any feature of experience on which conscious subjects cannot agree, such 
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introduce an element of doubt with regard to the epistemological ground of such purity; and, 
LQWXUQWKLVGRXEWSRLQWVEDFNWR:HLO¶VFDWHJRULHVRIORJLFDHVWKHWLFVDQGHWKLFVDQGWKH
SULRULW\VKHDFFRUGVWRORJLFVLQFHIRUKHUµDWWKHEDVHRIDOOWKRXJKW>ORJLF@RIHYHU\
feeling [aesthetics], and of all volition [ethics] there is FRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶428.  
5.422 Attending  
The installation Attending PDUNHG:HLO¶VELUWKFHQWHQDU\LQWKHWRZQZKHUHVKHGLHGDQGLV
buried and was held at the Eurostar wing of Ashford International Station, 27th November ± 
11th December 2009. It consisted of a video projection (DVD Track 4) and a 
pamphlet/bookmark (Appendix 6). Attending was a site-specific installation (Figs. 5.21±22), 
not so much because Ashford happens to be the place where Weil died and where she is 
buried (even though, of course, this fact is not wholly inconsequential) but because the 
semantic function of Attending relies on the specific semiotic situation of Ashford 
International Station, and if one abstracts from this semiotic milieu429, the work loses much 
of its intended meaning: my aim was to create a rich sign conveying contradiction capable of 
being contemplated aesthetically.  
                                                                                                                                          
as individual tastes, community values, or the emotional tinge which is associated by individuals and 
communities with particular situations. Secondly, one only retains a sort of structural residue of 
conscious experience that can be the object of a consensus, and of a collectively efficient use as a 
predictive tool. ... Objectivity arises from a universally accepted procedure of intersubjective debate ... 
[and it is not] a transcendent resource of which intersubjective consensus is only an indirect 
V\PSWRP¶%LWEROSS±72).   
428
 My point that Weil prioritises logic over feeling and will, rests on my belief that, ultimately 
contradiction belongs to logic, because only what is spoken (Latin dicere, Greek ȜޢȖȦ) can be contra-
dicted. Nevertheless, one could object that Weil is simply referring to an everyday experience of 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQZKLFKLQGHHGVHHPVWRLQFOXGHIHHOLQJVDQGYROLWLRQDVZKHQRQHKDVµPL[HGIHHOLQJV¶
DERXWVRPHWKLQJRURQHLVµLQWZRPLQGV¶DERXWGRLQJVRPHWKLQJ 
429
 Undoubtedly, there is a certain degree of similarity between the semiotic situations expressed by 
different train stations, but, as it will become evident, the specificity of Attending depended on its 
relying on the particular signs in the Ashford station. 
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Fig. 5.21 Attending installation, Ashford International Train Station, 2009: Video projection. 
 
         
Fig. 5.22 Attending installation, Ashford International Train Station, 2009: Video projection. 
In order to explain how Attending functioned semantically, I will report the semiotics of the 
station. On the one hand, there are inviting signs conveying images of places away from the 
station; in fact, these signs convey the idea that you are already elsewhere:  
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2QWKHOLIWGRRUDQLPDJHRI0LFNH\0RXVHSRLQWVRXWWKDWµ'LVQH\ODQGLVFORVHUWKDQ\RX
WKLQN¶WKHGRRULVDILFWLRQDOHQWUDQFHWR'LVQH\ODQG&DVWOHDQGWKHILFWLRQFRQWLQXHVLQVLGH
the lift) (Figs. 5.23±24): 
 
Fig. 5.23 Lift at Ashford International Train Station, 2009 (detail of Fig. 5.24). 
 
        
Fig. 5.24 Lift at Ashford International Train Station, 2009. 
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$ELOOERDUGZLWKDGUDZLQJUHSUHVHQWLQJDFRXQWU\VLGHODQGVFDSHUHDGVµ2QO\ILYHPLQutes 
DZD\([SORUHWKHFRXQWU\VLGHE\WUDLQ¶)LJV±26): 
 
 
Fig. 5.25 Page of studies for Attending: Semiotic situation of Ashford International Train Station, 2009, coloured felt tip 
pens on tracing paper, 29.7 × 21 cm. 
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Fig. 5.26 Page of studies for Attending: Semiotic situation of Ashford International Train Station (detail), 2009, coloured 
felt tip pens on tracing paper, 5.2 × 4.1 cm (detail of Fig. 5.25). 
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A billboard with a photograph of the Musée du quai Branly imaginarily transports the 
viewer to Paris: 
 
Fig. 5.27 Page of studies for Attending: Semiotic situation of Ashford International Train Station, 2009, 
coloured felt tip pens on tracing paper, 21 × 29.7 cm. To the right of the red area, one can see a sketch of 
the Musée du quai Branly billboard.   
 
A more recondite sign of elsewhere-ness is a metal structure which, in the winter months, is 
used by travel agents to welcome skiers on their way to the slopes (Figs. 5.28±30): 
 
Fig. 5.28 Page of studies for Attending: The box, 2009, coloured felt tip pens on tracing paper, 21 × 29.7 
cm. 
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Fig. 5.29 Page of studies for Attending: The box, 2009, pencil on tracing paper, 29.7 × 21 cm. 
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Fig. 5.30 Page of studies for Attending: The box, 2009, coloured felt tip pens on tracing paper, 29.7 × 21 cm. 
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On the other hand, there is an injunctive sign, which, borrowing the stereotypical expression 
of gunmen, orders that nobody move (Figs. 5.31±32): 
   
Fig. 5.31 %LOOERDUGDW$VKIRUG,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDLQ6WDWLRQUHDGLQJµ1RERG\PRYH,Q Ashford business can reach its 
SRWHQWLDO1RWWRPHQWLRQPLOOLRQ(XURSHDQFXVWRPHUV¶. 
        
 
Fig. 5.32 %LOOERDUGDW$VKIRUG,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDLQ6WDWLRQUHDGLQJµ1RERG\PRYH,Q$VKIRUGEXVLQHVVFDQUHDFKLWV
potential. Not to mention 450 milOLRQ(XURSHDQFXVWRPHUV¶ 
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Thus, the station conveys contradictory messages in terms of what is conveyed (move/do 
not move); and, with regard to how these messages are conveyed. If the mode is not 
straightforwardly contradictory, it is at the very least incongruous (the Disneyland invitation 
versus the order of Nobody Move Man); and this incongruity, this jarring quality, is 
heightened by the ubiquitous presence of CCTV cameras, which betrays the fact that this is a 
highly controlled environment, even though it intends to convey a friendly image (this 
station is popular with families going to Disneyland). With Attending, I aimed to direct the 
YLHZHUV¶attention to this contradiction. 
The video (DVD Track 4) shows the front covers430 RIVRPHRI:HLO¶VERoks published 
between 1951 and 2008, in chronological order, followed by the first sentence of each book. 
Viewers were informed of both book ordering and sentence selection procedures. By these 
procedures, I aimed at conveying a quality of detachment. The book covers and quotes are 
LQWHUVSHUVHGZLWKGLDORJXHVZKLFKVWHPIURPDSDVVDJHLQ:HLO¶VGravity and Grace, of 
which a section has been previously quoted in §3.363: 
If we descend into ourselves, we find we have exactly what we desire. If we desire a certain 
being (who is dead), we desire a particular, limited being; therefore, necessarily a mortal, and 
we desire that special being who..., to whom..., etc., in short, that being who died on such and 
such a day, at such and such a time. And we have that being ± dead. If we desire money, we 
desire a medium of exchange (institution), something that can only be acquired on certain 
conditions, so we desire it only in the measure that... Well, in that measure, we have it. In such 
cases, suffering and emptiness are the mode of existence of the objects of desire. We only have 
to draw aside the veil of unreality and we shall see that they are given to us in this way. When 
we see this, we still suffer, but we are happy.431  
In each dialogue, there are two interlocutors: one represents the view expressed in the above 
quote, while the other argues against this view; that is, each dialogue is a variation on the 
same theme and an unfolding of contradiction. Moreover, some of the dialogues are set in 
the station and some of the speakers are impersonated by Mickey Mouse, Nobody Move 
0DQDQGWKHWUDYHODJHQWV¶VWDQGZKLFKWLHVWKHFRQWUDGLFWLRQRIWKHGLDORJXHVZLWKWKDWRI
WKHVWDWLRQ¶VVHPLRWLFVLWXDWLRQ 
The pamphlet/bookmark (Appendix 6) picks up the same theme, and includes two drawings 
that refer to the elsewhere-ness conveyed by the signs in the station (the drawings show the 
sanatorium in which Weil died and her family flat in Paris), but, unlike the latter, the sketchy 
quality of the drawings is not inviting, but rather conveys a sense of absence, one could say 
of elsewhere-ness-less. In the normative work, the drawings functioned to a high degree as 
indexes of the drawing agent, while, in Attending, the quality and content of the drawings 
                                                 
430
 All images of Weil were removed from the covers. 
431
 Weil, GG, London, Routledge, pp. 22±23. 
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fulfils the semantic function of HQJDJLQJZLWK:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQGHWDFKPHQWDQG
contradiction. In the context of the station, drawing refers to contradiction also for the 
following reason: in the station, photography is frowned upon, even when one has 
permission (as I discovered), but drawing is allowed. The contradiction is that the station 
does not allow photography presumably to avoid the gathering of information by ill-
intentioned people, but drawing can be much more effective than photography as a means of 
gathering information.   
The dialogues in the video are very short, relative to the duration of the whole video, and the 
exchanges between the interlocutors are quick and with stark transitions, while the book 
covers and texts linger on the screen and follow one another with soft fading transitions. I 
describe the characteristics of the dialogues in relation to the book covers and texts because 
the dialogues represent the jestful (but not mocking) quality, typical of the imaginal projects, 
by which I found I could overcome to a certain degree the awe-inducing effect432 produced 
E\WKHKLHUDWLFDQGSRHWLFTXDOLW\RI:HLO¶VZULWLQJVDQGFDWFKJOLPSVHVRILQWHUHVWLQJ
epistemological problems that would almost certainly have otherwise passed me by. This 
jestful quality was a result of the general approach I adopted for the imaginal projects, an 
approach which greatly differs from the one I adopted for the normative projects. In the 
normative projects, I would make the work only when I had a distinct idea of what 
procedure to follow for its production. In the imaginal projects, the approach was more 
somnambulistic, following connections without fully knowing where they would lead me. 
7KHDUWLVWeULF'X\FNDHUWVZULWLQJDERXWKLVLQWHUHVWLQWKHQRWLRQVRIµFHUWDLQW\¶DQGµWUXWK¶
in a humorous and seemingly quasi-autobiographical book, describes an open-ended, 
expectant disposition which finds a parallel in my approach in the imaginal projects:  
The idea of the gap between certainty and truth had become a certainty for me ..., I was 
uncertain [GDQVO¶H[SHFWDWLYH]: if this idea was true, as I was certain, it could not be true at all, 
since I was certain of it. The reason why I talk about expecting [expectative] is that I preferred 
to wait for this question to find its solution by itself ... Thus I let this issue sleep ... while I 
started going to sleep more and more often and for longer and longer ... By sleeping too much 
one ends up not being sleepy. It is then that all can start: one forces oneself to sleep by a kind 
of autohypnosis which produces an incomplete sleep, rich of surprises.433 
To return to the relationship between book covers and dialogue in the video, while the cover 
and texts convey the hieratical and poetical quality (which is heightened by the epigraphic 
character of the texts and by their decontextualisation and erratic juxtaposition), the 
GLDORJXHVSXWDVQDJLQWKH³:HLOLDQ3DUQDVVXV´DVLWZHUHLQWKHIRUPRIDBut..., or a Wait 
                                                 
432
 It is my view that many Weilian scholars are in awe of Weil. An indication of this is the fact that 
most Weilian scholars refer to Weil as Simone Weil throughout their essays, as if they could not sever 
the personal and emotional tie with our Simone, as she is sometimes referred to in Weilian circles. I 
ILQGWKLVDWWLWXGHXQKHOSIXOIRUWKHFULWLFDOVWXG\RI:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\ 
433
 Duyckaerts, 1992, pp. 12±13. 
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a minute..., or even an ,GRQ¶WJHWLW. But this, hopefully, is not mere sterile antagonism: as 
I pointed out in the first paragraph of this section, the aim was to make a sign whose 
contemplation would engender an aesthetic experience of contradiction by drawing on the 
semantic dynamic already at work in the station.   
5.5 Summary 
In this summary, I will consider how the imaginal projects have achieved the imaginal 
analogical aim (the expansion of knowledge of Weilian attention), through the process of 
aesthetic objectification of the concepts of tautology and contradiction.  
As a preliminary reflection on how the imaginal projects work, I will consider two works by 
the artist Lizzie Hughes, because there are some similarities between her work and the 
imaginal projects. In an essay on the artist, Michael Wilson writes that Hughes describes her 
ZRUNVDVµUH-representations of structures and networks that through scale and complexity 
GHI\DVLQJXODUYLVXDOLVDWLRQ¶DQGWKDWVRPHRIKHUZRUNµDWWHPSWVWRTXDQWLI\DQGHPERG\
YDULRXVSKHQRPHQDRIWHQE\UHODWLQJWKHPWRGLUHFWKXPDQLQWHUDFWLRQ¶434+XJKHV¶25 Kg 
Weight Piece IRUH[DPSOHFRQQHFWHGµWKHRQO\Goor to a weighed pulley system ..., 
WUDQVIRUPLQJWKHSURFHVVRIFRPLQJDQGJRLQJLQWRDQXQQHUYLQJWHVWRIVWUHQJWK¶435  
+XJKHV¶ZRUNVRPHWLPHVGHDOVZLWKODUJHVFDOHVWUXFWXUHVIRULQVWance, her Second Empire 
State Building Piece 2001 consists of a recording436 of the artist phoning one company on 
HDFKRIWKHIORRURIWKH(PSLUH6WDWH%XLOGLQJDQGDVNLQJµ&RXOG\RXWHOOPHZKDWIORRU\RX
DUHRQSOHDVH"¶&RQFHSWVVXFKDVµWDXWRORJ\¶DQGµFRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶DUHERWKKDUGWRPDNH
VHQVHRIPHUHO\FRQFHSWXDOO\DVLVWKHFRQFHSWµ.J¶DQGlarge in scale, not in a material 
sense but in the sense that concepts are classes which subsume a large, and often, an infinite, 
set of instances437. As one listens to Second Empire State Building PieceµWhe varied 
responses (which range from bored to baffled, reticent to enthusiastic) accrue to form a 
composite portrait in sound that recasts the powerful symbol of the American capital as a 
more human and more tentative and mutable HGLILFH¶438. In other words, the piece reveals 
VRPHWKLQJQHZDERXWWKHDEVWUDFWFRQFHSWµ(PSLUH6WDWH%XLOGLQJ¶DQGHQULFKHVDQGWRD
certain degree destabilises, this conceptual monolith. Likewise, the imaginal projects expand 
the coQFHSWVµWDXWRORJ\¶DQGµFRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶E\UHYHDOLQJVRPHWKLQJnew and by 
destabilising it with respect to the research exposed in Chapters 3 and 4, the dead-end 
FRQFOXVLRQUHDFKHGLQDQGWKHJHQHUDOYLHZRQ:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFVKHOGE\:HLOLDQ
                                                 
434
 Wilson, 2010.  
435
 Ibid. 
436
 This recording is contained in CD form in Harrison, 2002.  
437
 In §5.1, I pointed out that there are infinite instances of tautologies and contradictions. 
438
 Wilson, 2010. 
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scholarship, which I described in §5.1. As with 25 Kg Weight Piece and Second Empire 
State Building Piece, the imaginal projects do not replace the purely conceptual meaning, 
and that is why I use terms such as expansion and enrichment. It is important to stress this 
fact, because it indicates how open-ended the outcome of these projects is, compared with 
the binary occlusion reached in §5.32. The remainder of the summary outlines the expansion 
of the concepts of tautology and contradiction afforded by the imaginal projects.    
8VLQJ'XFDVVH¶VOHFWLFDODQGDHVWKHWLFFDWHJRULHV439 to order my account, I will consider the 
aesthetic and the lectical signification of the projects, drawing on my analysis of the 
plausible interpretations they solicit, which I articulated in this chapter. I will not refer to the 
individual projects but rather give a synopsis of the significations which the projects share. 
As regards lectical signification, I will use the notion of grammatical mood440 to highlight 
the difference between the outcome of the imaginal projects and the outcome expressed in 
§5.32. I will argue that the signification expressed in §5.32 is indicative, while the lectical 
signification expressed by the imaginal projects is interrogative. As regards aesthetic 
signification, I will use the general notion of quality, by which I simply mean anything that 
can be denoted by an adjective, and I will indicate the difference between, on one hand, the 
quality of purely conceptual tautology and contradiction and, on the other hand, the quality 
of aesthetic representation of tautology and contradiction in the imaginal projects.   
The mood of lectical signification of the imaginal projects is interrogative, that is, the 
projects formulate questions about entities that are typically thought in purely conceptual 
terms: What is a circle? How does one know one is acting voluntarily? What is real? What is 
JRRG":KDWLVJRRGHQRXJK",Q,UHIHUUHGWR-DPHV/HH%\DUV¶XVHRIWKHTXHVWLRQDV
artwork material. I do not think that the questions which the imaginal projects obtain 
IXQFWLRQDV%\DUV¶TXHVWLRQVGRDOWKRXJKWKHSURMHFWVGUDZLQDJHQHUDOZD\RQKLVXVHRI
the question). Byars¶ intention was to isolate questions, to sever questions from their 
potential answers, so that questions themselves would become an object of contemplation, 
while the questions obtained by the imaginal projects, even though they are unanswered, 
nevertheless remain not only answerable but also ask for an answer. That the questions 
remain unanswered is hardly surprising given that they belong to metaphysics, a topic whose 
broadness vastly exceeds both my knowledge and the scope of this research. Yet one might 
ask in what sense questions can be a valuable outcome in their own right, since, generally, 
research outcomes are expressed in the indicative mood. To answer this question, I will refer 
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 As I argued in §5.2, the heuretic function of art is not very relevant in the imaginal projects. 
440
 Examples of grammatical moods are: indicative (used for factual statements and positive beliefs), 
imperative (used for orders, prohibitions, etc.), and interrogative (used for questions). 
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WRDSDVVDJHIURP$QGUHZ,QJUDKDP¶VSwain School Lectures. Considering the topic of 
epistemology, Ingraham writes: 
It requires much experience of answers to frame a question rightly. The old analysts asked 
their questions boldly, and expected to find answers as 7 or 8; but they got fractions, negatives, 
zeros, infinities, imaginary and complex quantities, with which they did not know what to do. 
These are seen now to contain answers to questions which lurked unnoticed in the original 
TXHVWLRQV6LPLODUO\WKHHSLVWHPRORJLVW¶VTXHVWLRQVLPSOHDVLWPD\VHHPLQYROYHV,WDNHLWD
QXPEHURIGLIIHUHQWTXHVWLRQV+HZKRDVNVDV.DQWGLG³+RZLVNQRZOHGJHSRVVLEOH"´
should have explained more fully than Kant did just what he meant by such ambiguous terms 
as how and possible and knowledge.441  
,Q,DVNHG+RZFDQDWWHQWLRQEHPDQLIHVWHGLILWVREMHFWLVWUDQVFHQGHQW"¶µ&DQWKH
artist ascend to the transcendent"¶DQGVRRQDQd, I argued that, in turn, these questions led 
WR:HLO¶VQHJDWLYHWKHRORJ\DQGWRFRQWUDGLFWRU\TXHVWLRQVHJµ,VJRRGERWKSRVVLEOHDQG
LPSRVVLEOH"¶RUWRWDXWRORJLFDOTXHVWLRQVHJµ,V*RG*RG"¶7KHFRQWUDGLFWRU\TXHVWLRQV
seem unanswerable, while the tautological questions seem not worth asking. These were, 
ERUURZLQJ,QJUDKDP¶VODQJXDJHbold questions, and the conclusion in §5.32 leaped equally 
boldly to answers (in the indicative mood) which I deemed unsatisfactory. The questions 
obtained through the imaginal projects do not attempt to explain the various terms of the 
original questions, but rather they consider the forms of the statements by which the 
concepts referred to in the original questions are represented, namely, tautology and 
contradiction. The reason why I pointed out that these questions are answerable at least in 
SULQFLSOHDQGZK\,GLVWLQJXLVKHGWKHPIURP%\DUV¶TXHVWLRQVLVWKDW,GRQRWLQWHQGWR
essentialise442 the question. My hope is that the questions I have articulated will offer an 
opportunity for dialogue for artists and Weilian scholars alike.  
I now turn to the aesthetic signification of the imaginal projects. The questions which I 
reported at the beginning of the previous section on lectical signification were explicitly 
expressed in the projects. However, the implicit and overarching questions referred to the 
notions of tautology and contradiction. Such questions were implicit in the sense that they 
were an offshoot of reflection on the aesthetic signification of the projects443, i.e. their 
quality. In §2.4, I claimed that the outcome of the imaginal projects introduced the snag of 
contingency in my representation of tautology and contradiction by objectifying them. Even 
though it was not incorrect to describe this representation of tautology and contradiction as 
non-contingent as mine, in fact such a description is definitional. As Wittgenstein writes in 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 
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 Ingraham, 1903, p. 49. 
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 +RZHYHU,GRQRWWKLQNWKDW%\DUV¶LVHVVHQWLDOLVLQJWKHTXHVWLRQ 
443
 My assumption here is that the imaginal projects possess the qualities that I ascribe to them and 
that a reflective interpreter would find that such qualities lead to a questioning of the notions of 
tautology and contradiction.  
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The proposition, the picture, the model, are in a negative sense like a solid body, which 
restricts the free movement of another: in a positive sense, like the space limited by solid 
substance, in which a body might be placed. ... Tautology leaves to reality the whole logical 
space; contradiction fills the whole logical space and leaves no point to reality.444  
6XFKLVWKHYLHZRIWDXWRORJ\DQGFRQWUDGLFWLRQZKLFKIRUPVWKHEDVLVRI:HLO¶VQHJDtive 
theology and transcendent PHWDSK\VLFVZKLFK,VNHWFKHGLQ)ROORZLQJ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V
image, the imaginal projects point to a perch in the absolute emptiness of tautology and to a 
FUDFNLQWKHDEVROXWHO\VROLGVXEVWDQFHRIFRQWUDGLFWLRQ7KHWHUPVµWDXWRORJ\¶DQG
µFRQWUDGLFWLRQ¶GHQRWHSHUIHFWLRQZKLOHWKHLPDJLQDOSURMHFWVUHSUHVHQWWKHPDVimperfect. 
My aim in representing this imperfection is not negative, that is, I do not intend to ridicule 
:HLO¶VPHWDSK\VLFVRU:HLOLDQVFKRODUVKLSWKDWDSSHDOVWRKHUPHWDSK\VLFVE\GHPRQVWUDWLQJ
that non-contingent tautology and contradictions are chimeras445. As I pointed out in §5.32, 
the scepticism engendered by the imaginal projects aims at favouring critical dialogue, not at 
dismissing outright any form of transcendentalism. The critical function of the imaginal 
projects (which is a result of the methodological superstructure of critical practical analogy) 
evidences that these projects do not merely aestheticise philosophy, but capitalise on 
aesthetics in an inquiring spirit446.   
I conclude this summary by answering the following question: Given that personally I am 
(for the time being) sceptically disposed towards transcendentalism (and here I am referring 
to the dismissive kind of scepticism), how did I manage to adopt a less dogmatic, more 
GLDORJLFIRUPRIVFHSWLFLVPLQWKHLPDJLQDOSURMHFWV"7KHDQVZHUGUDZVRQ$GULDQ3LSHU¶V
argument on the catalytic agent, which I exposed in §5.2: by renouncing the idea (present in 
the normative projects) that the artwork has to match my views as a private, self-reflexive 
subject. That is not to say that the experience of developing the imaginal projects did not 
change my views on these matters (I hope to have become less dismissively dogmatic), but 
rather I wish to stress that it was the nature of the imaginal projects that determined the 
change of view and not vice versa. This demonstrates that, in my research, the function of art 
is not merely illustrative of previously held views but generative of ideas. 
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 Wittgenstein, 1999, §4.463, p. 63. 
445
 This would be analogous to trying to demonstrate the non-existence of perfect circles by showing 
the inevitable imperfections in a few actually drawn circles. 
446
 In a recent essay on artistic appropriation of academic institutional forms, Jonathan T.D. Neil 
argues that the work of artists such as Anton Vidokle, Pablo Helguera and Mark Leckey uses 
pedagogy²notably, the lecture form²merely as a trope and do not strive to acquire expertise in 
those extra-artistic fields of inquiry with which their work purports to engage (Neil, 2010; for a more 
V\PSDWKHWLFYLHZWRZDUGVWKHµSHGDJRJLFDOWXUQ¶VHH&Karlesworth, 2010, Gillick, 2008; 1HLO¶VFULWLFDO
view of peGDJRJLFDODUWLVDNLQWR/XF\/LSSDUG¶VFULWLFLVPRILQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\DUW, expressed in her 
passage that I quote in §1.44); it could be said that these artists aestheticise pedagogy. On the other 
hand, the artists Agnes Denes, Adrian Piper and, to a lesser extent, Éric Duyckaerts have striven to 
achieve a high standard of extra-artistic knowledge²in science, ethics and epistemology, 
respectively²and, therefore, they have been guiding examples of the inquiring spirit which has 
animated my research into metaethics.          
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6.1 Synopsis 
In §1.1, I stated that the aim of this research was to provide an example of the use of art 
within a metaethical perspective. In conclusion, I will indicate how this aim has been 
achieved and I will elucidate the implication of the research outcomes for the field of art 
practice and practice-led research. In order to do so, I will reconsider the concerns I 
introduced in §1.4 in light of the research which I have described and analysed in this thesis. 
Accordingly, §6.2 deals with the distinction between a theoretical and a practical view of 
Weilian attention (introduced in §1.41); §6.3 deals with the issues of subjective and 
REMHFWLYHWUXWKDQGRI:HLO¶VDFFRXQWRIVXEMHFWLYLW\LQWURGXFHGLQFRQVLGHUV
how this research affords an expansion of the knowledge of Weilian attention (introduced in 
§1.43); and §6.5 deals with the methodological issue of discursively representing art practice 
in the context of art practice-led research (introduced in §1.44). 
)URPµZKDWDWWHQWLRQis¶WR µZKDWDWWHQWLRQLVfor¶ 
As I have argued in §1.41, initially, my research was guided by the tacit assumption that I 
would gain a theoretical knowledge of what Weilian attention is conceptually, but that this 
assumption in fact led to an obfuscation of the notion of Weilian attention. Since, in order to 
explain how I dealt with WKLVGLIILFXOW\,ZLOOEHGUDZLQJDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµZKDW
something is¶DQGµZKDWVRPHWKLQJLVfor¶,ZLOOLOOXVWUDWHWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQZLWKDQH[DPSOH
when I use a computer, I do not know what a computer is (those who built it, not me, 
possess such knowledge), but I know, albeit it limitedly, what a computer is for: surfing the 
internet, sending emails, etc. One could call this the difference between theoretical and 
practical knowledge. As I have shown in Chapters 3 and 4, I articulated an inventory of the 
theoretical themes relevant to Weilian attention and I distinguished between different orders 
of attention, highlighting some of the conceptual difficulties with these notions, but this was 
not enough to address the feeling that something was missing and that the goal of achieving 
a conceptual clarification of Weilian attention kept slipping away. In fact, as I realised, the 
problem was my expectation of an acquisition of exclusively theoretical knowledge of 
Weilian attention: what I have acquired is a practical knowledge of it.  
The practical knowledge of Weilian attention which my research has identified can be 
defined very simply: attention is for447 the development of a disposition of detachment. 
Nevertheless, as I will argue in the remainder of this section, such a practical definition was 
impracticable for me as a possible448 regulative principle for art practice until, through the 
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 ,XVHWKHVRPHZKDWJUDPPDWLFDOO\XQRUWKRGR[SUHSRVLWLRQµIRU¶WRHPSKDVLVHWKHGLIIHUHQFH
between a theoretical view of attention (i.e. attention is + definition of attention) and a functional, or 
practical, view of attention (i.e. attention is for + end to which attention is a means).  
448
 In accordance with the critical function of the overarching methodology (i.e. critical practical 
analogy) as I defined it in §2.2 (that is, as an investigation of the subjective conditions of thinking 
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normative projects, I demonstrated that the notion of detachment does not necessarily entail 
a notion of objective truth (as Weil intimates) but is compatible with a notion of subjective 
truth, and that, in turn, an appeal to a subjective perspective need not entail a self-reflexive, 
solipsistic approach to art practice-led research. The consequences for art practice of these 
two insights are discussed in §6.3. Here, I will limit myself to showing in what sense the 
notion of detachment (or attention-for-detachment) might seem to entail objective truth, 
HYHQLIRQHGLVUHJDUGV:HLO¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKLVLVVXH6HFRQGO\,ZLOODrgue that the notion of 
objective truth made the notion of detachment impracticable for me.  
)LUVWO\P\DQDO\VLVRI:HLO¶VZULWLQJVRQDWWHQWLRQOHDYHVOLWWOHGRXEWWKDWRQWKHZKROHVKH
subscribed to an objective notion of truth. But notwithstanding WeLO¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKHPDWWHU
the idea that one can have a detached disposition does seem to imply quite naturally some 
form of objectivity: if I am detached, I must be detached from something, which must be 
some object from which I can detach myself.  
Secondly, if detachment entails objective truth, then the notion of detachment is unusable for 
me, because I find the notion of objective truth problematic, particularly in the context of 
observational visual representation449 (to which class observational drawing belongs). What 
FRXOGµREMHFWLYHWUXWK¶SRVVLEO\PHDQLQWKLVFRQWH[W"2EMHFWLYHDFFRUGLQJWRZKRVH
VWDQGDUG"$FFRUGLQJWRWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOFDQRQRI:HVWHUQDUW",V5HQRLU¶VMont Sainte-
Victoire PRUHRUOHVVREMHFWLYHO\WUXHWKDQDQ\RI&p]DQQH¶s paintings of the same 
PRXQWDLQ",V*RYRQL¶VSelf-Portrait 1915450 DQREMHFWLYHO\WUXHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI*RYRQL¶V
IDFH"$QGDUHDQ\RI$QDVWDVL¶VSubway Drawings451 an objectively true representation of a 
                                                                                                                                          
about the concept of attention), once I had HVWDEOLVKHGWKDWWKHFRQFHSWµDWWHQWLRQ¶FRPSULVHGWKHLGHD
of attention-for-detachment, my aim was not to practice detachment but to investigate the possibility 
of such a practice. The scope of my aim is similar to that which the mathematician David Ruelle 
DVFULEHVWRPDWKHPDWLFVµ+XPDQPDWKHPDWLFVFRQVLVWVLQIDFWLQWDONLQJDERXWIRUPDOSURRIVDQGQRW
actually performing them. One argues quite convincingly that certain formal texts exist, and that it 
would in fact not be impossible to write them down. But it is not done: it would be hard work, and 
useless because the human brain is not good at checking that a formal text is error-free. Human 
mathematics is a sort of dance around an unwritten formal text, which if written would be 
XQUHDGDEOH¶5XHOOH 2000, pp. 3±4.) Can the analogy between mathematics and metaethics be taken 
further? Are the formal texts or norms of which metaethics postulates the possibility necessarily 
unreadable or in-practicable? Answering this question is beyond the scope of my research, but it 
PLJKWDIIRUGDIUXLWIXOSHUVSHFWLYHIRUIXUWKHUUHVHDUFKLQWR:HLO¶VGLVPD\HGRSWLPLVP 
449
 However, as I pointed out in §4.322, the issue here is not that visual representation is empirical 
while Weil refers to the non-empirical truth of analytic a priori propositions (e.g. 7 + 8 = 15), 
because, even with respect to mathematical propositions, all that is required for attention as a practice 
of detachment is a notion of subjective truth.     
450
 *RYRQL¶VSelf-Portrait is a very schematic representation of a face. For instance, the eyes are two 
FLUFOHVZLWKLQZKLFKRQHUHDGVµFLUFOHRIWKHGHDWKRIWKHWHDUVOLIHEXR\RIVRUURZ¶DQGµJRWKLFSRUWDOV
RIWKHFDWKHGUDOVRISKRVSKRUXVRQP\EUDLQ¶P\WUDQVODWLRQ from Italian).  
451
 The Subway Drawings were produced as follows: Anastasi sat in a moving underground carriage 
and, with eyes closed and holding a pencil in each hand over a piece of paper, he let the movement of 
the carriage make the drawings.    
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subway? Faced with these or similar questions, I assume that people would display a varied 
range of attitudes towards them. For instance, one might believe that the question regarding 
Mont Sainte-Victoire is, at least in principle, answerable, although consensus might be 
difficult to reach; but many might thiQNWKDW*RYRQL¶VIDFHREMHFWLYHO\GLGQRWORRNDVKH
depicted it (given that faces normally do not possess any textual feature). In the case of 
$QDVWDVL¶VGUDZLQJVRQHPLJKWDVNZKDWWKHGUDZLQJSXUSRUWVWRUHSUHVHQWLQWKHILUVWSODFH
These examples illustrate why I find the notion of objective truth problematic in 
observational drawing and also why I assume that I am not alone in this.  
I conclude this section by lessening the dichotomy between theoretical and practical 
knowledge of Weilian attention. As I pointed out in the first paragraph of this section, the 
problem was my expectation of gaining exclusively theoretical knowledge, not my pursuit of 
theoretical knowledge itself. I postulated the dichotomy between theory and practice for the 
sake of exposition while, in fact, one outcome of this research has been precisely the 
demonstration that theoretical and practical domains are not separate: my theoretical study 
of Weilian attention informed the development of the normative projects and, in turn, the 
normative projects highlighted the fact that an exclusively conceptual approach to Weilian 
attention was unsatisfactory. In this respect, the normative projects constitute an example of 
metaethical critique by means of art practice.  
6.3 Objective and subjective truth, and the Weilian subject  
In §6.2, I argued that the realisation afforded by the normative projects (i.e. that a full 
understanding of Weilian attention ought to take into account its practical dimension) 
illustrates the critical function of art practice and as such exemplifies a metaethical use of art 
practice. But I also pointed out that I saw the practicability of attention-for-detachment as 
GHSHQGHQWRQWKHFRPSDWLELOLW\RI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVHRQDWWHQWLRQZLWKDQRWLRQRIVXEMHFWLYH
truth. Accordingly, in this section, firstly, I will return to the point I made in §4.322 and 
§4.4, namely, that the notion of subjective truth is compatible with attention-for-detachment, 
provided that one refers to the Weilian version of the subject. Secondly, I will show why the 
notion of subjective truth and the Weilian subject make the notion of detachment usable for 
me. Lastly, I will abstract from my particular concern with attention-for-detachment, in 
RUGHUWRHOXFLGDWHKRZ:HLO¶VYLHZRIWKHVXEMHFWDQGWKe compatibility of attention with 
subjective truth indicate a way of conceptualising art practice metaethically, as I anticipated 
in §1.42 .  
Firstly, in §4.322, I argued that the notion of subjective truth is compatible with attention-
for-detachment: e.g. a detached disposition requires that I pay attention to the mistakes I 
make in a drawing, but as long as it seems to me that I made a mistake, that is enough for me 
to attempt to act in a detached manner. In other words, I do not need a constitutive, objective 
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notion of truth, but merely a subjective, regulative notion of truth in order to make sense of a 
practice of attention (as distinguished from a theoretical knowledge of attention). As I 
pointed out in §4.322, the notion of truth as a regulative principle of conduct retains its sense 
despite the lack of objective basis for truth. Nevertheless, as I argued in §1.42, a certain form 
of solipsistic subjectivism would dismiss the possibility of intersubjective meaningful452 
consensus on metaethical issues. But the kind of subject which Weil postulates in her 
discourse on attention as a practice of detachment (§4.22) is precisely not a self-reflexive 
and solipsistic subject: the de-UHLILFDWLRQRIWKHµ,¶ZKLFKLVWKHJRDORIDWWHQWLRQ-for-
detachment objectifies the subject by conceptualising it as a mere point in the web of 
necessary relationships, which, for Weil, constitutes reality. As with anything else in the 
world, then, the Weilian objectified subject becomes a viable subject of intersubjective 
dialogue. As I maintained in §4.3, it was through the normative projects that I elucidated 
:HLO¶VYLHZVRQWKHDJHQWDVDsubject to necessity453, which indicates the heuristic function 
of art practice within the research. 
Secondly, as the only obstacle to the practice of attention-for-detachment was that it seemed 
to imply the notion of objective truth, once I realised that such an implication does not 
necessarily follow, attention-for-detachment became practicable. Furthermore, this 
conceptualisation of attention has WKHEHQHILWRIFODULI\LQJ:HLO¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQWKHIDFWWKDW
the results of attentive action are unimportant, because, if truth is subjective, then one could 
be both attentive and acting on beliefs which everybody else finds mistaken. Even though all 
the normative projects evidence my reflection on the relation between attention-for-
detachment and truth, it is %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH that most explicitly shows this relation as one 
between detachment and subjective truth. As I pointed out in §1.2, it was essential for me to 
engage with the Weilian community not only discursively, but also directly through 
artworks. Daniel Boitier, in an essay on the visual representation of Weil in art and books, 
which appeared in the journal Cahiers Simone Weil, writes of Bâton GHO¶DYHXJOH that, 
EHFDXVHRIWKHPHWKRGXVHGWRSURGXFHWKHGUDZLQJVLHWKHEOLQGGUDZLQJPHWKRGµWKH
WUDFHORVHVDOOUHIHUHQFHWRVXEMHFWLYLW\¶454 Being a representation of detachment, it is 
appropriate that %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH loses all reference to subjectivity; but this reference 
stands in need of qualification: the blind drawing method emphasises subjective error, 
subjective partiality of vision, and, therefore, in %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH the non-subjective 
                                                 
452
 The quDOLILFDWLRQµPHDQLQJIXO¶LVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHRQHFRXOGJUDQWWKDWLQWHUVXEMHFWLYHFRQVHQVXV
is indeed reached while maintaining that such consensus is in no way an indication of convergence 
guided by some true fact of the world.   
453
 As I argued several times throughout the thesis, this elucidation afforded a clearer understanding of 
the workings of the normative critical practical analogy. 
454
 Boitier, 2010, p. 109. 
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reference pertains to the pursuit of a detached disposition and not to some notion of 
objective truth of the object of observation. Likewise, in the skull drawing After Agnes 
'HQHV¶³+XPDQ'XVW´ 2008 (Fig. 4.25), which appeared in my essay on Weilian 
attention and notions of impersonalism and personalism455, the drawing can be qualified both 
as impersonal (or objective) and personal (or subjective) according to whether one considers, 
respectively, the aim (detached disposition) or the method (the imagined skulls were highly 
subjective).     
Lastly, my research demonstrates that a subjective notion of truth that is approached via the 
Weilian subject is compatible with an art practice that critiques the possibility of ethical 
attention. However, even though it was as a result of my research on Weilian attention that I 
FDPHWRUHDOLVHDWWHQWLRQ¶VFRPSDWLELOLW\ZLWKVXEMHFWLYHWUXWKDQGWKDW,HQYLVDJHGDQRQ-
solipsistic kind of subjectivism, one can abstract from my particular Weilian concerns and 
consider the paradigmatic consequences of these findings: namely, that this research 
constitutes an example of how (the many) sceptical artists can conceptualise their practice in 
metaethical terms while retaining their scepticism with regard to objective truth and without 
entirely repudiating a subjectivist approach.   
6.4 From dogmatic scepticism to dialogic scepticism ± from proposition to image 
My reference to scepticism in the concluding paragraph of the previous section leads back to 
the issue anticipated in §1.43 and articulated in my analysis of the imaginal projects in 
&KDSWHUQDPHO\WKDWLQRUGHUWRHQJDJHZLWKWKHWUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVPRI:HLO¶VGLVFRXUVH
on attention, I adopted a methodological disposition of dialogic scepticism. In §2.4, I stated 
that the aim of the imaginal critical practical analogy was to use art to expand the knowledge 
of Weilian attention beyond its present restricted horizon; and in §5.1, I argued that this 
horizon was constituted by both the transcendentalist occlusion of inquiry typical of much 
Weilian scholarship and by my oZQGRJPDWLFVFHSWLFLVPZLWKUHJDUGWR:HLO¶VQHJDWLYH
theology. In this section, firstly, I will qualify dialogical scepticism further, by 
distinguishing it from dogmatic scepticism; secondly, I will reiterate how the expansion of 
knowledge of Weilian attention was achieved; and, lastly, I will elucidate how the imaginal 
projects constitute an example of metaethical art practice. 
My change of approach towards the investigation of Weilian attention ± from the approach 
which obtained the dead-end conclusion described in §5.32 to the approach which obtained 
the imaginal projects ± can be conceptualised as a trajectory from dogmatic scepticism to 
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 Alfier, 2009b. 
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dialogic scepticism456. The aim of dogmatic scepticism is to produce a dogma which is 
antithetical to some other dogma; its intention is therefore polemical; while the aim of the 
kind of scepticism displayed by the imaginal projects is to invite dialogue, or at least to 
make dialogue a thinkable possibility457, through non-propositional representation; in this 
sense, its intention is dialogical. The trajectory from dogmatic to dialogic scepticism is a 
trace of my endeavour to find a place where art practice and philosophical practice meet. 
These two practices have met somewhere in the middle: on one hand, I have emphasised the 
non-propositional, imaginal mode in philosophy (whereas, typically, philosophy operates 
propositionally) through the objectification of argument forms; and, on the other hand, I 
have emphasised the lectical mode in art practice, by using the dialogical format (which 
belongs to the canon of philosophy) to produce artworks. 
With regard to expanding the knowledge of Weilian attention beyond its restricted horizon, 
since a horizon is always correlated to a given viewpoint, one can ask: What is the viewpoint 
that restricts this horizon? The answer suggested by the imaginal projects is that it is 
restricted by an exclusive reliance on the propositional mode of representation. I return to 
3LUUXFFHOOR¶VFODLPWKDWWKHREMHFWRIDWWHQWLRQFDQQRWEHSRVLWLYHO\UHSUHsented by statements 
RIIDFWVEXWRQO\WKURXJKLPDJHVVHH3LUUXFFHOOR¶VDUJXPHQWrefers (propositionally) 
to images but is not an image, and, therefore, it merely points at the restricted horizon 
(qualifying it as restricted) and conjectures a viewpoint which would expand the horizon. On 
the other hand, the whole enterprise of the imaginal projects could be described as an 
actualisation of the viewpoint which Pirruccello conjectures, i.e. an imaginal viewpoint. The 
imaginal viewpoint has been attained by objectifying tautological and contradictory 
argument forms (forms are images), as distinguished from the consideration of specific 
instances of these forms (i.e. SURSRVLWLRQVWKDWFDQEHIRXQGLQ:HLO¶VZULWLQJV
Furthermore, the frequent use of dialogue contributes to the imaginal character of the 
projects, because dialogues can be images, if their intention is not to prove a point but rather 
to make an inventory of a range of positions on a certain subject458 ± and such was my 
                                                 
456
 The concept of dialogic scepticism draws on the distinction made by Michel Bitbol between 
GRJPDWLFDQGPHWKRGRORJLFDOVFHSWLFLVP,VXEVWLWXWHWKHTXDOLILFDWLRQµPHWKRGRORJLFDO¶ZLWK
µGLDORJLF¶WRHPSKDVLVHWKHUROHRIGLDORJXHLQWKHLPDJLQDOSURMHFWV)RU%LWEROPHWKRGRORJLFDO
VFHSWLFLVPLVDSRVLWLRQZKLFKµFRQWUDULO\WRGRgmatic scepticism, does not aim to build up a 
pessimist antithesis to the progressive eschatology of the realist thesis, but only to contribute, by the 
provocation that it represents, the refining of self-XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHZRUNRIVFLHQWLILFUHVHDUFK¶
(Bitbol, 1998, p. 1.) The aim that Bitbol assigns to methodological scepticism is thus critical, as I 
defined it in §2.2. 
457
 As I argued in §5.32, the two propositions which constitute the dead-end conclusion exclude the 
possibility of fruitful dialogue between those who hold the opposing views that I have described. 
458
 ,VWUHVVµFDQEH¶EHFDXVHDGLDORJXHFDQDOVREHYHU\SURSRVLWLRQDOLILWVLQWHQWLRQLVWRSURYHD
SRLQW+RZHYHUWKHYHU\HW\PRORJ\RIµGLDORJXH¶VXJJHVWVLWVLPDJLQDOFKDUDFWHUdialogos, dia: 
across, logos: discourse, speech, statement, report, account, explanation, reason (see Kahn, 1981, p. 
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intention. Thus the imaginal projects are dialogic in two senses: (1) in the determining sense 
described in §5.5, where I have shown that the aesthetic significance of the imaginal projects 
is the engendering of a kind of scepticism which favours dialogue, through the interrogative 
mood conveyed by the projects; and (2) in the intentional, or attitudinal, sense of being the 
result of a non-propositional disposition on my part, achieved partly through the use of 
imaginal dialogues.   
Lastly, I turn to the elucidation of how the imaginal projects constitute an example of 
metaethical art practice. Such an elucidation, as in §6.2 and §6.3, involves identifying that 
which is contingent to my research (and therefore non-exemplary), and that which can be 
viewed as relevant and applicable to art practice-led research in general. Both scepticism and 
dialogism are contingent: the former, because even though it was a strategy to deal with the 
specific problems I came up against in my study of Weilian attention, it is conceivable that 
other research subjects might not lead to such problematic results; the latter, because even 
though dialogism was instrumental to the creation of images, dialogism is not the only 
conceivable way to produce images. What can be generalised is the capitalisation on the 
inherent459 non-propositional quality of art objects for the adoption of an imaginal viewpoint 
which is not available to exclusively propositional metaethical research.  
6.5 Critical practical analogy and art practice-led interdisciplinary research 
In this section, I return to the question, posed at the end of §1.44, regarding the intelligibility 
of interdisciplinary research. The question (which I approached methodologically by means 
of critical practical analogy) was: what is the minimum requirement of a discursive 
representation of art practice in order for it to be intelligible in an interdisciplinary context? I 
will show how critical practical analogy can meet that requirement by avoiding a 
hierarchical methodological priority of theory over art practice460.  
The minimum requirement for a discursive representation of art practice so that it is 
intelligible in an interdisciplinary context is that the practice not only be discursively 
represented as an inquiry but also that the method that makes such inquiry meaningful be 
explicitly represented thus. This might seem an obvious point, but, as I will show with an 
example, it is anything but obvious. In the video Exploding the Crystal, accompanying the 
recent Chris Ofili exhibition at Tate Britain, London, 27th January ± 16th May 2010, Ofili 
GHVFULEHVKLVDUWSUDFWLFHDVDQµLQTXLU\¶DQGDVVHUWVWKDWKHLVµH[DPLQLQJLQSDLQWLQJ¶,W
                                                                                                                                          
29). Thus, dialogue can be understood as a process of going across accounts, i.e. as the representation 
of a structure (a structure is an image) of accounts.    
459
 That is to say, not ontologically inherent but historically inherent.  
460
 The tendency towards hierarchisation is due to the fact that the discursive mode of exposition is 
usually thought of as belonging pre-eminently to philosophy and not to art practice.   
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does not seem inappropriate that Ofili should describe his art practice as an inquiry, because 
his subject is clearly defined 461. %XW2ILOL¶VLQTXLU\LVDOVRYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURPLQTXLU\LQ
most other fields, because he does not explicitly state what makes his practice meaningful, 
since, as he states in the video, he assumes that the history of painting will make sense of the 
work for an art-LQIRUPHGYLHZHU7KDWDVVXPSWLRQPLJKWEHFRUUHFWLQWKHFDVHRI2ILOL¶V
work, but, then again, he is not an interdisciplinary art practice-led researcher. In my view, 
the latter cannot dispense with explicitly articulating why the method makes sense of the 
final product (articulation which is the norm for most researchers in many fields), if he or 
she wishes the outcome of the research to be intelligible in an interdisciplinary context.  
In The Waste Book, by the 18th century scientist and man of letters Georg Christoph 
Lichtenberg, one finds the following aphorism: 
³+RZ¶VLWJRLQJ"´DEOLQGPDQDVNHGDFULSSOH³$V\RXVHH´WKHFULSSOHUHSOLHG462  
On one reading, this is merely an illustration of lack of communication. But there is also a 
more positive interpretation: the aphorism shows how knowledge can be acquired indirectly, 
through the use of analogy7KHEOLQGPDQFDQQRWGLUHFWO\SHUFHLYHWKHFULSSOH¶VFRQGLWLRQ
but, through the analogy that the cripple makes between his or her condition and the blind 
PDQ¶VFRQGLWLRQWKHEOLQGPDQDFTXLUHVNQRZOHGJHRIWKHFULSSOH¶VFRQGLWLRQ,WPLJKWVHHP
unkind on my part to make an analogy between the situation presented by Lichtenberg and 
the philosophical and the artistic communities, but I think that the lack of a common frame 
of reference for meaningful dialogue is indeed very similar in both.    
Initially, my way of dealing with the invisibility problem in the discursive representation of 
art practice consisted of downplaying the role of philosophy for artists and downplaying the 
role of art for philosophers463. I was also aware that philosophy (in which I include also art 
theory) came with its own tested discursively explicit methodology (identification of 
relevant literature, definition of key concepts, etc.). But no such explicit methodology was 
available for art practice, with the result that the discursive representation of art practice 
always tended to veer towards philosophy to the detriment of the practice. The critical 
practical analogy addressed this problem and proposed a solution, because, as I argued in 
§2.3 and demonstrated throughout the research, it subsumes both theoretical and practical 
research. Furthermore, critical practical analogy allows for the kind of indirect acquisition of 
knowleGJHZKLFK,H[HPSOLILHGZLWK/LFKWHQEHUJ¶VDSKRULVPIRULQVWDQFHLQWKHQRUPDWLYH
critical practical analogy, the art-LQIRUPHGFRPPXQLW\FDQXQGHUVWDQG:HLO¶VRQWRORJLFDO
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 Although this applies to a lesser degree to the latest work shown in the exhibition.  
462
 Lichtenberg, 2000, p. 74. 
463
 I mean downplaying the specificity of my art practice, as distinct from theorising about art practice 
in general with some token reference to my practice.  
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model of the dualistic relation between agent and world through the reflective analogue, 
while the Weilian community can understand a certain approach to observational drawing 
practice by reference to the objective analogue.  
In §6.1, I stated that critical practical analogy affords a way of dealing with the difficulties 
which I have identified above in general. I will support this claim of general applicability of 
critical practical analogy with the following elucidations.  
Firstly, in the same way that, as I have demonstrated in §2.2, one can abstract from the 
specific concerns that Art & Language had in the snow project and one can identify the 
general schema of critical practical analogy which underlines the project (i.e. one can 
consider the snow project as one of the many possible instantiations of critical practical 
analogy), so the particular objective and reflective analogues and operational principles that 
I have devised for the normative and imaginal projects are by no means prescriptive: they 
are only two of the many possible ways of articulating and of making explicit a relation 
between theoretical and artistic epistemic constructs.464    
Secondly, the formulation of a critical practical analogy does not necessarily have to precede 
art practice-led research: its primary function is to allow the articulation of a discursive 
representation of art practice, and as such it can follow the production of the final artwork 
and be used as an instrument of reflection. This makes critical practical analogy particularly 
suited to art practice-led research, because in my experience, although artist-researchers 
know where their research is heading, it is also true that surprises and subsequent changes of 
course are of a different order and far more widespread in art practice-led research than in 
other fields of inquiry.  
Thirdly and lastly, critical practical analogy can provide an interface between art and 
philosophy in interdisciplinary art practice-led research, both while respecting the difference 
of investigative approach of these two domains and while retaining mutual intelligibility. 
The discursive representation of art practice that critical practical analogy allows can both 
acknowledge the specificity of art practice and theory and show how these two strands 
inform one another.  
6.6 Summary 
Having opened this report by asserting that the aim of my research was to provide an 
example of how art can be employed within a metaethical perspective, I will conclude with a 
                                                 
464
 As I have elucidated throughout the thesis, the epistemic constructs of the normative and imaginal 
analogies were, respectively: the relation between agent and reality postulated by Weil, and the 
relation between drawer and object of observation which I postulated in my observational drawing 
practiceDQG:HLO¶VUHIHUHQFHWRWDXWRORJ\DQGFRQWUDGLFWLRQ, and tautology and contradiction 
considered as forms.  
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synopsis of the research outcomes, articulated in §6.2±6.5, which underscores the exemplary 
function of the research.  
However, firstly, with a view to identifying the distinguishing feature of the research with 
regard to its being an example, I will outline a conjectured instance of a research into 
metaethics, still involving art practice, but which would not be an example of art practice 
operating within a metaethical perspective. Such research could, for instance, comprise the 
following steps: (1) an H[FOXVLYHO\WKHRUHWLFDOVWXG\RI:HLO¶VZULWLQJVDQGRWKHUUHOHYDQW
philosophical discourses; (2) a positioning of Weilian attention within the map of 
contemporary metaethical viewpoints465; and (3) a GLVFXUVLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VSUH-
existing art practice with reference to the results of (1) and contextualised with regard to (2). 
In step (3) of the above conjectured example, art practice has only an exegetic function, 
while I hope to have demonstrated that the scope of art practice can expand so as to also 
effectively function heuristically. Thus, the distinguishing feature of this research qua 
example is the heuristic function of art practice.  
Finally, I turn to the overall exemplary status of the research, firstly, by presenting a 
synopsis of the considerations exposed in §6.2±6.5; and, secondly and lastly, by a further 
generalisation of the applicability of the research outcomes to art practice-led research.   
The synopsis correlates the broadest assumptions which I make regarding particular 
characteristics of contemporary art practice with the research outcomes. §6.2 assumes that it 
is meaningful to draw a distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge; the 
normative projects show how art practice can be used critically to obtain practical 
knowledge and how, in turn, the practical knowledge thus gained can lead to a refining of 
theoretical knowledge. §6.3 assumes that contemporary artists are weary of absolutism and 
transcendentalism (or at least of its terminology); a subjective notion of truth, twinned with a 
Weilian perspective on subjectivity, allows a non-absolutist and non-transcendent art 
practical investigation of metaethical subjects that, as in the case of attention-for-
detachment, involves a transcendentalist strand. §6.4 assumes that art objects are primarily 
non-propositional; an imaginal approach to metaethical subjects capitalises on the non-
propositional character of art objects, while not disallowing the use of the propositional 
mode. §6.5 assumes that the method of inquiry in art practice is often non-linear and 
indirect; critical practical analogy could provide artists with both a heuristic research tool 
and a template for articulating a discursive representation of art practice which both 
                                                 
465
 As I argued in §4.4, Weil fits roughly within non-naturalist cognitivism: µ&RJQLWLYLVWVWKLQNWKDW
a moral judgement expresses a belief. Beliefs can be true or false: they are truth-apt, or apt to be 
assessed in terms of truth and falsity ... [while] non-naturalists [are cognitivists who] think that moral 
propertiHVDUHQRWLGHQWLFDOWRRUUHGXFLEOHWRQDWXUDOSURSHUWLHV¶0LOOHUSS±4.)   
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acknowledges the non-linearity and indirectness of practice-led research and the need for 
interdisciplinary intelligibility. 
In other words, this research exemplifies the heuristic use of art within a metaethical 
perspective by offering a conceptualisation of knowledge (§6.2), a view of subjectivity and 
truth (§6.3), an approach (§6.4) and a methodology (§6.5) which are congenial to the 
particular nature of contemporary art practice. 
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Appendix 1: Original texts 
14 µLes lycéens, les étudiants qui aiment Dieu ne devraient jamais dire ©0RLM¶DLPHOHV
PDWKpPDWLTXHVª©0RLM¶DLPHOHIUDQoDLVª©0RLM¶DLPHOHJUHFª,OVGRLYHQWDSSUHQGUH
à aimer tout cela, parce que tout cela fait croître cette attention qui, orientée vers Dieu, est la 
VXEVWDQFHPrPHGHODSULqUH¶(Weil, AD, p. 86.) µ,OIDXWGRQFpWXGLHUVDQVDXFXQGpVLU
G¶REWHQLUGHERQQHVQRWHVGHUpXVVLUDX[H[DPHQVG¶REWHQLUDXFXQUpVXOWDWVFRODLUHVDQV
aucun égard aux goûts ni aux aptitudeVQDWXUHOOHVHQV¶DSSOLTXDQWSDUHLOOHPHQWjWRXVOHV
H[HUFLFHVGDQVODSHQVpHTX¶LOVVHUYHQWWRXVjIRUPHUFHWWHDWWHQWLRQTXLHVWODVXEVWDQFH
de ODSULqUH¶(Ibid., p. 88.) µ(QGHKRUVPrPHGHWRXWHFUR\DQFHUHOLJLHXVHH[SOLFLWHWRXWHV
les fois que un rWUHKXPDLQDFFRPSOLWXQHIIRUWG¶DWWHQWLRQDYHFOHVHXOGpVLUGHGHYHQLUSOXV
DSWHjVDLVLUODYpULWpLODFTXLHUWFHWWHDSWLWXGHSOXVJUDQGHPrPHVLVRQHIIRUWQ¶DSURGXLW
DXFXQIUXLW¶(Ibid., pp. 87±88.) 
15 µ4XDQGXQDUWLVWHHVWDPRXUHX[GHVRQVXMHW le UpVXOWDWQHVHUDTXHPpGLRFUH«(n 
SUDWLTXDQWDX[PRPHQWVGHVDFUpDWLRQO¶DUWLVWH>GHJpQLH@IDLWDEVWUDFWLRQGHVRL-PrPH¶
(Zippel,1994, p. 13.) µ/HVSUHPLqUHV°XYUHVG¶XQDUWLVWHVRQWVRXYHQWG¶XQHJpQLDOLWp
VXUSUHQDQWH&HWWHJpQLDOLWpV¶pSXLVHDvec expérience et se dégrade en répétitions si 
O¶DWWHQWLRQQ¶HVWSDVFRQVWDPPHQWSUpVHQWH¶ (Ibid., p. 15).  
16 µODSDURODVYHODLQVWDQWDQHDPHQWHDTXDOHJUDGRGLDWWHQ]LRQHVLDQDWD¶ (Campo, 1987, p. 
169.) 
18 µ6LRQFKHUFKHDYHFYpULWDEOHDWWHQWLRQODVROXWLRQG¶XQSUREOqPHGHJpRPpWULHHWVLDX
ERXWG¶XQHKHXUHRQQ¶HVWSDVSOXVDYDQFpTX¶HQFRPPHQoDQWRQDQpDQPRLQVDYDQFp« 
dans une autre dimension plus mystérieuse. «&et effort en apparence stérile et sans fruit a 
mLVSOXVGHOXPLqUHGDQVO¶kPH« /HVFHUWLWXGHVGHFHWWHHVSqFHVRQWH[SpULPHQWDOHV¶
(Weil, AD, p. 86±87.) µ/DSHQVpHKXPDLQHHWO¶XQLYHUVFRQVWLWXHQWDLQVLOHVOLYUHVUpYpOpVSDU
H[FHOOHQFHVLO¶DWWHQWLRQpFODLUpHSDUO¶DPRXUHWODIRLVDLWOHVGpFKLIIUHU/HXUOHFWXUH
constitue une prHXYHHWPrPHO¶XQLTXHSUHXYHFHUWDLQH$SUqVDYRLUOXO¶Iliade en grec, nul 
QHVRQJHUDLWjVHGHPDQGHUVLOHSURIHVVHXUTXLOXLDDSSULVO¶DOSKDEHWJUHFQHO¶DSDV
WURPSp¶(Weil, IPC, p. 171.) 
20 µ'DQVODPHVXUHRO¶DWWHQWLRQLQGLYLGXHOOHQ¶HVWQXOOHPHQWFRQYRTXpHO¶HVSULWVH
détourne de la réalité extérieure et se renferme sur lui-meme¶(Jiménez Ruiz, 2010, p52). 
25 µ6LPRQH:HLOQ¶DFHVVpGHGpQRQFHUla tendance de toute collectivité à fabriquer du 
mensonge, que Platon traduit par le fait de caresser le «gros animal » dans le sens du poil. 
6LPRQH:HLOTXLVHPpILHGHFHTX¶HOOHDSSHOOH© la chose sociale ªDVVXUHTX¶RQSHXWOD
reconnaître à un signe certain F¶HVWFHTXLGL© NOUS ». « Nous ªF¶HVWOHUHIXVGHSHQVHU
par soi-même, de remettre en question les idées et les croyances. Avec quelle facilité 
Appendix 1 
218 
 
O¶LQGLYLGXVHQRLHGDQVODSHQVpHFROOHFWLYH¶µ8QHDSSURFKHDXWKHQWLTXHGHODUHOLJLRQVHUDLW
DLQVLG¶DSSUHQGUHG¶DERUGjVHQWLUFHOLHQTXLdans le secret, nous relie à un ordre du monde 
GDQVO¶XQLYHUVOHPDFURFRVPHTXLHVWDXVVLHQQRXVPLFURFRVPH«¶(Nicolle, 2009, pp. 
47±48).   
52 µV\QWD[HFRPSOLTXpHHWSDUIRLVHOOLSWLTXH¶ µH[SUHVVLRQVHWDOOXVLRQVpQLJPDWLTXH¶Edl & 
Matz, 1994, p. 7). 
53 µ/HPRGHG¶DFWLRQSROLWLTXHHVTXLVVpLFLH[LJHTXHFKDque choix soit précédé par la 
FRQWHPSODWLRQVLPXOWDQpHGHVSOXVLHXUVFRQVLGpUDWLRQVG¶HVSqFHWUqVGLIIpUHQWHV&HOD
LPSOLTXHXQGpJUpHG¶DWWHQWLRQpOHYpjSHXSUqVGXPrPHRUGUHTXHFHOXLTXLHVWH[LJpSDUOH
WUDYDLOFUpDWHXUGDQVO¶DUWHWODVFLHQFH¶(Weil, E, p. 273.) 
54 µ(VVD\HUGHUHPpGLHUDX[IDXWHSDUO¶DWWHQWLRQHWQRQSDUODYRORQWp/DYRORQWpQ¶DGH
prise que sur quelques mouYHPHQWVGHTXHOTXHVPXVFOHV« Je peux vouloir mettre ma main 
jSODWVXUODWDEOH6LODSXUHWpLQWpULHXUHRXO¶LQVSLUDWLRn, ou la vérité dans la pensée étaient 
QpFHVVDLUHPHQWDVVRFLpHVjGHVDWWLWXGHVGHFHJHQUHHOOHSRXUUDLHQWrWUHREMHWGHYRORQWp¶
(Weil, OG, p. 208.) 
55 µ0DXYDLVHPDQLqUHGHFKHUFKHU/¶DWWHQWLRQDWWDFKpHjXQSUREOqPH(QFRUHXQ
SKpQRPqQHG¶KRUUHXUGXvide. On ne veXWSDVDYRLUSHUGXVRQHIIRUW« Il ne faut pas 
YRXORLUWURXYHU¶ (Weil, OG, p. 210).  
57 µ3RXU IDLUHFHTX¶RQYHXWLOIDXWQHIDLUHTXHFHTX¶RQYHXW¶(Alain, 1990, p. 240.) 
60 µ/HGHYRLUG¶DFFHSWDWLRQjO¶pJDUGGHODYRORQWpGH'LHXTXHOOHTX¶HOOHSXLVVHrWUHV¶HVW
imposé à mon esprit comme le premier et le plus nécessaire de tous, celui auquel on ne peut 
PDQTXHUVDQVVHGpVKRQRUHUGqVTXHMHO¶DLWURXYpGDQV0DUF-Aurèle sous la forme de 
O¶amor fati VWRwFLHQ¶(Weil, AD, p. 40.) 
62 µ/¶XQLYHUVWRXWHQWLHUQ¶HVWSDVDXWUHFKRVHTX¶XQHPDVVHFRPSDFWHG¶REpLVVDQFH¶(Weil. 
IPC, p. 161.) 
63 µconnexions nécessaires, lesquelles constituent la réalité même du monde¶ (Weil, IPC, p. 
154). 
67 µ2QSHUGla notion de nécessité quand on cherche anxieusement un objet perdu urgent ; 
mais quand on cherche méthodiquement, il appairaît la nécessité que la chose ne se trouve 
SDVOjRRQDFKHUFKpTX
RQGRLWODWURXYHUjWHOHQGURLWVLHOOH\HVW¶(Weil, LP, pp. 96±97.) 
68 µ1HQRXVIDLVRQVGRQFDXFXQVFUXSXOHG¶LPLWHUHQFRPPHQWDQW'HVFDUWHVODUXVH
cartésienne. Comme Descartes, pour former des idées justes au sujet du monde où nous 
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vivons, a imaginé un autre monde, qui commencerait par une sorte de chaos, de même 
imaginons un autre Descartes, un DescarWHVUHVVXVFLWp¶(Weil, S, p. 47.) 
76 µ3laisir et peine ne sont-ils pas sans mélange l'un de l'autre ... Même me blesser, c'est 
avant tout goûter ce plaisir qui est comme la saveur de ma propre existence. La présence du 
monde est avant tout pour moi ce senWLPHQWDPELJX¶(Weil, S, pp. 49±50.) 
77 µ-HQHSXLVGRQFULHQGLUHGXPRQGH-HQHSXLVGLUHFHWWHpSLQHPHIDLWPDODXGRLJWQL
PrPHM
DLPDODXGRLJWQLPrPHM
DLPDO¶(Ibid., p. 50.) 
79 µ/es impressions me servent d'intermédiaires pour subir OHPRQGH¶(Ibid., p. 69.) 
80 µ-e puis admettre que cette table, ce papier, cette plume, ce bien-être et moi-même ne sont 
que des choses que je pense ...  Je les pense, elles ont besoin de moi pour être pensées. ... Et 
par cette puissance de pensée, qui ne se révèle encore à moi que par la puissance de douter, 
MHVDLVTXHMHVXLV¶(Ibid., pp. 54±55.) 
81 µ-HFRQQDLVFHTXHMHIDLVHVWFHTXHMHIDLVF
HVWSHQVHUHWF
HVWH[LVWHU¶(Ibid., p. 55.) 
82 µ7RXWSRXYRLUUpHOHVWLQILQL¶(Ibid., p. 60.) 
84 µ6
LO n'existe que moi, il n'existe que cette puissance absolue ... Je suis Dieu, car cette 
même domination souveraine que j'exerçais sur moi négativement quand je m'interdisais de 
MXJHUMHGRLVHQFHFDVO¶H[HUFHUSRVLWLYHPHQWFRQFHUQDQWODPDWLqUHGHPRQMXgement ; 
c'est-à-dire que rêves, désirs, émotions, sensations, raisonnements, idées ou calculs ne 
GRLYHQWrWUHTXHPHVYRXORLUV¶(Ibid., p. 60.) 
85 µ0a souveraineté sur moi, absolue tant que je ne veux que suspendre ma pensée, disparaît 
dès qu'il s'agit dHPHGRQQHUXQHFKRVHjSHQVHU¶(Ibid., p. 60.) 
86 µ,OH[LVWHGRQFDXWUHFKRVHTXHPRL¶(Ibid., p. 60.) 
87 µ&RQQDvWUHMXVTX
LFLQ
DSDVpWpDXWUHFKRVHSRXUPRLTXHGHUHQGUHFRPSWHG
XQH
SHQVpH¶(Ibid., p. 69.) 
88 µ/e monde, sans dépendre de moi, n'est pas non plus une emprise inexplicable sur moi, 
mais bien ... O
REVWDFOH¶(Ibid., p. 68.) µ-HGRLVUXVHUMHGRLVP
HPSrFKHUPRL-même par des 
REVWDFOHVTXLPHPqQHQWRMHYHX[¶(Ibid., p. 84.)  
89 µlien d'action et de réaction entre le monde et ma pensée¶(Ibid., p. 71). 
91 µ4XDQGMHFRPSWHFHVPrPHFKRVHVjO
RFFDVLRQGHVTXHOOHVO
LPDJLQDWLRQUqJQHHQPRLMH
rencontre une idée d'une autre espèce, qui ne s'impose pas à moi, qui n'existe que par un acte 
de mon attHQWLRQTXHMHQHSXLVFKDQJHU« Cette idée du nombre, et celles qui lui 
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ressemblent, je trouve qu'elles replacent pour ainsi dire les changements sans règle auquel 
OHVDXWUHVVRQVXMHWWHVSDUXQSURJUqVGRQWHOOHVVRQWOHSULQFLSH¶(Ibid., p. 75.) 
93 µIl n'y a plus de contradiction entre ... idéalisme et réalisme ... tout l'esprit est en acte dans 
O
DSSOLFDWLRQGHODSHQVpHjXQREMHW¶ (Weil, S, pp. 97±98.) 
95 µ8QHRULHQWDWLRQGHO¶kPHYHUVTXHOTXHFKRVHTX¶RQQHFRQQDvWSDVPDLVGRQWRQFRQQDvW
ODUpDOLWp$LQVLLOP¶HVWYHQXXQHSHQVpHTXL PHSDUDvWLPSRUWDQWH-HQ¶DLSDVGHTXRLOD
QRWHU-HPHSURPHWVGHP¶HQVRXYHQLU'HX[KHXUHVDSUqVLOPHYLHQWjO¶HVSULWTXHM¶DLj
PHVRXYHQLUG¶XQHSHQVpH-HQHVDLVSOXVGXWRXWODTXHOOHQLPrPHGHTXRLLOV¶DJLW
J'oriente mon attention vers ce chose dont je sais qu'elle est, mais dont je ne sais pas du tous 
ce qu'elle est. Cette attention à vide peut durer plusieurs minutes. Puis (dans le meilleur des 
FDVFHODYLHQW¶(Weil, C 2, p. 291.) 
96 µ&¶HVWODPRQWDJQHHOOH-même qui, de là-bas, se fait voir du peintre¶(Merleau-Ponty, 
2006, p. 21). 
99 µ1ous ne verrons pas, chez Simone Weil, de franche rupture entre les écrits de jeunesse et 
ceux de la maturité « La plupart des sujets philosophiques sur lesquels elle écrivait dans les 
années quarante figuraient au centre de ces préoccupations dès les années vingt : les 
SUREOqPHVGHODQpFHVVLWpGXWHPSVGHO¶DWWHQWLRQGHODILQDOLWpVDQVILQ« La clef de 
O¶LQWHUSUpWDWLRQGHODSHQVpHGH6LPRQH:HLOUpVLGHGDQV« la « distinction des niveaux ». «
Lire n¶HVWSDVUHPSODFHUXQWH[WHSDUXQDXWUHXQHUpDOLWpSDUXQHDXWUHHQGpODLVVDQWOHV
QLYHDX[LQIHULHXUHVDXSURILWGXQLYHDXVXSpULHXUH/HPRQGHQ¶HVWSDVXQUpEXVGRQWOD
traduction « au bon niveau ªWLHQGUDLWOLHXGHUpDOLWp¶ (Chenavier, 2001, pp. 32±34). 
100 µ&RPPHXQHQIDQWDSSUHQGO¶H[HUFLFHGHVVHQVODFRQQDLVVDQFHVHQVLEOHODSHUFHSWLRQ
GHVFKRVHVTXLO¶HQWRXUHQWFRPPHSOXVWDUGLODFTXLHUWOHVPpFDQLVPHVGHWUDQVIHUW
analogues qui sont liés à la lecture ou a la sensibilité nouvelle qui accompagne le maniement 
GHVRXWLOVGHPrPHO¶DPRXUGH'LHXLPSOLTXHXQDSSUHQWLVVDJH« 8QHQIDQWVDLWG¶DERUG
TXHFKDTXHOHWWUHFRUUHVSRQGjXQVRQ3OXVWDUGHQMHWDQWOHV\HX[VXUXQSDSLHUOHVRQG¶XQ
PRWOXLHQWUHGLUHFWHPHQWGDQVODSHQVpHSDUOHV\HX[¶(Weil, IPC, p. 170.) 
102 µ/HEkWRQGHO¶DYHXJOHH[HPSOHWURXYpSDU'HVFDUWHVIRXUQLWXQHLPDJHDQDORJXHj
celle de la lecture. Chacun peut se convaincre en maniant un porte-plume que le toucher est 
comme transporté au bout de la plume. Si la plume se heurte à quelque inégalité dans le 
papier, ce heurt de la plume est immédiatement donné, et les sensations des doigts, de la 
PDLQjWUDYHUVOHVTXHOOHVQRXVOHOLVRQVQ¶DSSDUDLVVHQWPrPHSDV3RXUWDQWFHKHXUWGHOD
SOXPHF¶HVWVHXOHPHQWTXHOTXHFKRVHTXHnous lisons. Le ciel, la mer, le soleil, les étoiles, 
les êtres humains, tout ce qui nous entoure est de même quelque chose que nous lisons. Ce 
TX¶RQQRPPHXQHLOOXVLRQGHVVHQVFRUULJpHF¶HVWXQHOHFWXUHPRGLILpH¶(Ibid., p. 7.) µ/a 
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perception des objetVDXERXWG¶XQEkWRQRXG¶XQLQVWUXPHQWHVWDXWUHTXHOHWRXFKHU
SURSUHPHQWGLW&HWDXWUHVHQVVHIRUPHSDUXQGpSODFHPHQWGHO¶DWWHQWLRQDXPR\HQG¶XQ
DSSUHQWLVVDJHRO¶kPHWRXWHQWLqUHHWOHFRUSVRQWSDUW¶(Weil, OC VI 2, p. 337.) 
103 µ'DQVODSHUFHSWLRQQRUPDOHLO\DGpMjJpRPpWULH'RQFLOQ¶\DXUDSDVjV¶pWRQQHUV¶LO
\DLPDJLQDWLRQGDQVODJpRPpWULHSXLVTX¶LO\DGpMjLPDJLQDWLRQGDQVODSHUFHSWLRQ¶(Weil, 
LP, p. 50.)  
104 µ6LOHVRLUGDQVXQFKHPLQVROLWDLUHMHFURLVYRLUDXOLHXG¶XQDUEUH un homme 
embusqué, une présence humaine eWPHQDoDQWHV¶LPSRVHjPRLHW me fait frémir avant 
PrPHTXHMHVDFKHGHTXRLLOV¶DJLWMHP¶DSSURFKHHWVRXGDLQWRXWHVWDXWUHMHQHIUpPLV
SOXVMHOLVXQDUEUHHWQRQXQKRPPH,OQ¶\DSDVXQHDSSDUHQFHet une interprétation ; une 
SUpVHQFHKXPDLQHDYDLWSpQpWUpSDUPHV\HX[MXVTX¶jPRQkPHHWPDLQWHQDQWVRudain, la 
SUpVHQFHG¶XQDUEUH (VWKHUV¶DYDQoDQWYHUV$VVXpUXVQHV¶DYDQFHSDVYHUVXQKRPPH
GRQWHOOHVDLWTX¶LOSHXWODPHWWUHjPRUWHOOHV¶Dvance vers la majesté même, la terreur 
PrPHTXLSDUODYXHOXLDWWHLJQHQWO¶kPHHVWF¶HVWSRXUTXRLO¶HIIRUWGHPDUFKHUODIDLWDLQVL
GpIDLOOLU(OOHOHGLWG¶DLOOHXUVFHTX¶HOOHFRQWHPSOHDYHFFUDLQWHFHQ¶HVWSDVOHIURQW
G¶$VVXpUXVF¶HVWODPDMHVWpTXL\HPSUHLQWHHWTX¶HOOH\OLW2QSDUOHJpQpUDOHPHQWHQSDUHLO
FDVG¶XQHIIHWG¶LPDJLQDWLRQPDLVSHXW-être vaut-LOPLHX[HPSOR\HUOHPRWGHOHFWXUH¶
(Weil, OC IV 1, p. 76.)  
105 µ'HX[IHPPHVUHoRLYHQWFKDFXQHXQHOHWWUHDQQRQoDQWjFKDFXQHTXHVRQfils est mort; 
ODSUHPLqUHDXSUHPLHUFRXSG¶°LOMHWpVXUOHSDSLHUV¶pYDQRXLW La seconde reste la même, 
VRQUHJDUGVRQDWWLWXGHQHFKDQJHQWSDVHOOHQHVDLWSDVOLUH&HQ¶HVWSDVODVHQVDWLRQF¶HVW
la signification qui a saisit la première, en DWWHLJQDQWO¶HVSULWLPPpGLDWHPHQWEUXWDOHPHQW
sans sa participation, comme les sensations saisissent.  Tout se passe comme si la douleur 
résidait dans la lettre, et de la lettre sautait au visage de qui lit. Quant aux sensations elles-
mêmes, telles que ODFRXOHXUGXSDSLHUGHO¶HQFUHHOOHVQ¶DSSDUDLVVHQWPrPHSDV&HTXLHVW
donné à la vue, c¶HVWODGRXOHXU¶(Ibid., p. 74.) µ$ chaque instant de notre vie nous sommes 
saisis comme du dehors par les significations que nous lisons nous-mêmes dans les 
apparences. Aussi peut-on discuter sans fin sur la réalité du monde extérieur.  Car ce que 
nous appelons le monde, ce sont des significations que nous lisons FHODQ¶HVWGRQFSDVUpHO
Mais cela nous saisit comme du dehors FHODHVWGRQFUpHO¶(Ibid., pp. 74±75.) µ(QXQVHQVLO
ne nous est donné que des sensations ; en un sens nous ne pouvons jamais, en aucun cas, 
penser autre chose que des sensations. Mais en un sens nous ne pouvons jamais penser les 
sensations. Nous pensons seulement quelque chose à travers elles. Nous lisons à travers 
HOOHV¶(Weil, OC VI 1, p. 411.) µ,OHVWDGPLVFRPPXQpPHQWDXMRXUG¶KXLPrPHSDUFHX[TXL
ne connaissent pas bien les preuves, que le soleil est fort éloigné de nous, beaucoup plus que 
la lune, quoique leurs grandeurs apparentes soient à peu près les mêmes, comme cela est 
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VHQVLEOHGDQVOHVpFOLSVHV2QQHSHXWGRQFVRXWHQLUTXHO¶REMHWTXHQRXVDSSHORQVVROHLOOH
vrai soleil, soit cette boule éblouissante; autant vaudrait dire que le vrai soleil est cette 
GRXOHXUGHO¶°LOTXDnd nous le regardons imprudemment. Il faut donc rechercher comment 
on est arrive à poser ce vrai soleil, que personne ne peut voir ni imaginer, pas plus que je ne 
puis voir le cube que je sais pourtant être un cube. -¶HQYRLVGHVVLJQHVFRPPHMHvois des 
signes du vrai soleil ... L¶REMHWHVWSHQVpHWQRQSDVVHQWL¶(Alain, 1990, pp. 59±60.) 
106 µTRXWHQRWUHYLHHVWIDLWHGXPrPHWLVVXGHVLJQLILFDWLRQVTXLV¶LPSRVHQW
successivement¶ (Weil, OC IV, 1 p. 78.)  
107 µ,OQ¶\DSDVXQHDSSDUHQFHHWXQHLQWHUSrétation ; une présence humaine avait pénétré 
SDUPHV\HX[MXVTX¶jPRQkPHHWPDLQWHQDQWVRXGDLQODSUpVHQFHG¶XQDUEUH¶(Weil, OC 
IV 1, p. 76.) µ'RQFHVSDFHUHOLHIIRUPHVQRXVVRQWGRQQpVSDUQRWUHLPDJLQDWLRQ%LHQ
entendu, dans ce cas-là, «imagiQDWLRQªQ¶HVWSDVGXWRXWV\QRQ\PHGHIDQWDLVLHRX
G¶DUELWUDLUHTXDQGQRXVYR\RQVGHX[SRLQWVQRXVQHVRPPHVSDUOLEUHVGHYRLUDXWUHFKRVH
TX¶XQHGURLWH¶(Weil, LP, p. 49.) 
112 µ,QGLUHFWHPHQWHWDYHFOHWHPSVODYRORQWpHWVXUWRXWO¶DWWHQWLRQHWVXUWRXWO¶DWWHQWLRQ
sous forme de prière, aboutissent à une modification dans la lecture. Ce qui est alors changé 
HVWO¶LPDJLQDWLRQ¶(Weil, OC VI 1, p. 411.) 
113 µ2QQHFKRLVLWSDVOHVVHQVDWLRQVPDLVGDQVXQHODUJHPHVXUHRQFKRLVLWFHTX¶RQVHQWj
travers elles QRQSDVHQXQPRPHQWPDLVSDUXQDSSUHQWLVVDJH¶(Weil, OC VI 1, p. 410.) 
114 µ/DSHUFHSWLRQGHVREMHWVDXERXWG¶XQEkWRQRXG¶XQLQVWUXPHQWHVWDXWUHTXHOHWRXFKHU
SURSUHPHQWGLW&HWDXWUHVHQVVHIRUPHSDUXQGpSODFHPHQWGHO¶DWWHQWLRQDX PR\HQG¶XQ
DSSUHQWLVVDJHRO¶kPHWRXWHQWLqUHHWOHFRUSVRQWSDUW¶(Weil, OC VI 2, p. 337.) 
115 µ8QKRPPHWHQWpGHV¶DSSURSULHUXQGpS{WQHV¶HQDEVWLHQGUDSDVVLPSOHPHQWSDUFH
TX¶LODXUDOXODCritique de la raison pratique LOV¶HQDEVWLHQGUDSHXW-être même, lui 
semblera-t-LOPDOJUpOXLVLO¶DVSHFWPrPHGXGpS{WVHPEOHOXLFULHUTX¶LOGRLWrWUHUHVWLWXp
&KDFXQDpSURXYpGHVpWDWVVHPEODEOHVRLOVHPEOHTX¶RQYRXGUDLWPDODJLUPDLVTX¶RQQH
SHXWSDV'¶DXWUHVIRLVRQYRXGUDLWELHQDJLUPDLVRn ne peut pas. «/e problème de valeur 
SRVpDXWRXUGHFHWWHQRWLRQGHOHFWXUHDUDSSRUWDXYUDLHWDXEHDXFRPPHDXELHQVDQVTX¶LO
VRLWSRVVLEOHGHOHVVpSDUHU¶(Weil, OC IV 1, p. 79.) 
116 µ/¶DWWHQWLRQVHGpILQLW« chez Simone Weil, non pas par la juxtaposition de la 
SHUFHSWLRQHWGHODUpIOH[LYLWpPDLVGDQVFHWWHIRUPHSDUIDLWHGHV\QWKqVHTXLPqQHMXVTX¶DX
SRLQWRLOGHYLHQWLPSRVVLEOHGHOHVGLVWLQJXHU2QFRPSUHQGGqVORUVDVVH]ELHQO¶LQWpUrW
porté par Simone Weil à la lecture dans la mesure où elOHHVWH[HPSODLUHG¶XQHWHOOH
V\QWKqVH2QQHPHWSDVO¶DWWHQWLRQDXVHUYLFHGHODOHFWXUHPDLVRQVHGRLWIDLUHVRL-même 
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attention pour accéder à une lecture qui, si elle est authentique, ne saurait nous laisser 
LQGHPQH¶(Lecerf, 2006, p. 64.) µdirigere EHQHO¶DWWHQ]LRQHROWUHO¶DSSDUHQ]DGHOOHFRVHH
GHJOLHYHQWLSHUSUHGLVSRUODDGRULHQWDUVLQHOO¶LQILQLWjGLVLPEROLFKHLOFRVPRRIIUHDOOD
lettura¶(Marianelli, 2004, p. 92.)    
117 µ8QPRWYLHQWVRXYHQWVRXVODSOXPHGH6LPRQH:HLOTXDQGHOOHpYRTXHO¶DWWHQWLRQ
&¶HVWOHPRWlecture3DUOHFWXUHLOIDXWHQWHQGUHOLUHO¶DXWUHOHFRPSUHQGUH¶(Molard, 2008, 
p. 88.) 
119 µ/HVWH[WHVGRQWOHVDSSDUHQFHVVRQWOHVFDUDFWqUHVV¶HPSDUHQWGHPRQkPH
O¶DEDQGRQQHQWVRQWUHPSODFpVSDUG¶DXWUHV ; valent-ils mieux les uns que les autres ? Sont-ils 
plus vrais les uns que les autres ? Où trouver une norme "¶(Weil, OC IV 1, p. 78.) 
123 µRPDSHQVpHV¶HIIRUoDQWSHQGDQWGHVKHXUHVGHVHGLVORTXHUGHV¶pWLUHUHQKDXWHXU
pour prendre exactement la forme de la chambrHHWDUULYHUjUHPSOLUMXVTX¶HQKDXWVRQ
JLJDQWHVTXHHQWRQQRLUDYDLWVRXIIHUWELHQGHGXUHVQXLWVWDQGLVTXHM¶pWDLVpWHQGXGDQVPRQ
OLWOHV\HX[OHYpVO¶RUHLOOHDQ[LHXVHODQDULQHUpWLYHOHF°XUEDWWDQW MXVTX¶jFHO¶KDELWXGH
eût changé la couleur des rideaux, fait taire la pendule, enseigné la pitié à la glace oblique et 
FUXHOOHGLVVLPXOpVLQRQFKDVVpFRPSOqWHPHQWO¶RGHXUGXYpWLYHUHWQRWDEOHPHQWGLPLQXpOD
KDXWHXUDSSDUHQWHGXSODIRQG¶(Proust, 1992, pp. 50±51.)  
124 µ/¶KDELWXGHWUDQVIRUPHHn mouvements instinctiIVOHVPRXYHPHQWVYRORQWDLUHV« Ainsi 
OHVRUJDQHVV¶KDELWXHQWWHOOHPHQWDX[PRXYHPHQWVTX¶H[LJHQWXQH[HUFLFHYLROHQWRXXQ
WUDYDLOSpQLEOHTX¶LOVGHYLHQQHQWSRXUORQJWHPSVLQFDSDEOHVGHPRXYHPHQWVSOXVGRX[¶
(Ravaisson, 2008, p. 58.) 
128 µ/¶XQLYHUVWRXWHQWLHUQ¶HVWSDVDXWUHFKRVHTX¶XQHPDVVHFRPSDFWHG¶REpLVVDQFH&HWWH
masse compacte est parsemée de point lumineux. Chacun de ces points est la partie 
VXUQDWXUHOOHGHO¶kPHG¶XQHFUpDWXUHUDLVRQQDEOHTXLDLPH'LHXHWTXLFRQVHQWj obéir. Le 
UHVWHGHO¶kPHHVWSULVGDQVODPDVVHFRPSDFWH¶(Weil, IPC, p. 161.) 
129 µtout entiers obéissance, mais seulement à la maniqUHG¶XQHSLHUUHTXLWRPEH¶(Weil, 
IPC, p. 162.) 
140 µ/a vrai philosophie ne construit rien ; sont objet lui est donné, ce sont nos pensées ; elle 
HQIDLWVHXOHPHQWO¶LQYHQWDLUHVLDXFRXUVGHO¶LQYHQWDLUHHOOHWURXYHGHVFRQWUDGLFWLRQVLOQH
GpSHQGSDVG¶HOOHGHOHVVXSSULPHUVRXVSHLQHGHPHQWLU/HVSKLORVRSKHVTXLHVVDLHQWGH
construire des systèmes pour éliminer ces contradictions sont ceux qui justifient en 
DSSDUHQFHO¶RSLQLRQTXHODSKLORVRSKLHHVWTXHOTXHFKRVHGHFRQMHFWXUDOFDUGHWHOV
V\VWqPHVSHXYHQWrWUHYDULpVjO¶LQILQLHWLOQ¶\DDXFXQHUDLVRQG¶HQFKRLVLUXQSOXW{WTX¶XQ
DXWUH¶(Weil, OC IV 1, pp. 59±60.)  
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141 µ/¶pPRWLRQSURYRTXHWRXMRXUVO¶DWWHQWLRQVSRQWDQpHSHXUKRUUHXUHWF«6LJQHV
psychologiques : on ne peut plus penser à autre chose. Signes physiologiques : immobilité, 
UDLGHXUUHVSLUDWLRQDUUrWpH¶(Weil, LP, pp. 264±265.) 
142 µ,O\DGHX[PDQLqUHVGHIDLUHDWWHQWLRQTXLFRUUHVSRQGHQWO¶XQHjO¶DGUHVVHO¶DXWUHjOD
PDODGUHVVH(QUpDOLWpOHPDODGURLWQHVDLWSDVIDLUHDWWHQWLRQ,OHVWIDVFLQpSDUO¶REVWDFOH
FRPPHO¶RLVHDXSDUOHVHUSHQW/RUVTXHQRWUHFRUSVQ¶HVWSDVIRUPpQRXVIDLVRQVattention 
DX[DFWLRQVTXHQRXVGHYRQVpYLWHU/¶DSSUHQWLF\FOLVWHSDUH[HPSOH, fait attention aux 
PDODGUHVVHVTX¶LOSHXWIDLUHHWLOOHVIDLW/DERQQHYRORQWpFKH]OHVGpEXWDQWVVHWUDGXLVHHQ
UDLGHXU¶(Weil, OC I, p. 386.) µ8QDSSUHQWLF\FOLVWHDSHXUG¶XQREVWDFOHLOQHSHQVHTX¶j
O¶pYLWHUPDLVLOSHQVHMXVWHPHQWWHOOHPHQWTXHVHVPDLQVFRQGXLVHQWOHJXLGRQH[DFWHPHQW
GDQVODGLUHFWLRQGHO¶REVWDFOH/HFDUDFWqUHHVVHQWLHOGHFHSKpQRPqQHFRQVLVWHHQFHTXHOH
F\FOLVWHWUDQVSRUWHGDQVO¶REMHWPrPHODUpVLVWDQFHTX¶RSSRVHVRQSURSUHFRUSVjVRQGpVLU¶
(Weil, LP, p. 33.) 
143 µ/¶pWDWGHO¶DSSUHQWLHVWHQUpDOLWpO¶pWDWRO¶RQDFRQVFLHQFHPDLVRQQHSHXWSDVIDLUH
DWWHQWLRQ/¶DWWHQWLRQGHO¶DSSUHQWLHVWWRXMRXUVQpJDWLYH¶(Weil, OC I, p. 386.) 
147 µ/¶LQWHOOLJHQFHDWWHQWLYHDVHXOHODYHUWXG¶RSpUHUOHVFRQQH[LRQVHWGqVTXHO¶DWWHQWLRQ
se détend OHVFRQQH[LRQVVHGLVVROYHQW« Les connexions nécessaires, lesquelles constituent 
ODUpDOLWpPrPHGXPRQGHQ¶RQW-elles-mêmes de réalité que comme objet dHO¶DWWHQWLRQ
LQWHOOHFWXHOOHHQDFWH¶(Weil, IPC, p. 154.) 
148 µ&et exemple peut nous faire concevoir ce que peuvent être pour moi les changements 
d'un monde qui ne me fait impression que par l'intermédiaire de l'imagination. Pour peu que 
Protée change, toute trace de l'état immédiatement précèdent est aussitôt abolie¶(Weil, OC I, 
p. 122)µ&
HVWOHUqJQHGH3URWpHF
HVWjGLUHGHODFKRVHTXLVHWUDQVIRUPHSDUXQHSXLVVDQFH
intérieure, et sDQVFRQWLQXLWp¶(Ibid., p. 127.) µ,l y a une part d'imagination en toute 
perception¶(Ibid., p. 128.) µ/'imagination est nécessairement conservée en toute perception. 
Pourtant ... l'on peut distinguer des degrés dans la perception selon que l'imagination y est 
plus ou moins surmontée ; et une série peut être ainsi formée, dont le premier terme sera 
l'imagination pure, ou rêve, le second terme, l'imagination réglée, qui constitue ce que l'on 
peut appeler perception vulgaire ; le troisième terme est la parfaite perception, ou 
O
LPDJLQDWLRQDEVROXPHQWVXUPRQWpH¶(Ibid., p. 129.)  
149 µ,O\DSRXUFKDTXHH[HUFLFHVFRODLUHXQHPDQLqUHVSpFLILTXHG¶DWWHQGUHODYpULWpDYHF
GpVLUHWVDQVVHSHUPHWWUHGHODFKHUFKHU8QHPDQLqUHGHIDLUHDWWHQWLRQDX[GRQQpHVG¶XQ
SUREOqPHGHJpRPpWULHVDQVHQFKHUFKHUODVROXWLRQDX[PRWVG¶Xn texte de latin ou grec 
VDQVHQFKHUFKHUOHVHQVG¶DWWHQGUHTXDQGRQpFULWTXHOHPRWMXVWHYLHQQHGHOXL-même se 
SODFHUVRXVODSOXPHHQUHSRXVVDQWVHXOHPHQWOHVPRWVLQVXIILVDQWV¶(Weil, AD, p. 94.) 
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µ/¶DWWHQWLRQHVWXQHIIRUWOHSOXVJUDQGVGHVHIIorts peut-rWUHPDLVF¶HVWXQHIIRUWQpJDWLI
Par lui-PrPHLOQHFRPSRUWHSDVGHIDWLJXH¶(Ibid., p. 92.) 
150 µ2QSHXWDQDO\VHUO¶DWWHQWLRQTX¶RQSRUWHjXQSUREOqPHGHJpRPpWULHjODGLVVHUWDWLRQ
du moment. Signes psychologiques FDOPH« 'DQVO¶DWWHQWLRQYRORQWDLUHRQV¶HPSrFKH
sans cesse soi-PrPHGHVHUDLGLURQHPSrFKHVDQVFHVVHO¶DWWHQWLRQYRORQWDLUHGHVH
WUDQVIRUPHUHQDWWHQWLRQVSRQWDQpH¶(Weil, LP, p. 265.) µ/HSOXVVRXYHQWRQFRQIRQGDYHF
O¶DWWHQWLRQXQHHVSqFHG¶HIIRUWPXVFXODLUH6LRQGLW à des élèves : « Maintenant vous allez 
faire attention », on les voit froncer les sourcils, retenir la respiration, contracter les muscles. 
Si après deux minutes on leur demande à quoi ils font attention, ils ne peuvent pas répondre. 
,OVQ¶RQWSDVIDLWDWWHQWLRQjULHQ,OVQ¶RQWSDVIDLWDWWHQWLRQ,OVRQWFRQWUDFWpOHXUVPXVFOHV¶
(Weil, AD, p. 90.) 
151 µ$XFXQUDSSRUWHQWUHOHVPRXYHPHQWVQDWXUHOOHPHQWMRLQWVDXGpVLUHWjO¶LPDJLQDWLRQGH
tel ou tel changement dans la matière et les mouvements efficaces pour accomplir ce 
FKDQJHPHQW¶(Weil, OC VI 2, p. 237.) 
152 µla noesis intuitive et dialectique ... [et] la dianoia discursive et hypothétique ¶Janiaud, 
2002, p. 69.) 
153 µ/¶DWWHQWLRQVXSpULHXUHHVWVHORQHOOHQRQSDVGLVFXUVLYHRUUDWLRQQHOOHPDLVEien 
LQWXLWLYHHOOHHVWFRPPHXQHSHUFHSWLRQGLUHFWHGXVXUQDWXUHO¶(Ibid., p. 69.)  
154 µ/¶DWWHQWLRQHPSLULVWHVHUDLWWURSLQGLIIpUHQWHjVRQREMHWO¶DWWHQWLRQLQtellectualiste trop 
VDYDQWH« 6LPRQH:HLOVHUDWWDFKHG¶DERUGjO¶LQWHOOHFWXDOLVPHSDUVDdette envers 
Descartes et Alain : la géométrie est présente en toute perception, et le sommeil de la 
FRQVFLHQFHQ¶HVWTX¶XQPDQTXHG¶DWWHQWLRQ0DLVODSXLVVDQFHTX¶HOOHDFFRUGHGDQVVHV
SUHPLHUVpFULWVjO¶HVSULWKXPDLQGpMjWHPSpUpHSDUO¶pSUHXYHGHODmatière dans le travail, 
HVWQHWWHPHQWUHPLVHHQFDXVHSDUODVXLWH/¶DWWHQWLRQSHXWQRXVRXYULUjXQHUpDOLWpYUDLPHQW
VXUSUHQDQWHTXHO¶HVSULWQHPDLWULVHSDV¶(Janiaud, 2002, p. 123.)  
155 µ&HV©OHFWXUHVVXSHUSRVpHVªHWDUWLFXOpHVFRQVWLWXHSHXjSeu le réseau GHO¶RQWRORJLH
GH6LPRQH:HLO« OHIUDQFKLVVHPHQWG¶XQVHXLOSOXVLHXUVIRLVVDQVFKDQJHUGHGLUHFWLRQ
FKDTXHQLYHDXWURXYDQWVRQVHQVHWVDYDOHXUGDQVXQFKDQJHPHQWGXUpJLPHGHO¶DWWHQWLRQ¶
(Chenavier, 2001, p. 35.) 
156 µ1RXVSDUO
DWWHntion intellectuelle, nous ne créons certes pas, nous ne produisons 
aucune chose, mais pourtant dans notre sphère nous suscitons en quelque sorte de la réalité. 
Cette attention intellectuelle est à l'intersection de la partie naturelle et de la partie 
surnaturelle de l'âme. Ayant pour objet la nécessité conditionnelle, elle ne suscite qu'une 
demi-réalité. Nous conférons aux choses et aux êtres autour de nous, autant qu'il est en nous, 
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la plénitude de la réalité, quand à l'attention intellectuelle nous ajoutons cette attention 
HQFRUHVXSpULHXUHTXLHVWDFFHSWDWLRQFRQVHQWHPHQWDPRXU¶(Weil, IPC, p. 155.)  
157 µ'LHXHVWO¶DFFHSWDWLRQVDQVGLVWUDFWLRQ,OIDXWLPLWHUO¶DWWHQWHHWO¶KXPLOLWpGH'LHX 
&¶HVWGDQVOHWHPSVTXHQRXVDYRQVQRWUHPRL/¶DFFHSWDWLRQGXWHPSVHWGHWRXWFHTX¶LO
peut apporter ± sans aucune exception ± (amor fati) ± F¶HVWODVHXOHGLVSRVLWLRQGHO¶kPHTXL
VRLWLQFRQGLWLRQQpHSDUUDSSRUWDXWHPSV¶(Weil, OC VI 4, p. 185.) µ,OYXRWRODFRQGL]LRQH
GLULQXQFLDDOO¶DSSURSULD]LRQHGHOPRQGRPHWWHO¶DQLPDXPDQDLQXQDWWHJJLDPHQWRGL
attesa, di attenzione verso il Totalmente Altro ... O¶DGHVLRne totale, attenzione pura¶Carta 
Macaluso, 2003, p106). µ,OIDXWGRQFDYRLUG¶DSUqVHOOHXQHLPPHQVHFDSDFLWpG¶DWWHQWLRQ
pour pouvoir contempler en face la nécessité, une attention TX¶HOOHFRQoRLWFRPPHDPRXU¶
(Rey Puente, 2007, p. 132). 
161 µ/DPXVLTXHVHGpURXODQWGDQVOHWHPSVFDSWXUHO¶DWWHQWLRQHWO¶HQOqYHDXWHPSVHQOD
SRUWDQWjFKDTXHLQVWDQWVXUFHTXLHVW/¶DWWHQWHHVWDWWHQWHjYLGH HWDWWHQWHGHO¶LPPpGLDW¶
(Weil, OC VI 3, p. 268.) µ6DYRLUTXHULHQGHFHPRQGHTX¶RQWRXFKHHQWHQGYRLW, etc., rien 
GHFHTX¶RQVHUHSUpVHQWHULHQGHFHTX¶RQSHQVHQ¶HVWOHELHQ6LRQSHQVH'LHXFHQ¶HVWSDV
le bien non plus. Tout ce que nous pensons est imparfait comme nous, et O¶LPSDUIDLWQ¶HVW
SDVOHELHQ« Le bien est pour nous un QpDQWSXLVTXHDXFXQHFKRVHQ¶HVWERQQH0DLVFH
QpDQWQ¶HVt pas encore non-rWUHQ¶HVWSDV irréel. Tout ce qui existe comparé à lui est irréel. 
Ce néant est au moinVDXVVLUpHOTXHQRXV&DUQ{WUHrWUHPrPHQ¶HVWSDVDXWUHFKRVHTXHFH
besoin du bien. Le bien absolu est tout entier dans ce besoin. Mais nous ne pouvons pas aller 
O¶\SUHQGUH1RXVSRXYRQVVHXOHPHQWDLPHUjYLGH¶(Weil, OC VI 3, pp. 190±191.)    
162 µ4XDQGQRXVQHYR\RQVSDVTXDQGODUpDOLWpGH'LHXQ¶HVWUHQGXHVHQVLEOHjDXFXQH
SDUWLHGHQRWUHkPHDORUVSRXUDLPHU'LHXLIIDXWYUDLPHQWVHWUDQVSRUWHUKRUVGHVRL&¶HVW
cela aimer Dieu. Pour cela il faut avoir constamment le regard tourné vers Dieu, sans jamais 
ERXJHU« Il faut être tout à fait immobile. Rester immobile ne veut paVGLUHV¶DEVWHQLUGH
O¶DFWLRQ« Il y a un effort à faire qui est loin le plus dur de tous, mais il ne pas du domaine 
GHO¶DFWLRQ¶(Weil, OC IV 1, p. 274.) µ/HVHXOFKRL[ TXLV¶RIIUHDO¶KRPPHF¶HVWG¶DWWDFKHU
ou non son amour ici-EDV4X¶LOUHIXVHG¶DWWDFKHUVRQDPRXULFL-EDVHWTX¶LOUHVWHLPPRELOH
VDQVFKHUFKHUVDQVERXJHUHQDWWHQWHVDQVPrPHVDYRLUFHTX¶LODWWHQG,OHVWDEVROXPHQW
sûr que Dieu fera tout le chePLQMXVTX¶jOXL¶(Ibid., p. 278.) µ/DFOHIG¶XQHFRQFHSWLRQ
FKUpWLHQQHGHVpWXGHVF¶HVWTXHODSULqUHHVWIDLWHG¶DWWHQWLRQ&¶HVWO¶RULHQWDWLRQYHUV'LHXGH
WRXWHO¶DWWHQWLRQGRQWO¶kPHHVWFDSDEOH« 6HXOHODSDUWLHSOXVKDXWHGHO¶DWWHQWLRQHQWUHHQ
coQWDFWDYHF'LHXTXDQGODSULqUHHVWDVVH]LQWHQVHHWSXUHTX¶XQWHOFRQWDFWV¶pWDEOLVVH¶
(Weil, AD, p. 85.)  
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164 µ6LO¶RQGHVFHQGHQVRLRQWURXYHTX¶RQ a H[DFWHPHQWFHTX¶RQGpVLUH6LO¶RQGpVLUHWHO
être (mort), on désire un être particulier F¶HVWdonc nécessairement un mortel, et on désire 
cet être-OjFHWrWUHTXL«TXH«HWFEUHIFHWrWUHTXLHVWPRUWWHOMRXUjWelle heure. Et on 
O¶D- PRUW« /DVRXIIUDQFHOHYLGHVRQWHQGHWHOVFDVOHPRGHG¶H[LVWHQFHGHVREMHWVGX
GpVLU4X¶RQpFDUWHOHYRLOHG¶LUUpDOLWpHWRQYHUUDTX¶LOVQRXVVRQWGRQQpVDLQVL4XDQGRQOH
YRLWRQVRXIIUHHQFRUHPDLVRQHVWKHXUHX[¶ (Weil, OG, p. 42.)  
168 µ&RPPHRQDSSUHQGjOLUHFRPPHRQDSSUHQGXQPpWLHUGHPrPHRQDSSUHQGjVHQWLU
en toutes choses, avant touWHWSUHVTXHXQLTXHPHQWO¶REpLVVDQFHGHO¶XQLYHUVj'LHX&¶HVW
vraiment un apprentissage. Comme tout apprentissage, il demande des efforts et du temps. 
« 3RXUTXLDDFKHYpO¶DSSUHQWLVVDJHOHVFKRVHVHWOHVpYpQHPHQWVSDUWRXWWRXMRXUVVRQWOD
vibration de la même parole divine infiniment douce. La douleur est la coloration de certains 
pYpQHPHQWV'HYDQWXQHSKUDVHpFULWHjO¶HQFUHURXJHFHOXLTXLVDLWOLUHHWFHOXLTXLQHVDLW
SDVYRLHQWSDUHLOOHPHQWGXURXJHPDLVODFRORUDWLRQQ¶DSDVODPrPHLPSRUWDQFHSRXUO¶XQ
HWSRXUO¶DXWUH¶(Weil, OC IV 1, p. 356.) 
169 µ4XDQGRQDFRPSULVMXVTX¶DXIRQGGHO¶kPHTXHODQpFHVVLWpHVWVHXOHPHQWXQHGHV
IDFHVGHODEHDXWpO¶DXWUHIDFHpWDQWOHELHQDORUVWRXWFHTXLUHQGODQpFHVVLWpVHQVLEOH
contrariétés, douOHXUVSHLQHVREVWDFOHVGHYLHQWXQHUDLVRQVXSSOpPHQWDLUHG¶DLPHU¶(Weil, 
IPC, p. 36.) 
170 µ2QQHSRXUUDLWMDPDLVSURXYHUTX¶XQHFKRVHDXVVLDEVXUGHTXHOHFRQVHQWHPHQWjOD
nécessité soit possible. On peut seulement le constater. Il y a en fait des âmes qui 
FRQVHQWHQW¶(Ibid., p. 150.)  
176 µ/DSHUFHSWLRQQ¶HVWMDPDLVLPPpGLDWH± Dans la perception considérée comme 
LPPpGLDWHDXFXQHLOOXVLRQQHSRXUUDLWWURXYHUSODFHO¶pWXGHGHVSULQFLSDOHVLOOXVLRQVIDLW
YRLUTX¶XQHWHOOHSHUFHSWLRQQ¶H[LVWHSDV3HUFHYRLUF¶HVWWRXMRXUVDXWUHFKRVHTXHVXELURX
UHFHYRLUFRPPHXQHHPSUHLQWHF¶HVWWRXMRXUVDIILUPHUFHTX¶RQDVHQWLTXHOTXHFKRVHTXH
O¶RQMXJHUpHO¶(Lagneau, 1950, p. 167.)   
177 µ/DSHUFHSWLRQHVWGRQFO¶DFKqYHPHQWGHODUHSUpVHQWDWLRQHWODUHFtification des données 
VHQVLEOHVTXLUpVXOWHQWO¶XQHWO¶DXWUHG¶XQMXJHPHQWLPPpGLDWHWLQWXLWLIHQDSSDUHQFH, mais 
IRQGpVXUO¶KDELWXGH¶(Ibid., p. 178). 
178 µ,OQ¶\DSRLQWGHYpULWpGHODFRQQDLVVDQFHVHQVLEOH«/a connaissance sensible est 
fausse eQFHTX¶RQQHVDXUDLWFRQFHYRLUXQHPDQLqUHGHVHQWLUTXLGRLYHrWUHFRQVLGpUpH
comme la vrai pour nous dans les circonstances données. En effet, cela supposerait, soit que 
notre nature sensible ne change pas, soit que son développement est soumis à une loi 
rigoureuse, c'est-à-dire que cette nature résulte complètement en nous de son rapport avec le 
PRQGHH[WpULHXUHGRQWHOOHQHVDXUDLWTX¶XQHIIHWXQHUpVXOWDQWH«6i tout dans la nature 
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pWDLWVRXPLVjODQpFHVVLWpV¶LO\DYDLWSRXUQRXVXQHPDQLqUHGHsentir qui serait la vrai, si à 
FKDTXHLQVWDQWQRWUHPDQLqUHGHVHQWLUUpVXOWDLWGXPRQGHH[WpULHXUHQRXVQHVHQWLURQVSDV¶
(Ibid., pp. 181±182.) 
179 µ,OQ¶\DSRLQWGHYpULWpSXUHPHQWDEVWUDLWH«6¶LOH[LVWDLWXQHYpULWpDEVWUDLWHF¶HVW-à-
dire une nécessité indépendante de O¶HVSULW«, cette vérité purement abstraite serait purement 
LQLQWHOOLJLEOH« 6LQRXVFRQFHYRQVTX¶LO\DXQHYpULWpQRXVODFRQFHYRQVFRPPHOD vérité 
GHFHTXHQRXVVHQWRQV« Mais de cela même que la vérité a sa base dans la sensibilité, dans 
la perception actuelle, et de ce que cette perception est en elle-même indéterminable, il 
résulte que la nécessité elle-même, qui repose sur cette base indéterminable, ne saurait être 
GpWHUPLQDEOH/¶RUGUHGHO¶LQWHOOLJHQFHUHSRVHVXUO¶RUGUHGH ODVHQVLELOLWp¶(Ibid., p. 182.) 
180 µ&HWWHDFWLRQQHVDXUDLWV¶H[SOLTXHUVDQVO¶DIILUPDWLRQG¶XQHOLEHUWpTXLQHVXELWOD
QpFHVVLWpTXHSDUFHTX¶HOOHODMXJHHWO¶DSSURXYH¶(Ibid., p. 136.) 
181 µ7RXWHFHUWLWXGHHVWGRQFXQHQpFHVVLWpTXLGpSHQGGHODOiberté et qui repose sur une 
FUR\DQFH&¶HVWXQHQpFHVVLWpYRXOXHHWPDLQWHQXHSDUO¶DFWLRQFRQVWDQWHGHODOLEHUWpHVW
FHWWHDFWLRQFRQVWDQWHQ¶HVWSRVVLEOHTX¶DXPR\HQGHO¶KDELWXGHPRUDOHTXLHVWO¶HVSULWVH
faisant nature (dans une nature) par la voloQWp¶(Ibid., p. 105.)  
182 µ&¶HVWXQHHUUHXUGHGLUHTX¶XQHDFWLRQTXHO¶RQVDLWIDLUHVe fait ensuite sans attention. 
« -HGLUDLVSOXW{WTXHOHMXJHPHQWLFLSDUODYHUWXGHO¶KDELWXGHHVWREpLDXVVLtôt, sans 
PRXYHPHQWVLQXWLOHV« La rançon de la penséHF¶HVWTX¶LOIDXWELHQSHQVHU&RPPHQRXV
ne savons pas agir sans penser, nous ne pouvons agir comme il faut sans y bien penser. La 
peur de mal faiUH\HVWOHSULQFLSDOREVWDFOH« 3RXUODYDLQFUHHWIDLUHFHTX¶RQYHXWLOIDXW
QHIDLUHTXHFHTX¶RQYHXW, par exemple allonger le bras sans que le pied parte, ou bien ouvrir 
XQHVHUUXUHVDQVJULQFHUOHVGHQWVRXELHQHQFRUHWHQLUO¶DUFKHWVDQVOHVHUUHUPRQWHUVDQV
UHWHQLUOHVRXIIOH«/¶KRPPHDSSUHQG non pas par répétition machinale, mais ... toujours 
VRXVODFRQGLWLRQG¶XQHDWWHQWLRQVRXWHQXHGLVRQVDXWUHPHQWVRXVODFRQGLWLRQTXHOHV
PRXYHPHQWVH[pFXWpVVRLWYRXOXVHWOLEUHVVDQVTXHOHFRUSVHQIDVVHG¶DXWUHV «/a cause 
principale de ce désordre [i.e. raidissement] est la confusion des idées augmentée encore par 
la peur de se tromper¶(Alain, 1990, pp. 240±241.)   
183 µ-HFURLVDVVH]TXHF¶HVWO¶XQLYHUVWRXWHQWLHUTXLHVWEHDXHWODOLDLVRQGHWRXWHVFKRVHV ; 
OHVSHWLWVPRUFHDX[QHGLVHQWULHQLOVQ¶RQWSRLQWGHVHQV0DLVWRXWDXQVHQVFar tout tient 
jWRXW2QDLPHODPHUHWODPRQWDJQHSDUFHTXHOHMHXGHVIRUFHV\HVWYLVLEOHF¶HVWQRWUH
DOSKDEHW$SUqVDYRLUpSHOpLOIDXWOLUHHWDSSUHQGUHjVDLVLUG¶XQUHJDUGODOLDLVRQGHWoute 
FKRVHjWRXWHVOHVFKRVHV« Si on savait parfaitement lire dans le Grand Livre, tout serait 
EHDX¶(Alain, 1970, p. 95.)  
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184 µ'DQVODSHUFHSWLRQODSOXVULJRXUHXVHO¶LPDgination circule toujours¶(Alain, 1990, p. 
62). 
185 µ'DQV WRXWIDLWG¶LPDJLQDWLRQRQWURXYHUDWRXMRXUVWURLVHVSqFHVG¶LPDJLQDWLRQ'¶abord 
O¶LPDJLQDWLRQUpJOpHTXLQHVHWURPSHTXHSDUWURSG¶DXGDFHPDLVWRXMRXUVVHORQXQH
méthode et soXVOHFRQWU{OHGHO¶H[SpULHQFH« /¶DXWUHLPDJLQDWLRQVHGpWRXUQHGHVFKRVHVHW
ferme les yeux, attentive surtout aux mouvements de la vie et aux faible impressions qui en 
résultent, pourrDLWrWUHDSSHOpHODIDQWDLVLH« (QILQO¶LPDJLQDWLRQSDVVLRQQpHVHGpILQLUDLW
VXUWRXWSDUOHVPRXYHPHQWVFRQYXOVLIVHWODYRFLIpUDWLRQ¶(Ibid., p. 64.) 
186 µ/'idée même que se font les Stoïciens de la vérité n'est-elle pas faite pour nous garder 
du découragement sceptique, ne nous rendre la confiance en nous? Pourquoi douter de ce 
que nous savons? C'est temps perdu: car ce que nous importe ce n'est pas ce que nous 
savons, mais ce que nous saurons ; c'est ne pas le vrai qu'il faut poursuivre mais le plus vrai ; 
ce que l'on doit considérer, ce ne sont pas les résultats, mais la méthode ; c'est ne pas l'état de 
QRWUHHVSULWPDLVOHSURJUqVGHQRWUHHVSULW¶(Alain, 1891, p. 41.) 
205 µ$XFHQWUHGHO¶DFWHYRORQWDLUH O¶DWWHQWLRQ¶(Weil, OC I, p. 390.) µ,OHVWLPSRVVLEOH
PrPHDEVXUGHGHV¶pWRQQer que Achille soit inhumain. Il ne fait pas attention que le jeunes 
7UR\HQVVRQWGHODPrPHHVSqFHTXH3DWURFOH¶(Ibid., p. 389.)  
219 µ7RXWHDFWLRQTXLDUpHOOHPHQWHXOLHXVHODLVVHUpGXLUHjXQMHXGHQpFHVVLWpVVDQVTX¶LO
reste aucun résidu qui soit la part du moi¶(Weil, OC VI 1, p. 331). 
220 µ,OQ¶\DSDVG¶DWWLWXGHGHSOXVJUDQGHKXPLOLWpTXH O¶DWWHQWHPXHWWHHWSDWLHQWH« Le cri 
GHO¶RUJXHLOF¶HVW©O¶DYHQLUHVWjPRLªVRXVTXHOTXHIRUPHTXHFHVRLW/¶KXPLOLWpHVWOD
connaissance de la vérité contraire. Si le présent est seul à moi, je suis néant, car le présent 
HVWQpDQW¶(Wei, OC VI 4, p. 129.) 
221 µ/DIDLPVRLIHWFHWWRXWGpVLUGHODFKDLUHVWXQHRULHQWDWLRQGX FRUSVYHUVO¶DYHQLU
7RXWHODSDUWLHFKDUQHOOHGHQ{WUHkPHHVWRULHQWpHYHUVO¶DYHQLU/DPRUWJODFH/DSULYDWLRQ
UHVVHPEOHGHORLQjODPRUW/DFKDLUYLWRULHQWpHYHUVO¶DYHQLU/DFRQFXSLVFHQFHHVWODYLH
PrPH/HGpWDFKPHQWHVWXQHPRUW¶(Ibid., p. 125.) 
223 µ&HTX¶LO\DGHSDUWLFXOLHUjO¶°XYUHG¶DUWHVWTXHFHVRQTXLDUULYHjO¶DXGLWHXUGH
O¶H[WpULHXUHOXLVHPEOHQ¶rWUHTXHOHIUXLWGHVDSURSUHDWWHQWH&¶HVWTX¶LODpWpHQHIIHWOH
IUXLWGHO¶DWWHQWHGHO¶DUWLVWH3RXUOHFRPSRVLWHXUSUpYRLUODQRWHTXHVXLYUDQ¶HVWMDPDLV
DXWUHFKRVHTXHO¶LQYHQWHUFHWWHLQYHQWLRQ HVWOHIUXLWG¶XQHDWWHQWH¶(Weil, OC I, p. 75)µ(n 
FRPSRVDQWGHODPXVLTXHRXGHODSRpVLHRQDHQYXHXQFHUWDLQVLOHQFHLQWpULHXUGHO¶kPHHW
on dispose les sons ou les mots dHPDQLqUHjUHQGUHO¶DVSLUDWLRQjFHsilence perceptible à 
autrui¶Weil, C 1, p. 56). 
Appendix 1 
230 
 
230 µ7RXWELHQYpULWDEOHFRPSRUWHGHVFRQGLWLRQVFRQWUDGLFWRLUHVHWSDUVXLWHHVWLPSRVVLEOH
Celui qui tient son attention vraiment fixée sur cette impossibilité et agiWIHUDOHELHQ¶(Weil, 
OC VI  3, p. 95.) 
231 µ1RXVVDYRQVWRXVTX¶LOQ¶\DSDVGHELHQLFL-bas ... Tout être humain a 
vraisemblablement eu dans sa vie plusieurs instants où il se avoué clairement qu¶LOQ¶\DSDV
de bien ici-EDV« &¶HVWjHX[GHUHVWHULPmobiles, sans détouUQHUOHUHJDUG« Si Dieu, 
après une longue attente, laisse vaguement pressentir sa lumière ou même se révèle en 
SHUVRQQHFHQ¶HVWTXHSRXUXQLQVWDQW'HQRXYHDXLOIDXWUHVWHULmmobile, attentif, et 
DWWHQGUH« Électre ne cherche pas Oreste, elle attend. ... 7RXWFHTXHOOHGpVLUHF¶HVWGHQH
SDVH[LVWHUGqVORUVTX¶2UHVWHQ¶H[LVWHSDV¬FHPRPHQW2UHVWHQ¶\WLHQWSOXV,OQHSHXWSDV
V¶HPSrFKHUGHVHQRPPHU,OGRQQHODSUHXYHFHUWDLQHTX¶LOHVW2UHVWH¶(Weil, OC IV 1, pp. 
334±335.)  
241 µOn fait doublement tort à la mathématique quand on la regarde seulement comme une 
spéculation rationnelle et abstraite. Elle est cela, mais elle est aussi la science même de la 
nature, une science tout à fait concrète, et elle est aussi une mystique. Les trois ensemble et 
LQVpSDUDEOHPHQW¶(Weil, IPC, p. 159.) 
242 µ,O\DDQDORJLHHQWUHODILGpOLWpGXWULDQJOHUHFWDQJOHjODUHODWLRQTXLOXLLQWHUGLWGHVRUWLU
GXFHUFOHGRQWVRQK\SRWpQXVHHVWOHGLDPqWUHHVWFHOOHG¶XQKRPPHTXLSDUH[HPSOH
V¶DEVWLHQWG¶DFTXpULUGXSRXYRLURXGHO¶DUJHQWDXSUL[G¶XQHIUDXGH¶(Ibid., p. 156.) 
243 µ1ous avons perdu cette idée que la certitude absolue convient seulement aux choses 
GLYLQHV« Notre intelligence est devenue si grossière que nous ne concevons même plus 
qX¶LOSXLVVH\DYRLUXQHFHUWLWXGHDXWKHQWLTXHULJRXUHXVHFRQFHUQDQWGHVP\VWqUHV
incompréhensibles. Il y aurait sur ce point un usage infiniment précieux à faire de la 
PDWKpPDWLTXH(OOHHVWLUUHPSODoDEOHjFHWpJDUG¶(Ibid., pp. 125±126.) 
244 µ/¶DSSDULWion de la géométrie en Grèce est la plus éclatante parmi toutes les prophéties 
TXLRQWDQQRQFpOH&KULVW2QSHXWFRPSUHQGUHDLQVLTXHSDUO¶HIIHWGHO¶LQILGpOLWpODVFLHQFH
soit devenue pour une part un principe de mal¶(Ibid., p. 133)µ&URLUHTXHO¶RQ peut mettre le 
ELHQHWOHPDOHQWUHSDUHQWKqVHVOHWHPSVG¶DFTXpULUGHVFRQQDLVVDQFHVTXHO¶RQIHUDHQVXLWH
servir au bien, est une erreur¶(Rey, 2009, p. 195). 
249 µ/'observation ne tempère pas le geste ; mais au contraire c'est le geste qui tempère 
l'observation. Retiens le geste, si tu YHX[FRQQDvWUH¶(Alain, 1923, p. 65.) 
257 µ,l m¶est YHQXXQHSHQVpHTXLPHSDUDvWLPSRUWDQWH-HQ¶DLSDVGHTXRLODQRWHU-HPH
SURPHWVGHP¶HQVRXYHQLU'HX[KHXUHVDSUqVLOPHYLHQWjO¶HVSULWTXHM¶DLjPHVRXYHQLU 
G¶XQHSHQVpH-HQHVDLVSOXVGXWRXWODTXHOOHQLPrPHGHTXRLLOV¶DJLW-¶RULHQWHPRQ
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DWWHQWLRQYHUVFHWWHFKRVHGRQWMHVDLVTX¶HOOHHVWPDLVGRQWMHQHVDLVSDVGXWRXWFHTXHOOH
est. Cette attention à vide peut durer plusieurs minutes. Puis (dans les meilleurs des cas) cela 
YLHQW-HUHFRQQDLVVDQVDXFXQHLQFHUWLWXGHTXHF¶HVWFHOD¶(Weil, C 2, p. 291.) 
273 µ/e langage a une grande importance dans ... O¶DWWHQWLRQIRUPHGHODYRORQWpeWDQW
donné que nous avons le langage,  parmi les mots qui nous viennent aux lèvres, il y en a que 
nous pouvons UHIXVHUVpOHFWLRQGHVPRWV« /HODQJDJHHVWXQREMHWGXIDLWTX¶LOHVWIL[H
permanent, artificiel). Il nous permet de nous dédoubler : larmes, cris, gémissements sont 
des états de nous, souvent inconscients et, en tout cas, toujours ressentis comme nôtre ; au 
FRQWUDLUHOHPRW©GRXOHXUªQ¶HVWSDVGRXORXUHX['qVTX¶RQDGRQQpXQQRPiVHV
VHQWLPHQWVRQSHXWOHVUHJDUGHUFRPPHXQREMHW¶(Weil, LP, p. 69.) 
274 µ&RPPHSRXUO¶HUUHXUHWODSHQVpHFODLUHHWGLVWLQFWHLO\DGHVSHQVpHVG¶DFWLRQTXLVL
RQOHVIL[HGXUHJDUGGHO¶kPHHQVXVSHQGDQWVRQMXJHPHQWV¶pYDQRXLVVHQWFRPPHGHVEXOOHV
G¶DLUHOOHVQHSHXYHQWLQIOXHUVXUOHVPRXYHPHQWVGXFRUSVTXHGDQVOHVWpQqEUHVGHO¶kPH
G¶DXWUHTXLDXFRQWUDLUHSDVVHQWDORUVGDQVOHUpHOHQPRUGDQWVXUODUpDOLWpSDUO¶LQWHUPpGLDLUH
GXFRUSV¶(Weil, OC VI 1, p. 333.) 
275 µ3UHVTXHWRXMRXUVOHPRPHQWGHGpOLEpUDWLRQQHFRwQFLGHSDVDYHFFHOXLGXFKRL[2Q
délibère quand on a déjà choisi, ou peut-être, plus rarement, quand on ne pas encore en 
PHVXUHGHFKRLVLU¶(Ibid., p. 332.)  
279 µ/¶REpLVVDQFHHVWOHVHXOPRELOHSXU« ¬ODFRQGLWLRQTXHFHVRLWO¶REpLVVDQFHjXQH
QpFHVVLWpQRQSDVDXQHFRQWUDLQWH¶(Weil, OC VI 2, p. 194.)   
280 µ2EpLVVDQFHLQHQDGHX[On peut obéir à la pesanteur, ou aux rapports des choses*. 
'DQVOHSUHPLHUFDVRQIDLWFHjTXRLSRXVVHO¶LPDJLQDWLRQFRPEOHXVHGHYLGH« Si on 
VXVSHQGOHWUDYDLOGHO¶LPDJLQDWLRQFRPEOHXVHHWRQIL[HO¶DWWHQWLRQVXUOHVUDSSRUWVGHV
choses, une nécessité DSSDUDvWjODTXHOOHRQQHSHXWSDVQHSDVREpLU¶(Ibid., p. 200.)  
*
 µ1pFHVVLWp9RLUOHVUDSSRUWVGHVFKRVHVHWVRL-PrPH\FRPSULVOHVILQVTX¶RQSRUWHHQVRL
FRPPHXQGHVWHUPHV¶(Ibid., p. 201.)  

 µ/¶KRPPHQHSHXWMDPDLVVRUWLUGHO¶REpLVVDQFH à Dieu. Une créature ne peut pas ne pas 
REpLU/HVHXOFKRL[RIIHUWDO¶KRPPHFRPPHFUpDWXUHLQWHOOLJHQWHHWOLEUHF¶HVWGHGpVLUHU
O¶REpLVVDQFHRXGHQHSDVODGpVLUHU6¶LOQHODGpVLUHSDVLOREpLWQpDQPRLQV
perpétuellement, en tant que chose soumisHjODQpFHVVLWpPpFDQLTXH6¶LOODGpVLUHLOUHVWH
VRXPLVjODQpFHVVLWpPpFDQLTXHPDLVXQHQpFHVVLWpQRXYHOOHV¶\VXUDMRXWHXQHQpFHVVLWp
constituée par les lois propres aux choses surnaturelles. Certaines actions lui deviennent 
LPSRVVLEOHVG¶DXWUHVV¶DFFRPSOLVVHQWjWUDYHUVOXLSDUIRLVSUHVTXHPDOJUpOXL¶(Weil, AD, p. 
113.) 
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282 µ/HWUDYDLOPDQXHO/HWHPSVTXLHQWUHGDQVOHFRUSV« Le travail est comme une mort. 
Il faut passer par la mort ± TXHOHYLHLOKRPPHPHXUH0DLVODPRUWQ¶HVWSDVXQVXLFLde. Il 
faut être tué ; subir la pesanteur, le poids du monde. «Travailler ± VLO¶RQHVWpSXLVp± F¶HVW
devenir soumis au temps de la même manière que la matière. La pensée est contrainte de 
SDVVHUG¶XQLQVWDQWDXVXLYDQW&¶HVWOjREpLU¶(Weil, OC VI 2, p. 62.) 
285 µJe dis que 7 +  8 =  16, je me trompe MHIDLVG¶XQHFHUWDLQHPDQLqUH 0DLV
FHQ¶HVWSDVPRLTXLIDLVTXH Un théorème mathématique nouveau ; un beau 
vers UHIOHWVGHFHWWHJUDQGHYpULWp«-HVXLVDEVHQWGHWRXVFHTXLHVW YUDLRXEHDXRXELHQ¶
(Ibid., p. 125.)  
286 µ/DEHDXWpG¶XQSD\VDJHDXPRPHQWRSHUVRQQHQHOHYRLWDEVROXPHQWSHUVRQQH9RLU
XQSD\VDJHWHOTX¶LOHVWTXDQGMHQ¶\VXLVSDV4XDQGMHVXLVTXHOTXHSDUWMHVRXLOOHOHVLOHQFH
du ciel et de la terre pDUPDUHVSLUDWLRQHWOHEDWWHPHQWGHPRQF°XU¶(Weil, OC VI 3, p. 
109.) 
288 µ6LXQKRPPHVXUSUHQGODIHPPHTX¶LODLPHHWjTXLLODYDLWGRQQpWRXWHVDFRQILDQFHHQ
fragrant délit G¶LQILGpOLWpLOHQWUHHQFRQWDFWEUXWDODYHFODYpULWp6¶LODSSUHQGTX¶XQH femme 
TX¶LOQHFRQQDvWSDVGRQWLOHQWHQGSRXUODSUHPLqUHIRLVOHQRPGDQVXQHYLOOHTX¶LOQH
connaît pas davantage, a trompé son mari, cela ne change aucunement sa relation avec la 
YpULWp&HWH[HPSOHIRXUQLWODFOHI/¶DFTXLVLWLRQGHVFRQQDLVVDQFHVIait approcher de la 
YpULWpTXDQGLOV¶DJLWGHODFRQQDLVVDQFHGHFHTX¶RQDLPHHWHQDXFXQDXWUHFDV¶(Weil, E, 
pp. 318±319.)  
300 µquand le soleil le lève, je ne sais si le paysage me paraît plus joyeux parce que 
M¶pSURXYHSOXVGHMRLHRXSDUFHTXHOH soleil est plus haut ; un paysage réel est éclairé aussi 
ELHQSDUPRQERQKHXUTXHSDUOHVUD\RQVGXVROHLO¶(Weil, OC I, p. 138.)  
301 µ(QUpDOLWpO
REMHWSUHPLHUGHQRWUHSHUFHSWLRQFHQHVRQWSDVGHVFKRVHVpSDUSLOOpHVFH
n'est même pas le Protée de la fable, quelque chose que j'aie devant à moi ; c'est un Protée 
indivisible, qui se presse sur mon corps, s'enroule pour ainsi dire autour de moi, sans être 
jamais, puisqu'il est sans parties, grand ou petit, proche ou lointain. De cet état qui précède la 
perception, nous ne pouvons nous faire aucune idée¶(Ibid., p. 132.) µ&et exemple peut nous 
faire concevoir ce que peuvent être pour moi les changements d'un monde qui ne me fait 
impression que par l'intermédiaire de l'imagination. Pour peu que Protée change, toute trace 
de l'état immédiatement précèdent est aussitôt abolie¶Ibid., p. 122)µ&
HVWOHUqJQHGH
Protée, c'est à dire de la chose qui se transforme par une puissance intérieure, et sans 
FRQWLQXLWp¶(Ibid., p. 127.) 
302 µ&HUWHVLOIDXWDGPLUHr l'homme qui, sorti de la caverne par réflexion sur la géométrie, a 
empoigné Protée, l'a dépouillé et a trouvé, sous ce manteau d'émotions, la pure étendue, 
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toujours extérieure à soi, matière de nos travaux, qui ne parle, ne pense ni veut. Mais pour le 
sage même ces moments de clairvoyance sont difficiles, rares, et sans rapport avec les 
perceptions ordinaires, qui toutes, sans exception, sont d'abord émotions. Il suffira d'un 
tiraillement d'estomac, d'un rayon de soleil, d'un bruit plus effrayant ou plus doux que les 
autres, pour faire retomber le sage à notre monde d'illusions; il oubliera alors sa difficile 
sagesse, et, au moment même où il a besoin de cette sagesse pour vaincre les passions, sera 
DXVVLFUpGXOHDX[pPRWLRQVTX
XQHQIDQW¶(Ibid., p. 137.)  
303 µ(n un lever de soleil peint, si la lumière me peut donner de la joie, jamais cette joie ne 
VHUDDFFRPSDJQpHG¶XQDFFURLVVHPHQWGHOXPLqUH¶(Ibid., p. 138.) 
304 µ$LQVLQRVPRPHQWVGHFODLUYR\DQFHFDUWpVLHQQHQRXVVRQWLQXWLOHVVDQVXQDUWGH
percevRLUF¶HVW-à-dire une gymnastique qui nous permet de rappeler le pur entendement, 
VDQVFHVVHUSRXUWDQWFRPPHQRXVIDLVRQVDXPRPHQWGHODUpIOH[LRQG¶rWUHDWWHQWLIVDX[
danses de notre corps. Mais cette gymnastique même ne nous serait sans doute jamais 
aFFHVVLEOHVDQVO¶H[SpULHQFHGHSHUFHSWLRQVSULYLOpJLpHVSDUOHVTXHOOHVODGDQVHVSRQWDQpH
GHQRWUHFRUSVWRXWHQV¶LPSRVDQWSDUIRLVjO¶DWWHQWLRQQ¶HPSrFKHMDPDLVHWSHXW-être aide, 
O¶H[HUFLFHGXSXUHQWHQGHPHQW&HVSHUFHSWLRQVSULYLOpJLpHVVRQWIRXUnis à chacun de nous 
SDUO¶KXPDQLWpGDQVOHV°XYUHVG¶DUWV¶(Ibid., p. 138.) µ/DFDWKpGUDOHQRXVpPHXWSOXVTXHOD
nature, mais les choses ne répondent plus du tout à notre émotion; tout en nous émouvant, 
elles restent elles-PrPHVLQGLIIpUHQWHV¶(Ibid., p. 138.) µ$LQVLMXVTX
jSUpVHQWPDYLHVH
partageait en deux parts ; les moments où, à force d'attention aux choses, je cessais de me 
laisser émouvoir, et me livrais de la pure raison ; et les moments où, les émotions 
m'atteignant à nouveau, je me lassais tromper par Protée, revêtant de mes propres émotions 
les objets même. ... Mais ces objets merveilleux eux-mêmes me seraient inutiles, si, par une 
imitation des attitudes, des mouvements, de l'immobilité qu'ils m'imposent, je ne pouvais, 
sans me soustraire aux émotions que je reçois de la nature, chose impossible, ôter du moins à 
la nature le reflet de mes émotions. Il faut que les paysages deviennent pour moi des 
tableaux, les forêts des cathédrales, les sons des symphonies, les hommes des portraits ou 
des statues DORUVVHXOHPHQW3URWpHHVWYpULWDEOHPHQWGRPSWp¶(Ibid., pp. 138±139.) 
306 µ6LGDQVXQHIRUrWM¶HQWHQGVXQFULG¶HIIURLOHVPXUPXUHVPrPHVGHVIHXLOOHVPH
SDUDvWURQWSOHLQVG¶KRUUHXUPDLVDXFRQFHUWDSUqVXQHVRUWHGHJpPLVVHPHQWTXLVHUUHOe 
F°XUYLHQWDXVVLW{WQRQSDVVHORQPHVpPRWLRQVPDLVVHORQOHWH[WHGHODV\PSKRQLHOXL-
PrPHFRQIRUPHjGHVUqJOHVLQYDULDEOHVXQFKDQWG¶DPRXURXGHWULRPSKH¶(Ibid., p. 138.) 
315 µ-¶pFULVVDQVYRLU-HVXLVYHQX-HYRulais vous baiser la main ... Voilà la première fois 
qXHM¶pFULVGDQVOHVWpQqEUHV« VDQVVDYRLUVLMHIRUPHGHVFDUDFWqUHV3DUWRXWRLOQ¶\DXUD
ULHQOLVH]TXHMHYRXVDLPH¶ (Diderot, 1984, p. 48.) 
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316 µ1RWUHrWUHPrPHjFKDTXHLQVWDQWDSRXUpWRIIHSRXUVXEVWDQFHO¶DPRXUTXH'ieu 
QRXVSRUWH/¶DPRXUFUpDWHXUGH'LHXTXLQRXVWLHQWGDQVO¶H[LVWHQFHQ¶HVWSDVVHXOHPHQW
VXUDERQGDQFHGHJpQpURVLWp,OHVWDXVVLUHQRQFHPHQWVDFULILFH&HQ¶HVWSDVVHXOHPHQWOD
3DVVLRQF¶HVWODFUpDWLRQHOOH-même qui est renoncement et sacrifice de la part de Dieu. La 
3DVVLRQQ¶HQHVWTXHO¶DFKqYHPHQW'pMjFRPPHFUpDWHXU'LHXVHYLGHGHODGLYLQLWp,OSUHQG
ODIRUPHG¶XQHVFODYH,OVHVRXPHWjODQpFHVVLWp¶µ/HPDOTXHQRXVYR\RQVSDUWRXWGDQVOH
monde sous forme de malheur et une signe de la distance où nous sommes de Dieu. Mais 
FHWWHGLVWDQFHHVWDPRXUHWSDUVXLWHGRLWrWUHDLPpH¶µ&HQ¶HVWSDVTX¶LOIDLOOHDLPHUOHPDO
Mais il faut aimer Dieu à travers le mal. Quand un enfant en jouant brise un objet précieux, 
ODPqUHQ¶DLPHSDVFHWWHGHVWUXFWLRQ0DLVVLSOXVWDUGVRQILOVV¶HQYDDXORLQRXPHXUWHOOH
_UHJDUGHOHPDOKHXU_SHQVHjFHWWHDFFLGHQWDYHFWHQGUHVVHSDUFHTX¶HOOHQ¶\YRLWSOXVTX¶XQH
GHVPDQLIHVWDWLRQVGHO¶H[LVWHQFHGHVRQHQIDQW¶(Weil, OC IV 1, pp. 272±273.) µ,O\DXQ
efforWjIDLUHTXLHVWGHORLQOHSOXVGXUGHWRXVPDLVLOQHSDVGXGRPDLQHGHO¶DFWLRQ&¶HVW
GHWHQLUOHUHJDUGGLULJpYHUV'LHXGHOHUDPHQHUTXDQGLOF¶HVWpFDUWpGHO¶DSSOLTXHUDYHF
WRXWHO¶LQWHQVLWpGRQWRQGLVSRVH¶(Ibid., pp. 274±275.) µ/HVHXOFKRL[TXLV¶RIIUHjO¶KRPPH
F¶HVWG¶DWWDFKHURXQRQVRQDPRXULFL-EDV4X¶LOUHIXVHG¶DWWDFKHUVRQDPRXULFL-EDVHWTX¶LO
UHVWHLPPRELOHVDQVFKHUFKHUVDQVERXJHUHQDWWHQWHVDQVHVVD\HUPrPHGHVDYRLUFHTX¶LO
DWWHQG¶(Ibid., p. 278.)    
317 µ&¶HVWOD montagne elle-même qui, de là-EDVVHIDLWYRLUGXSHLQWUHF¶HVWHOOHTX¶LO
interroge du regard. Que lui demande-il au juste ? De dévoiler les moyens, rien que visible, 
par lesquelles elle se fait montagne sous nos yeux. Lumière, éclairage, ombres, reflets, 
FRXOHXUWRXVFHVREMHWVGHODUHFKHUFKHQHVRQWSDVWRXWjIDLWGHVrWUHVUpHOVLOVQ¶RQW
FRPPHGHVIDQW{PHVG¶H[LVWHQFHTXHYLVXHOOH,OVQHVRQWPrPHVTXHVXUOHVHXLOGHOD
vision profane, ils ne sont pas communément vus. Le regarde du peintre leur demande 
FRPPHQWLOVV¶\SUHQQHQWSRXUIDLUHTX¶LO\DLWVRXGDLQTXHOTXHFKRVHFHWWHFKRVHSRXU
FRPSRVHUFHWDOLVPDQGXPRQGHSRXUQRXVIDLUHYRLUOHYLVLEOH¶(Merleau-Ponty, 2006, p. 
21.) 
323 µ/¶KRPPHQ¶DSDVjFKHUFKHUQLPrPHFURLUHHQ'LHX,O doit seulement refuser son 
amour à tout ce qui est autre de Dieu. Ce refus ne suppose aucune croyance. Il suffit de 
FRQVWDWHUFHTXLHVWpYLGHQFHSRXUWRXWHVSULWF¶HVWTXHWRXVOHVELHQVG¶LFL-bas, passés, 
présents ou futurs, réels ou imaginaires, sont finis et limités, radicalement incapable de 
VDWLVIDLUHOHGpVLUG¶XQELHQLQILQLHWSDUIDLWTXLEUOHSHUSpWXHOOHPHQWHQQRXV¶(Weil, OC IV 
1, p. 277.) 
340 µ&KDFXQGHVREMHWVTXHQRXVYR\RQVFRPPDQGHXQHHVTXLVVHGHPRXYHPHQWVL
imperceptible soit-elle. 8QHFKDLVHFRPPDQGHGHV¶DVVHRLUXQHVFDOLHUGHPRQWHUHWF¶
(Weil, LP, p. 23.) 
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350 µ/
DWWHQWLRQFRQVLVWHjVXVSHQGUHVDSHQVpHjODODVVHUGLVSRQLEOHYLGHHWSpQpWUDEOHj
l'objet, à maintenir en soi-même à la proximité de la pensée, mais à un niveau inférieure et 
sans contact avec elle, les diverses connaissances acquises qu'on est forcé d'utiliser. ... Tous 
les contresens dans les versions, toutes les absurdités dans la solution des problèmes de 
géométrie, toutes les gaucheries du style et toutes les défectuosités de l'enchaînement des 
idées dans les devoirs de français, tout cela vient de ce que la pensée s'est précipitée 
hâtivement sur quelque chose, et étant ainsi prématurément remplie n'a plus été disponible 
SRXUODYpULWp¶(Weil, AD, pp. 92±93.) 
352 µ,QGLUHFWHPHQWHWDYHFOHWHPSVODYRORQWpHWVXUWRXWO¶DWWHQWLRQHWVXUWRXWO¶DWWHQWLRQ
sous forme de prière, aboutissent à une modification dans la lecture. Ce qui est alors change 
HVWO¶LPDJLQDWLRQ¶(Weil, OC VI 1, p. 411.) 
353 µ2QQHFKRLVLWSDVOHVVHQVDWLRQVPDLVGDQVXQHODUJHPHVXUHRQFKRLVLWFHTX¶RQVHQWj
travers elles QRQSDVHQXQPRPHQWPDLVSDUXQDSSUHQWLVVDJH¶(Ibid., p. 410.)  
354 µ$XFHQWUHGHO
DFWHYRORQWDLUH : l'attention6HXOHO
DWWHQWLRQHVWOLEUH¶(Weil, OC I, pp. 
386±387.) 
359 µ$ODSKLORVRSKLHFDUWpVLHQQHGHO¶LPPpGLDWHWp6LPRQH:HLORSSRVHGRQFXQH
PpWDSK\VLTXHUHOLJLHXVHD[pHVXUO¶LGpHGHmédiation et sur la présence du Médiateur. La 
philosophie rationnelle garde son rôle essentielle : « mettre en lumière ce qui lui est 
irréductible », mais après que le « rationnel au sens cartésien, c'est-à-dire le mécanisme, la 
nécessité humainement représentable, [aura été] supposé partout où on le peut » [C2 III, 
@/¶HVSULWVHKHXUWHDORUVj©O¶LQFRPSUpKHQVLEOHª, « aux vrais mystères, aux vrais 
LQGpPRQWUDEOHVTXLVRQWUpHOª>&,,,@¶(Devaux, 1995, p. 22.) 
364 µ6LQRXVFUR\RQVDYRLUXQ3qUHLFL-EDVF¶HVWQHSDVOXLF¶HVWXQIDX['LHX« Il faut être 
KHXUHX[TX¶LOHVWLQILQLPHQWKRUVGHQRWUHDWWHLQWH¶(Weil, OC IV 1, p. 337.) 
369 µ/HVP\VWqUHVGHODIRLQHVRQWSDVXQREMHWSRXUO¶LQWHOOLJHQFHHQWDQWTXHIDFXOWpTXL
SHUPHWG¶DIILUPHURXGHQLHU,OVQHVRQWSDVGHO¶RUGUHGHODYpULWpPDLVDX-dessus. La suele 
SDUWLHGHO¶kPHKXPDLQHTXLVRLWFDSDEOHG¶XQFRQWDFWUpHODYHFHX[F¶HVWODIDFXOWpG¶DPRXU
VXUQDWXUHOOH6HXOHSDUVXLWHHOOHHVWFDSDEOHG¶XQHDGKpVLRQjOHXUpJDUG¶(Weil, LP, pp. 64±
65.)  
370 µ2QGRLWDX[SUpFLVLRQVGRQWO¶(JOLVHDFUXGHYRLUHQWRXUHUOHVP\VWqUHVGHODIRLHW
notamment à ses condamnations (... anathema sit) une attitude permanente et 
LQFRQGLWLRQQHOOHG¶DWWHQWLRQUHVSHFWXHXVHPDLVQRQSDVXQHDGKpVLRQ« /¶DGKpVLRQ
LQWHOOHFWXHOOHQ¶HVWMDPDLVGXHjTXRLTXHFHVRLW&DUFHQ¶HVWMDPDLVjDXFXQGHJUpFKRVH
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YRORQWDLUH/¶DWWention seule est volontaire. Aussi est-elle seule PDWLqUHG¶REOLJDWLRQ¶(Weil, 
LR, p. 68.)    
372 µ,O\DTXHOTXHFKRVHGDQVQRWUHkPHTXLUpSXJQHjODYpULWDEOHDWWHQWLRQEHDXFRXSSOXV
violemment que la chair ne répugne à la fatigue. Ce quelque chose est beaucoup plus proche 
GXPDOTXHODFKDLU&¶HVWSRXUTXRLWRXWHVOHVIRLVTX¶RQIDLWYUDLPHQWDWWHQWLRQRQGpWUXLW
GXPDOHQVRL¶(Weil, AD, p. 92.)  
378 µ/DSHQVpHKXPDLQHHWO¶XQLYHUVFRQVWLWXHQWDLQVLOHVOLYUHVUpYpOpVSDUH[FHOOHQFHVL
O¶DWWHQWLRQ pFODLUpHSDUO¶DPRXUHWODIRLVDLWOHVGpFKLIIUHU/HXUOHFWXUHFRQVWLWXHXQHSUHXYH
HWPrPHO¶XQLTXHSUHXYHFHUWDLQH$SUqVDYRLUOXO¶Iliade en grec, nul ne songerait à se 
GHPDQGHUVLOHSURIHVVHXUTXLOXLDDSSULVO¶DOSKDEHWJUHFQHO¶DSDVWURPSp¶(Weil, IPC, p. 
171.) 
381 µ'LHXVH produit lui-même parfaitement ... AvDQWWRXW'LHXV¶DLPHVRL-PrPH« 
/¶DPRXUHQWUH'LHXHW'LHXTXLHVWOXL-même Dieu, est ce lien à double vertu ; ce lien qui 
XQLWGHX[rWUHDXSRLQWTX¶LOVQHVRQWSDVGLVFHUQDEOHVHWVRn réellement un seul, ce lien qui 
V¶pWHQGSDU-GHVVXVODGLVWDQFHHWWULRPSKHG¶XQHVpSDUDWLRQLQILQLH¶ (Weil, OC IV 1, p. 353.) 
390 µ&HVJUDSKLVPHVSRXUWDQWjO¶RULJLQHSDUIDLWHPHQWFRQWLQJHQWVOLHVSDUH[HPSOHjXQH
langue particulière : pourquoi si non noter m une masse ?), finissent pour porter une 
véritable charge ontologique : dans la perception du physicien E est une énergie, v est une 
YLWHVVHHWF,OQ¶HVWSRXUV¶HQDVVXUHUTXHGHYRLUODGLIILFXOWpjPHWWUHHQ°XYUHXQHORL
physique, fût-elle élémentaire, des lors que sont modifiées les notations conventionnelles ¶
(Lévy-Leblond, 2006, p. 67).  
µ4XDQGO¶DWWHQWLRQIL[pHVXUTXHOTXHFKRVH\DUHQGXPDQLIHVWHODFRQWUD>GL@FWLRQFDUDX
fond de toute pensée, de tout sentiment, de toute volonté il y a contradiction), il se produit 
FRPPHXQGpFROOHPHQW(QSHUVpYpUDQWGDQVFHWWHYRLHRQSDUYLHQWDXGpWDFKHPHQW¶(Weil, 
OC VI 3, p. 96.) 
µ3DUHQWpGXPDODYHFODIRUFHDYHFO¶rWUHHWGXELHQDYHFODIDLEOHVVHOHQpDQW(Q
même temps le mal est SULYDWLRQ(OXFLGHUODPDQLqUHTX¶RQWOHVFRQWUDGLFWRLUHVG¶rWUHYUDLV
0pWKRGHG¶LQYHVWLJDWLRQ GqVTX¶RQDSHQVpTXHOTXHFKRVHFKHUFKHUHQTXHOVHQVOH
FRQWUDLUHHVWYUDL¶(Weil, OG, p. 184.) 
µ6LRQGpVLUHGHO¶DUJHQWRQGpVLUHXQHPRQQDLHLQVWLtution), quelque chose qui ne peut 
rWUHDFTXLVTXHGDQVWHOOHRXWHOOHVLWXDWLRQGRQFRQQHOHGpVLUHTXHGDQVODPHVXUHR«2U
GDQVFHWWHPHVXUHRQO¶D¶(Weil, OG, p. 42.) For the rest of the quote, see note 164.  
µ/¶LGpHGXGpFDODJHHQWUHFHUWLWXde et verité était devenu pour moi une certitude ..., 
M¶pWDLVGDQVO¶H[SHFWDWLYHVLFHWWHLGpHpWDLWYUDLcomme M¶HQDYDLVODFHUWLWXGHHOOHGHYDLWQH
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SDVO¶rWUHWRXWà fait, puisque M¶HQDYDLVODFHUWLWXGH6LMHSDUOHG¶H[SHFWDWLYHF¶HVWTXHMH
préférais attendre que cette question WURXYHVDVROXWLRQWRXWHVHXOH« Je donc laisser dormir 
cette histoire ... en même temps que je me mettais à dormir de plus en plus souvent et de 
SOXVHQSOXVORQJWHPSV« À trop dormir, on ILQLWSDUQ¶DYRLUSOXVVRPPHLO&¶HVWDORUVTXH
tout peut commencer RQVHIRUFHjGRUPLUSDUXQHVRUWHG¶DXWRK\SQRVHTXLSURGXLWXQ
VRPPHLOLQFRPSOHWWUqVULFKHHQVXUSULVH¶(Duyckaerts, 1992, pp. 12±13.) 
456 µ/DSRVLWLRQTXHQRXVDOORQVDGRSWHUHVWFHOOHG
XQVFHSWLFLVPHPpWKRGRORJLTue, qui, 
contrairement à un scepticisme dogmatique, ne vise pas à se constituer en anti-thèse 
pessimiste face à l'eschatologie progressiste de la thèse réaliste, mais seulement à contribuer, 
par la provocation qu'il représente, au raffinement de l'auto-comSUpKHQVLRQGHO
°XYUHGH
UHFKHUFKHVFLHQWLILTXH¶(Bitbol, 1998, p. 1.) 
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Appendix 2: Three texts from residency with Hephzibah Rendle-Short 
The following are three texts from the May 2008 Centre for Drawing Project space 
collaborative residency with Hephzibah Rendle-Short. 
+HSK]LEDK¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI'LQR¶VGUDZLQJUHSURGXFHGLQ)LJ 
I'm going to turn the drawing upside down. The page seems to be divided into four. I am 
looking at the drawing the right way up now. At the bottom there is a curve swinging left to 
right. On the bottom right: time and date. The bottom edge of the page demarcates the shape. 
The curve is an accumulation of small marks and smudges into a tonal area at the top of the 
curve. This whole area is slightly greyer than everywhere else in the drawing. Down the 
right-hand side of the page there is a white strip of paper. The bottom edge of the strip is the 
right-hand edge of the curve I first described. The strip is about an inch wide and is cut off at 
the top by a diagonal going from left to right in an upward direction. The character of the 
diagonal is slightly wiggly and stops before it reaches the edge of the paper, so that it feels 
as if stopped in mid-air. In this vertical shape of white paper down the right-hand side, there 
are three pencil marks about an inch apart which seem to imply closeness to me compared to 
the vertical of the edge of the shape. The top section of the page has got pencil marks on it. 
Every pencil marks seem to gather others with it which gives the drawing a kind of nervous 
energy. There is a diagonal that runs on the top left-hand side corner a 1/4 inch from to left, 
it runs as a diagonal into the centre of the page, about a third of the way down the page. On 
the horizontal, this diagonal brings my eyes into the centre section of the page which is 
almost a square. The thing that stops it being a square that bites into it is the curve at the 
bottom of the page. This square has a lot of lines in it. Almost every line is repeated by 
another line, another line, another line. Only occasionally does a line stand on its own. 
Sometimes, shapes are picked out by diagonal shading which moves from right to left. Some 
lines are harder that others and have been reiterated. This gives them a more emphatic 
quality. Some areas of this central square, particularly the top right, sit on the surface of the 
page; in fact the way they sit on the surface of the page connects them to the top section of 
the page which I described,  which gives the drawing a interesting dynamic (but maybe that's 
an ethical statement). There are lots of verticals across the central square and some 
horizontals. The two verticals on the side of the square and the horizontal echo the square at 
the centre of the drawing which seems to represent a window. The diagonal that runs from a 
1/4 of a inch from the left corner in to the centre square where there is a nervous energy 
made by the repeated marks is running in the same direction of the right hand side of the 
curve at the bottom of the page; in fact, if I extended this diagonal it would connect to the 
top section of the drawing. There is an ellipse made with many small pencil marks. Inside 
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the ellipse, there is another ellipse which echoes a curve in the top third of the central square 
of the drawing. 
'LQR¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI+HSK]LEDK¶VGUDZLQJUHSURGXFHGLQ)LJ 
Sticking with facts. There is some writing on it. That is a fact. It is quite difficult. I will start 
with simple things. What I can infer about gesture from the marks. Overall, the lines have 
been PDGHZLWKDVORZPRYHPHQWRIWKHKDQG6ORZEXWQRW«ZKDWVKDOO,VD\«DUHOD[HG
pace so that you get this line that is slightly wavering.  It has a tension about it, but it is not 
OLNH«QRWWKDWSURQRXQFHGDVLIWKHGUDZLQJKDGEHHQPDGHE\XVLQJVORZHUPovements. 
7KHUHLVDYDULHW\RISUHVVXUHWKDWZDVDSSOLHG,ZRXOGVD\WKHUHLV«VLPSOLI\LQJLWD
OLJKWHUPLGSUHVVXUHDQGPXFKKHDYLHUPDUNV$QGORRNLQJDWWKRVHPDUNVDJDLQ«ORRNLQJ
at the three pressures, the light and mid marks are much closer in tone. So the dark mark is 
ORZHURQWKHVFDOHWKHGDUNLVPDGHZLWKPRUHSUHVVXUHWKDQWKHRWKHUWZR$K«WKHUHLVD
VHQVHWKDWWKHUHLV«LWLVYHU\GLIILFXOW«\RXDUHQRWHYHU\ZKHUH«\RXDUHWRXFKLQJWKH
FRQWRXUIHHOLQJ«WKRXJKQRWWRRSURQRXQFHG:KHUe I notice it particularly is where you 
UHSUHVHQWWKHZLQGRZSDQHV,ZRXOGH[SHFWWKHYHUWLFDOWREHYHUWLFDO«LWZDVPRUH
touched than looked at, so there is a more haptic quality about that. I suppose the haptic 
quality seems to be present throughout, it seems to diminish when you do longer lines, e.g. 
WKHOLQHVUHSUHVHQWLQJDUHVOLJKWO\VNHZHG«RQWKHJURXQGWKHOLQHRQWKHOHIWUHSUHVHQWLQJ
the left line of the wall. Whereas the haptic quality seems to increase where the line is not a 
straight one, for example, the line representing the pipe of the left hand radiator. There are a 
ORWRIHUDVHGOLQHVZKLFKVHHPWR«ZHOOWKHZD\WKDWWKH\KDYHEHHQHUDVHGWKHUHLVDQ
element of correction, but there is also a sense that it has a function of repreVHQWLQJOLJKW«
SDUWLFXODUO\RQWKHOHIWKDQGVLGH7KHUHLVVRPHWKLQJ,GRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQG,GRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQG
what it is. It is on the representation of the floor of the drawing and it appears to be a piece 
of paper. In any case it seems to have the function of a representing something that is on the 
JURXQGWKHVODQWRIWKHJURXQGDVLWPRYHVWRZDUGVWKHYLHZHUUHSUHVHQWVWKHVSDFH7KDW¶VLW
IRUWKHPRPHQW«SHUKDSVZHFDQUHWXUQ« 
Transcript of dialogue between Hephzibah and me, by which Hephzibah drew the drawing 
reproduced in Fig. 4.19  
Ok... so the first thing I want to do is to kind of... ermm... to get some agreement on the size 
of the page so...  ermm...   the only thing I can think of doing that is  by  drawing the 
rectangle within the rectangle. And in order to draw it on the... ssss ermm... more or less the 
VDPHVL]H,ZRXOGOLNHWRGRLWWKURXJK«,GRQ¶WNQRZLIWKLVLVJRLQJWRZRUNRXWDK
UK\WKP6RLI\RXLPDJLQH\RXDUHPDNLQJ«OLNHD«DOLQH«VRMXVWGUDZOLNHDKRUL]RQWDO
OLQHDV«DQ\ZKHUHRQWKHSDJH«LWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHUDOLQHXQLIRUPO\«OLNHWKDW«DQGWKHQ
DQRWKHURQHDQGMXVWWU\WRJHWLWDVXQLIRUPDVSRVVLEOH«OLNHLQWHUPVRIVSHHGDQGWKHQ
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DV\RXGRWKDWVWDUWPDNLQJDQRWKHURQH«VWDUWFRXQWLQJDUK\WKP««««««
«««>/DXJKWHU@ Is it meant to be one line? «VRUU\«WKHUHLW¶VMXVWWR
JHWWKHUK\WKP«But mine has gone right off the page«:HOOLWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHULWLVPRUH
WKHUK\WKP«But am I following your rhythm or my own? )ROORZLQJPLQHIROORZPLQH«
Ok shall we start again? <HV«««««««,¶PRIIWKHSDJH. Ok, 
\RX¶UHRIIWKHSDJH$K7KDW¶VDJRRGZD\RIGRLQJLW6R\RXURIIWKHSDJHWKHQ«Yeah, 
my page«&DQZHGRFDQZHGRLWDJDLQWKHQ",GLGQ¶WVWDUWDWWKHRWKHUHGJHRIWKHSDJH,
started in from the other edge. Ok, start... start from the edge of the page then. Ok2N«
>,Q,WDOLDQ@««««««««0LQH,¶PRII. At... at eight? Nine2NVRWKDW¶V
QLQH«HUPP«RN«VR«FDQFDQZHGRLWDJDLQWRVHHLIZHDUHLQV\QFKURQ\"6R«2N«
PPP«««««««««Off2NVRQRZLWZDVDELW«WRRIDVW2N«
VR,,¶OOXVH\RXDVDUK\WKP«VR,ZLOOGRLWRQFHDJDLQ«««««««
«««RII2NWKDW¶VWKDW¶V«,¶PEHLQJSUHWW\FRQVWDQW<HDKWKDW¶VSUHWW\JRRG. 
2NVRWKDWZRXOGEHRXU«ZLGWKWhat? Nine? Nine. 7KDW¶VWKHZKROHSDJH. For you? 
Yeah. 7KDW¶VWKHZKROHSDJH2NDQGWKHQMy page [Laughter] is horizontal. So your 
SDJHLV««««««««"Yeah. Ok, so now we will do a vertical. Ok. 
And then be hopefully twelve. You want it what? 7ZHOYH7ZHOYH««««««
«««««Ok. Ok, so just that will be basically the size of the page. Ok. 
7KHUH«HUPP«RNVRVRWKDWZRXOGEH««WKDWZRXOGEHVRUWRIWKHUK\WKPWKDW,
am going to use if that makes any sense. Yep2NHUUU«VR«,¶PJRLQJWRVWDUWIURPWKH«
WKHERWWRPOHIWFRUQHU«HUPP«DQG$K«/HW¶VVHHERWWRPOHIWFRUQHU«PPP«
PPP«VWKRZDP,JRLQJWRGRWKLV"+«K«RN«RNDFWXDOO\WRSUOHIWFRUQHU«
eUPP«DQGDK«VSWP«DKKKPPP«DUH\RXGUDZLQJZLWKLQN\HDK"Yeah, I am«
[Laughter] and my page is kinda horizontal$K«RN«DK«RK,GRQ¶WNQRZZKDWWRGR«
DK«DK«PPP«III«PPP«,ILQGWKLVYHU\GLIILFXOW,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHUHWRVWDUW
IURP«VRZHKDYHJRWWKHSDJHVL]H««RN«RNZKDW,ZRXOGOLNHWRGRRNLV
PPPERWWRPHGJHRNOHW¶VVWDUWE\FRXQWLQJ«WZRIURPWKHOHIWHGJHVRJRLQJ«in our 
rhythm? \HVVR««RNDQGWKHQPDUNDVSRWGRZQWKDWOLQHyeah«DQGWKH
sDPHDFWXDOO\QRQRWWKHVDPH«DQGWKUHHRQWKHRWKHUVLGH«VRWKUHH«coming in three? 
)URPWKHULJKW«RK«VRWKHRQH«VRVRWZRIURPWKHOHIWoh, I see. Ok«DQGWZRIURP
WKHULJKWVR«««VRWKDWPHDQVWKDWZHVKRXOGEHOHIWZLWKLQWKHPLGGOHVROHW¶V
FKHFNWKDWDVZHOOLVWKDWULJKW««««WKDW¶V«,¶YHJRWILYHLQWKHPLGGOH. Ok, 
so I guess adjust it until it is more or less 4. Ah, but the whole thing is twelve« QRLW¶VQRW
LW¶VQLQHQLQH«ok«WKHQIURPWKHOHIWSRLQW«JRWZR«HU,ZRXOGJRXSDKP«
II«II«IRXUXQLWVVR««««DQGIURP«VRDFWXDOO\\HDPDUNWKDWSRLQWEXW
GRQ¶WPDNHDOLQH«too late«RNDK\HVZHOOHUPP«\RXNQRZ«DQGRQWKHRWKHU
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VLGHEDVLFDOO\DK«WKHVDPHWKLQJYHUWLFDOJRLQJXSEXWGRQ¶WPDUNLW6R«««
«DQGWKHQJRXSKDOIDVZHOO«KDOIRIWKDW«VR«what twoVR\HV«VR«there 
should be six. It should be half way up«QRQRQRQRQRWKDOIRIWKDWKDOIRIRQHKDOIRID
unit. So it would be like four and a half moUHRUOHVV«VRLI\RXJRRQHDQGWKHQFXWWKDWLQ
KDOIDQGPDUNWKDWSRLQW«RNPPP«QRZWKDWZHKDYHWKRVHWZRSRLQWVDFWXDOO\
DFWXDOO\PDNHLWPDNHLW«DIRXUILYH«VROHW¶VFRXQWDJDLQIURPWKHERWWRP«VRWKDW
YHUWLFDOLV««««DQGVRZHVKRXOGKDYHDERXW«JRLQJXS«OLNHDOLNHD
IURPWKDWSRLQWWRWKHWRSHGJHVR«««««2NPLQHLVDELWVKRUWVR,
KDYHWREULQJLWXS«RN«RNVREDVLFDOO\ZHOO,NQRZ\RXPDGHDOLQHEXW\RXVKRXOG
have two points now somewhere on the page. Ok, now what I want to do is... to make... a 
OLQH«WKDWFRQQHFWVWKHVHWZRSRLQWVDQGLW¶VEDVLFDOO\LWLW¶VOLNHDFLUD\RXNQRZD
FXUYHLW¶VDFXUYHWKDWMRLQV,¶P,¶PORRNLQJDWLWIURPWKHOHIWIURPWKHSRint on the left, 
and that curves upwards... but actually I am not seeing upwards. I am seeing it in space so I 
DPQRWQRWIODWWHQLQJLWVRWKDWLWPRYHVWRWKHRWKHUSRLQWWKDWZH¶YHGUDZQDQGZKDWLW
GRHVLWGRHVQ¶WFXUYHLQDVPRRWKZD\LW¶VLW¶VPDGHXSRIVHJPHQWV1RZZKDW,DP
going to do is to... ah... go kinda using the rhythm and going through several times trying to 
join, so every time I... I... mmm... ok, I think the rhythm here is not going to help much 
EHFDXVHRNOHW¶VVD\,DPVWLOOJRLQJWRXVHWKHUK\WKPEXWLWLWLVJRLQJWRPPP«RN
«OHW¶VOHW¶VGUDZDQRWKHUKRUL]RQWDOOLQH«DK«VVVWKDWJRHVWZHOYH«OHW¶VWU\
DFWXDOO\«OHWVOHWVQRKRUL]RQWDOOLQH«can you say that again what did you say? So I... I 
just wanWWRDDKDKNLQGRI«DKUHKHDUVHDJDLQWKHVSHHGRIWKHOLQHVRDPPP
make... we make a horizontal line which is the width of the page counting one to nine...  
again«\HD\HDdo that again«\HVVRZHNLQGRIDWWXQHWKHVSHHGRIWKHOLQHVR. 1... 
«««««««WKDW¶VDERXWLW«yeah... Ok, so there is the speed of the 
OLQHVR\RXKDYH\RXURZQVSHHGVRVWDUWLQJIURPWKHOHIWSRLQW,¶PMXVWJRLQJWREDVLFDOO\WR
PDNH«D«OLQH«WKDWFKDQJHV«VOLJKWO\GLUHFWLRQVRLWEHFRPHV«VRevery time that 
\RXWKLQNVRLI\RXDUHPDNLQJDFRQWLQXRXVOLQHDQGLWFKDQJHVGLUHFWLRQ«PPPNLQG
RIVODQWLQJVOLJKWO\D«DPPP«GRZQZDUGVHYHU\WLPH,VD\FKDQJH«DPPDQGHYHU\
time I change... say change... its kind of slanting a little bit and the idea is that in the end... so 
EDVLFDOO\,¶PJRLQJWRVVVWRFRXQWWKHFKDQJHVDQGNHHSLQJWKDWNLQGRIVSHHGRIOLQHWKDW
ZHGHFLGHGRQDQG\RXVKRXOGMRLQWKHSRLQWRQWKHULJKW>/DXJKWHU@WKLVLVGLIIHUHQWLVQ¶W
it? Ok. So... and I am goinJWRGRLWVHYHUDOWLPHVXQWLOXQWLO,JHWLWNLQGRIULJKW«RN«
DQGVR\RXIROORZPH«6RVRXQWLOWKH,¶YHMRLQHGXSWKHSRLQWV«\HVEXWEDVLFDOO\WKH
line is also the same speed and I just call the changes... ok «RN«UHDG\«FKDQJH«
FKDQJH«FKDQJH«FKDQJH«FKDQJH«WKDWWKDW¶VQRWWRREDG>/DXJKWHU@LQPLQH,
GLGQ¶WHYHQORRN«PPPKRZ¶V\RXUV"Laughter) Is it far off the mark? We we will do it 
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DJDLQ«it is as far from the mark as it was at the beginning«QR,GRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQG«well, 
I have ended up as far away from my destination as I was from my setting out point. Ok, so 
shall we do it again? Yeah, so maybe I made my changes too abrupt«ZHOOLWLVTXLWH
GLIILFXOWVRHYHQIRUPHVROHW¶V«I am finding it hard because I am left handed so I 
would naturally go work from right to left«RN«VR,¶PILQGLQJPD\EHLI,XVHP\ULJKW
hand it might be better«SHUKDSV«WKDW¶VJRLQJWRFKDQJHP\UK\WKP... well... well, I can 
GRLWWKHRWKHUVLGH«LQIDFWOHW¶VVWDUWGRLQJLWIURPRQHVLGHWRWKHRWKHU«RN«FDQZH
start from the right hand side then ok? 2N«VRZHDUHJRLQJ«VRWKHUK\WKPPPP
RNWDVRUU\«VWDUW«FKDQJH«FKDQJH«FKDQJHFKDQJH«FKDQJH«ok... ok... how 
many changes did we have? [In Italian] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Ok« \HDK«1, 1, 2, 3, 
4... oh, I only have four changes shall we 5, 6 ok«EXWZHFDQGRLWDJDLQXQWLOHUUUXQWLO
LWNLQGRIIHHOVULJKW«RNOHW¶VWU\DJDLQEHFDXVH,KDYHQ¶WUHDOO\JRW«DKZDLW,VKRXOG
also say... sorry... the line... the line... ok... on the left, the line, if we start from the left, the 
OLQHVWDUWVZLWKDVODQWLW¶VQRWDYHUWLFDOOLQHLWVWDUWVZLWKDVODQW«DKWRWKHULJKW«VRUU\
ok yeah yeah«RN«EXW«EXW\RXVD\\HDKEXW\RXDUHWKLQNLQJRIWKDWDUH\RX«are 
we... are we starting on the left hand side or on the right hand side? 7KHOHIWWKLVWLPH«the 
OHIW«RNWKHQ«RNPPPPPP«are we going yet? *R«RNFKDQJH«FKDQJH«
FKDQJHFKDQJHFKDQJH«ah, that was better... mine was totally off this timH«,¶YHJRQH
too far«DKRN,WKLQN\RXNQRZQRZZHVWDUWIURPWKHULJKW,WKLQNZHQHHGWRJHW
VRPHUK\WKPKHUH,WKLQNLW¶VWK«it was better that time«\HDKEXWWKLVWLPH,,ZDVQ¶W
really... I was going with the rhythm and kind of changing m\VSHHG«ah«VRVKRXOGNHHS
the speed... the... the speed the same so... so if we start from the... when we start from right 
«yeahLW¶VPXFKPRUHVODQWHG«oh, the first line more slanted«\HDKWKHILUVWRQHLV
PRUHVODQWHG«we are aiming higher... nRQR\R\RLW¶VVODQWHGHUUUGRZQZDUGV
PRUH«RK,VHH6R\RXGRQ¶WDLPDVKLJK«\HDK\RXGRQ¶WDLPKLJK«ok... so the rhythm 
LVGDWDGD«have we... have we started? 2NOHWVVWDUW«RN« FKDQJH«FKDQJH«FKDQJH«
FKDQJH«FKDQJH«noWKHUH¶V WKHUH¶VVRPHWKLQJZURQJDERXW«QRQRQRWZURQJ
LWV«WKHUH¶V\HDK,WKLQNEHFDXVHXPPP,WKLQN,DPJRLQJWRVWDUWZLWKWKH
UK\WKP«1R,WKLQN,¶PQRWEDVLFDOO\,¶PDGMXVWLQJP\UK\WKPVR,VKRXOGNHHSWKHWKH
speed of the line the VDPH,,WKWKLQNWKHSUREOHPLVWKDW,¶PWKHUK\WKPLVWRRIDVW. So 
if I slow down the rhythm, so... like... so if we take our... our nine and try to go as slow as 
ZHPDNHOHW¶VVD\«OHW¶VPDNHLWVL[WHHQGRHV'RHVWKDWPDNHVHQVH"6RZHwe... we... 
go much slower. Ok. 6ROHW¶VVHHOHW¶VWU\DQRWKHUKRUL]RQWDOWKHQbut ok... but the distance 
LVQ¶WDVPXFKDVLWVHHPV. No no, but so it... so basically we have nine and we keep that... 
that distance but basically it will take... so if I gR««««ZHVREDVLFDOO\NHHSLQJ
that rhythm. Ok. 8PPPWKDWWKDW¶VVWLOOWKHUK\WKPWKHOLQHZHPDNHLVPXFKVORZHUVR
Appendix 2 
244 
 
that it will take sixteen of that to... to go from one side to the other of the page. Ok/HW¶VWU\
it if it works. So are we starting from the left-hand side or the right-hand side? Left-hand 
side. Ok. 6R««««««««««««««HUUU
«« 2NWKDW¶VWRRVKRUW«:HOOPLQHZDVWRRORQJVR,REYLRXVO\GLGQ¶WXQGHUVWDQG
you because mine was almost a whole circle. Right, ok, so I think we should keep to the nine 
because that seemed to be a more natural way... slightly more natural... if... if... if... that if 
that... if... that... if I count the speed kind of  relaxed speed... ummm... Shall we try again? 
Do we... do we do the nine?  Yes. Ok.  From the right. Ff... so just make a horizontal line 
from the right. A horizontal. Why a horizontal? Ah, are we making a circle? Ok, sorry I 
GLGQ¶WUHDOLVHThe curve. The curve, yeah, so from the right... eUUURNVWDUW«PPP
FKDQJH«FKDQJH«FKDQJHFKDQJH«FKDQJH«\RXVHHWKDWWKDWWKDWIHOWEHWWHUGLGGLG
you feel that the last one was longer? It was much longer. Yeah. 7KDW¶VZK\,GLGDZKROH
circle last time. Yeah, but... but you know the... errr... regardless of what kind of line we are 
PDNLQJWKDWWKDWZDVWKDWZDVEHWWHUEHWWHU«much better. If I could attune that... ok so... 
ZHOOOHW¶VVWDUWDOOWKLVIURPWKHULJKWWKHQEHFDXVH,WKLQNOk2N*RFKDQJH«
FKDQJH«FKDQJH«FKDQJH«change... so stop... really... mmm... ZHDUHJHWWLQJFORVHU«
mmm... ok again then. Ok, ready, ok. &KDQJHFKDQJH«FKDQJHFKDQJH«FKDQJH«
FKDQJH«RNmmm... ,PHDQ,WKLQN,WKLQNLW¶VJHWWLQJEHWWHULQWKHVHQVHWKDW,UHDOLVH
that now I really QHHGEDVLFDOO\WKHZD\,,,¶PGRLQJWKLVLVWRDWRQFHFRQFHQWUDWHRQ«
on the line... mmm... kind of going at uniform speed and then concentrate on where I see 
the... the slanting changing and just somehow without even looking at the page just, you 
know, keeping the speed right... errr... like... errr... a uniform... and then changing there and 
LWVTXLWHGLIILFXOWWRGRWKHVHWKLQJV,¶OOGRLWDJDLQ*RFKDQJH«FKDQJH«QRQR,¶YH
completely lost it. ,¶PMXVW,¶PMXVWJRLQJRYHUWKHVDPHPDUN«for some reason... Are you 
looking? What point do you draw? Ummm... yeah... kind of... well, I no... yes... ok... well, yes 
I think I am... FRV,VXSSRVH,KDYHQ¶WEHHQ  \RXKDYHQ¶WEHHQno... so... so basically 
what... what I... what... what I ended... is a like a... a series of... of kind more or less... 
similar... yeah... yeah... ok but actually... but now... now... there... there... so... so basically 
this sort of a cluster of marks is quite... is quite interesting because suddenly, now that we 
have made so many, I realise that... I realise in which way it is not representative of what I 
ZDQWWRUHSUHVHQW«EHFDXVH«EEDVLFDOO\QRZ,¶PVWDUWLQJWRGHVFULEHZKDWZKDW,VHH
the... the difference I see between this cluster of marks... ummm... and... and actually how I 
think it should be to represent what I see. So if... if you take... if... if I take my top... ermm... 
like the top of my cluster of marks... yeah... HUUU«RNLI,WDNHWKDWEDVLFDOO\,IHHOOLNHLW
should be much higher than it LV,VD\«EDVEDVLFDOO\LI\RXGUDZDKRUL]RQWDO«IURP«
HUPP«OHW¶VVD\WKDWJRHVWKDWJRHVDFURVVWKHSDJHDQGWKDWWRXFKHVWKDWJRHVWKURXJK
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the... the point on the left that we done. So if you draw a horizontal there that goes across... 
the whole page\HDK«ZHOOPLQHLVQRWUHDOO\KRUL]RQWDO«RN«VRLIRN\RXKDYH
that... basically it feels like that... that... that the curve... that it comes on the top of that 
KRUL]RQWDOVKRXOGEHHUUUNLQGRIPXFKKLJKHU«LLLLW¶V... basically the curve 
VKRXOGFXUYHPHUUUDORWKLJKHUDQGWKDWZRXOGVD\LI\RXWDNHWKHGLVWDQFHRIDKPP«
OLNHZKHUHWKHFXUYHFXOPLQDWHVRQWKHWRSRN«DKOHW¶VVHH«LWVKRXOG«DKRN
OHW¶VRNVD\OHW¶VWKDWXPPPVRZKDt... so you must have a place where the curve 
culminates on top...  the top, the highest point of the curve... yeah... yes... now if you draw a 
OLQHOLNHDYHUWLFDOWKDWPHHWVWKH«WKHKRUL]RQWDOZHGUDZDFURVVWKHSDJHyeah... RN«VR
you... you got that, VREDVLFDOO\ZKDW,DPJRLQJWRGRQRZLV«HUPP«LVLVWRGR
VRPHWKLQJ>6RXQGRIVRPHRQHVWULGLQJDFURVVDURRP«VRPHWKLQJLVGURSSHGDQGWKHQWKH
VRXQGRIVWULGLQJEDFN@HUUUDKRNXVLQJWKHVDPHUK\WKP,¶PJRLQJWRWKHWKH
rhythm thDWZHXVHGDQGWKHUK\WKPWKDW,WKLQNZHVKRXOGUHKHDUVHDKVROHW¶VGRWKH
QLQHDJDLQDWWKHERWWRP««««««««WKDWWKDWVHHPHGDOULJKW
with me. Was that alright with you? Ummm... that looks good. Errr... ok... so from that 
hoUL]RQWDOIURPWKDWSRLQWRQWKHKRUL]RQWDOHUUUU,¶PJRLQJWRFRXQWDQGDQGOHW¶V
VWRSZKHUH,VWRS6RJR««where are we going? «VRUU\XSZDUGV From the 
horizontal? From the horizontal up to the... basically just retrace the vertical that you have 
been tracing. Ok, ok. 2NDJDLQJR«RKVRUU\,ZDVQ¶WORRNLQJOk. $KRNJR«
«mmmRNVR,¶OOGRLWDJDLQ*R««WKDW¶VQRWJRRG$JDLQJR««
«DQG«RQFHDJDLQJR«««RNVR,I got a point which is higher than... than 
the curve was. Do you have the same? Yep. Ok, so basically that... th.. that is the top of the 
curve really as I perceive it. Oh, really? Yes. 2KZRZZHDUHZH¶UHQRWDLPLQJKLJK
enough here [Laughter]. So... RNVRWKDW¶VWKHWRSRIWKHFXUYHShall we have another shot? 
Ah, well, I think... I... I think... what I would like to do is... ummm... so if you take that... 
that point there that is higher... the curve, and somehow make it a unit... errr... sorry, make 
there a horizontal which goes through that point and is... that is centred on that point which 
is... and is a unit so is one and is centred there...  just one?  Yes, so one. Ok. Ok, so you have 
got that line... emmm... ummm... DQGWKHQIURP«RNVRIURPfrom... the right point... errr... 
WKDWWKDWZHEHHQ«\RXNQRZof that unit? Errr... no no, sorry, from the right point of the 
start of it, the one that we used to make the curve. Oh, yeah. Errr... we again... we again... 
EDVLFDOO\«ZHDUHWU\LQJWRMRLnt that right point with the right point of the line that we just 
made...  ok... and... in how many moves? It is basically just one move. What? Yes. What, one 
unit? Well, no... errr... sorry it is one change... one change but... but... but what I would like 
to do first is basically to... to join the points without... just with a straight line and... two right 
hand points? Yes. Ok. And we kind of... I... I mean I think rhythm is not going to help much 
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here. I think... errr... kind of just voice is going to hHOSVRZHNLQGRIQHHG,,WKLQN,¶G
OLNHWRDWWXQHWKHGLVWDQFHRIWKRVHWZRSRLQWVVROLNH\RXNQRZ,¶OOMXVWJR«in a straight 
line?  Yeah, and from, yeah, one from one to the other and when I stop my... mmm... there 
will be the end.  Ok. And OHW¶VVHHDQGZHDQGZH\HDKNHHSWKHXVXDOVSHHG
mmmDQGVWRSZHOOZKHQ,VWDUWVLQJLQJZHOOLVVLQJLQJWKDW¶VDELJZRUGIRULW
ODDDDDDDDK«WKDWZDVLW«,¶OOGRLWDJDLQ«ODDDDDDDDKQRWKDWZDVWRRVKRUWHUUU«
alright, that was about it but... but it actually comes to the left of the right point. Is that the 
case for you? Well, I was aiming for the right point. Ok. So... it comes just below it... ok, so 
aim... aim slightly to the right... left of the right point. Towards the centre of the right point, 
towards the centre of the line? Yes, yes, towards the centre, to the left of the right point... 
ok... and do it again... errrrrrrrrrah... ok...  RNWKDWZDVDERXWLW2N«RNVREDVLFDOO\QRZ«
so if you consider that line WKDW\RXMXVWPDGHDVWKHERWWRPRIXP«OLNHDDD
triangle... yeahRNVREDVLFDOO\ZHDUHWRPDNHWKHRWKHUWZRVLGHVRIWKHWULDQJOH«
DQG«WKHVLGHWKDWVWDUWVIURPWKHWKHSRLQWRQWKHKRUL]RQWDOOLQHWKDWZHMXVWIRXQGDQG
that goes through the apex of that triangle, so that side is longer than the one that goes from 
that apex of that triangle to the bottom of... errr... errr... the point of the bottom right. Does 
that make sense?  8PPPQR,¶PQRWXSZLWK\RX.  Ok, so, basically if you consider that 
line that we just made as... yeah, like the base of a triangle... yes, yes... so what we want to 
do is to construct the other two sides of that base. Yes. Ok, and so if you... if you... if you 
look at those two sides, basically the... the left side, the one more to the left is longer than 
the one to the right... okDQGVRWKDW¶VZKDWZH¶UHJRLQJWRGRQRZLVWRWU\WRWRWR
construct that triangle... errr... and I think the only way to do it... no, it is not the only way... 
oQHZD\DJDLQLVWRXVHVRLI\RXWKLQNWKDWIURPWKHSRLQWRQWKHKRUL]RQWDO«WKHUHLVD
VOLJKWVODQWGRZQZDUGVRIRIWKHOLQHRNOHW¶VMXVWGRWKDWVRVVOLJKW«VRLI\RXLI\RX
just make a line which is... ummm... well, you can make it as long as you want. At the 
moment it is just kind of a guide line which slants slightly towards... so downwards from 
that point. Is that clear? From the right-hand point on the horizontal? Yes, so it slants 
slightly. Just make a line. Ok. Yeah, just... ok... VRWKDWOLQHQRZ,¶PJRLQJWRDJDLQJR
errrrrrrrrrah and then change, and when you change, the line slants downwards and the idea 
is that eventually it should join the right down point. Does that make sense?  :K\":KDW¶V
ZKDW¶VWKHGRZQSRLQW" The..WKHSRLQWZKHUHZHDWWKHEHJLQQLQJZH¶YHEHHQNLQGRI
building the curve from... from ok, ok... so... and... so basically, you know, as I go 
errrrrrrrrrah, you go along the line that we just... yeah... drew and then slant with the other 
one. Ok. Ok... errrrrrrrrrah... change... stop. Was that anywhere near? 1RLW¶VNLQGRIOLNH
LW¶VNLQGRIYHUWLFDOO\DERYH. ,W¶VYHUWLFDOO\DERYH2NA... one... errrrrrrrrrah.  Ok, lets do it 
DJDLQHUUUUUUUUUUDKFKDQJH,GLGQ¶WVD\VWRS/HW¶VGRLWDJain... errrrrrrrrrah... change... 
Appendix 2 
247 
 
VWRS«mmm. How did that go? ,W¶VJHWWLQJFORVH. <HDKOHW¶VGRLWDJDLQHUUUUUUUUUUDK
FKDQJHVWRSDQGRQFHDJDLQHUUUUUUUUUUDKFKDQJHVWRS«mmmm... RNOHW¶VZKDW
what I ended up with is not with the line I wanted at all. Have you got a triangle? No, I have 
got something that kind of resembles a very squashed triangle. Basically more or less I... I... 
I... just a cluster of lines that kind of make up some sort of triangle... yeah... but the way is... 
I see it what do you call it a isosceles... yes... \HVDQGLWVKRXOGQ¶WEHEDVLFDOO\ZKDWLW
should be basically... the left... so if you have the base and the two sides, so the left side 
should actually be longer than it is and slightly lower, slLJKWO\PRUHVODQWLQJGRZQZDUGV«
VRLI\RXMXVWGRDOLQHWKDWLVVOLJKWO\VODQWLQJGRZQ«DFWXDOO\\HDKLILI\RXFXW«
DQG«EDVLFDOO\ZKHUHWKDWOLQHWKDWZHMXVWGUHZPHHWVthe problem is my ink is so thick I 
FDQ¶WVHHLW [Laughter] it is becoming black.  I am really curious to see the drawing. Can 
ZHVWRSDQGILQGSDJH«an arm«QRRNZHOODFWXDOO\LI\RX¶YHGRQHWKDWOLQHWKDW,MXVW
said... sorry... have you... have you drawn that line I just mentioned? No, reiterate it. So 
basically if you just draw a line there... from where? )URPWKHOHIW«VRUU\IURPWKHULJKW
point of the horizontal... yeah... and which is basically about half way between the base of 
the triangle and the... the sss... halfway in terms of angles between the base of the triangle 
and the... the... the guide lines... the guide lines... yeah, done that... so basically if you do that 
line where it meets one of the first of lines of the other side of the triangle... yeah... you stop 
and leave it to that... when it meets WKHRWKHUVLGHRIWKHWULDQJOH«\RXVWRS.  ,¶PG\LQJWRVHH
your drawing. ,¶PQRWVXUHZKDW\RXPHDQE\WKHRWKHUVLGHRIWKHWULDQJOH. You know, 
basically we... we built this triangle that was an isosceles triangle... yeah, its more notional 
than actual... yeah, yes, so yeah, even for me basically but more or less where... where it 
meets the other side which might be... yeah, yeah, ok, so what do I do when... when...  you... 
you just stop there. Ok, done. Ok... ermm... so moving on the left side of that... errr... 
horizontal which is... yepRNZKLFKLVZKDW,¶PJRLQJWRGRLVIURPWKDWSRLQW,ZDQWWR
join the left point, you know the bottom left point on this horizontal that we made earlier, the 
horizontal that... that goes across the page so... from... from which we shot our curves? ... 
yes, yes... ok... IURPZKLFKZHVKRWRXUFXUYHVDQGZKDW,¶PJRLQJWRGRLVWRPDNH\HV
so... so... so... to draw a line from one to another... just a straight line? ... yeah, just a straight 
line... is it a guide line? ... \HV«RNWKDW¶VHDV\«WKDW¶VYHU\HDV\«WKDW¶VJRRG«WKDW¶V
DOULJKW«DQGRN«,¶YHJRWDSUREOHPP\LQNLVGULSSLQJ. ,W¶VGULSSLQJmmm... ZH¶UH
nearly finished... mmm...  EHFDXVH,GRQ¶WWKLQN,FDQVXVWDLQWKLVIRUHYHUZHOO,ILnd this 
very interesting... actually I find this more about the way I draw. Yes, it is interesting. So 
basically what I am going to do now is to join... so... so we made this guide line... mmm... 
what I want to do is to join those two points we... actually«WKUHHWKHUHDUHWKUHHOLQHV«
EDVLFDOO\«ah... VRLW¶VLW¶VQRWDQGEDVLFDOO\ZHDUHNLQGRINLQGDIROORZLQJWKHVODQW
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that we were trying to do with the circle, but we are just... just slightly above it... mmm... so 
if you start from the right point of that horizontal, you know the top horizontal with a slight 
slant, and again accord... up or down slant? ... errr... down slant... so... so fairly slight slant... 
mmm... if I call... ok, I will just go with the voice and then call the changes... mmm... mmm... 
FKDQJH«FKDQJH«VWRS. Ok. Anything near? <HDK,¶PZD\RIIEXWRNOHW¶VGRLWRQFH
PRUHPPPFKDQJHFKDQJHQR,¶YHJRWLWZURQJ«PPP«FKDQJH«FKDQJH«
VWRSRN«LWVTXLWHRIIWKHPDUNEXW,WKLQN,ZLOOOHDYHLW/HW¶VOHDYHLt to that. 
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Appendix 3: Text of performance Is capable of not not-being 
My name is Dino Alfier. In October of this year, I started a PhD research at the University of 
the Arts London and I am based at Wimbledon College of Art. The working title of my 
research is: The semethics of Simone Weil: attention as geometric mean between the existent 
and the real. [Write 'Weil' on blackboard]  
Weil was a thinker, left-wing political activist and philosophy and Greek teacher. She was 
born in Paris in 1909 and died in Ashford, Kent, in 1943. Her major philosophical interests 
were Greek thought, history of philosophy and science, mathematics and, in her last years, 
Catholicism. The notion of attention [Write 'attention' on blackboard] crops up time and 
again in her writings and it is my view that Weil regarded attention as a virtue. 
The talk that I wrote, that is printed on the pages which are on this [point] table right in front 
of me, and that I have faith I will deliver today had already begun before I started talking. 
What do I mean by this? I will first tell you a couple of meanings that I don't mean. But, 
before, I would like to have a minute of silence. [Minute of silence]   
So, the talk had already started. 
I don't mean to say that when you started making your way towards the venue where you 
believed the talk would be held in order to attend it (having the attending of the talk as the 
end of your walking) the talk was already implied in your walking and, therefore, it had 
already begun before you heard me saying the first sentences of this talk. 
Neither do I mean to say that the talk started at that precise moment in the past when the first 
thought of it came to my mind. 
More generally, I don't mean to say that, by tracing backwards the network of causes, one 
could go right back to the origins of the universe and, there, find the implication of my talk. 
All these senses may well have been the senses I meant. And I don't doubt that there are 
RWKHUVHQVHVWKDWFRXOGEHPHDQWE\WKHSURSRVLWLRQµ7KHWDONHWFHWF had already begun 
EHIRUH,VWDUWHGWDONLQJ¶%XWQRQHRIWKHVHDUHWKHVHQVH,PHDQ7KDWLVZK\,VSHQWVRPH
time to point out that none of these are the sense I mean.  
What I mean to say is that, by observing a minute of silence, I wished to introduce four of 
WKHREMHFWVRIWKHWDON>:ULWHREMHFWVRQEODFNERDUG@%\µREMHFWV¶,PHDQZKDWWKHWDONLV
about. 
)RUWKHQRWLRQRIµREMHFW¶,DPLQGHEWHGWR3DXO5\DQZKRLVDIULHQGDQGDVHFRQG\HDU3K'
researcher at UAL and based at WCA. The title of his research is: 3HLUFH¶V6HPHLRWLFVDQG
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the Implications for Aesthetics in the Visual Arts. An Extemporary Case Study: The 
Sketchbook and its Position in the Hierarchies of Collecting and Exhibiting.  
The objects of the talk are: (i) the relation between form and content which is also briefly 
recast as mind/matter right at the end of the talk; (ii) belief; (iii) experimental certainties; and 
(iv) levels and meta-levels. 
7KHUHLVDOVRDQRYHUDUFKLQJREMHFWZKLFKLVµDFNQRZOHGJLQJFRPSOH[LW\¶ZKLFK,ZLOOZULWH
on thHEDFNRIWKHEODFNERDUGWRV\PEROLVHDOWKRXJKWKHWHUPµV\PERO¶LVDOLWWOHWULFN\LWV
overarching-ness ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHUHVWRIWKHREMHFWV>:ULWHµDFNQRZOHGJLQJFRPSOH[LW\¶
on back of blackboard] 
2EMHFWVLLDQGLLL,I,KDGWROG\RXµ%HOLHYH that the sound in this room when everybody 
tries to be as quiet as possible is very different from the sound in this room when everybody 
GRHVQRWWU\WREHDVTXLHWDVSRVVLEOH¶EHLQJDVDFFXUDWHDVSRVVLEOHLQP\GHVFULSWLRQRI
what I deemed the difference to be, my statement and description may have informed a 
belief in you in the existence of such difference and even a fairly precise idea of the nature 
of that difference as I conceived it. The experimental certainty that there is (or there is not) a 
difference between room-in-silence and room-not-in-silence and the non-experimental belief 
WKDWVXFKDGLIIHUHQFHH[LVWVRUGRHVQ¶WH[LVWIHHOTXLWHGLIIHUHQW7KHIHHOLQJRIWKHODWWHU
difference (difference (or not) between experimental certainty and non-experimental belief) 
is also of the nature of an experimental certainty. 
Object (i). The content, object (i), was in a particular form, that is, in the minute-of-silence 
event ± and what followed was a description of the content. Now, imagine the following 
scenario. (If you have experienced the situation I am about to describe, you may find it 
easier to imagine.) You are in a modern office. There is a power cut. You become aware of 
the silence which is another way of saying that you become aware of how noisy the office, 
with its computer vents spinning, was before the power cut. The content of the imaginary 
scenario I described is object (i) (the relation between form and content) but the relation 
between form and content is different from the one in the minute-of-silence event. In the 
office case, the content was described to you by me and not experienced by you, except as 
description; in the minute-of-silence event, it was experienced by you. 
Moreover, the silence event and the imagined office scenario are, on another level within the 
talk (a meta-OHYHOREMHFWLYDQRWKHUIRUPLQZKLFKWKHREMHFWµUHODWLRQEHWZHHQIRUPDQG
FRQWHQW¶LVFDVW2QWKLVOHYHOWKHVLOHQFHHYHQWDQGWKHLPDJLQHGRIILFHVFHQDULRSOD\DUROH
analogous to, respectively, not-silence/silence. In the sense that, in moving from the silence 
event to the imagine office scenario, you experienced (I would assume) a difference. 
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Another, fifth, object regards an aspect of the nature of attention (more accurately, attention 
as the notion defined by Weil in her writings, as I understand it now). The fifth object [Write 
object on board] is the proving (or disproving) of the following hypothesis: Nobody and 
nothing can compel one to be attentive; something can hinder one from being attentive. 
[Write full hypothesis on blackboard.] 
There are other objects: 
2EMHFWYLLVµWUDSVLQDUJXPHQWRUORRVHUHDVRQLQJFKDLQ¶7KLVLVDQLPSOLFLWREMHFWLQWKH
sense that it is a little hidden; and, it is very likely that, in this talk, there may be many 
instances of loose reasoning chains that are hidden to me but blatantly evident to you and 
that you may want to point out at the end of this talk; in fact, this is so probable that you may 
be wondering why I bothered to intentionally loosen some reasoning chains; I suppose the 
DQVZHUZRXOGEH-XVWLQFDVH>:ULWHµL¶EHVLGHWKHLPSOLFLWREMHFWV@ 
%\µLPSOLFLWREMHFW¶,DOVRPHDQWKDWWKHREMHFWLVin the form. For instance, take question: µ,V
WKHILUVWZRUGRIWKLVTXHVWLRQµLV¶"¶DVHOI-referential question? [Write sentence on 
blackboard] 
In this sentence the object self-referentiality LVLPSOLFLWLQµ,VWKHILUVWZRUGRIWKLVTXHVWLRQ
µLV¶"¶DQGH[SOLFLWLQµµ,VWKHILUVWZRUGRIWKLVTXHVWLRQµLV¶"¶DVHOI-UHIHUHQWLDOTXHVWLRQ"¶DVD
whole. Although, is LW"'LIILFXOWWRWHOOVLQFHµWKLVTXHVWLRQ¶VHHPVWRUHIHUWRERWKWKHZKROH
question and the nested question.  
Other objects are: (vii) facts (?); (viii) erasure ± implicit; (ix) axiom; (x) question; and there 
DUHSUREDEO\RWKHUREMHFWV>:ULWHµ¶XQGHU objects]. 
)LUVW,ZLOOUHDGWZRTXRWHVIURP:HLO¶VZULWLQJVZKHUHVKHWDONVDERXWDWWHQWLRQ 
The first quote is from a book called Leçons de philosophie. This book does not contain 
:HLO¶VZULWLQJVEXWWKHQRWHVWKDWDVWXGHQWRI:HLOWRRNGXULQJKHUSKLOosophy lessons. 
Moreover, the quote that you will hear is my translation in English of an Italian translation 
of the text. Here is the quote:  
Emotions always engender spontaneous attention (fear, horror, etc.). ... Psychological 
symptoms: One cannot think about something else. ... In voluntary attention, one continuously 
... stops voluntary attention from becoming spontaneous attention.466  
So Weil makes a distinction between spontaneous and voluntary attention. From now on, 
when I refer to attention, I mean voluntary attention. As an example of voluntary attention, 
Weil gives the effort one puts in solving a geometrical problem. 
                                                 
466
 Weil, LF, pp. 243±4. 
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As an example of spontaneous attention I would give this [Bang loudly on the table]. 
The second quote is taken from an essay which LQ(QJOLVK,GRQ¶WNQRZWKH)UHQFKWLWOHLV
FDOOHGµ5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH5LJKW8VHRI6FKRRO6WXGLHVZLWKD9LHZWRWKH/RYHRI*RG¶
which is contained in the book with the English title Waiting for God. The French title is 
Attente de Dieu. Weil did not give this title to the book nor did she collect the essays 
contained in it ± it was published posthumously.   
It is certain that this effort [of attention] will bear its fruit in prayer. There is no doubt whatever 
about that. Certainties of this kind are experimental. But if we do not believe in them before 
experiencing them, if at least we do not behave as though we believed in them, we shall never 
have the experience that leads to such certainties. There is a kind of contradiction here. Above 
a given level this is the case with all useful knowledge concerning spiritual progress. If we do 
not regulate our conduct by it before having proved it, if we do not hold on to it for a long time 
by faith alone, a faith at first stormy and without light, we shall never transform it into 
certainty. Faith is the indispensable condition.467 
I will start by making a little terminology substitution: Someone or something that compels 
one to do p can be also said to demand p from that very one. I make the substitution to 
temper a OLWWOHWKHDEVROXWHQHVVRIWKHWHUPµFRPSHO¶,IILUVW,SURYHWKDWVRPHERG\RU
something can demand that one be attentive, then, it may be easier to take on the task of 
proving the stronger not-compel/hinder hypothesis. If I cannot prove the weaker demand 
hypothesis, then, there seems to me little hope to prove the strong hypothesis. 
Here are two things ± rather two words that stand for two classes of things, that is, objects 
that you can see and touch of which I brought one example [Show Tractatus] and something 
that stands for it [Show piece of twine]. So, here are two things: a tightrope and 
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VTractatus Logico-Philosophicus (to which, from now on, I will refer as the 
Tractatus). 
For those of you who are not familiar with the Tractatus, it is considered by many an 
extremely demanding read ± I say demanding read  and not book because, as a book, the 
Tractatus could, for instance, be used as a door stopper, although that would perhaps be too 
demanding for the Tractatus since it is so slim. 
Does reading the Tractatus demand attention? No. One could read it inattentively. 
Does walking on a tightrope demand attention? No. One could walk on it inattentively and 
fall. Or a very experienced tightrope-walker may walk on it inattentively and not fall. 
                                                 
467
 Weil, WG, p. 58. 
Appendix 3 
253 
 
It seems that Tractatus-reading and tightrope-ZDONLQJGHPDQGRQH¶VDWWHQWLRQRQO\LIRQH
reads the Tractatus and walks on the tightrope attentively. This is a plain tautology. Is there 
DZD\RXWRIWKHWDXWRORJ\",VD\µDZD\RXW¶EHFDXVHto me, a tautology feels like a 
FLUFXODULW\WKDW,ZDQWWRH[LWDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOH,VWUHVVµto me¶EHFDXVHto you, a tautology 
may feel like a pleasant place to be, a place that you may want to leave eventually ± but not 
in a rush. 
A way out of the tautology would be WRWUDFHEDFNWKHHW\PRORJLFDOURRWRIWKHYHUEµWR
GHPDQG¶ZKLFKLVWKH/DWLQdemandare, to entrust, charge with a commission. The Tractatus 
and the tightrope demand attention in the sense that they entrust whoever reads/walks them 
with the commission of reading/walking them attentively ± one can choose whether to 
read/walk them attentively or not, whether or not to betray the entrusted trust. The drawback 
LVWKDWLQ(QJOLVKWKHYHUEµWRGHPDQG¶KDVYHU\VWURQJFRQQRWDWLRQRIRUGHUWREHVXUHDQ
order that can be contravened but not without an expectation of more or less unwanted 
FRQVHTXHQFHVWKDWLVQRWWKHFDVHLQ,WDOLDQIRULQVWDQFHZKHUHµGRPDQGDUH¶PHDQVµWR
DVN¶>2EMHFWYL7KLVLVDOLWWOHWUDS(DUOLHURQ,VDLGµ,I,FDQQRWSURYHWKHZHDker demand 
K\SRWKHVLVWKHQWKHUHVHHPVWRPHOLWWOHKRSHWRSURYHWKHVWURQJK\SRWKHVLV¶EXWQRZQRW
having proven the weak demand hypothesis, I proceed to try to prove the strong compel 
hypothesis]  
>:ULWHRQEODFNERDUGµ7KLVVWDWHPHQWLVIDOVH¶@ 
[The liar paradox is an example of paradox. The status of the example with regard to 
LQGLYLGXDODQGXQLYHUVDOVLVDVSHFLDORQHDFFRUGLQJWR$JDPEHQµ,QDQ\FRQWH[WZKHUHLW
exerts its force, the example is characterized by the fact that it holds for all cases of the same 
type, and, at the same time, it is included among these. It is one singularity among others, 
ZKLFKKRZHYHUVWDQGVIRUHDFKRIWKHPDQGVHUYHVIRUDOO¶468  This may have a bearing on 
the discourse on what distinguishes an art product from a, for instance, philosophy product 
(e.g. a book), the former usually understood as individual (particular), the latter as universal 
JHQHUDO$OVRWKLVPD\EHLPSRUWDQWLQUHODWLRQWR:HLO¶VXVHRI*UHHNWUDJHG\DVDQ
example. A tragedy is a fictional example (in this sense, different from the liar paradox 
which is both a paradox and an example of a paradox).] 
This is called the liar paradox. It is also known as Epimenides paradox, named after 
(SLPHQLGHVZKRZDVD&UHWDQZKRRQFHVDLGµ$OO&UHWDQVDUHOLDUV¶ 
Try to work out if the statement is true or false [Give a couple of minutes to the audience to 
think about the paradox]. 
                                                 
468
 Agamben, 2007, pp. 9±10. 
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Your reasoning will probably have been something like the following: If the statement is 
false, then it is true; but if the statement is true, then it is false; but if the statement is false, 
then it is true; and so on. 
What I want to draw your attention to is not the circularity of the statement (as interesting I 
ILQGLWEXWWRWKHIDFWWKDWLWVHHPVWRPHWKDWZKHQ\RXUHDVRQµ,I the statement is false, 
WKHQLWLVWUXHRULIWKHVWDWHPHQWLVWUXHWKHQLWLVIDOVH¶QRERG\DQGQRWKLQJFRPSHOV\RXWR
do so.  
Your reasoning seems to me a thought experiment, you are drawing conclusions as though 
you believed >:ULWHµDVWKRXJK¶RQElackboard] that the statement is false and as though you 
believed that the statement is true. Your thought experiments are not unlike the experiments 
that scientists do as though s/he believed that p to see if p is the case or not. And it is not 
unlike my KDYLQJDVDQREMHFWRIWKHWDONWKHK\SRWKHVLVµ1RERG\DQGQRWKLQJFDQFRPSHO
RQHWREHDWWHQWLYHVRPHWKLQJFDQKLQGHURQHIURPEHLQJDWWHQWLYH¶DVWKRXJK,EHOLHYHGLWLQ
order to see if this hypothesis is or is not the case.  
Certainly, it is not the statement that compels you to make these thought experiments since 
the statement gives you no answers with regard to its truth or falsity. And certainly, it is not 
me that compels you to make these thought experiments since all I ask of you is to try to 
work out if the statement is true or false and I leave the rest to you.  
<RXFDQQRWHYHQVXVSHFWWKDWVRPHKRZP\NQRZLQJWKHDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQµ,VWKH
VWDWHPHQWWUXHRUIDOVH"¶LVXQNQRZLQJO\WR\RXVWLUULQJRUHYHQcompelling) you to 
formulate certain thought experiments since, if you have tried to answer it, you are probably 
quite certain by now that I do not know the answer either. 
<HWWKHUHLVVRPHWKLQJWKDWKLQGHUV\RX<RXMXVWFDQQRWDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQµ,VWKH
VWDWHPHQWWUXHRUIDOVH"¶± it keHSVVOLSSLQJDZD\<RXPD\WKLQN7KHµWKLV¶LQµ7KLV
VWDWHPHQWLVIDOVH¶GRHVQRWSRLQWWRWKHVHOI-same sentence where it is found. This is all very 
ZHOOEXWWKDWGRHVQ¶WDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQµ,VWKHVWDWHPHQWWUXHRUIDOVH"¶EXWWKHTXHVWLRQµ,V
the statement self-UHIHUHQWLDORUQRW"¶%HVLGHVHYHQWU\LQJWRGHFLGHZKHWKHUWKHVHQWHQFHLV
self-referential or not seems to me tricky, to say the least. 
This paradox should have given you the flavour of a non-compelled act. It should also have 
given you the flavour of a hindered act. That is, if you accept that a thought experiment is an 
act and if you agree with me that the thought experiment involved in the liar paradox is non-
compelled but hindered. [Write flavour near hypothesis] In fact, this flavour is another 
object.  
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I will return to object v shortly but, first, I think a break would be beneficial. What follows is 
a recreational short section called the blackboard >:ULWHµEODFNERDUG¶RQEODFNERDUG@
dealing with object (vii). 
In an early version of the blackboard section I wrote: 
µ,QWKHblackboard VHFWLRQ,ZLOOGHDORQO\ZLWKIDFWVµ:KDWLVDfact"¶\RXPD\DVN$QG,
PD\UHSO\µ$QH[DPSOHRIDIDFWZRXOGEHµ7KHHDUWKLVQRWIODW¶¶$QG\RXZKRPD\QRWEH
in the mood for heavyweight arguing and may OHWJRRIWKH³IDFW´WKDW\RXGLGQ¶WDVNIRUDQ
H[DPSOHRIDIDFWEXWIRUDGHILQLWLRQRIDIDFWPD\VD\µ%XWZRXOGµ7KHHDUWKLVQRWIODW¶EH
a fact for someone who believes that the earth is IODW"¶$QG,PD\VD\µPPP¶DQGVFUDWFK
my head. 
And at thLVSRLQW,PD\UHDOLVHWKDWEHIRUH,VD\µ,QWKHblackboard section I will deal only 
ZLWKIDFWV¶,EHWWHUPDNHVXUHWKDW,DPFOHDUDERXWZKDWDIDFWLV$QGDVWKLVSURFHVVRI
clarification may seem very daunting to me, I may leave it to one side for the moment and 
UHSKUDVHWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHEODFNERDUGVHFWLRQµ,QWKHblackboard section I will deal 
only with non-H[SODQDWLRQV¶ 
µ:KDWLVDnon-explanation"¶\RXPD\DVN$QG,PD\UHSO\µ$QH[DPSOHRIDQRQ-
H[SODQDWLRQZRXOGEHµ7KHHDUWKLVQRWIODW¶¶$VVXPLQJWKDW\RXPD\VWLOOQRWEHLQWKHPRRG
IRUKHDY\ZHLJKWDUJXLQJ\RXPD\VD\µ%XWZRXOGµ7KHHDUWKLVQRWIODW¶EHDQRQ-
explanation to someone who believes that the earth is IODW"¶$QG,ZRXOGSUREDEO\VD\
µ<HV¶¶ 
[The quote from an earlier version of the talk is so long that, when I read it, I forget it is a 
quote (a bit like for the long quotes in the Iliad), that is, I am hindered from believing that it 
is a quote even though I know that it is a quote.] 
Here are a few non-explanations: 
0\SULPDU\VFKRROWHDFKHUZDVFDOOHGµ0DHVWUD0DULXFFL¶>:ULWHµ0DULXFFL¶RQEODFNERDUG@ 
$*HUPDQDUWLVWZKRZDVERUQLQDQGGLHGLQZDVFDOOHGµ-RVHSK%HX\V¶>:ULWH
µ%HX\V¶RQEODFNERDUG@ 
One day, in 1974, Maestra Mariucci taught a lesson at the primary school of the town of 
0XVLOHGL3LDYH>:ULWHµ0XVLOHGL3LDYH¶RQEODFNERDUG@ 
One day, in 1974, Joseph Beuys gave a lecture at The Art Institute in Chicago [Write 
µ&KLFDJR¶RQEODFNERDUG@ 
In 1974, Maestra Mariucci used a blackboard. 
In 1974, Joseph Beuys used a blackboard  
Appendix 3 
256 
 
In January 2007, I used a blackboard. 
In October 2007, I used a blackboard. 
In January 2007, somebody mentioned Joseph Beuys to me. 
In October 2007, somebody mentioned Joseph Beuys to me. 
[It would be very tempting for me to say: in January and in October 2007, nobody 
mentioned Maestra Mariucci to me. This would still be a non-explanation but it would also 
make explicit (implicit-ness/explicit-ness is another object that the talk represents through 
examples) my questioning of the usefulness of the kind of comparisons people tend to make 
when talking about art, that is, it would imply that the fact that Beuys used a blackboard 
GRHVQ¶WVHHPYHU\UHOHYDQWWRPHLQUHODWLRQWRZKDW,¶PGRLQJ7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQWSRLQWLV
to show that categories (such as non-H[SODQDWLRQDQGH[SODQDWLRQGRQ¶WKDYHQHFHVVDULO\
VKDUSO\GHILQHGOLPLWVDQGWKLVOLQNVZLWK+RIVWDGWHU¶VLPDJHRIWKHZLQGFKLPHWKDWWKH\
PD\EOXUVKDGHLQWRRQHDQRWKHU:KHQRQHVD\Vµ,DPRQO\VWDWLQJWKHIDFWV¶DVLI WRVD\µ,
am not trying to present facts in a certain light, I am not trying to tell you what to think about 
WKHIDFWV¶WKHOLQHEHWZHHQH[SODQDWLRQDQGQRQ-explanation is supposed to be very clearly 
defined. By not saying this, I hope that the form itself will reveal the content, showing it 
rather that describing it.]  
Object viii. I cannot prove the hypothesis nobody and nothing can compel one to be 
attentive; something can hinder one from being attentive. Why? 
It may be that I run out of ideas. Or there may be something about the hypothesis that resists 
(for the time being at least) its proving. So, I will have another look at the hypothesis. 
One aspect of the hypothesis that I had not noticed at first is that the two parts of it do not 
seem to me equally problematical. That attention can be hindered seems quite unproblematic 
to me, and this has nothing to do with how one defines attention. It is unproblematic because 
anything in the material world of action and reaction can potentially be hindered. Any 
human being can be hindered in any action whatsoever by another human being if, for 
instance, the latter kills the former. But what about compulsion? 
Nobody and nothing can compel one to be attentive: In order for me to prove this to each 
one of you, I would have to find a way to make you make an effort of attention, but without 
compelling you to so do (since that would disprove the hypothesis). And how could I do 
this? 
At the moment, I think that the only way I could do this is by suggesting, by inviting you to 
have faith in the hypothesis, to act as though the hypothesis were true which, as I said 
Appendix 3 
257 
 
earlier, seems to me a non-compelled act. And which is what Weil argues in the quote I read 
earlier and which I will read again: 
It is certain that this effort [of attention] will bear its fruit in prayer. There is no doubt whatever 
about that. Certainties of this kind are experimental. But if we do not believe in them before 
experiencing them, if at least we do not behave as though we believed in them, we shall never 
have the experience that leads to such certainties. There is a kind of contradiction here. Above 
a given level this is the case with all useful knowledge concerning spiritual progress. If we do 
not regulate our conduct by it before having proved it, if we do not hold on to it for a long time 
by faith alone, a faith at first stormy and without light, we shall never transform it into 
certainty. Faith is the indispensable condition.469  
But would this suggestion/invitation count as me proving to each one of you that nobody and 
nothing can compel one to be attentive? It would seem not but I am not too sure about this. 
The other issue is that, for Weil, (voluntary) attention is non-compelled by definition: 
In voluntary attention, one continuously ... stops voluntary attention from becoming 
spontaneous attention.470  
Imagine that somebody who wants to challenge Weil on the point of the non-compellability 
RIDWWHQWLRQVD\VWR:HLOµ6RPHRQHLVSRLQWLQJDJXQWR\RXUKHDG6KHJLYHV\RXSHQFLO
and paper and tells you to draw a perfect circle. S/he also tells you that if the circle you draw 
is not perfect, s/he will kill you. You will probably draw as attentively as you can and you 
ZLOOEHFRPSHOOHGWRGRVR¶,LPDJLQHWKDW:HLOZRXOGUHSO\µ1RGUDZQFLUFOHZLOOHYer be a 
perfect circle so there is no point in me trying to draw one. If my life depends on my 
GUDZLQJDSHUIHFWFLUFOH,DPDVGHDGDOUHDG\E\WKHYHU\GHILQLWLRQRISHUIHFWFLUFOH¶7KH
other, a little impatient because Weil has cunningly evaded the issue, would then slightly 
UHVKDSHWKHLPDJLQDU\VFHQDULRDQGVD\µ2NQRWDSHUIHFWFLUFOHEXWZKDWHYHUWKHJXQ-
SRLQWHUGHHPVWREHDJRRGHQRXJKFLUFOH¶,LPDJLQHWKDW:HLO¶VUHSO\ZRXOGEHµ,I,ZDV
compelled to draw attentively it was spontaneous attention that I exercised and not voluntary 
attention, which by definition is voluntary and, therefore, non-FRPSHOOHG¶ 
[The dialogue highlights the relation between form and content. The content of the dialogue 
could be represented in a non-dialogue form but LWZRXOGQ¶WEHTXLWHWKHVDPHthing ± yes, 
words on a piece of paper are a thing too, and not only at the level of ink on paper. The 
Socratic dialogues. A dialogue as an example of a line of thought?] 
Object xix. I am almost tempted to say that, for Weil, it is axiomatic that attention is non-
compellable. But I am not sure about this.  
                                                 
469
 Weil, WG, p. 58. 
470
 Weil, LF, pp. 243±4. 
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%\µD[LRP¶,PHDQtraditional axiom. In the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, under the 
ZRUGµD[LRP¶RQHUHDGV 
Traditionally, propositions taken as axioms were so selected because they were thought to be 
self-evidently and indubitably true; neither capable of proof nor requiring any.471 
The modern notion of axiom is: 
A formula (i.e. proposition, or a well-formed expression which on interpretation yields a 
proposition) that belongs to an axiomatic system, without being derived from any other 
formula in that system.472 
If you are interested in the modern notion of axiom, I suggest that you have a look at 
'RXJODV+RIVWDGWHU¶VGödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid. I can give you the 
bibliographic details at the end, if you are interested. 
So, in a way, it feels right to me that the non-compellability of attention should be axiomatic, 
since the axiom is the epitome of the non-compelled belief in the sense that nobody and 
nothing can compel one to believe an axiom, since it is so self-evident that it cannot be 
doubted in the first place.  Here is an example of an axiomatic and self-HYLGHQWWUXWKµLIa, b; 
a therefore b¶>:ULWHµLIa, b; a therefore b¶RQERDUG@,KDYHVRPHGRXEWs on whether this 
qualifies as an axiom but I will assume it does for the moment. 
I will read an extract taken from an email exchange which took place between July and 
August 2005 on the International Stoic Forum, between Paul Ryan, who I mentioned earlier, 
and somebody who I do not name because I did not ask their permission to do so. The email 
DQVZHUVDTXHVWLRQDERXW/HLEQL]¶VPrinciple of Sufficient Reason: There can be no true 
proposition without a sufficient reason for its truth. Paul writes: 
this is how I see it: 
true propositions not based on any particular reason are the 
µLQGHPRQVWUDEOHV¶RIORJLFVRFDOOHGLQVWRLFORJLF 
for example: 
If A, then B; A therefore B. 
There are five such indemonstrables. 
These are the foundations of reason, and being such they have no pre-cursor 
reasons to be true. Instead they tell us something about causation itself 
(which is why paradoxes were so important to stoics - they show up the 
detail). 
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 Mautner, 2000, p. 56. 
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So we can say: 
µ,ILWLVGD\WKHQLWLVOLJKWLWLVGD\WKHUHIRUHLWLVOLJKW¶ 
Without needing further justification 
It may be counter-intuitive, but we can also say 
µ,ILWLVGD\WKHQLWLVGDUNLWLVGD\WKHUHIRUHLWLVGDUN¶ 
but we might want to re-GHILQHWKHZRUGVµGD\¶RUµGDUN¶VRWKDWYRFDEXODU\ 
can make sense. 
I make WKDWODVWSRLQWWRWU\WRVKRZWKDWWKHµLQGHPRQVWUDEOH¶LVWKH 
SURSRVLWLRQ¶VµIRUP¶QRWWKHZRUGV 
µ,Ia, b; a therefore b¶LVDQD[LRPEHFDXVHQRERG\VRIDUWRP\NQRZOHGJHZKLFK,DGPLW
is very limited in this field) has ever come up with a way of disproving it. Thus, so far, to my 
NQRZOHGJHQRERG\KDVHYHUEHHQFRPSHOOHGLQEHOLHYLQJWKDWµ,Ia, b; a therefore b¶LVWUXH 
The way I picture to myself an axiomatic truth is in the form of a dialogue: On one side of 
the dialogue, there is a follower oI'HVFDUWHV¶ZKRKDVDWWDLQHGWKHVHFUHWRIabsolute doubt 
(there is no limit to the capacity of doubt of this Cartesian; s/he can even doubt whether s/he 
is at all, in order to come to the unshakable belief that indeed s/he is because s/he thinks); on 
the other side of the dialogue, there is somebody who has a few self-acknowledged limits 
ZKHQLWFRPHVWRGRXEWLQJ)RULQVWDQFHVKHFDQQRWGRXEWWKDWµLIa, b; a therefore b¶LVWUXH
The Cartesian says: prove it, prove it, prove it! On and on, and the other does not know what 
to say.     
 Object x. Is the non-compellability of attention likewise self-evident and non-provable? The 
title of this talk is a quote from a book by Giorgio Agamben called The Coming Community 
(the Italian original title is La communità che viene) and it is to be found near the end of the 
following passage: 
Between the not being able to not-be that sanctions the decree of necessity and the being able 
to not-be that defines fluctuating contingency, the finite world suggests a contingency to the 
second power that does not found any freedom: It is capable of not not-being, it is capable of 
the irreparable.473  
,ZRQ¶WVD\DQ\WKLQJDERXWµEHLQJDEOHWRQRW-EH¶VLQFHFRQWLQJHQF\GRHVQ¶WULQJWUXHWRPH 
When I first started writing the talk, WKHZRUGVWKDW,XVHGLQWKHWLWOHµLVFDSDEOHRIQRWQRW-
being", seemed, somehow, to promise an answer to the question: Is the non-compellability 
of attention likewise self-evident and non-provable? I say promised because it was by no 
means clear to me how it could answer the question. It was a feeling. But as the days passed 
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Appendix 3 
260 
 
WKHIHHOLQJHYDSRUDWHGDQG,VSHQWDVOHHSOHVVQLJKWZLWKµLVFDSDEOHRIQRWQRW-EHLQJ¶
swirling in my mind, trying to at least recapture that feeling if not getting an answer. 
ThenOLWWOHE\OLWWOHLWZDVQRVXGGHQEROWIURPWKHVN\DQLGHDVWDUWHGHPHUJLQJµLV
capable of not not-EHLQJ¶VXEWO\HPSKDVLVHVLQWHULRULW\,WGRHVVRE\PRYLQJWKHµQRW¶IURP
WKHSODFHEHIRUHWKHDELOLW\>:ULWHµQRWEHLQJDEOHWRQRW-EH¶RQEODFNERDUG] to the place after 
WKHDELOLW\RUFDSDELOLW\>0RYHµQRW¶@2EMHFWLVRWKDWWKHDELOLW\HQYHORSVWKHQHJDWLRQ
rather than the other way around.  
%XWDVDZDUHQHVVRIWKHVXEWOHGLIIHUHQFHLQPHDQLQJEHWZHHQµQRWEHLQJDEOHWRQRW-EH¶DQG
"is capable of not not-being" emerged,  I also became aware that it kept slipping away with 
"not being able to not-be" and "is capable of not not-being" boiling down to the same thing. I 
use the expression boiling down to convey the idea of a purely mechanistic outlook that 
assumes that meanings can be boiled down since it is, I think, this kind of outlook that makes 
me lose sight of the subtle difference.  
Acknowledge complexity. I will conclude the talk with an image that Douglas Hofstadter 
develops in the book The 0LQG¶V,, which, to me, seems a fruit of a non-boiling down 
outlook. This book is concerned with the issue of the distinction between matter and mind. 
The view of the author is that the distinction is not nearly as sharp as it has generally been 
thought to be, but rather is a matter of (subtle) degree. 
[Attach the Tractatus to the twine and hang it] 
7KHLPDJHLVWKDWRIDZLQGFKLPHWKHORZOLHVWZLQGFKLPH¶+RIVWDGWHUVD\VWKDWWKLVZLQG
FKLPHKDVYROLWLRQ%XWWKHQKHJRHVRQµ%XWLVLWIDLU"'RHVDZLnd chime have desires? 
&DQDZLQGFKLPHWKLQN"¶7KHQKHSURJUHVVLYHO\PDNHVKLVLPDJLQHGZLQGFKLPHPRUHDQG
more complex:  
There is a fan on a track near the chime, whose position is electronically controlled by the 
angle of one particular branch in the chime, and whose blades rotational speed is controlled by 
the angle of another branch ... many branches control blowers, one blower per branch. Now 
when wind ± natural or blower-caused ± blows, a group of tinklers will shimmer, and subtly 
and delicately they will transmit a soft shimmer to various other portions of the chime. That in 
turn propagates around, gradually twisting branches, thus creating a new chime state that 
determines where the blowers point and how hard they blow ... Now the external wind and the 
internal chime state are intertwined in a very complicated way ± so complicated, in fact, that it 
would be very hard to disentangle them conceptually from each other.474   
 [Turn blackboard.] 
                                                 
474
 Hofstadter, 1982, p. 198.  
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I leave you with the image of this wind chime which is so very hard to disentangle 
FRQFHSWXDOO\IURPWKHZLQGWKDWEORZVRQLW$JDPEHQ¶VµLVFDSDEOHRIQRWQRW-EHLQJ¶VHHPV
to me also to point to the same complexity, to give a flavour of it with the subtlety of the 
linguistic adjustments that he makes. [Again the importance of form for content/meaning. 
7KHGLIIHUHQFHLQ$JDPEHQ¶VSKUDVHVLVYHU\GLIILFXOWWRH[SODLQLQWHUPVRIJUDPPDWLFDO
difference. From a grammatical point of view, both phrases are a double negation and they 
KDYHµURXJKO\¶WKHVDPHPHDQLQJ@ 
It seems to me that a discourse on the compellability or non-compellability of attention 
would have to start with an acknowledgement of such complexity, which is what I aimed to 
do with this talk.  
Thank you. 
Appendix 4 
262 
 
Appendix 4 
263 
 
Appendix 4: Version of %kWRQGHO¶DYHXJOH published in Alfier, 2010.  
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Text on Appendix 5, p. 273.  
Dear Fellows of the Board of Discernment of Realities, 
I learn, not without profound consternation, that BODOR doubts my reality. I shall tackle 
the issue headlong and without hesitation: I am real! You should know that I seldom employ 
exclamation marks, but I hope you will excuse this use of heightened punctuation, given the 
fact that what is at stake here is nothing less that my reality! I am quite sure that many 
others, if similarly plighted, would not refrain from using two, or even three exclamation 
marks! In the acts of your last yearly colloquy, whose inflammatory, yet infuriatingly 
catchy, title was Railing at Roilers of Really Real, one reads: 
³$IWHUPXFKFDUHIXOGHOLEHUDWLQJWKHPHPEHUVRIWKH%RDUGXQDQLPRXVO\FRQFXUWKDW Mr 
Otto U. Gayl is a mere figment of the imagination, an inconsequential thought, an 
immaterial nothing, a less than measly insignificance, a paltry, puny, trifle of a negligible 
triviality. Succinctly, Mr Gayl is NOT REAL, and, therefore, Mr Gayl shall be BANNED 
FROM REALITY, from now on and for eternity. Anyone found claiming the reality of Mr 
*D\OZLOOEHVHYHUHO\SURVHFXWHG´ 
Leaving aside the question of how something non-real would need to, or even could be, 
banned from reality, I believe that I have good reasons to be alarmed. May I ask how any of 
you, gentlemen of the Board, would react at the unexpected news of your unreality? Not to 
mention the fact that, having claimed, at the opening of this letter, my reality, I can now look 
forward to be severely prosecuted, although I wonder how: by realigning the real rollers of 
my derailed unreality, perhaps? That would not surprise me, if the title of your colloquy is 
anything to go by. But let us move on. 
To me, the fact of my reality seems to follow uncontrovertibly from the fact that I am 
writing to you. Yet, I understand (or, rather, I can imagine, which, perhaps, is not the same 
as understanding) that, in order to be reassured, or, rather, assured, of my reality, you might 
need some elucidations as regards the modality of my being real. What does qualify as real, 
for me? Simple: anything that can conceivably have an effect, of which the real something is 
the cause, or that can reasonably explain a fact, is real. It is true that, since clairvoyance is 
rare and since reasonableness is a complicated notion, the matter is not as simple as it may at 
first appear, nevertheless, the criteria of reality, which I propose, have, on the whole, proved 
reliable in my day-to-day business of deciding what is real. 
Let us go back to 1633. In Rome, Galileo Galilei stands before the Inquisition, suspected of 
heresy. In his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, he had argued, in a 
PDQQHUQRWYHLOHGHQRXJKIRUKHOLRFHQWULVP*DOLOHRLVWKLQNLQJ³,ZRQGHULIJHRFentrism is 
UHDO"´1RZ,DPWKLQNLQJ³*DOLOHR¶VPRVWREYLRXVDQGUHDVRQDEOHH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHIDFW
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that he was standing trial was the reality of geocentrism. And he could conceive of a set of 
likely effects of geocentrism, effects which geocentrism would have conceivably caused, 
had he not recanted his heliocentric assertions. Therefore, Galileo must have concluded that 
JHRFHQWULVPZDVUHDOLQGHHG´1R*DOLOHRGLGQRWWKLQNWKDWJHRFHQWULVPZDVtrue. In fact, 
it is precisely because he believed that geocentrism was false that he became so aware of the 
reality of it. But, I ask, is it not enough for something that is real to be real? Why burden it 
with the weighty bifurcation of either true or false?      
As I said, I am real. I am real as geocentrism is real. And I can add a further analogy: I am 
UHDODVLVUHDO/HWPHH[SODLQZLWKDUDWKHUORQJTXRWHIURP'RXJODV+RIVWDGWHU¶VI Am 
A Strange Loop&KDSWHUµ7KH&DXVDO3RWHQF\RI3DWWHUQV¶6XEFKDSWHUµ7KH3ULPH
0RYHU¶ 
³0\ILUVWH[DPSOHLQYROYHV WKHIDPLOLDUQRWLRQRIDFKDLQRIIDOOLQJGRPLQRV+RZHYHU,¶OO
jazz up the standard image a bit by stipulating that each domino is spring-loaded in a clever 
fashion (details do not concern us) so that whenever it gets knocked down by its neighbor, 
after DVKRUW³UHIUDFWRU\´SHULRGLWIOLSVEDFNXSWRLWVYHUWLFDOVWDWHDOOVHWWREHNQRFNHG
down once more. With such a system, we can implement a mechanical computer that works 
by sending signals down stretches of dominos that can bifurcate or join together; thus signals 
can propagate in loops, jointly trigger other signals, and so forth. Relative timing, of course, 
will be of the essence, but once again, details do not concern us. The basic idea is just that 
we can imagine a network of precisely timed domino chains that amounts to a computer 
program for carrying out a particular computation, such as determining if a given input is a 
prime number or not. (John Searle, so fond of unusual substrates for computation, should 
OLNHWKLV³GRPLQRFKDLQLXP´WKRXJKWHxperiment!) 
/HWXVWKXVLPDJLQHWKDWZHFDQJLYHDVSHFLILFQXPHULFDO³LQSXW´WRWKHFKDLQLXPE\WDNLQJ
any positive integer we are interested in ± 641, say ± and placing exactly that many dominos 
HQGWRHQGLQD³UHVHUYHG´VWUHWFKRIWKHQHWZRUN1RZZKHQZHWLSRYHUWKHFKDLQLXP¶V
first domino, a Rube Goldberg-type series of events will take place in which domino after 
domino will fall, including, shortly after the outset, all 641 of the dominos constituting our 
input stretch, and as a consequence various loops will be triggered, with some loop 
presumably testing the input number for divisibility by 2, another for divisibility by 3, and so 
forth. If ever a divisor is found, then a signal will be sent down one particular stretch ± OHW¶V
FDOOLWWKH³GLYLVRUVWUHWFK´± and when we see that stretch falling, we will know that the 
input number has some divisor and thus is not prime. By contrast, if the input has no divisor, 
then the divisor stretch will never be triggered and we will know the input is prime.     
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Suppose an observer is standing by when the domino chainium is given 641 as input. The 
observer, who has not been told what the chainium was made for, watches keenly for a 
while, then points at one of the dominos in the divisor stretch and asks with curiRVLW\³+RZ
FRPHWKDWGRPLQRWKHUHLVQHYHUIDOOLQJ"´ 
Let me contrast two very different type of answer that someone may give. The first type of 
answer ± myopic to the point of silliness ± ZRXOGEH³%HFDXVHLWVSUHGHFHVVRUQHYHUIDOOV
\RXGXPP\´7REHVXUHWKLVLVFRUUHFWDVIDUDVLWJRHVEXWLWGRHVQ¶WJRYHU\IDU,WMXVW
pushes the buck to a different domino, and thus begs the question. 
7KHVHFRQGW\SHRIDQVZHUZRXOGEH³%HFDXVHLVSULPH´1RZWKLVDQVZHUZKLOHMXVW
as correct (indeed, in some sense is far more on the mark), has the curious property of not 
talking about anything physical at all. Not only has the focus moved upwards to collective 
properties of the chainium, but those properties somehow transcend the physical and have to 
do with pure abstractions, such as primality. 
[...] 
%HIRUHSDVVLQJRQWRRWKHUPHWDSKRUV,¶GOLNHWRSRLQWRXWWKDWDOWKRXJKKHUH¶V
primality was used as an explanation for why a certain domino did not fall, it could equally 
serve as the explanation for why a certain domino did fall. In particular, in the domino 
FKDLQLXPWKHUHFRXOGEHDVWUHWFKFDOOHGWKH³SULPHVWUHWFK´ZKRVHGRPLQRVDOOWRSSOHZKHQ
the set of potential divisors has been exhausted, which means that the input has been 
determined to be prime. 
7KHSRLQWRIWKLVH[DPSOHLVWKDW¶VSULPDOLW\LVWKHEHVWH[SODQDWLRQSHUKDSVHYHQWKH
only explanation, for why certain dominos did fall and certain other ones did not fall. In a 
word, 641 is a prime mover. So I ask: Who shoves whom around inside the domino 
FKDLQLXP"´475.  
³:KRVKRYHVZKRPDURXQGLQVLGHWKHGRPLQRFKDLQLXP"´,VWKHUHDEHWWHUZD\WRHQGD
TXRWDWLRQWKDQRQDTXHVWLRQLQJQRWH"³:KRVKRYHVZKRPDURXQGLQVLGHWKHGRPLQR
FKDLQLXP"´$QGDTXHVWLRQDERXWFDXVHDQGHIIHFWDERXWVKRYLQg, in the bargain! Where 
was I? Ah, yes: I am real as 641 is real. I suspect that you, with your detestable nominalistic 
ways, whose perniciousness is indicated by the despicable language you have used to 
describe my supposed non-reality, would hold that 641 is not real, and that the only real 
thing in relation to the not-falling of domino x is the not-falling domino preceding it (the 
not-falling domino, not the not-falling of it). What can I say to you? On the one hand, I feel 
sorry for you: you are like a people whose numerical system does not include the notion of 
                                                 
475
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0; even though you get by, your calculations are incredibly cumbersome and, must I say it, 
they lack the intangible Beauty of True Mathematics. On the other hand, I despise your 
arrogant presumption of being the keepers of the gates of reality. You delusionally believe 
yourselves to be the tamers of that ravenous institutional Great Beast whose name is 
BODOR, but, in fact, BODOR subjugates you, mere slaves to a monstrous master. 
But, ultimately I do not fear your ban. If you wish, you can hang a generous reward over my 
unreal head, as bait for those who would be only too glad to hand my unreal self over to the 
real you, if ever should I digress the unreal borders, or the real limits of unreality, within 
which, by your decree, you allegedly confine me. The fact is that you cannot keep me out, 
and you know it. Your preposterous words are a sure mark of the powerlessness you so 
desperately attempt to conceal. Well, you cannot fool me. 
Yours really, 
Otto U. Gayl 
*** 
Text on Appendix 5, pp. 278±280.  
FE: You know, off Dundonald Road, coming from Wimbledon Station²I often walk it on 
my way here²MXVWDIWHUWKHWUDPOLQHWKHUH¶VDWXUQRQWKHULJKWFDOOHG³*RRGHQRXJK5RDG´
:KHQ,VDZ³1RWDXWRORJ\LQWKHNLQJGRPRI*RRGHQRXJK´RYHUWKH&HQWUHIRU'UDZLQJ
Project Space door, it came to mind. Any connection? 
DA: Yes, I know the road you mean. No connection, not conscious, at least. There is an 
DQHFGRWHWKDWWKHSKUDVH³/HWQRRQHLJQRUDQWRIJHRPHWU\HQWHU´ was engraved at the 
entrance of Plato's Academy. I also remember reading²I think it might have been in 
Simone PétremeQW¶VELRJUDSK\RI6LPRQH:HLO²that, in one of the lycées where Weil 
taught, her students had written this same phrase, or something like it, over the classroom 
GRRU7KHVFKRRODXWKRULWLHVZHUHQ¶WSOHDVHGZLWKLW3HUKDSVWKH\ZHUHQ¶WJHRPHWULFLDQV$OO
WKLVZDVDWWKHEDFNRIP\PLQGZKHQ*D\OFDPHXSZLWKKLVRZQYHWR³Let no one ignorant 
RI7DXWRORJ\HQWHU´%XW*D\OLVYHU\DPELYDOHQWOn the one hand, he is a sort of perfect 
HPERGLPHQWRIWDXWRORJ\DQGRQWKHRWKHUKHLVWKH³+RXGLQLRI7DXWRORJ\´DVKHRQFH
said, so... 
FE: Do you know that Houdini used to attend séances to debunk con psychics and mediums?  
DA: No. 
FE: Yes, he was a member of a Scientific American committee that offered a cash prize to 
any medium who could demonstrate supernatural abilities.  
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DA: Did anyone ever collect the prize? 
FE: No, thanks to Houdini. Quite ironically, after his death, his wife, Bess, held yearly 
séances at Halloween for ten years. He never showed up, so she stopped. She said ten years 
was long enough to wait for any man. 
DA: This reminds me of something Weil says about attention, absolutely pure attention, 
attention to the void, to what is inexpressible, impossible. 
FE: What do you mean? 
DA: When attention is directed towards something that can be present without attention, 
DWWHQWLRQLVQRWSXUHLW¶VPL[HGZLWKLPSUHVVLRQ3HUIHFWFLUFOHVIRULQVWDQFH<RXFDQ¶WKDYH
an impression of them, because no drawn circle, no visible circle, will ever be perfect. For 
WKHVHQVHVDSHUIHFWFLUFOHGRHVQ¶WH[LVWVRLI\RXFRQFHLYHLI\RXLPDJLQHDSHUIHFWFLUFOH
LW¶VVROHO\E\YLUWXHRIDQHIIRUWRIDWWHQWLRQ 
OF: But how can you imagine a perfect circle? 
'$,W¶VZKDW:HLOFDOOVattention à vide, an expression that is difficult to translate in 
(QJOLVK,WPHDQVµDLPOHVVDWWHQWLRQ¶EXWWKHQ\RXORVHWKHYRLGDQGWKHLPDJHRIµDWWHQGLQJ
WRWKHYRLG¶ 
FE: Empty attention, perhaps? 
'$7KDW¶VPLVOHDGLQJThis kind of attention is full, fully directed towards the void.  
FE: Oriented attention but not clinging... sometimes I try to listen to music that way. 
DA: Attention as desire without wish ± µZLVK¶DVLQ³PDNHDZLVK´:HLOJLYHVWKHH[DPSOH
of the love one has for a person who is dead: One desires that s/he has been, and s/he has 
been. 
OF: You desire that the one you love be dead? 
'$1RLW¶VQRWOLNHWKDW(LWKHU\RXDFFHSWWKHIDFWWKDWZHOOLI\RXZLVKWKDWWKHGHDGEH
DOLYH\RXGRQ¶WGHVLUHWhe life of the one you love, since, clearly, that particular life ended 
when it did. You desire an imaginary life. 
OF: I vaguely see what you are saying, you know, like one of those featureless patterns you 
VWDUHDWWLOOWKH\SRSXSLQ'LW¶VDERXWWRSRSEXWLWGRHVQ¶W,W¶VYHU\FRXQWHULQWXLWLYH 
DA: Bess waited for ten years, but not à vide. She was waiting for something, a ghost, a 
YRLFH,GRQ¶WNQRZ 
OF: Ten years was long enough, for her. 
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FE: Good enough. 
DA: Goodenough. Ah, yes: Goodenough Road. I was saying, Gayl µHPERGLPHQWRI
WDXWRORJ\¶DQGGayl µ+RXGLQLRIWDXWRORJ\¶ ³1R7DXWRORJ\LQWKH.LQJGRPRI
*RRGHQRXJK´DVLIWRVD\³:KDWWDXWRORJ\"7KHUH¶VQRSHUIHFWWDXWRORJ\$OZD\VDFUDFN
somewhere, always tarnish, at most enough, never perfect´ 
FE: Like a perfect circle, a perfect tautology exists only by virtue of an effort of attention. 
'$<RXFRXOGSXWLWWKDWZD\:KHQ,VDZ³*22'(128*+´VWHQFLOOHGRQWKHZDOO,
NHSWUHDGLQJµJRRGQRXJK¶DQGWKLQNLQJgoode DVDQREVROHWHVSHOOLQJRIµJRRG¶GRHVLW
exist?), like olde IRUµROG¶DQGnoughtHYHQWKRXJKWKHUH¶VQRµW¶1RJRRGJRRGIRU
QRWKLQJVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKDW$QGWKHQ,GRQ¶WNQRZZK\,WKRXJKWRI*RRGHQRXJK5RDG 
OF: Do you know the story about the two friends talking about beauty?  
DA: No. 
)(7KHRQHLQZKLFKWKHIULHQGVHQGXSORRNLQJLQWRHDFKRWKHU¶VSXSLOVWRVHHLIEHDXW\
really is in the eye of the beholder? 
OF: No. This is about two inseparable friends called Tauto and Logy. They are sitting by the 
sea, at sunset. TauWRVD\V³,VQ¶WWKLVEHDXWLIXO´³<HVWUXO\EHDXWLIXOWKHFDOPVHDWKH
LQFDQGHVFHQWUHGWKHVHDJXOOVDK´VD\V/RJ\³%XW\RXFDQ¶WUHGXFHWKLVEHDXW\WRD
PHUHVWULQJRIIDFWVDVLI\RXFRXOGHQJLQHHULWLQVRPHODEDWZLOO´³2N7KHQEHDXW\LV´
³%HDXW\LVEHDXW\EHDXW\LVjust EHDXW\´7DXWRFULHVRXW$QG/RJ\³*RRG6Rthat is that. 
:KDWFDQZHWDONDERXWQRZ"´ 
FE: Logy is the one who wants to articulate ideas. It seems to fit its name: In the beginning 
was the word, the logos. And logos DOVRPHDQVµDFFRXQW¶µVSHHFK¶µH[SODQDWLRQ¶ 
2)/RJ\ZDQWVWRJLYHDQDFFRXQWRIEHDXW\EXW7DXWRZRQ¶WKDYHDQ\RIWKDW7UXHWRLWV
name (tauto µWKHVDPH¶7DXWRNHHSVUHSHDWLQJLWVHOI7DXWRGRHVQ¶WZDQWH[SODQDWLRQV
GRHVQ¶WGR plane, but goes around and around.    
'$7KHUH¶VDWHQVLRQLQWKHYHU\ZRUGµWDXWRORJ\¶EHWZHHQFLUFXODUUHWLFHQFHDQGGHVLUHWR
talk through.  
OF: Could you say something about how Gayliana: Isle of Idle relates to your study of 
:HLO¶VQRWLRQRIDWWHQWLRQ" 
DA: As I see it, Weilian attention forms a cluster of what I would call agnostic ultimate 
notions: The ethical notion of absolute good, the aesthetic notion of absolute beauty, and the 
logical notion of absolute truth. These, for Weil, are inseparable, they are, in a way the same 
thing, expressions of the same thing in different domains, perhaps. The most elevated kind 
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of attention leads to an omni-acceptance of reality (consent to everything that happens, amor 
fati), reality which is the creation of God who, in creating, withdraws itself from creation 
and is therefore unknowable, as are GRG¶VSHUIHFWJRRGWUXWKDQGEHDXW\9HU\PXFKD
negative theology: This kind of acceptance is an unreachable ideal. 
OF: A void? 
'$$Q\DEVROXWHHQWLW\DVWKHWHUPµDE-VROXWH¶ suggests, is solely itself, the same as itself, 
WKDWLVDWDXWRORJ\,WKLQN,DPPRUHRID³/RJ\W\SH´,ZDQWWRWDONWRXQIROGQRW
necessarily with words... unfold tautology. I think Otto U. Gayl was born out of this desire. 
)(µ8QIROG¶IHHOVYHU\ GLIIHUHQWIURPµH[SODLQ¶µ([SODLQ¶PDNHVPHWKLQNRILURQLQJWDNLQJ
WKHFUHDVHVRXW,W¶VIHHOVDELWSXULWDQLFDO 
OF: Explaining is puritanical? 
)(3HUKDSVLW¶VMXVWWKDWLURQLQJLVVRERULQJ 
DA: Some people even iron their towels. 
OF: They do look much tidier in the linen cupboard. 
DA: I suppose they do. Anyway, there was Gayl... 
OF: What about Tino Netta or Annie Tott? 
'$6RUU\,GRQ¶WIROORZ\RX 
OF: Otto U. Gayl is a personification of tautology. Have you thought about personifying 
attention? I¶GEHLQWHUHVWHGWRVHHZKDWDWWHQWLRQJHWVXSWR 
)(7KHILUVWFKDUDFWHUWRDSSHDURQWKHVFHQHLQ$HVFK\OXV¶Prometheus Bound is Strength, 
and there is Violence too. 
DA: I have an Italian translation of Prometheus, and it has Potere µ3RZHU¶IRU6WUHQJWK and 
Forza µ6WUHQJWK¶IRU9LROHQFH²TXLWHGLIIHUHQW,KDGQ¶WWKRXJKWDERXWSHUVRQLI\LQJ
DWWHQWLRQ,¶GSUREDEO\FKRRVH$QQLH,VXSSRVHLW¶VEHFDXVHµDWWHQWLRQ¶LVIHPLQLQHLQ,WDOLDQ
my mother tongue.    
)(,IWKHUHZDVDQH[WUDµH¶LQµDWWHQWLRQ¶\RXcould have had Antoinette: attention so 
HOHYDWHGDVWREH³KHDG\´'RHVQ¶WGHDOLQJZLWKWDXWRORJ\IHHOOLNHEHLQJLQDKDPVWHU
ZKHHO",PHDQ\RXGRQ¶WJRDQ\ZKHUH$WOHDVWZLWKSDUDGR[HV\RXSURJUHVVDOLWWOHQRW
PXFKWKDW¶VWUXHEXWIRUH[DPSOHµ7KLVVWDWHPHQWLVIDOVH¶,ILW¶VWUXHLW¶VIDOVHEXWLI
LW¶VIDOVHLW¶VWUXH\RXVHHDELWRIVSDFHWRVWUHWFK%XWZLWKWDXWRORJ\LW¶VUHDOO\MXVWJRLQJ
around in circles. 
DA: It feels more like a spiral to me. 
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FE: Moving inwards or outwards? 
DA1HLWKHU,GRQ¶WNQRZ,KDYHQ¶WUHDOO\WKRXJKWDERXWLW 
2),¶GOLNHWRVD\VRPHWKLQJWKDWWDQJHQWLDOO\UHODWHVWR28*$µKHUH¶LQ%UDLOOH$
IHZ\HDUVDJR,ZDVGULYLQJWRP\EURWKHU¶VZLWKDQHSKHZRIPLQHKHZDVDERXWWKUHHDW
the time and he KDGQHYHUEHHQWRP\EURWKHU¶VKRXVH+HNHSWJLYLQJGLUHFWLRQVDOOWKHZD\
:KHQZHJRWWKHUH,DVNHGKLP³'R\RXNQRZZKHUH\RXDUH"´+HYHU\FRQILGHQWO\VDLG
³<HV´³:KHUH"´³+HUH´ 
DA: He was right. 
OF: Yes, faultless. 
DA: I wonder what he would haYHVDLGLI\RXKDGDVNHG³:KHUH¶VKHUH"´ 
2)³+HUHLVKHUH´SHUKDSV":K\LVWKHJODVVHQJUDYHGZLWKWKHZRUGµKHUH¶FRYHUHGE\D
plastic casing? 
DA: How do you know Braille? 
OF: I have a friend who is blind. When she goes on holidays, she takes pictures. I asked her 
why. She said it was to show them to people who can see. It made me think about being 
blind in a world of mostly seeing people, and I learnt to read Braille. 
'$,GLGQ¶WZDQWSHRSOHWREHDEOHWRWRXFKLW,ZDQWHGWRPDNHLWXVHOHVVRUXQXsable, like 
DPDSZLWKDSRLQWLQJ³\RXDUHKHUH´ZKHQ\RXGRQ¶WNQRZZKHUHKHUHLV,ZDVDOVR
thinking about the idea (was it Kant?) that the beautiful is purposeless, useless. And, you 
NQRZYHU\RIWHQZKHQRQHVD\V³<RXUDUJXPHQWLVDWDXWRORJ\´LW¶Vmeant as a fault²I 
suppose it is²EXWWKHUH¶VDQRWKHUZD\RIORRNLQJDWWDXWRORJ\DVWKH\GRLQORJLF$
tautology is a propositional formula that is true under any possible valuation. So it seems 
WKDW\RXFDQEHVXUHWKDWµ$LV$¶LVDOZD\VWUXH$QGZKDW¶VWKHXVHRIWKDW" 
)(%XWLQDZD\WRNQRZWKDWKHUHLVKHUHLVQ¶WXVHOHVV'RHVDVWRQHNQRZWKDW" 
'$,GRQ¶WNQRZ 
2)0D\EHDVWRQHLVVRFHUWDLQRILWDGHJUHHRIFHUWDLQW\ZHFDQ¶WHYHQLPDJLQHWKDWIRULW
here is actually hereVRWKHUH¶VRQly HERE. 
DA: Or maybe stones are not very talkative.   
)(,FDQ¶WUHDG%UDLOOHVR,GLGQ¶WNQRZWKDWLWUHDG³KHUH´,DVVXPHPRVWSHRSOHFDQ¶WUHDG
%UDLOOH,VQ¶WWKDWDSUREOHP" 
'$,WZRXOGQ¶WWDNHPXFKIRUVRPHRQHWRMRWGRZQWKHGRWVDQGWRJRDQGIind out what 
they mean. 
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2)$QGZKHQWKH\ILQGRXWWKH\ZRXOGQ¶WEHKHUH,PHDQKHUHZRXOGEHthere, displaced, 
and here here would be, in a sense, vacant. 
DA: Void. 
)(7KDW¶VDVNLQJDORWRIWKHYLHZHU 
'$,GRQ¶WVHHDSUREOHPZLWKWKDW,W¶VQRWLPpossible. Perhaps, it would help, if I said 
something about the genealogy of this work, or it might just confuse things. 2009 is the birth 
centenary of Weil and I want to mark it with a work in Ashford, Kent, where she is buried. 
,Q$VKIRUGWKHUH¶VDURDGFDOOHG³6LPRQH:HLO$YHQXH´ 
OF: So roads come around again. 
'$<HVDQGWKHUH¶VDSODTXHGHGLFDWHGWR:HLOZLWKDIHZELRJUDSKLFDOGHWDLOV,WKRXJKW,
FRXOGPDNHDVLJQWRJRQHDUWKHSODTXHDVLJQLQ%UDLOOHUHDGLQJ³\RXDUHKHUH´ZLWKQR
relief. I had an email exchange about it with a friend of mine, who had many questions about 
what the sign would communicate, about what its illegibility would convey. He also thought 
that there was, on my part, an intention to conceal something, and when I told him, that, yes, 
WKHUHZDVKHUHSOLHGWKDWWKDWZDVILQHZLWKKLPEXWWKDWLWPLJKWEDFNILUH,GLGQ¶WTXLWH
understand what he meant by that, but he knows me very well, so I reckon he probably had a 
point. I toyed with the idea of using this email dialogue to write a fictional dialogue between 
5KHD2¶(XUH\DQDQDJUDPRIµ\RXDUHKHUH¶DQG,FDQ¶WUHPHPEHUQRZVRPHWKLQJWRGR
ZLWKWKH*HUPDQIRUµGHDWK¶ 
2)6RKRZGLG\RXJHWIURP³WKHUH´WR³KHUH´WRWKHSLHFHLQGayliana? 
FE: Gayl and Weil: They sound very similar. Coincidence? 
'$$JDLQLWZDVQ¶WDFRQVFLRXVWKLQJEXWLWFDQ¶WEHIRUWXLWRXV,WKLQN,W¶VFXULRXV:KHQ
\RXVD\³*D\OLDQD´,WKLQN³*D\OLDQD,VOHRI,GOH´SHUKDSVEHFDXVH,WKLQNSOD\IXOQHVVLV
at the heart of this installation. $V,ZURWHRQWKHSRVWHULW¶VDERXWWKHLGHDRIattention-as-
waiting EHLQJDVRUWRIDVVLGXRXVLGOLQJ7KDW¶VZK\,KDGWKHLPDJHRIWKHFORXGUHDGHURQ
the poster: Productive idling. When I was a child, I remember one year I read several times 
The Mysterious Island by Verne. It was summer, under a huge kaki tree... 
2):KDWGRHVDNDNLWUHHORRNOLNH",¶YHQHYHUVHHQRQH 
DA: Its fruits look a bit like orange tomatoes. 
OF: Are they nice? 
'$,GRQ¶WNQRZ,¶YHQHYHUHDWHQDQ\EXW\RXcan eat them. Birds liked them. I kept 
UHDGLQJLWRYHUDQGRYHUDJDLQ,W¶VDVLILWKDGQ¶WRFFXUUHGWRPHWKDW,FRXOGUHDGVRPHWKLQJ
else.  
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FE: I had something similar when I was fourteen with Brave New World. I think it belonged 
to my sister.  
OF: Do you remember soma"³+Xg me till you drug me honey kiss me... 
OF & FE: ... till I'm in a coma hug me honey snuggly bunny love's as good as soma." 
DA: Soma? As in soma sema in the Phaedrus? 
OF: Nothing to do with that. 
DA: Soma sema PHDQVµWKHERG\LVDWRPE¶DWRPEIRUWKHVRXO, if I remember correctly, but 
,RIWHQWKLQN³WKHVLJQLVDWRPE´ 
FE: A tomb of what? 
DA: Just a tomb. 
OF: Imagine a people whose language has only nouns²no verbs. 
FE: And pronouns? 
2)1RXQVDQGSURQRXQVµKRXVH¶µWKLV¶µWRPE¶ 
)(<RXVHH,FDQ¶WLPDJLQHWKDW:KHQ\RXVD\³KRXVHWKLVWRPE´,DXWRPDWLFDOO\WKLQN
VRPHWKLQJOLNH³WKLVKRXVHLVDWRPE´RU³WKLVWRPELVDKRXVH´ 
2)-XVWEHFDXVH\RXFDQ¶WLPDJLQHLWLWGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWLWFDQ¶WEH 
FE: Can you imagine it? 
OF: No. I guess, after so many years of predicative language, it would take a lot of practice.   
'$7KH\FRXOGQ¶WWKLQNWDXWRORJLHV 
OF: Do they have compounds? 
FE: Sorry? 
2)&RPSRXQGZRUGVOLNHµKRXVHKRXVH¶µWKLVWKLV¶µWRPEWRPE¶" 
)(:KDW¶VDtombtomb? 
DA: Can I just come in and steer a little the conversation? There, under the video, there are 
some books which are relevant to Gayliana: Isle of Idle&DQ,SLFNRQH")ODQQ2¶%ULHQ¶V
The Third Police Man. 
)(+RZGLG\RXILQG)ODQQ2¶%ULHQ" 
DA: In a second-hand bookshop. Can you speak Irish? 
FE: I learnt it in school. I speak it a bit. I can read it. 
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'$,Q,ULVKWKHZRUGIRUµMXVWLFH¶LVceart DQGµVTXDUH¶LVcearnógLVQ¶WLW",ZDVOHDILQJ
through an English-Irish dictionary, once. Are ceart and cearnóg etymologically related? 
FE: I know ceart PHDQVµFHUWDLQ¶µVXUH¶EXW,GLGQ¶WNQRZLWDOVRPHDQVµMXVWLFH¶:K\GR
you ask? 
DA: I was curious because it seems to make sense that justice should be square, you know, 
precise, measured. 
FE: It could have something to do with public squares. 
'$7KDWDSSHDOVPXFKOHVV,QVWLWXWLRQ%XW,¶PGLJUHVVLQJ 
OF: I think justice is more of a circle: All are equal before the law, as all the points on the 
circumference are equidistant from the centre. 
DA: Actually, this reminds me of something Weil writes which is not that far from the issue 
of attention. She says that there is an analogy between the way a right-angled triangle is 
bound to the circle of which its hypotenuse is the diameter and, say, the just man who 
abstains from power at the price of fraud. And one can perceive this analogy only if one can 
SHUFHLYHPDWKHPDWLFDOQHFHVVLW\DQGWKDW¶VZKHUHDWWHQWLRQFRPHVLQintellectual attention: 
It is attention that makes one perceive reality as a web of necessary relationships. I think all 
WKLVLVLQWKHHVVD\µ7KH3\WKDJRUHDQ'RFWULQH¶LQIntimations of Christianity among the 
Ancient Greeks. 
)(³7KHVXQZLOOQRWWUDQVJUHVVKLVPHDVXUH,IKHGRHVWKH)XULHVPLQLVWHUVRI-XVWLFH
('LNƝZLOOILQGKLPRXW´+HUDFOLWXV 
DA: Strange use RIWHQVHV,ZRXOGUDWKHUVD\³7KHVXQFDQQRWWUDQVJUHVVKLVPHDVXUH,IKH
GLGWKH)XULHVPLQLVWHUVRI-XVWLFHZRXOGILQGKLPRXW´%XW,GRQ¶WNQRZDQFLHQW*UHHN,
GRQ¶WNQRZKRZYHUEVZRUN 
FE: Neither do I. This is a translation by Charles Khan. <RXVDLG³intellectual DWWHQWLRQ´,V
that different from attention à vide? 
DA: They are not the same. Through intellectual attention, you see conditional necessity, or 
UHDOLW\DQGWKHQWKHUH¶VDKLJKHUGHJUHHRIDWWHQWLRQWKURXJKZKLFK\RXDFFHSWFRQVHnt to, 
love reality. Weil says that intellectual attention produces only a half-reality. It is the higher 
form of attention which gives the fullness of reality. Is this elevated attention the same as 
attention à vide":HLOGLGQ¶WZULWHDV\VWHPDWLFWUHDWLVe on attention, but, yes, I think for her 
WKH\¶UHWKHVDPHWKLQJ 
FE: So how do you go from intellectual attention to attention à vide?  
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'$7REHKRQHVWP\YLHZVRQWKLVRVFLOODWH6RPHWLPHV,WKLQNLW¶VDJUDGXDOLQFUHDse 
from one towards the other²Dµyou-FDQ¶W-run-before-you-can-ZDON¶VRUWRIWKLQJ²and, 
VRPHWLPHV,WKLQNWKHUH¶VGLVFRQWLQuity, when you get to the top²PRUHRIDµ0DU\-sucked-
up-to-KHDYHQ¶W\SHRIHYHQW 
FE: Do you believe that? 
DA: What? 
FE: The giant cosmic hoover effect. The Assumption. 
DA: That people can be transported up to the celestial sphere body and soul? No, not really. 
But then I sometimes catch myself thinking thoughts that, well, somehow, seem just as 
untenable, but they have a more acceptable attire. It comes down to fashion, perhaps: 
Fashionable thinking, thinking out of fashion. 
FE: Assumption? Thinking out of mind, if you ask me! 
2)2ULWPLJKWKDYHVRPHWKLQJWRGRZLWKWKHIDFWWKDWVLJQVFDQGHFHLYHLI\RXGRQ¶WTXLWH
know what you are dealing with. Who was it who saLG³%HWZHHQWKHWZRRIWKHPWKH\RQO\
had 10 g of bread, a measly 5 g each. Had they thought of sharing with a third, what never-
HQGLQJDEXQGDQFH´" 
)(2UWKHDSSDUHQWLQILQLW\RIʌ 
'$$QG=HQR¶VWXUWOH 
FE: Tortoise!  
OF: On my mp3 player I have a discussion with Derrida, in 2002. He is talking about 
µSUD\LQJ¶DQGWKHUH¶VDSDUWZKLFK,WKLQNLVUHOHYDQWWRZKDWZHDUHWDONLQJDERXW,¶YH
listened WRLWVRPDQ\WLPHVWKDW,NQRZH[DFWO\ZKHUHLWLV¶¶¶WR¶¶¶'R\RXPLQG
if I connect this to WKHVSHDNHUDQGSOD\LW"³the suspension of certainty is part of the prayer. 
And then I consider that this suspension of certainty, this suspension of knowledge, this 
inability to answer your question²³7RZKRP":KRGR\RXH[pect to answer these 
SUD\HUV"´²is part of what a prayer has to be, in order to be authentic. If I knew, if I knew, if 
I was simply expecting an answer, that would be the end of the prayer, that would be an 
RUGHUWKHZD\,RUGHUDSL]]DRN"1R,¶PQRWH[SHFWLQJ$QGP\DVVXPSWLRQLVWKDW,PXVW
give up any expectation, any certainty as to the one, the one or more than one, to whom I 
address this prayer, if this is still a prayer. And, of course, the child is praying for, expecting 
some answer, or expecting some protection, for himself, for life, for his beloved ones, for his 
UHODWLYHVIRUZLIHFKLOGUHQIULHQGVDQGVRRQDQGVRIRUWKEXW,FDQ¶WWHOOLI,DPSUD\LQJ
someone invisible, transcendent one, or if I am praying precisely these other ones in myself 
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that I want to address out of love and for the protection of their lives. ... Now, there is, at the 
same time, some suspension of any expectation, of any economy, any calculation, any 
FDOFXODWLRQ,¶PQRWH[SHFWLQJ,¶PQRWKRSLQJLW¶VDKRSHOHVVSUD\HURQWKHRQHKDQG
totally hopeless, and I think this hopelessness is part of what a prayer should be. And, on the 
other hand, I know there is hope, there is calculation, there is economy, but what sort of 
economy? Is it the economy of the child, or my own economy as an old, old man? ... So, the 
calculation, if there is a calculation, and obviously there is a calculation, despite the 
incalculable hopelessness that I mentioned earlier, there is a calculation. That calculation, if I 
wanted to describe it briefly, would be, would take the following form: I know that praying 
in that way, even if there is no one God, in the form of father, or mother, receiving my 
prayer, I know that by this act of praying in the desert, out of love, out of love, out of love, 
EHFDXVH,ZRXOGQ¶WSUD\RWKHUZLVHVRPHWKLQJPLJKWEHDOUHDG\JRRGLQP\VHOIOLNHD
therapy, I know that, by doing this, I try²not necessarily succeed²but try to affirm and to 
accHSWWRDFFHSWVRPHWKLQJLQP\VHOIZKLFKZRQ¶WGRDQ\KDUPWRDQ\RQHHVSHFLDOO\WRPH
The impression that I, that I do something good to myself ± WKDW¶VDFDOFXODWLRQ± and, by the 
same token, to my beloved ones, if through this prayer, I am a little better in reconciling, 
and, if I give up any calculation, because of this calculation about, around the incalculable, I 
can become better for myself, narcissistically, but, to become better narcissistically, is a way 
of loving in a better way, of being more ORYDEOHIRURXUEHORYHGRQHV6RWKDW¶VD
FDOFXODWLRQLW¶VDFDOFXODWLRQWKDWWULHVWRLQWHJUDWHWKHLQFDOFXODEOH´ 
DA: Where can I find it? 
OF: Ubu.com. They have a lot of interesting stuff there. 
DA: How do you spell it? 
2)µ8¶µ%¶µ8¶ 
'$2¶%ULHn, I was saying. The Third Policeman. It made me think about, no, I thought 
through LWIRUPHLW¶VUHDOO\DSKLORVRSKLFDOWH[WLIDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSKLORVRSK\DQG
OLWHUDWXUHRUDUWLQJHQHUDOKDVDQ\VHQVH,¶PQRWVXUHLWKDVWKURXJKLW,WKRXght about 
pure attention, attention unmixed with impression. We were talking about it earlier on. I said 
WKDWIRUWKHVHQVHVSHUIHFWLRQGRHVQ¶WH[LVW,QWKHERRNWKHUH¶VWKLVVXUUHDOSROLFHPDQ
MacCruiskeen. The following happens to the narrator of the story²,¶OOFDOOKLP³1DU´VLQFH
his name is never mentioned. The policeman takes a spear. He asks Nar to put his hand out. 
+HSXWVWKHVSHDUHYHUFORVHUWR1DU¶VSDOP:KHQWKHSRLQWLVDERXWKDOIDIRRWDZD\1DU
IHHOVDSULFNDQGWKHUH¶VDELWRIEORRG1DU¶VFRQIXVHG,¶PJRLQJWRUHDGDFRXSOHRI
SDVVDJHV0DF&UXLVNHHQ¶VH[SODQDWLRQ7KHSRLQWLV³VLPSO\´YHU\VKDUS³$ERXWDQLQFK
from the end it is so sharp that sometimes ± late at night or on a soft bad day especially ±
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you cannot think of it or try to make it the subject of a little idea because you will hurt your 
ER[ZLWKWKHH[FUXFLDWLRQRILW´%XWLWWXUQVRXWWKDWZKDWJDYH1DUWKHSULFNLVQRWWKH
SRLQW7KHSRLQWLVHYHQWKLQQHU³LWLVVRWKLQWKDWLWFRXOGJRLQWR\RXUKDQGDQGRXWLQWKH 
other extremity externally and you would not feel a bit of it and you would see nothing and 
KHDUQRWKLQJ,WLVVRWKLQWKDWPD\EHLWGRHVQ¶WH[LVWDWDOODQG\RXFRXOGVSHQGKDOIDQKRXU
trying to think about it and you could put no thought around it in WKHHQG´<RXZRXOGQRW
feel it, nor see it, maybe LWGRHVQ¶WH[LVWDWDOO, you could put no thought around it ± only pure 
attention is pierced by it. 
OF: Only attention à vide. 
)(%XWLI\RXFDQ¶WVHHLWKHDULWRUWKLQNLWKRZFDQ\RXSRVVLEO\NQRZ LW¶VWKHUH"$QG
besides, what LVWKHUH":KDW¶VWKLVµSXUH-attention-SLHUFLQJ¶WKLQJ" 
2))RU0DF&UXLVNHHQLW¶VDOZD\VDPDWWHURIWKLQNLQJof something, making something the 
subject of an idea, putting a thought around something.   
FE: So? 
OF: Those preSRVLWLRQVVHHPLPSRUWDQW7KH\PLJKWEHDOHDG,¶PVHHLQJWKLQNLQJDVD
groping hand and the spear as that which the hand is trying to grasp, to get hold of. The hand 
GRHVQ¶WJUDVSWKHVSHDUEXWWKHUH¶VVWLOOWKLQNLQJVWLOOJURSLQJ 
FE: Yes, thinking of the spear! 
OF: No, we are thinking of, and not of the spear: We are thinking of thinking of the spear. 
Nar is thinking of something else, and he knows that what he is thinking of is not the spear.   
FE: So, for Nar, the spear, the object of thought, is a kind of nose-WKXPELQJMHVWHU³1RQR
no, not me! I know you can say LW³VSHDUVSHDUVSHDU´EXWQRWthis spear, this spear is your 
desSDLU´ 
OF: That seems so bleak! 
DA: Yes, Fiona, your jester launches a sarcastic, personal attack on Nar, while, for me, the 
image of the spear suggests impersonal continuity: In thought, the spear gets progressively 
WKLQQHUDOLWWOHWKLQQHUDOLWWOHWKLQQHUXQWLOLW¶VXQWKLQNDEO\WKLQ 
)(7KDW¶VH[DFWO\P\SUREOHP+RZFDQDQ\WKLQJEHXQWKLQNDEOH"7KHZRUGµXQWKLQNDEOH¶
is an oxymoron in disguise, since something truly unthinkable would not be unthinkable at 
all, it would simply not be. The unthinkable is always somehow thinkable. 
OF: Not-to-be is not that easy. The point of the spear is unthinkably thin, but it still is.  
FE: Any proof of its existence? 
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OF: It is causing our mouths to move, for instance. 
)(%XWWKHVSHDULVMXVWDQLGHDLQDERRNLW¶VLPPDWHULDO+RZFRXOGLWFDXVHDQ\WKLQJ" 
2):HOOLW¶VVWLOOWKHEHVWH[SODQDWLRQ,FDQWKLQNRI 
FE: That doeVQ¶WPHDQLW¶VUHDOO\WKHFDXVH 
2):KDWGR\RXPHDQE\µUHDOO\¶" 
'$7KLVFRXOGJRRQIRUHYHU%\WKHZD\WKHHW\PRORJ\RIµR[\PRURQ¶LVoxys µVKDUS¶DQG
moros µVWXSLG¶WKDWLVµR[\PRURQ¶LVDQR[\PRURQDVVD\LQJ³LQWHOOLJHQW-VWXSLG´ 
2)2U³VKDUS-tKLFN´:K\GRZHDVVRFLDWHWKLQNLQJZLWKVKDUSQHVV" 
'$µ$FXWH¶WKDW¶VWKHVDPHLGHD3RLQWHGQHVVµ$FXWH¶DQGµREWXVH¶ 
FE: Perhaps, because thinking is like a sceptic, sorry, like a scalpel, a very sharp scalpel that 
can dissect, I mean, the sharper the scalpel, anyway, you get my point. 
OF: Is your point a thinkable point? 
DA: Your image of the sharp scalpel reminds me of an installation I did, here, in the Project 
6SDFHDZKLOHDJR,PHDVXUHGWKHKDOISRLQWRIWKHURRP¶VOHQJWKDQGRQWKHIORRU,drew 
DOLQHDFURVVWKHZLGWKZLWKDSHUPDQHQWPDUNHU7KHQ,PHDVXUHGRQHKDOI¶VKDOIDQGGUHZ
DQRWKHUOLQHDQGWKHVDPHRQWKDWKDOI¶V-KDOI¶VKDOIDQGVRRQ,VWRSSHGZKHQWKHKDOIJRW
too small to be drawn. Then I put a post-it note on the wall, close to the floor, reading 
³0RYHRQ=HQR´7KHWRUWRLVHEHDWV$FKLOOHVRQO\ZLWKWKHKHOSRI=HQR¶V³VKDUSWKLQNLQJ
VFDOSHO´=HQRNHHSVFDUYLQJHYHUPRUHLQILQLWHVLPDOVOLFHVRIVSDFHDQG$FKLOOHVDVKHJHWV
closer to the tortoise, sinks in the quicksand of infinity.       
)(,VDZWKDWLQVWDOODWLRQ,WKRXJKW\RXZHUHSRNLQJIXQDW=HQR³=HQRZKLOH\RXVLWDQG
SRQGHU\RXU³FOHDYHU´SDUDGR[HVWKHHDUWKJRHVDURXQG$FKLOOHVEHDWVWKHWRUWRLVH
measuring tapes have their limits, markers their thickness, and we've all got something or 
RWKHUWRGRVRPRYHLW´ 
DA: My aim was humour, not mockery.  
FE: Well, with me, you missed your aim. 
'$,FOHDUO\GLG,GRQ¶WWKLQN=HQRZDVWU\LQJWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWPRWLRQGRHVQ¶WH[LVW
Alain, in Éléments de philosophieWDONVDERXW=HQR¶VDUURZSDUDGR[$WDJLYHQLQVWDQWD
³PRYLQJ´DUURZFDQHLWKHUPRYHWRZKHUHLWLVQRWRUPRYHWRZKHUHLWLVLWFDQ¶WPRYHWR
ZKHUHLWLVVLQFHLWLVDOUHDG\WKHUHDQGLWFDQ¶WPRYHWRZKHUHLWLVQ¶WVLQFHDQLQVWDQWLV
like a IUR]HQVQDSVKRW7KHUH¶VQRWHQRXJKWLPHLQDQLQVWDQWIRUPRYHPHQW,QIDFWWKHUH¶V
no time at all.  
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2))URPVSHDUVWRDUURZV:KDWQH[W"$JXQSHUKDSV":KR¶V$ODLQ" 
'$$)UHQFKSKLORVRSKHU+LV³UHDO´QDPHZDV³ePLOH&KDUWLHU´EXWKHLVEHVWNQRZQby 
KLVQLFNQDPH³$ODLQ´+HZDV:HLO¶VSKLORVRSK\WHDFKHU$FFRUGLQJWR$ODLQ=HQRZDV
making the point that movement exists in the realm of thought, as a system of relationships, 
DQGLQWKRXJKWWKHUH¶VQRVLQJOHLQVWDQWEXWDOZD\VUHODWLRQRILQVWDQWs.  
2)$QLQVWDQWLVOLNH0DF&UXLVNHHQ¶VXQWKLQNDEO\WKLQVSHDU¶VSRLQW 
DA: And Alain extends this argument to any object: They are all systems of indivisible 
relationships. Take a cube: A cube has 6 squared sides, 90° angles, and so on. But, when you 
seHDFXEH\RXGRQ¶WVHHWKLV 
OF: So, strictly speaking, nobody has ever seen a cube. 
'$7KDWFRQYH\VWKHLGHDRIDPDWHULDOPDFKLQHGRLQJWKH³UDZVHHLQJ´WKH³QRW-really-
VHHLQJ´DQGDQLPPDWHULDOPLQGGRLQJWKH³VHHLQJSURSHU´$QG,GRQ¶WWKLQN$ODLQ¶V
argument implies this kind of matter-PLQGGXDOLVP7KHUH¶VRQO\one seeing.   
2)<RXGLGVD\³ZKHQ\RXVHHDFXEH\RXGRQ¶WVHH WKLV´ 
'$<RX¶UHULJKW,VKRXOGKDYHVDLG³<RXVHHthis: a system of relationships, a cube, but 
\RXGRQ¶WVHHthese: sqXDUHVDQJOHVHWFVHSDUDWHO\RUXQV\VWHPDWLFDOO\´$ODLQ¶V
system LVDQDORJRXVWR:HLO¶Vweb of necessary relationships, of which attention reveals the 
weave, and she also refers to the example of the cube, which, I think, she ascribes to Jules 
LaJQHDX$ODLQ¶VSKLORVRSK\WHDFKHU 
OF: Achilles is spiralling towards the tortoise-centre, spiralling inwards. 
FE: Ever heard of Duns Deme Tuiuge and Geod Toggdob? 
OF & DA: No. 
FE: In the last issue of the Journal of Recursive Acronyms, there appeared an email 
H[FKDQJHEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRSHUVRQV7KHVXEMHFWZDV³21( 21(QHYHUHQGV´ZKHQFH
the publication in JoRA. 
DA: Are Dan Dean... 
FE: ... Duns Deme Tuiuge and Geod Toggdob... 
DA: ... yes, are they real people? 
FE: The piece came out of nowhere, it seems. 
DA: How can that be? 
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)(,WZDVMXVWSXEOLVKHG,KDYHQ¶WORRNHGLQWRLW,KDSSHQWRKDYHLWZLWKPH,W¶VQRWWKDW
long. It all took place on 12th -XQHEHWZHHQDQG,W¶VTXLWHVDG6KDOO,UHDG
LW"³'HDU'HRJ2QHIHHOVDEsolutely lonely, as if there was no one else. One could say... it 
doesn't matter... one could say..., one could say..., but this is perfectly one's predicament: one 
FDQQRWVD\³WZR´2QHKDVQRVROXWLRQIRUWKLVDQGRQHQHHGVQRsoluWLRQ8QLWHGO\'XQV´
³'HDU'XQV One apologises if one disappoints, but one cannot offer one single two. Sticking 
a one to a one just won't do: one ends up with a monstrosity. This could possibly be the most 
VWHULOHGLDORJXHRQHFDQLPDJLQH/RQHO\'HRJ´³'HDU'HRJ7KHLPDJHRIWKH2QHone 
monster is frightful and one seeks refuge in the hope that it be nonsense. Deog, is one one, or 
is one one? One is so confused. But there's only one one, so one is The One! Onely and only, 
'XQV´³'HDU'XQVOne is one. Is one One too? There's only one One and one is That One! 
6ROHO\´³RQHRQRQH RQHQRRQHRQHDQGRQH DQRQHGRQH21( 21(QHYHUHQGV 
ONE never ends never ends = ONE never ends never ends never ends = ONE never ends 
QHYHUHQGVQHYHUHQGVQHYHUHQGV[´ 
DA: Could you photocopy it for me? 
FE: Sorry, but I'd rather not. The subscribers are so few that the journal is financially 
struggling, and photocopying kills small journals. 
2),LPDJLQHLW¶VDVPDOOQLFKH 
)($QGWKHVXEVFULSWLRQIHHGRHVQ¶WKHOS 
DA: Is it very expensive? 
FE: 7KHILUVW\HDULW¶VIUHH7KHVHFRQG\HDULW¶V 
'$7KDW¶VQRWYHU\PXFK 
FE: The third, again £1. The fourth, £2. Then, £3, £5, £8, £13, £21, £34, £55, £89, and so on. 
%\WKHWLPH\RXJHWWROHW¶VVD\WKHWZHQW\-ILUVW\HDULW¶V 
DA: Ah! Fibonacci! 
OF:  Spiralling outwards, and fast. 
FE: Yes. I appreciate the coherence of JoRAEXWEHFDXVHRIWKLVPRVWSHRSOHGRQ¶WUHQHZ
their subscription after the tenth year. There are a few exceptions, of course. The longest-
standing subscriber was a certain Clive Surrey. 40 years. He was very wealthy, but he finally 
reached his limit: £63,245,896.   
2),UHJUHWWRVD\WKDW,¶YHUHDFKP\WLPHOLPLW,PXVWJR 
)(7LPH¶VDUURZNHHSVPRYLQJ,PXVWJRWRR 
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DA: Good talking to you. 
OF: Good or good enough?  
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